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' 



AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 



•The 




THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO • DALLAS 
ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN & CO., Limited 

LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. 

TORONTO 



AN INTRODUCTION TO 
PHILOSOPHY 



BY 



ORLIN OTTMAN FLETCHER 

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN FURMAN 
UNIVERSITY 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
1913 

^11 rights reserved 



^<i 



13-l'i^l'i 



Copyright, 1913, 
By the MACMILLAN COMPANY. 



Set up and electro typed. Published June, 1913. 



NorfajDoli Press ^^ 

J. S. Gushing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co. '^jf 

Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. 



©CI.A.'547747 



V 



PREFACE 

This Introduction is a product of the classroom. It 
originated in a desire to outline an undergraduate year in 
Philosophy that would be both critical and constructive. 

The History of Philosophy affords a natural introduc- 
tion to the problems with which this discipline deals. 
It acquaints the student with the questions considered 
by those who have determined the course of reflective 
thought, and it reveals their attitudes and modes of ap- 
proach. It also furnishes him with developed statements 
of philosophical problems, and discovers to him the ad- 
vance made in their solution. In thus tracing the devel- 
opment of the Science of Sciences, the student grasps the 
significance of philosophical activity. This course is also 
preeminently fitted to develop the critical interest and 
aptness which are essential to the framing of worthy 
philosophical conceptions. But the results have led 
many to doubt the wisdom of limiting the undergraduate 
to the History of Philosophy. Most students whose only 
acquaintance with Philosophy has been made through a 
historical study of it, are merely critical. Many become 
philosophic sceptics ; and most of those who retain some 
philosophic faith are sadly confused. 

On the other hand, if the history of reflective thought 
be ignored and the student be immediately introduced to 
a completed statement and solution of these problems, he 
fails to get what the history alone furnishes. This alter- 
native course tends to a blind acceptance of the views 
held by the teacher; and the resultant dogmatism pre- 



vi PREFACE 

vents the development of the philosophic spirit and the 
attainment of a philosophic vision. 

I sought a course which would be critically construc- 
tive, one in which the student would become acquainted 
with the great thinkers of the past and their thought, in 
which he would also be led to a solution of the main 
problems. A certain end influenced my choice of ap- 
proach and presentation. It is agreed that the teacher 
of Philosophy is not to aim to give his students informa- 
tion concerning Philosophy and philosophers ; he should 
induce them to philosophize. He and they are not to 
read and think and talk about Philosophy ; the students 
are to be incited to think critically and constructively of 
themselves and the world of persons and things and his- 
tory. Up to the measure of his ability the student is to 
become a philosopher; and, in endeavoring to secure 
this, we are to keep in mind the fact that a true Philoso- 
phy is not a mere theory of the universe, it is a personal 
relating of the Self to all that is. 

These considerations led me several years since to out- 
line the course herein presented. Lectures, classroom 
discussions, and the criticisms of friends have determined 
the filling in of the outline. At the urgency of persons 
who were acquainted with the results, it was offered for 
publication. 

Frankly, I have a philosophical doctrine, and that doc- 
trine determines the treatment given the questions and 
opinions which are considered. My point of view is that 
of Objective Idealism. Reality, in its epistemological 
relation, is conceived as being with meaning; In its onto- 
loglcal relation, as active being; "active" being here used 
with the meaning assigned it on page 187. In a word. 
Reality is regarded as cognizable and immanently active. 
I also distinguish between a "totality" and "a true 



PREFACE 



Vll 



whole." A totality, being an aggregation, lacks the one- 
ness which is essential to a unitary whole. In dealing 
with the categories, I have followed a pedagogical order ; 
but weighty reasons may be advanced in favor of pre- 
senting them in the logical order of their development. 

I owe a great debt of gratitude to Dr. J. E. Creighton, 
of Cornell University. He gave time to the reading of 
my manuscript, and his suggestions and criticisms have 
been invaluable. I would also acknowledge aid rendered 
by Dr. A. H. Jones, of Brown University. But I alone 
am responsible for what is justly open to adverse criti- 
cism. The list of references which follows the text gives 
the names of a few among the many authors to whom I 
am under obligation. I owe much to authors from whose 
philosophic doctrines I feel compelled to dissent; natu- 
rally few of these appear in that list. But for my wife's 
encouragement, the publication of this work would not 
have been undertaken; but for her constant assistance, 
this Introduction could not have been brought to comple- 
tion. She has looked up references, criticised statements, 
read proofs, and prepared the Index. 

O. O. F. 

Greenville, South Carolina, 
June, 1913. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PART I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY 

PAGE 

§ I. Ourselves and the World I 

§ 2. Experience and Philosophy 2 

§ 3. Subject and Object 4 

§ 4. Subjective and Objective 5 

§ 5. The Problem in Philosophy 6 

§ 6. Philosophic Material 8 

PART II. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 

CHAPTER XL PREFATORY 

§ 7. Purpose of this Sketch 11 

§ 8. General Divisions of Philosophy 12 

DIVISION A. ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY 

CHAPTER HI. GENERAL VIEW; PRE-SOCRATIC 
PHILOSOPHY 

§ 9. General View of Ancient Philosophy 14 

§§ 10-12. Pre-Socratic Philosophy 15 

§ II. Particular Doctrines 16 

§ 12. Summary . . . . , . . . . .21 

CHAPTER IV. THE SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY 

§ 13. Socrates 22 

§ 14. Plato 25 

§ 15. Aristotle 30 

§ 16. Teleology in this Philosophy 37 

ix 



X TABLE OF CONTENTS 

CHAPTER V. GR^CO-ROMAN AND NEO-PLATONIC 
PHILOSOPHIES 

PAGE 

§§ 17, 18. The Grseco-Roman Philosophy 39 

§§ 19, 20. The Neo-Platonic Philosophy 43) 44 

§ 21. Point of View and Doctrines at the Close of the Ancient Phi- 
losophy 45 

DIVISION B. MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY 

CHAPTER VI. GENERAL VIEW; PATRISTIC AND 
SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHIES 

§ 22. General View of Mediaeval Philosophy ..... 47 

§§ 23-25. The Patristic Philosophy 48 

§ 24. Period of Growth 49 

§25. Period of Decline 51 

§§ 26-28. The Scholastic Philosophy 51 

§§ 26, 27. General View of this Philosophy . . . 5i> 53 

§ 28. The Platonic Period 54 

CHAPTER VII. SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY {Continued); 
TIME OF TRANSITION 

§§ 29-32. The Scholastic Philosophy {Continued) .... 56 
§§ 29, 30. The Aristotelian Period . . . . . • 56 
§§ 31* 32' The Period of Separation 59> 60 

§§ ZZf 34- The Transition 61 

§ 35. Summary of Mediaeval Philosophy 62 

DIVISION C. MODERN PHILOSOPHY 

CHAPTER VIII. GENERAL VIEW OF MODERN 
PHILOSOPHY 

§ 36. Introductory 65 

§ 37. Schools in Modern Philosophy 69 

CHAPTER IX. SUBSTANTIALISTS AND EARLY 
EMPIRICISTS 

§§ 38* 39- The Substantialists 70 

§§ 40, 41. The Early Empiricists 76, 77 



TABLE OF CONTENTS xi 

CHAPTER X. IDEALISTIC RATIONALISTS 

PAGE 

§ 42. Idealism Defined 81 

§ 43. Historical . . . 82 

§ 44. Kant 83 

CHAPTER XI. IDEALISTIC RATIONALISTS {Continued) 

§ 45. Fichte 95 

§ 46. Schelling 98 

§ 47. Hegel .... 100 

CHAPTER XII. REALISTIC RATIONALISTS AND LATER 

EMPIRICISTS 

§ 48. Realism Defined 109 

§ 49. Realistic Rationalism : History and Doctrines . . .110 

§ 50. General View of Empiricism . . . ... .113 

§51. Doctrines of Later Empiricists , . . . • ^'S 

CHAPTER XIII. PHILOSOPHY TO-DAY 
§52. Questions settled; Points of Difference 118 

CHAPTER XIV. THE PROVINCE OF PHILOSOPHY 

§ 53. Historical 122 

§ 54. The Plain Man and the Scientist 123 

§ 55. Science and Philosophy 124 

§ 56. Descriptive and Normative Sciences . . . . .126 

PART III. ELEMENTS OF GENERAL 
PHILOSOPHY 

CHAPTER XV. EXPERIENCE 

§ 57. Standpoints of Psychology and Philosophy Distinguished . 128 

§ 58. Dual Aspect of Experience 132 

§ 59. Characteristics of Consciousness and Experience . . . 134 



-tft; 



xii TABLE OF CONTENTS 

DIVISION A. COGNITION AND REALITY; EPISTEMOLOGY 
CHAPTER XVI. SCEPTICISM 

PAGE 

§ 60. Historical 140 

§61. Purpose of this Study 141 

§ 62. Grounds of Doubt 141 

§ 63. Scepticism Examined 144 

§ 64. Conclusion . 149 

CHAPTER XVII. SOLIPSISM 

§ 65. The Doctrine Stated ' . 150 

§66. Purpose of this Study 151 

§ 67. Exposition of Solipsism ........ 152 

§68. Examination of Solipsism 153 

§ 69. Conclusions 155 

CHAPTER XVIII. APPEARANCE AND REALITY; 
PHENOMENALISM 

§ 70. The Question Stated 157 

§ 71. Doctrine Criticised: Appearance is a Seeming, back of which 
there is a Reality; we know Appearance, Reality remains 
unknown . . . . . . . . . • ^59 

§ 72. Doctrine Criticised: Appearances are Illusory; we know Ap- 
pearances, Reality cannot be known . . . .161 

§ 73. Shall we discard the Concept Reality ? . . . . .166 

§ 74. Conclusions , . . . . . . . , .169 

CHAPTER XIX. APPEARANCE AND REALITY; 
PHENOMENALISM {Continued) 

§ 75. Appearance is Reality Expressed . . . . . '171 

§ 76. The Apparent and the Real . . . . . . -173 

§77. Sources of Error in Perception; Conclusion . . . • 175 

CHAPTER XX. REALITY 

§78. Kinds of Reality 179 

§ 79. Degrees of Reality . 180 

§ 80. Reality as the Universal in Experience 181 



TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii 



§ 8i. The Nature of Reality i86 

§ 82. Reality expressed only in the Subject-Object Relation . .188 

CHAPTER XXI. IS THE COGNITIVE EXPERIENCE 

RESOLUBLE ? 

§ S^. What the Resolution of Cognitive Experience Signifies . .190 

§ 84. Why Cognition is thus Analyzed 191 

§85. Attempt to resolve Cognitive Experience Criticised . . . 192 

§ 86. Is a State of Consciousness the Primary Object in Cognition ? 197 

§ 87. The Kantian Limitation of Knowledge 203 

§ 88. Summary 205 

CHAPTER XXII. TRI-PHASAL CHARACTER OF 
COGNITIVE ACTIVITY 

§ 89. Historical 207 

§ 90. Consciousness is Unitary 209 

§ 91. Feeling and Will involved in Cognition , . . . .211 

§ 92. Cognition characteristically a Thought Process , . .213 

CHAPTER XXIII. A CONSTRUCTIVE STUDY OF 
COGNITION 



§ 93. A Review 

§ 94. The Universal in Experience and Cognition . 

§ 95. Concepts, Objective Reality, and Cognition 

§ 96. " Identity in Difference " and Cognition 

§ 97. The Particulars of Experience organically Related 

§ 98. Conclusions; Questions answered . 



215 
216 

218 

222 

225 

228 



DIVISION B. THE CATEGORIES AND REALITY; 
ONTOLOGY 

CHAPTER XXIV. GENERAL VIEW OF THE CATEGORIES 

§ 99. Introductory 234 

§ 100. Historical 235 

§ loi. The Categories and Reality 238 

§ 102. Characteristics of the Categories » . . . . . 241 

§ 103. Conclusions .... 242 



XIV 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



CHAPTER XXV. RELATIONS IN GENERAL 



§ 104. Characteristics of Relation 

§ 105. Thought is mediated by Relation . 

§ 106. Relation and Reality .... 

§ 107. As to Externality or Internality of Relations 

§ 108. Objects modified by Relation 

§ 109. The Ground of Relation 

§ no. Conclusions 



PAGE 

243 
244 

245 
246 

249 
252 
252 



CHAPTER XXVI. PERMANENCE AND CHANGE 

§ III. Introductory 

§ 112. Historical 

§ 113. Is Permanence Actual ? 

§ 114. Change, Permanence, and Reality .... 
§ 115. Conclusions 



254 
254 

255 
256 

257 



CHAPTER XXVII. INDIVIDUALITY 



§ 116. An Individual Object .... 

§ 117. Individuality as determined by the Subject 

§ 118. Individuality as determined by the Object 

§119. Conclusions . . . ' . 



259 
260 
261 
262 



CHAPTER XXVIII. SUBSTANTIALITY 



§ 120. Origin of this Category . . . . 

§ 121. Historical ...... 

§ 122. Substance and Substrate 

§ 123. Substance and the Primary Qualities 

§ 124. Substance and the Totality of Qualities. 

§125. Substantiality and Reality 

§ 126. Conclusions 



263 
265 
271 

273 
274 

275 
277 



CHAPTER XXIX. QUALITY 



§ 127. Quality and Object 

§128. Chararacteristics of Quality 

§ 129. Quality and Reality 

§ 130. Conclusions . 



278 
279 
281 
282 



TABLE OF CONTENTS xv 

CHAPTER XXX. QUANTITY 

PAGE 

§ 131. Introductory 283 

§ 132. Characteristics of Number 284 

§ 133. Characteristics of Measure .......' 285 

§ 134. Real and Ideational Number 286 

§ 135. Quantity and Reality 288 

§ 136. Conclusions 289 

CHAPTER XXXI. SPACE 

§ 137. Characteristics of Perceptual Space Experience . . . 291 

§ 138. What Perceptual Space Is 292 

§ 139. Direction .......... 294 

§ 140. Conceptual Space 294 

§ 141. Is Space infinitely Divisible and infinitely Extended ? . . 296 

§ 142. Space and Reality 297 

§ 143. Non-spatial, or Trans-spatial, Reality ..... 298 

§ 144. Conclusions . 299 

CHAPTER XXXII. TIME 

§ 145. Characteristics of Perceptual Time ..... 301 

§ 146. Conceptual Time ......... 303 

§ 147. Is Time infinitely Divisible and Extended ? . . . . 305 

§ 148. Time and Reality 306 

§ 149. The Non-temporal or Trans-temporal 307 

§ 150. Conclusions .......... 309 

CHAPTER XXXIII. ACTIVITY, REST, AND MOTION 

§ 151. Activity . . . 31 1 

§ 152. Transeunt Activity 312 

§ 153. Rest .... 313 

§ 154. Motion 314 

§ 155. Conclusions .......... 316 

CHAPTER XXXIV. CAUSALITY 

§ 156. Origin of the Idea of Cause 318 

§ 157. Conceptions of Cause . . 321 

§ 158. Phenomenal Cause . , . , * , . . 322 



XVI 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



§ 159. • Is Phenomenal Cause Adequate? 

§ 160. The Na!ve Metaphysical Conception of Cause 

§ 161. Is the Naive Metaphysical Conception Adequate ? 

§ 162. The Complete Ground ...... 

§ 163. Conclusions 



326 
330 
332 
333 
335 



CHAPTER XXXV. FINALITY 

§ 164. Finality in Individual Experience 338 

§ 165. Finality in Historical Sources ...... 339 

§ 166. Finality in the Development of Science .... 340 

§ 167. Finality in Ethical and ^sthetical Relations . . . 340 

§ 168. Directivity 341 

§ 169. Finality and Non-living Individua ..... 343 

§170. Self-determination the Highest Form of Activity . . . 345 

§ 171. Finality and Reality 346 

§ 172. Conclusions 348 

CHAPTER XXXVI. INDIVIDUALITY AND PERSONALITY 

§ 173. Individuality and Personality 350 



CHAPTER XXXVII. SOCIALITY; SUMMARY OF 
CONCLUSIONS 

§ 1 74. The Solitary Self and the Social Self .... 

§175. The Social Self is the Real Self 

§ 176. Social Reciprocity and the Development of the Individual 

§ 177. Conclusions from our Study of Sociality 

§ 178. Conclusions from our Study of the Categories 



355 
356 

359 
360 
361 



PART IV. HUMAN FREEDOM AND THE 
EXISTENCE OF GOD 



CHAPTER XXXVIII. HUMAN FREEDOM 

§ 179. The Problem 363 

§ 180. Kinds of Freedom ........ 364 

§ 181. Theories Stated 367 

§ 182. Historical .....•».. . 369 



TABLE OF CONTENTS xvli 

PAGE 

§183. Phases of Consciousness immediately related to Volition . 370 

§ 184. Conditions of Psychical Freedom 373 

§ 185. Character . 375 

CHAPTER XXXIX. HUMAN FREEDOM (^Continued) 

§ 186. Indeterminism Criticised ....... 379 

§ 187. In Favor of Determinism 380 

§ 188. Determinism Criticised 384 

§ 189. Self-determinism 387 

§ 190. Perfect Freedom . . 391 

CHAPTER XL. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 

§ 191. Introductory 393 

§ 192. The Religious Consciousness ...... 394 

§ 193. The Religious Consciousness Evaluated .... 399 

§ 194. Conclusion 404 

References 406 

Index 413 



INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

PART I 

GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTORY 

§ I. Ourselves and the World. — We find ourselves in 
a world where there are things and other persons, and 
where events occur. We have dealings with these per- 
sons and things, and we have part in some events and 
take interest in others. Life is very real. We are real, 
and the outer world and all that is in it are real. This 
fact of the reality of ourselves and all that is about us has 
been impressed upon us by the experiences we have had 
in our intercourse with persons and our handling of things. 
We have found that, if we would succeed in our under- 
takings, we must recognize the reality of that with which 
we have to do, and we must adapt ourselves to its way of 
behaving; and we are certain that, if we should ignore 
the reality of the world and its happenings and the way 
things and persons behave, we would invite trouble, if not 
disaster. 

Through the experiences which have impressed us with 
the reality of ourselves and the world, we have come to 
personal and practical acquaintance with ourselves and 
with what is other than self. We have learned something 
of the meaning for us of events and things and persons, 



2 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

something of their meaning for life. Our knowledge is 
not complete, neither is it always exact. Experience dis- 
covers to us the incompleteness and inexactness of our 
knowledge and enables us to enlarge and correct it. We 
recognize that the man of careful thought^'and extended 
practical acquaintance with the world and its affairs is 
the man whose opinion is of most value ; it is most likely 
to be correct. This is illustrated in the value which we 
assign to the judgment of the lawyer or the physician of 
wide reading and large practice, assuming that he is also 
a man who judges his experiences critically. In a word, 
reflection upon what has come to us in our commerce 
with the world of nature and persons and happenings, i.e. 
a thoughtful reasoned consideration of our experiences, 
tends to accurate knowledge. |' In this day of general edu- 
cation, the knowledge of most persons is to no small 
degree systematized. It is because their knowledge of 
numbers is to some extent systematized, that the mer- 
chant and the farmer are able to calculate the value of 
goods and produce. The knowledge of the scientist, like 
that of all others, comes through his experiences ; but it 
differs in some particulars from the knowledge of those 
who have not pursued critical studies. It comes more 
largely from reflection upon experiences ; and it is more 
extended, more exact, and better systematized. 

Summary: Our intercourse with persons and things 
gives us experience. Experience impresses us with the 
reality of the world and ourselves and life, and furnishes 
us with the content of our consciousness — our feelings 
and our knowledge. Through it we develop skill in think- 
ing and doing ; and our more exact knowledge comes of 
the reasoned consideration of our experiences. 

§ 2. Experience and Philosophy. — We have seen that 
we come to assurance of the reality of the world and to 



INTRODUCTORY 3 

knowledge of it, through experience. The question we 
have now to consider is, What does Philosophy, as dis- 
tinguished from other forms of thought, find in experience ? 
To this we can only give a general answer at this point. 
This book, as a whole, is little more than the beginning 
of an answer to this question. An illustration will help 
us to recognize what is peculiar to Philosophy in its view 
of experience. You hear a confused noise, you look in the 
direction of the sound and see a runaway horse bearing 
down upon you, you are filled with fear and flee to shelter. 
Let us see what Psychology, a science closely allied to 
Philosophy, will do with this. Speaking in very general 
terms, we may say that the Psychologist will note the 
auditory sensation and the localization of the source of 
the sound, then the visual sensation and the localization 
of the object, then the instinctive fear and the motor 
reaction in running to shelter. He would distinguish 
much more, but this will answer our purpose. For him, 
this experience is a process, or rather a series of processes. 
Philosophy, on the other hand, notes three character- 
istics of this experience which are of special moment for 
reflective thought. First, you are certain of the reality 
of what you heard and saw and fled from, and of yourself 
as seeing, fearing, and fleeing. Philosophy deals with 
this fact of reality ; and what it has to say concerning it 
will appear in our further study. The second character- 
istic of this experience is that you interpreted what you 
heard and saw, that you discovered meaning in it for your- 
self. What you were conscious of was not merely some 
sounds and an extended patch of color moving toward 
you ; but that a runaway horse was bearing down upon 
you. The perception of meaning was an element of the 
seeing and hearing. Philosophy deals with this fact of 
knowing. What it has to say about it will appear farther 



4 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

on. Just here we wish to emphasize another characteristic 
of this experience. This characteristic is that the ex- 
perience as a whole, and in every stage of it, has two con- 
trasted aspects. You hear the sound and refer it to 
something apart from you ; you see something and refer 
what you see, and your fear, to what is not you ; and 
you run to some place which is shelter for you. In these 
experiences, the hearing, the seeing, the fearing, and the 
idea of shelter have each of them two references ; one of 
them to you, the other to something which is not you. 
These two references are two aspects of one experience. 
Every experience has these contrasted references, or 
aspects. Later we shall have more to say about this. 
What we wish to do here is to call attention to this char- 
acteristic of experience as a cardinal fact for Philosophy. 
Philosophy has not always taken account of this fact, 
nevertheless it has affected all philosophic thought, except 
possibly the earliest. 

Summary : An experience is a selected whole of con- 
sciousness ; it may be regarded as a process in conscious- 
ness, or as content of consciousness. An experience has 
two aspects ; it is a unitary consciousness with duality 
of reference, a reference to the self and a reference to some- 
thing to which the self is giving attention. Philosophy 
is the reasoned consideration of experience, as experience. 

§ 3. Subject and Object. — An experience reduced 
to its simplest form may be stated in one of three ways : 
" I know something, I do something, or I feel somehow." 
It is evident that in each of these there is a self who ex- 
periences and something in respect of which he has the 
experience. This agrees with what was said about the 
two aspects of experience. The self who experiences is 
the Subject; that in relation with which the subject has 
the experience is the Object. Our experiences come of 



INTRODUCTORY 5 

our giving attention to objects. In the first two forms, — 
" I know something," and " I do something," — the object 
appears as something which is other than the subject; 
it is trans-subjective — i.e. beyond the subject. In 
the other form, " I feel somehow," the subject directs 
his thought toward himself as feeling; that is, he makes 
himself the object. We do this whenever we give atten- 
tion to ourselves, as when we say, " I know myself," or 
" I feel disturbed." There are other experiences which 
appear to be like these last named, though they really 
differ from them. Examples are at hand in experiences 
that may be stated thus : " I know what he thinks of it," 
and " I can picture the river-bank." In the first of these 
just given, the subject has an idea, or a thought, for his 
object; in the second, his object is a mental image. 

One may also have experiences that would be expressed 
in these words : " I am glad," and " I saw a beautiful 
house." The " gladness " has its existence in you ; you 
are the subject of the " gladness." The " beauty " is of 
the " house " ; the " house " is the subject of the " beauty." 
The subject is that to which the state or quality pertains. 

Summary : The subject is the self who experiences ; or 
that to which a state or quality pertains. The object is 
that in relation with which the subject has an experience, 
or that toward which the subject directs his thought. 
The subject may make himself, an idea, or a mental image, 
his object. 

§ 4. Subjective and Objective. — Our personal ex- 
periences belong peculiarly to ourselves. You cannot have 
my headache. You determine to write a letter ; that ex- 
perience, as a purpose, is yours. Another may have a 
similar experience, but he cannot have yours. These 
experiences are in a sense " private property." Looked 
at thus, experiences are Subjective ; they are in the subject 



6 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

and of the subject. In contrast with this " private prop- 
erty " in experience, we have " public property " for ex- 
perience. The world of nature, the events of history, 
literary remains, and current happenings, are objects 
for all of us just as they are for each of us. Some of us 
may get more from them than others, but they are there 
for all of us. What is " public property " for experience 
is said to be Objective. You picture the face of an absent 
friend by visual memory ; or you recall a symphony which 
you have heard, by auditory memory. These mental im- 
ages are subjective in so far as they are in you and of you ; 
but, inasmuch as you direct your thought to them, they 
are at the same time objective. What is in experience is 
subjective; what is for experience, is objective. 

§ 5. The Problem in Philosophy. — The purpose of any 
particular line of study determines the point of view, the 
choice of material, and the method. The geographer and 
the geologist both study the earth ; but they have different 
ends in view and, as a consequence, they differ in their 
selection of material. We have seen that Psychology and 
Philosophy differ in their study of consciousness ; this 
difference arises from the difference in the tasks they set 
for themselves. The important question for us at this 
point in our study is. What is the task which is under- 
taken by Philosophy ? All exact knowledge is attained by 
critical and systematic study of what comes to us in our 
experiences ; and we have concluded that Philosophy studies 
experience, as experience. Our present question, then, is, 
What does Philosophy seek in its study of experience t 

We say that the world as a whole is real and that the 
persons and things which are in it are real ; but what is it 
to be real .? Shall we say that what we can measure and 
weigh and what we can see and touch is real, and that 
what we cannot see and touch is not real } Is reality 



INTRODUCTORY 7 

always " lumpish," or is there reality which does not 
occupy space ? If ideas are as real as houses and trees, 
have we two kinds of reality, one that fills space and another 
that does not ? If so, what is the relative value for us of 
that which fills space and that which does not ? Which 
is most important for us, that we accumulate the things 
which can be measured and weighed or that we develop 
our minds and have right purposes ? Or we may ask. Is 
the world which we know the real world, or is it only a 
shadow or sign of the real world ? These questions are 
not prompted by idle curiosity ; they are asked because 
we wish to know just what we are and what those actu- 
alities are with which we are dealing day by day. It is 
important also that we attain to positive and correct 
answers to these inquiries. In fact, we have, each of us, 
already answered them, in part at least. We have certain 
notions respecting things and man, certain ideas as to 
their make-up and what they are for. Are these notions 
valid } Do they accord with reality ^ This is not a mere 
debate about words. Our belief as to what we are and 
as to what the world of things and other persons is, affects 
our thoughts and feelings and purposes. It determines 
the value we give to things. If to be real is to fill space, 
and if what does not fill space is not real, we will naturally 
put highest value on what is material ; and our ability 
to think will be valued only because it is a means for ac- 
quiring things. Our conception of what man is and of 
what he is for will certainly influence our thinking and our 
doing ; it will determine our attitude toward the questions 
of the day. We have questionings and fears, longings and 
hopes. These doubts, aspirations, and assurances have 
their origin and their support in our notions of the world 
and ourselves, in our conception of what is essential 
to the reality of man and things. We repeat that most. 



8 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

If not all, of us have arrived at some kind of an answer 
to these questions ; but our conclusions are of doubtful 
worth, because they are not the result of critical and sys- 
tematic study. Philosophy seeks a positive and valid 
answer to these inquiries. Philosophers wish to know the 
nature of the reality in us and in things and the true 
significance of life for us. In short, Philosophy seeks to 
give an exact and systematic account of the essential 
nature of all that is. 

§ 6. Philosophic Material. — We have concluded that 
Philosophy is the reasoned consideration of experience. 
From this it naturally follows that all particulars of ex- 
perience are material for Philosophy. Each of us has 
such material in his own consciousness — in his feelings 
and instincts, in his thought of himself and the universe, 
in all that he has felt and purposed. But we are not 
confined to our private experiences ; we may know the 
experience of others. Men are constantly giving expres- 
sion to their experience. We hear it in conversation, we 
find it in their writings, it is embodied in their art. Litera- 
ture, art, and religious ceremonies and beliefs are expres- 
sions of the conception of the universe and man and life 
had by authors, artists, and worshipers ; and they are 
therewith expressions of what these men themselves were. 
In fact, all the activities of men are expressions of experi- 
ence ; and the products of these activities record the 
thoughts and longings and hopes of men ; and so far as 
they do this they are material for Philosophy. Some- 
times men are subject to illusions, and many of their con- 
ceptions are doubtless incorrect, and the best are incom- 
plete ; but these illusions and misconceptions are ex- 
perience facts and are, therefore, philosophic material. 
Erroneous views and gross superstitions are oftentimes 
significant material for the philosopher. The tested and 



INTRODUCTORY 9 

assured findings of scientific investigation are of great 
value. So, too, are the views which have been held by 
men who have studied the world and man most critically 
and who have greatly affected the thought of their time. 
Of still greater value are the reasonings and teachings of 
those who have influenced thought long after their own age. 
All this material comes of commerce with the world of 
persons, things, and events, and of thought respecting 
the world and reflection upon It and ourselves. We con- 
clude, then, that the universe, what It contains, and all 
Ideas respecting the universe, its events, and ourselves 
are material for Philosophy. 

But, inasmuch as Philosophy would give an exact 
account of experience, the philosopher may not assign like 
value to all the Items In this vast store of material. To 
be exact, we must be critical ; and, while all the material 
has some value, the particulars are of unequal worth. 
The peach tree bearing fruit yields fuller information as to 
what a peach tree Is than the young tree just appearing 
aboveground. The thoughts and purposes of primitive 
man, as evidenced by the way he lived and what he did, 
are of value for the study of man ; but the activities of 
civilized man present a completer and, therefore, a more 
valuable embodiment of human experience. What Is 
Important for the understanding of one age, and therefore 
important for a true understanding of man, may be of 
little importance if we are studying man in another age. 
It Is also possible that what at first may seem to be of 
great value, will be found to be relatively valueless ; and 
that what Is apparently trivial may prove to have great 
significance. We must be careful In our evaluation of 
material. 

Our account Is to be systematic, otherwise it will not 
be exact. This will require that the particulars of the 



lo INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

material shall be carefully classified, and that the items 
shall be set in an orderly relation to each other and to the 
whole. If we would know the significance of any organ 
of the body, we must study it in its relation to the other 
organs and to the body as a whole. To get a true con- 
ception of the meaning of a finger, it must be studied in 
its relation to the other fingers, to the hand, and to the 
arm. In fact, we need to discern its part in making the 
hand an efficient instrument and in conserving life. It is 
not sufficient that the conclusions of philosophic study 
shall be organized into a system; but it is antecedently 
necessary that our material shall be organized, each part 
being set in right relation to the others and to the whole ; 
for only thus can we perceive what each item signifies. 

Summary : The task of Philosophy is to discover the 
essential nature of all that is and to give a systematic 
statement of its findings. In order to this, it is required 
to furnish a systematic and reasoned justification of its 
findings and of the course of thought by which it attains 
these conclusions. All human experience is philosophic 
material. The critical use of this material calls for a 
judicious classification and evaluation of the material, 
and for the careful and exact relating of the various partic- 
ulars to each other and to the whole. The real signifi- 
cance of an experiential fact can only be discovered when 
it is studied in its relations. 



PART II 

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER H 

PREFATORY 

§ 7. Purpose of this Historical Sketch. — Our purpose 
in this sketch is to take advantage of the work done by 
those who have preceded us. Much has been accomplished 
by men who have thought upon the great questions dis- 
cussed in Philosophy — the universe, whence it came, 
and what it is ; man, his origin, nature, and destiny. 
The records which preserve their discussions constitute 
a great storehouse of philosophic material ; but what they 
hand down to us is of such a character that it can only 
be rightly valued and efficiently used if we shall trace its 
development. In following the course of its development, 
certain facts will become evident. We shall see that upon 
the whole there has been steady advance. At times, 
progress will appear to halt ; at some points, it may even 
look as though the movement were backward. But such 
halting and such backward movement are more apparent 
than real, and are only temporary. We shall discover that 
some questions have been settled. We shall also perceive 
that there are three great topics for thought : — 

(i) The Object, i.e. the world of nature and history, of 
persons and things and events — all that is not the Self ; 

II 



12 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

(2) The Subject who is conscious of the object and of 
Self; 

(3) The Religious Consciousness with what it signifies. 
These are not always, all of them, distinctly treated in the 
Philosophy of every people and period ; but philosophic 
thought — and, in fact, the thought of all men — is con- 
stantly related, directly or indirectly, to these topics. We 
shall likewise learn how Philosophy has defined itself, its 
problem, and its province ; and we can note incidentally 
how it has approached its task and what are some of its 
conclusions. 

The limitations of this Introduction will require that 
we limit our sketch. We shall, therefore, confine it to 
what will best serve to introduce us to a study of the main 
problems of Philosophy. The observance of this limita- 
tion will result in the omission of much that is of itself 
interesting and valuable. For example, the questions 
immediately related to the religious consciousness will 
only be referred to in passing, except in the instance of 
the Medieval Philosophy. The study of the religious 
consciousness, though of the highest importance, must 
otherwise be left until later. 

§ 8. General Divisions. — The most general classifica- 
tion of philosophic thought is into Oriental and Occidental 
(or Western). 

I. Oriental Philosophy. — The Oriental peoples — Bab- 
ylonians, Hebrews, Egyptians, Persians, and others — 
gave the religious feelings dominance in reflection. This 
is true also of the Hindu philosophies, which survive even 
to-day. The earlier Chinese thought was distinctly re- 
ligious ; but under the influence of Confucius it became 
ethical rather than religious. Because of the dominance 
of the religious feelings and purpose, some would regard 
the thought under consideration as not in any true sense 



PREFATORY 13 

philosophic. But Its literature evidences a thoughtful 
consideration of the origin, nature, and destiny of the uni- 
verse and man; and this is philosophizing thought even 
though it lacks cogency and system. As familiar in- 
stances, we may name the Brahmanic, Buddhistic, Zoro- 
astrlan, and Hebrew literature. The philosophic charac- 
ter of the thought of portions of the Bible Is evident. As 
examples we may refer to the Books of Job and Ecclesiastes, 
and to some of the Psalms. 

2. The Poetic Period of Western Philosophy. — The 
early Philosophy which Is of special value to us is the 
Western. In its earliest, or Poetic, period it corresponds 
to the Oriental In the prominence which it gives to the 
religious conceptions and in its not being distinctively 
systematic. In the writings of Homer, Heslod, and Phere- 
cydes, we find the answers of the thought of their day to 
the questions raised by reflection upon man's experiences. 
They furnish accounts of the origin of the gods, and at- 
tempt is made to explain the origin of the cosmos (or 
orderly universe). 

3. Western Philosophy Proper. — About 600 B.C. 
Western reflective thought became somewhat critical 
and systematic. It Is this more critical and systematic 
reflection to which the term "Philosophy" is usually ap- 
plied ; and it is this Philosophy whose development we 
purpose to sketch. For historical purposes It is conven- 
ient to consider it under three divisions : Ancient, or Greek, 
Philosophy (from 600 B.C. to 325 a.d.) ; Medieval (150 
A.D. to 1625 A.D.) ; Modern (1625 a.d. to the present). 
These dates are merely approximate. It will be seen that 
Ancient and Medieval Philosophy overlap in time. 
This is because the classification is not fundamentally 
chronological, but is determined by affinities of thought. 



DIVISION A: ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY 
CHAPTER III 

GENERAL VIEW; PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY 

§ 9. Ancient Philosophy. — i. General View. — The 
Western Philosophy had its birth and early fostering in 
Greece ; in consequence of this, it is frequently spoken of 
as Greek Philosophy. It differs from Oriental Philosophy 
and the higher thought of the Poetic Period in its sub- 
ordinating the religious element to the intellective. But 
it did not suppress the religious instinct ; on the contrary, 
the religious feeling had so large a place In the Greek 
consciousness that it indirectly prevented the limiting 
of reflective thought to the consideration of the material 
world and present-day interests. With this exception, 
Philosophy had free range, subject only to the demand of 
the Western mind that its procedure should be rational. 

2. Divisions. — Ancient Philosophy will be considered 
under the following heads : I. Pre-Socratic Philosophy 
(600-400 B.C.) ; n. Socratic Philosophy (440-300 B.C.) ; 
III. Graeco-Roman Philosophy (380 B.C.-300 a.d.) ; IV. 
Neo-Platonic Philosophy (40 A.D.-325). The dates given 
are approximate and Indicate the periods of effective 
activity. Thus, the Neo-Platonic Philosophy was taught 
as late as 529 a.d. ; but it ceased to be effectively active 
about 325 A.D., hence the latter date Is given. 

3. Schools in Philosophy. — It must not be assumed that 

14 



PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY 15 

all the thinkers of any one of these great divisions held 
the same views or were in exact agreement as to what 
are the important questions. The philosophers of each 
of these divisions fall into groups, or schools. These 
schools are made up of thinkers who consider the same 
questions and whose views have certain fundamental 
likenesses. Hence when we speak of a school in Philosophy, 
the term " school " does not signify an institution of learning, 
but a group of thinkers who agree as to what are the im- 
portant questions and whose fundamental doctrines are 
somewhat alike. 

§ 10. The Pre-Socratic Philosophy. — General View. — 
The Pre-Socratic schools, given in the order of their de- 
velopment, are the Milesian or Early Ionian, the Pythag- 
orean, the Eleatic, the Later Ionian, the Atomists, and 
the Sophists. The earlier schools studied the external 
world, — the object of experiences, the first-named of the 
three great topics of thought (§ 7) ; in other words, this 
Philosophy was in the main objective. The Sophists 
turned attention toward the subject who has experience 
of the world, and Philosophy became somewhat sub- 
jective. The questions to which these early philosophers 
gave consideration are the germinal questions of reflective 
thought. Their ideas may seem to us to be very crude ; 
nevertheless these thinkers were men of ability and they 
did effective pioneer work. They defined, in general 
outline, the task of Philosophy; and they developed 
opposing attitudes toward the universe and life, attitudes 
which have been represented in every age since and which 
must be recognized if we would understand the Philosophy 
of to-day. To note these great questions and to follow 
the development of these attitudes will lend interest and 
give value to our further study. Their first inquiry was 
as to what the world is made of; and, in their endeavor 



i6 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

to answer this question, they give us their theory of the 
cosmos, or orderly world, i.e. their Cosmology. 

§ II. Particular Doctrines. — i. Change and Per- 
manence. — This world seems to us to be stable, yet change- 
ful ; and so it appeared to these first philosophers, and 
they thought of it as made out of a changeful single sub- 
stance. That the world is of one substance is a first 
assumption of the Milesians. In selecting a substance 
which would answer to the requirements, they naturally 
sought a substance that would change readily. Thales, 
the pioneer, chose water ; and he thought of air and mist 
as water rarefied, and earth and rock as water condensed. 
Anaximenes selected air; and Anaximander chose the 
Unlimited or Indeterminate, for it might become any- 
thing. But the Eleatics insisted that what is real cannot 
change; and, believing that what they perceived was real, 
they declared, " All is ; there is no becoming ; change is 
an illusion." Heracleitus — of the Later lonians — 
affirmed in opposition to the Eleatics, that " all is becom- 
ing " ; but inconsistently with this he believed that reason 
— the order of the world — is unchangeable. The Soph- 
ists followed Heracleitus in declaring that " all is becom- 
ing." Empedocles and Anaxagoras (of the Later lonians) 
and the Atomists held to the changeability of all else 
than the elements of which the world is composed ; but 
these unchangeable elements may change their place, 
and the world which we know comes of the changeful 
commingling of the moving elements. 

2. Hylozoism. — The Milesians assumed that matter, 
since it moves, is alive. In this they were followed by 
most, if not all, the Pre-Socratics down to the time of 
Empedocles. This is known as the doctrine of Hylozoism. 
The important fact for us is that they were thinking about 
the nature of reality. 



PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY 17 

3. Monism; Pluralism; Dualism. — We have indicated 
that the Milesians assumed that there is one world-stuff, 
and we have noted what some of them believed this world- 
substance to be. Of the Eleatics, Parmenides insisted 
that this substance is Being and that this Being is both 
matter and thought; Xenophanes said that the world- 
God is this substance, and in this he identified God with 
the world ; Heracleitus — a Later Ionian — declared fire 
to be the world-stuff. Here we have the doctrine that 
all the phenomena of the universe are derivable from a 
single principle, or source ; this doctrine is known as 
Monism. Against the view just stated, Empedocles 
asserted that the world-substance is many, not one. He 
said that there are four elemental substances — earth, 
air, fire, water. Anaxagoras insisted that the elemental 
substances are infinite in number; and the Atomists 
taught that the world-substance is an infinite number of 
Indivisible, unchiangeable, physical points, which are called 
atoms because of their indivisibility. Here we have the 
doctrine that the universe comes of a plurality of sources, 
that it is composed of many ultimate reals. This doctrine 
is known as Pluralism. Some of the Pythagoreans de- 
veloped a doctrine of Dualism, i.e. they would derive the 
world from two principles. This is a special form of 
Pluralism. These doctrines — Monism, Pluralism, and 
Dualism — have all been held in varying forms down to 
the present. We call attention to the fact that this 
philosophy was questioning as to the nature of the reality 
with which men are in constant commerce. 

4. Reality^ and the One and the Many. — The Milesians 
and the early Pythagoreans accepted the reality of the 
one world-substance and the many objects in the world. 
The Eleatics denied the reality of the many and insisted 
that reality is simple, it is all-alike oneness. The Later 

c 



1 8 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

lonlans (except Heracleltus) and the Atomists accepted 
the reality of the many and denied the oneness of reality. 
This question persists in Philosophy, but with great changes 
of reference and import. 

5. Cause. — Down to the time of the development of 
Pluralism, those who accepted the fact of change, accepted 
it without asking how it originated ; their Hylozoism led 
them to think of change as in the nature of the world- 
substance. But it was different with the Pluralists. 
Their elements were considered as unchangeable; and, 
as a consequence, they were forced to ask how change of 
place could occur in a world of changeless elements. Out 
of this inquiry arose the problem of Cause. Empedocles 
held that the elements were commingled through the action 
of some force external to them; Anaxagoras taught that 
reason, the most mobile of the elements, is supreme in 
power and determines the motions of the elements ; the 
Atomists insisted that the elements combine by necessity 
quite apart from any agency. 

6. Mechanism and Teleology. — Empedocles and the 
Atomists conceived the universe to be constituted solely 
by matter in motion. With Empedocles, change is change 
of place, not change of quality ; and the elements of the 
Atomists do not diifer in quality. In a word, they held 
that all changes in the universe are due to matter in 
motion, and that all differences in objects are really dif- 
ferences of quantity, not differences of quality. These dif- 
ferences in quantity arise through a commingling of the 
elements, and this commingling is determined by external 
compulsion or the nature of the elements. There is no 
place here for the free purposing and directing of changes 
by thought ; all moves machine-like. This is known as 
the doctrine of Mechanism. Anaxagoras held a doctrine 
which differs radically from that just described; his con- 



PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY 19 

ception of it was, to be sure, crude. He assumed an ele- 
ment, the reason, which he conceived as differing in quality 
from the other elements. According to him, this reason, 
or Nous, knows all things, and is free in action and su- 
preme in power. He insisted that the Nous determines 
the commingling of the elements, and that the Nous 
determines it toward a chosen end. Here we have the 
doctrine that all change has respect to an end ; and this 
is known as the Teleological conception of the universe. 
Teleology and Mechanism are distinctly opposed to each 
other as theories of the cosmos ; both views have persisted 
through varying statements down to the present. He in- 
troduced the distinction between mind and matter. 

7. Knowledge. — Doubt as to whether our knowledge 
is valid appears to have originated with the Eleatics. 
Parmenides, an Eleatic, declared that the senses deceive 
us, but that truth may be attained by thinking. A classic 
instance of such deception is the straight stick appearing 
to be broken when it is thrust into water. Anaxagoras 
averred that " all our ideas are derived solely from sensa- 
tions " ; and, in this statement, due emphasis is to be 
given the word " solely." This doctrine is known as 
Sensationalism ; we shall have occasion to consider it 
more particularly later in our study. Sensationalism 
followed upon the distrust of knowledge and culminated 
in the teachings of the Sophists. They taught, — 

(i) That knowledge is only sense-perception ; it con- 
sists of ideas aroused within us by objects from without. 
The subject perceives merely his idea of the object, not 
the object itself; hence perception gives no knowledge of 
the object. 

(2) That all is becoming ; therefore objects only become 
for the person perceiving — i.e. the percipient, and they 
become in the moment in which they are perceived. 



20 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

(3) That sense-impressions are unreliable. This they 
held was shown in the fact that different percipients have 
differing experiences of the same object. 

(4) That particular sensations are the only reality ; 
hence we only know our ideas of particular objects. 

(5) That it follows from the above that knowledge is 
purely personal {i.e. valid only for the individual subject), 
and is determined by education and intellectual habitude 
and condition. " As each thing appears to me, it is to me ; 
as it appears to you, it is to you." Any statement and 
its contradictory are both true, if they each appear to 
different persons to be true. There is no reality for com- 
mon, or public, knowledge ; ' this would follow from their 
claim that the object becomes only for the one subject. 
And there is no knowledge which is valid for all subjects; 
this follows from the doctrine that all knowledge is purely 
personal, or individual. 

Under Gorgias, this teaching developed into absolute 
scepticism. He held as follows : (i) Nothing exists ; (2) 
If anything could exist, it could not be known; (3) If 
we could know, we could not communicate our knowledge. 
His argument ran thus : That which is thought is some- 
thing else than that which is, or they could not be dis- 
tinguished ; hence we do not know the thing, we only 
know our thought of it. We cannot communicate; for 
every one has his own ideas, and there is no guarantee 
of mutual understanding. 

We call special attention to particulars of this teaching. 
The first is, that the immediate object of knowledge is not 
the object itself, but the subject's idea of the object. We 
shall have occasion to deal with this later; for it was 
scarcely challenged until late in the Modern age of Philos- 
ophy. The other is, that there is no common knowledge. 

Democritus, the ablest of the Atomists, a man of com- 



PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY 21 

prehensive learning and unusual acumen, was a contem- 
porary of Protagoras, the ablest of the Sophists, and of 
Socrates and Plato. He revolted from the scepticism 
which was the logical consequence of the Sophist sensa- 
tionalism; and, in his revolt, he developed a dualistic 
doctrine of knowledge. His doctrine will be more fully 
stated in our study of Aristotle. 

§ 12. Conclusion. — Philosophy first studied the object 
and sought to know what the world is made of; in other 
words, it questioned as to the Being of the world. The 
pursuit of this inquiry led the later Pre-Socratics to ask 
as to how we know, what we know, and whether our 
knowledge is valid. The problem of Philosophy thus 
takes two forms : it is the question of the Being of all-that- 
is ; and the question of Knowing. Corresponding to these 
two forms of the problem are the two great divisions of 
Philosophy : The theory of Knowing, or Epistemology ; 
and the theory of Being, or Ontology. These are not, 
however, wholly separable questions ; each involves the 
other. One cannot treat Ontology apart from his theory 
of Knowing; nor Epistemology apart from his theory 
of Being. The question of Reality is raised by these 
thinkers. They ask. Is the world that we know the real 
world f and, What is the real world } The question of 
Reality gives heart and life to Metaphysics — the theory 
of the essential nature of Being. The ultimate questions 
of both Epistemology and Ontology fall to Metaphysics. 
These ancient philosophers studied their experience in 
order that they might find out what experience had to 
say respecting the world and man. That is what Philos- 
ophy is doing to-day. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY 

The Socratic Philosophy is the product of three of the 
world's greatest thinkers — Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. 

§ 13. Socrates. — i. His Purpose. — Socrates did not 
develop a system ; he sought practical ends, not the con- 
struction of a theory. He was not interested in Philos- 
ophy, as such. His sole interest was in the discovery of 
the principles of right conduct; in other words, his in- 
terests were exclusively ethical. But he believed that 
true knowledge is the sole basis of upright conduct. He 
held that only he who has true knowledge will live a life 
of moral goodness ; and that he who has valid knowledge 
will live such a life, i.e. will be virtuous. Therefore, since 
knowledge is virtue, and morality is not possible without 
valid knowledge, Socrates believed that valid knowledge is 
of fundamental importance. He also believed that by 
criticism and self-examination valid knowledge may be 
attained. His ethical interest caused him to be dissatisfied 
with the sceptical conclusions of the Sophists, although 
he was himself of that school ; and his ethical impulse 
and his conception of the ground of morality led him to 
seek ethical knowledge which is not merely relative, not 
merely valid for the individual, but valid for all. 

2. Socrates and the Sophists Contrasted. — The Sophists 
had been led to doubt the validity of knowledge by reason 
of the emphasis which they laid upon the differences in 

9Z 



THE SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY 23 

the judgments of men respecting persons and things and 
events ; Socrates called attention to the fact that there 
is a general agreement among men touching ethical 
questions. The Sophists based their views on the con- 
tradictions in the experiences of individuals ; Socrates 
insisted that the truth is not to be found in the opinions 
of the inconstant individual, but in the experience of all 
men taken together. The Sophist, Protagoras, had said, 
" Man is the measure of all things " ; and he meant by 
this that truth is merely relative to the individual, and 
that contradictory opinions held by diiferent individuals 
are true because each is true for the subject holding it. 
Socrates would also say, " Man is the measure of all 
things " ; but he would mean by " man," not the individual 
man, but man in general, universal man, humanity. He 
insisted that in the opinions of all men taken together we 
find a rational agreement, an agreement which proves 
that there is ethical knowledge which is universally valid. 
3. His Method. — He proceeded by asking questions, 
as if he were himself seeking knowledge; and he would 
ask for the exact definition of words. Thus, if the con- 
versation should touch upon good citizenship, he would 
ask those with whom he was conversing to tell what they 
meant by " the good citizen." He might follow this by 
asking that they apply their definition to particular cases, 
or he might pass from this to the question of " goodness." 
He would in this way approach the definition of the various 
ethical terms — as " piety," " virtue," "patriotism," etc. ; 
and it would be found that there was substantial agree- 
ment, such agreement as made it evident that ethical 
judgment is not merely relative to the individual, but 
that the ethical experience of all subjects has a common 
content. It is also seen that there is general agreement 
as to attitude toward ethical questions, i.e. that men have 



24 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

common ethical attitudes and opinions. This is shown 
in the very fact that they use common terms — as " good," 
" bad," " right," " wrong " — to express their ethical ex- 
periences. These common ethical opinions and terms 
are concepts ; and one great service that Socrates ren- 
dered to reflective thought was his demonstration of the 
value of the concept. 

4. The Concept Illustrated. — In emphasizing the dif- 
ference in the knowledge of individuals, the Sophists had 
sense-perception in mind. Socrates searches for the com- 
mon objective element and finds it in the concept. The sig- 
nificance of the concept and its place in cognition, or the act 
of knowing, will be more fully treated later ; at this point, 
we will merely illustrate the concept, believing that such 
illustration will make for a readier understanding of the 
course of Philosophy from this time on. We will take 
" chair " for an example of a concept. There are objects 
which differ in particulars, but which are nevertheless 
alike in that they all have their parts so related that any 
one of them will serve as a seat, and they all have a part 
against which the sitter may lean back. Despite the 
individual differences of these objects, which may be many 
and marked, they are so far similar that they express a 
common idea — the idea of something to sit on. They 
have a common content for thought. Thus we see that 
" sufficient similarity " between objects gives them a com- 
mon content for thought, so that in knowing one of the 
particular objects we know all that have this common 
content. We perceive qualities and relations which 
are common to a number of objects ; and, assigning a name 
to this common content, we give our experience a fixed 
form. It should be noted that the term " concept " may 
be used of the idea which is common to the class, or group, 
or of the word by which we express this idea in speech. 



THE SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY 25 

The former may be Indicated by the term " idea-concept," 
the latter by the term " word-concept." In contrast 
with the percept in s'ense-perception, the concept is the 
universal which includes what is common to all the per- 
cepts which embody this common idea. Thus, the con- 
cept " book " is the universal which includes what is 
common to all the particular objects that embody this idea. 

Summary : Socrates was unsystematic ; but his great 
ability and enthusiasm and the directness of his practicality 
led him to a choice of method and an attainment of results 
which have been of great worth to Philosophy. It was 
his purpose to lead men to recognize the validity of ethical 
judgments. In accomplishing this he opposed the scepti- 
cism of the Sophists, and effectively criticised their doctrine 
that knowledge is purely relative to the individual ; and 
he called attention to the value of the concept for thought 
and to the fact of our common humanity and common 
ethical experience. He insisted that we may have ab- 
solute knowledge and arrive at universal truth. 

§ 14. Plato. — I. General View. — Of Plato's long life 
of eighty years, sixty years were given to Philosophy. 
He agreed with Heracleltus that the world about us is 
a world of Becoming, and with the Eleatics that the world 
of Reality is a world of eternal, unchangeable Oneness. 
He believed that we may know Reality; but along with 
this, he accepted the doctrine of the Sophists, and of 
Socrates, that sense-perception only yields relative truth. 
With the Pythagoreans, he rejected the Eleatic doctrine 
of the all-alikeness, or homogeneity, of the One Reality, 
and insisted that the eternal unchangeable Reality is 
Many in One, i.e. that the ultimate is complex unity. 
From Socrates he received the notion of the concept. It 
may be justly asserted that this principle of thought, the 
concept, ordered his Philosophy. 



26 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

2. General Estimate. — It must not be assumed that 
Plato merely collected and adopted the thoughts of others. 
He was not an eclectic; he was an independent thinker 
and a man of giant intellect. Plato gave new meaning 
and added value to every view in which he appears to be 
in agreement with others. Thus, while he remained true 
to his master, Socrates, he did not limit his interest to 
ethical questions ; he took the broader, philosophic view. 
It was this broader interest and outlook which led him to 
use the conceptual principle in the philosophic study 
of the world at large ; and in his application of this prin- 
ciple he utilized it in considering questions of Knowledge 
and Reality. Our limited sketch cannot give an adequate 
presentation of his system. Extended study is necessary 
if one would duly appreciate its comprehensiveness, its 
coherence, and its great advance beyond the philosophic 
thought which preceded him. We select for special 
mention here one notable contribution of his to Western 
Philosophy, — the conception of Reality as immaterial. 

3. His Doctrine of Ideas, — Plato's doctrine of reality 
can scarcely be understood or duly appreciated apart from 
his doctrine of Ideas. He developed this doctrine from 
the Socratic notion of the concept. He was many years 
perfecting his view of the Idea and at the last the Platonic 
Idea differed greatly from the Socratic concept. With 
Socrates the concept is a construct of thought and is a 
complex of the qualities which are common to a number of 
objects ; and it is at the same time the thought-content 
which is common to the opinions of men. In other words, 
with Socrates the concept is related in thought to percepts ; 
i.e. it is logically related to objects. With Plato the Idea 
bears the same relation to any particular of which it is 
the Idea that the Idea of the sculptor bears to the com- 
pleted statue. The statue comes to be, in order that the 



THE SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY 27 

sculptor's Idea may have embodiment. The Idea is 
before the statue, and it is the cause of the statue in this 
sense, that the statue comes to be because of the Idea. 
The statue is the means for realizing in marble what was 
first realized in the mind of the sculptor. The sculptor's 
Idea included the purpose to create the statue ; and this 
purpose is said to be the teleological cause of the statue. 
The purpose of any action is known as the teleological 
cause of the action and of the result of the action. So 
Plato conceived the particulars of the physical world as 
means for the expression of the world-Idea, as so many 
partial embodiments of that Idea. The world-Idea was 
before they began to be, and they come to be because of it. 
The world-Idea is related teleologically to the particulars 
of the world. Each of these particulars is but an incom- 
plete expression of the world-Idea ; and, because of its 
incompleteness, it is not real. The Socratic concept is 
related logically to its particulars ; the Platonic Idea is 
related teleologically to its particulars. 

4. His Doctrine of Reality. — This world and the persons 
and things in it with which we have intercourse are real 
to us. We demand the real ; we would not consent that 
life should be a pretence or that that with which we deal 
should be a mere seeming. We require that what is 
offered us for acceptance shall be a statement of reality 
before we accept it and undertake to act upon it. Philos- 
ophy raised the question as to what is real very early. 
It was involved in the discussions of the Eleatics. They 
held that the only reality is the Universal One, and that 
the many particulars, the individual persons and things, 
are not real. Plato stated the question in a way then 
quite new ; but this statement so affected reflective thought 
that we must understand Plato here if we would under- 
stand the subsequent course of Philosophy. He asked. 



28 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

Is Reality In the concept (or Universal) or In the sense- 
object (or Particular) ? Stating It In terms of Plato's 
doctrine of Ideas, the question would be, Is the Idea 
or the perceived object real ? For example, which Is 
truly real, this desk at which I sit, or the universal " desk," 
the " desk " as Idea ? Plato Insisted that reality Is In 
the " desk " Idea ; the desk at which I sit Is only an In- 
complete, an Imperfect, representation of the real " desk." 
Because of Its Incompleteness and Its being subject to 
change, It Is not real ; for with him reality Is perfect, 
eternal, and unchanging, and the particular Is Imperfect, 
temporary, and In constant change. His doctrine of 
knowledge also led him to deny the reality of sense- 
objects. He believed that perception only gives us rel- 
ative knowledge, not absolute knowledge or knowledge 
of reality. But sense-objects are, according to Plato, 
known by perception ; hence the particulars thus known 
are not reality. On the other hand, Plato held that knowl- 
edge by concepts, or knowledge of Ideas, Is absolute 
knowledge. From this. It would follow that reality Is in 
the Universal, or Idea. 

5. Dualism. — Plato agreed with the Eleatlcs In holding 
that the world of Reality Is a world of unchanging One- 
ness. Despite this manifest monistic assumption, he 
developed a distinct Dualism. Plato's Ideas were the 
structural types of physical objects ; that Is, his world of 
Ideas was a world of norms, the Ideas being the norms 
of the particulars of the physical world. The Ideas are 
not mental constructs, they are independent of the subject ; 
In other words, they are evidently objective, not sub- 
jective. In holding thus, Plato's system offers us two 
objective worlds — one the becoming, changeful world 
of physical objects ; the other, the unchanging world of 
Ideas. These worlds are represented as explanatory of 



THE SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY 29 

each other; but Plato's system keeps them otherwise 
apart, they are not organically united. In this he is 
dualistic; and the recognition of this Platonic Dualism 
is a pre-requisite to the correct interpretation of Aristotle. 
This is Ontological Dualism, — a dualistic theory of Being. 
His system also presents a dualistic theory of Knowledge, 
i.e. an Epistemological Dualism. He separates appre- 
hension through perception and apprehension through 
reason. According to Plato, perception only gives us 
relative knowledge, or opinion, whereas reason yields 
absolute knowledge. 

6. Was Plato^s World of Ideas Pluralistic? — His world 
of Reality appears to be constituted of many independent 
Ideas. But while he conceived the Ideas as independent 
of the subject, he did not think of them as wholly unrelated. 
The particulars of the physical world are related teleo- 
logically to the Ideas ; and the Ideas themselves are re- 
lated teleologically to the Idea of the Good. This Idea 
of the Good holds the primacy in his world of Reality; 
all the other Ideas are partial realizations of this primal 
Idea, they are that it may be realized. Hence Plato's 
world of Ideas is not a pluralistic world ; its Reality is a 
unitary Reality, the plural Ideas being unified in their 
teleological relationship to the primal Idea of the Good. 
His was a thoroughgoing teleological conception of the 
universe. 

Summary : Plato prepared Western thought to recognize 
immaterial Reality; previous to him Greek philosophy 
had assumed that Reality was material. In this he opened 
the way for a clearer distinction of mind and matter, 
although he himself did not definitely distinguish them. 
His system was for the time a strong defence of the valid- 
ity of knowledge against the assaults of philosophical 
doubt. His adoption and advocacy of the teleological 



30 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

doctrine — that the worid as a whole and all particulars of 
it exist for some purpose — was of itself a great contribution 
to reflective thought. Much of his work was achieved in 
his treatment of questions which do not come within the 
province of this introduction. From the point of view 
of our present inquiry, his great work is found in the stage 
to which he developed thought, making it ready for Aris- 
totle, and in the training of Aristotle for a still greater 
achievement than that effected by Plato himself. 

§ 15. Aristotle. — i. Introductory. — We preface our 
study of Aristotle with a consideration of the dualism 
which is implicate in the epistemology of Democritus and 
Plato. Theirs were the forms of philosophic thought 
which were most active when Aristotle began his stud- 
ies, and they naturally affected his procedure and 
conclusions. Democritus was a materialist and Plato 
was an immaterialist ; but they agreed in holding that 
there are two kinds of knowledge — knowledge obtained 
through sense-experience and knowledge attained by 
reason. Perceptual knowledge — that had through sense- 
experience — was said to be merely relative ; rational 
knowledge was thought to be absolute. According to 
Democritus, perceptual knowledge is knowledge of mere 
appearances, or phenomena ; according to Plato, it is 
opinion respecting what is an incomplete copy of reality. 

Plato's dualism was involved in his separation of the 
world of Ideas — i.e. the world of reality — from the 
world of perceptions. This has been set forth in our study 
of Plato. Democritus grounded his belief in two kinds 
of knowledge upon a distinction in the properties of the 
atoms. He divided these properties into two classes, and 
these became known later as the primary and secondary 
properties of matter. In the first of these classes he placed 
form, size, inertia, density, and hardness ; and he held 



THE SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY 31 

that these are properties of the atoms themselves ; and, 
as he believed that the atoms are reality, they were, 
for him, properties of reality. It would follow then that 
we know reality in knowing these properties. He held 
further that these properties are known through reason, 
not through perception. In the second class of properties, 
he placed sound, color, taste, and smell ; these are thought 
to exist only in the appearances and are perceived through 
the senses. From this we see how it was that Democritus 
and Plato were agreed in rejecting Sensationalism — 
the doctrine that knowledge is constituted solely of sense- 
elements — and in recognizing the activity of reason in 
cognition. The doctrine that the subject is rationally 
active in cognizing is known as Rationalism. Both these 
philosophers were rationalists, but they differed in their 
emphasis. Plato gave emphasis to the world of Ideas ; 
Democritus, upon the whole, to the facts of sense-ex- 
perience, or empirical facts as they are commonly called. 
Neither Democritus nor Plato could effect a union of the 
two worlds ; their philosophy had in it an element of 
Dualism. 

2. Aristotle^ s Attitude toward this Dualism. — Aristotle 
was convinced that his master, Plato, erred in not giving 
due value to empirical facts. Neither could he agree to 
the separation of the world of Ideas from the physical 
world. To separate them, as Plato did, would be to make 
knowledge of the world of nature impossible ; and Plato 
himself taught that we know the physical world. To be 
sure our knowledge of it is not a knowledge of reality; 
but that is because what is known is not reality. Besides 
this, how could the world of nature be related to the world 
of Ideas if they were separate as Plato taught .^ Yet 
Plato asserted that they were related teleologically. 
Aristotle could not accept the materialism and the radical 



32 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

mechanism of Democritus. Therefore he rejected the 
dualistic Philosophy of his time. 

3. Doctrine of the Universal. — Aristotle accepted the 
principle of the concept, or the universal ; but he did not 
accept the Platonic relation of the universal and the 
particular. The difference between him and Plato may 
be stated thus : With Plato, the Idea, or the universal, is 
before the thing ; with Aristotle, it is in the thing. For 
example, according to Plato, the ideas " man " and " dog " 
are, and the particular man and dog come to be as means 
for the expression of these Ideas. But this conception 
does not include a real linking of the Ideas and the objects ; 
as to reality, they are apart and cannot be joined by this 
thought of them. Aristotle, on the other hand, holds that 
the universal " man " or " dog " is in the particular man 
or dog as the essence of the particular. The universal is 
reality ; but it has no being apart from the particular ; 
and the particular has its being through the universal 
which is in it, which is there as the essence of the partic- 
ular. Thus, the universal " man " or " dog " has no 
reality apart from some particular man or dog. Thought 
of apart from any particular, it is a mere abstraction. On 
the other hand, the particular man or dog is because of 
that in it which is the essence of every man and every 
dog. For Aristotle, the concrete particular thing is the 
real. 

4. Principle of Development. — The next question to 
be answered is. How is this universal, or essence of the 
particular, related to the changing particular t The an- 
swer is. The particular is the unfolding of the universal ; 
that is, the particular is the universal in the developing 
expression of itself. An oak tree is an unfolding expres- 
sion of its own essence, and this essence is the universal 
" oak." When we apply this interpretation of the uni- 



THE SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY 33 

versal to the world of nature, we get a very different 
conception of it from that which is presented in the 
Platonic system. Plato's Idea is unchangeable, or static ; 
Aristotle's universal is active, or dynamic. As the uni- 
versal is reality, reality is active being. We must not, 
however, overlook the fact that Aristotle's development 
differs from the modern conception of development ; 
his is simply development within the particular, not a 
development of new classes, or genera. 

5. His Doctrine of Development is Teleological. — We 
have seen that Anaxagoras grasped the idea of teleology — 
that changes in the universe are related to purpose and 
move toward the fulfilment of purpose ; but he Hmited 
his application of this principle to the astronomical world. 
Plato needed it that he might effect a relation between his 
Ideas and the physical world. It has a place in Aris- 
totle's fundamental conception of reality. According 
to him, there is in every particular of the world of nature 
an essence which is unfolding into perceptible expression; 
i.e. every particular is matter to which form is being 
given. He thus distinguishes two elements in the partic- 
ular: Matter and Form. Matter, apart from Form, 
would be undetermined, would have no character. Form 
is the principle which gives character to the Matter of 
a particular. The Matter of an oak, conceived apart 
from the Form, is a potential oak; the Form is that by 
means of which the potential oak becomes actualized. 
The body of each of us is such a real particular; and its 
form is determined from within by its essence. In this 
relation, he conceived of the essence as active Form giving 
its own expression to Matter. From this it follows that 
all such activity is toward the fulfilment of a purpose, viz. 
the expression of the essence. The ideal end and the 
activity are within the particular; that is, they are im- 

D 



34 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

manent, not external. Aristotle's concept, or Idea, or 
universal, is being which is immanently and teleologically 
active. 

6. A Dualistic Remainder. — Aristotle himself did not 
succeed in avoiding dualism. We note one instance of 
his dualistic thought. What was said above about the 
immanent teleological unfolding of the universal into the 
particular seems clear and evident when we study the 
activity of nature and attend only to the individual object. 
But when Aristotle gave his attention to the activity of 
man in the shaping of material, — e.g. that of a carpenter 
making a box, — he felt that he was forced to seek the 
end and the activity outside that which is forming. Some 
changes do not appear to be effected immanently ; and 
when we relate particulars to each other, their related 
changes appear to be effected externally and mechanically. 
He failed to include these experiences in his teleology. 
At this point he accepts that change may be brought about 
by action from without, and he conceives particulars to 
be externally related to one another. He thus holds two 
opposed conceptions : Mechanism and Teleology. 

7. Logical Doctrine. — We desire that our conclusions 
about things and events shall be dependable. It is but 
natural that men should feel that they must have assurance 
that their knowledge of things and events is valid. If 
our judgments concerning the affairs and objects of life 
in which we are interested and with which we have to do 
are not valid, we are in a sad case. Sometimes the ques- 
tion takes this form : How may we reason convincingly, so 
that the reasonable man will accept our conclusions ? 
The Sophists had laid down some rules for convincing 
thought ; but Aristotle was the first to make an extended 
and thoroughgoing investigation of the forms of valid 
thinking. His work was so comprehensive and was so 



THE SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY 35 

well done that little occasion has arisen for making material 
change in the principles of Deductive Logic as stated by 
him. He agreed with Plato that there is one all-inclusive 
cause for all that is and all that occurs. He was an ac- 
complished scientist; and, as a scientist, he was wont to 
seek one general cause for all similar physical events. In 
other words, he had learned that particular events are 
individual instances of a general process. This Is a com- 
mon-place now in science, and gravitation Is a notable 
instance of such a general process. Believing as he did, 
it was but natural that Aristotle should assume this to be 
true of the process of thinking and that he should endeavor 
to discover the general laws and forms of valid thought. 
His search for these laws and forms was the origin of the 
science of Logic. 

For our Inquiry It will only be necessary that we take 
note of three particulars of his logical doctrine. First, 
he laid hold of a truth which has been too often overlooked : 
A complete thought Is always a conclusion respecting the 
object of thought. It Is not a mere name-Idea, as the name 
of a thing or a quality ; it is a judgment. To state It 
otherwise, the unit of thought is a judgment respecting 
some object; In the speech of the Plain Man, a complete 
thought is an opinion about some person, thing, or event. 
An Illustration will help us to understand the second partic- 
ular to which we call attention. Passing along a strange 
road, you see a building and you say, " That is a school- 
house." You arrived at this conclusion in this way : 
You have a general Idea of the appearance of a school- 
house and Its grounds ; you see this particular building 
and Its grounds ; you compare the general Idea and this 
particular perception, or Idea ; and you draw your con- 
clusion. Here we have three judgments : one general 
judgment (the general appearance of a schoolhouse)^ 



S6 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

a singular judgment (the appearance of this building), and 
the conclusion. Here is the foundation of his doctrine of 
the syllogism. The third characteristic of his logical 
doctrine comes of the fact that question may be raised 
as to the truth of either of the first two judgments, or 
propositions. It is evident that if we undertake to estab- 
lish the premises from which our conclusion is drawn, we 
must seek yet more general premises and the truth of 
these may be questioned. From this it follows that, 
if our reasoning shall be valid, there must be back of all 
thinking some truths which are not dependent upon proof 
for their validity, truths which are self-evident. Aristotle 
insisted that there are such truths ; e.g. a thing cannot be 
both itself and not-itself. 

8. Doctrine of Man. — Aristotle taught that man is 
body, soul, and Nous (or intelligence). The soul and the 
Nous are immaterial. According to him, all organisms 
have souls ; plants have nutritive souls, animals sensitive 
souls, and man has a rational soul. It is the Nous, or 
intelligence, which distinguishes man from other organisms, 
as to constitution. In the latest form of his teaching, the 
Nous has no bodily organ ; it enters man from without. 
Man thus becomes a triple real — a real as to the body, 
the soul, and the Nous. 

Summary : Our study of Aristotle has barely alluded to 
a few particulars of the thought of this wonderful genius, 
the father of Logic, one of the greatest scientists, and 
probably the greatest of philosophers. He was a Monist 
in purpose, but his system has in it an element of dualism. 
He advanced far beyond his predecessors in his appre- 
hension of the significance of the concept and in relating 
the concept to the individual object. At this point, he 
overcomes the dualism of Democritus and Plato. The 
universal, or concept, is seen to be the essence of the partic- 



THE SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY 37 

ular, or percept. There Is no particular apart from the 
universal, and no concrete universal apart from the partic- 
ular. Reality is in the particular. \ Aristotle believed 
that we know reality in knowing the object. He perceived 
that the unit of thought is a judgment, he discovered the 
fundamental forms of valid thinking, and he averred that 
some truths are self-evident. His conception of reality as 
dynamic, not static, was of itself a valuable contribution 
to Philosophy. His conception of development was, 
indeed, limited to development within the individual, 
but it was a distinct advance beyond the Platonic thought. 
He was dualistic in that he believed that changes which 
appear to be mechanical — as the movement of a ball when 
it is struck — are wholly apart from, and fundamentally 
different from, developmental changes — such as occur 
in the growth of a plant. 

§ 16. Teleology in the Socratic Period. — A clear 
understanding of the significance of teleology is so essential 
that we give a further illustration and description of it. 
Your friend goes into the country to visit his brother. 
Your friend's movements are undertaken for a purpose, 
— visiting his brother, — and they are determined with 
a view to the attainment of that purpose. His action is 
teleological, because it is related to a purpose, or end. 
Teleology is the theory that the world and its changes 
are purposeful ; this theory holds that they — the world 
and its changes — exist for a purpose. The purpose is 
usually spoken of as the end. In ordinary speech, the 
word " end " signifies a termination ; but it does not neces- 
sarily mean a terminus when used teleologically. In fact, 
in the teleological theory of the universe as it is generally 
held, " end " does not signify the terminus of activity. 
An illustration will make its meaning clear. You see men 
and materials gathered at the foot of the rapids and some 



38 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

work begun. Upon inquiry, you learn that a dam is to 
be built. Now, the completed dam is not the end, or 
purpose, of these changes, although the building of the dam 
is purposed. The end of this activity is the continued 
utilization of the water-power. The teleological end of 
a series of changes is that result which is sought through 
the changes, and the end may be something which is not 
thought of as terminating. 

The Socratic philosophers had a teleological conception 
of the universe. Socrates believed that the world was 
arranged with a view to man's advancement. Plato held 
that the changing world is in order that the Idea of Good- 
ness may have expression. It will be necessary to revert 
to Aristotle's doctrine of the Form if we would understand 
what he conceived to be the end of the universe and its 
changes. He conceived the reality which is the essence 
of any particular as immanently active, somewhat as the 
Plain Man thinks of the life of the plant as active within 
the plant. He likewise held that in its activity, this essence 
gives form and motion to matter; and he also conceived 
this activity as developmental, as giving gradual expres- 
sion to the nature of the essence. He called this reality, 
this essence. Form. But his conception of Form required 
a prime mover to initiate the world-changes ; and this 
prime mover must not be dependent upon matter, as is 
the form of every particular of the universe ; it must be a 
perfect universal. Aristotle spoke of this prime mover, 
the perfect reality, as pure Form ; it is his basal conception 
of God. Aristotle was the first philosophical monotheist. 
For him, the end of the universe is the expression of the 
pure Form, the perfect universal reality which gives reality 
to all that is. God is this pure Form, the perfect Being; 
and the end of the Cosmos is the expression of God's 
thought and blessedness. 



CHAPTER V 

GR^CO-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY; NEO-PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY 

§ 17. General View of the Graeco-Roman Philosophy. 

— The interests of this Philosophy were specifically ethical. 
Distrust of the prevailing religious thought had developed, 
and an effort was made to substitute individual morality 
for religion. In connection with the discussion incident 
to this attempt, and through the persistence of previous 
philosophic questionings, inquiry was made as to the tests 
or criteria of truth, the activity and passivity of the mind 
in cognition, the validity of knowledge, the idea of cause, 
and the teleological conception of the world. It was held 
by many that we have ideas previous to experience. This 
is the doctrine of innate ideas ; it comes Into evidence from 
this time on. This was a period of marked advance in the 
sciences. Archimedes, Arlstarchus, — who anticipated 
Copernicus, — and Euclid, the geometer and physicist, 
had part in this movement. The sciences were cultivated 
apart from philosophical system ; but there was no sug- 
gestion that Science and Philosophy differ In purpose and 
in field of thought. This Philosophy is represented In 
the following schools : Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics (or 
Agnostics), and Eclectics. 

§ 18. Doctrines of the Graeco-Roman Schools. — i. 
Reality. — Plato first introduced the Idea of Immaterial 
reality into European thought ; with Aristotle this reality 
became virtually spiritual. But it was a difficult con- 

39 



40 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

ception for the West. The Stoics and Epicureans insisted 
that only the material is real ; and the Stoics went so far 
as to declare that qualities, relations, and feelings are 
material. Despite the work of the Socratics, the prevailing 
doctrine of reality was materialistic down to the rise of 
Neo-Platonism. According to the Stoics, ultimate reality 
is one; the Epicureans were Atomists, and as a conse- 
quence, Pluralists. The Stoics held that the one reality 
is subject to changes of quality; the atoms of the Epicu- 
reans are unchangeable. 

2. Cognition. — The Stoics taught that the mind is 
active in cognition ; it assents to certain representations 
as true because it is forced so to do by tension aroused in 
the soul by the shock of the sense-impression. From these 
perceptions and certain innate ideas which arise naturally 
in us through experience, we form conceptions. These 
conceptions are thought-shadows of reality, but are them- 
selves unreal. The Epicureans taught that all cognition 
consists of transformed sensations ; but Epicurus recog- 
nized the activity of reason and the reality of " pre- 
conceptions." These " pre-conceptions " are composite 
images which arise from repeated sensations ; and the use 
of a term connected in thought with the sensation calls 
up this image. He cannot connect his world of images 
and his world of objects. 

3. Validity of Knowledge. — The Stoics believed that 
conceptions, scientifically proved, gave greater certainty 
than perceptions. Immediate conviction was their cri- 
terion of truth. The Epicureans held that we know images, 
but do not know objects ; there is no valid science. With 
them, vividness of feeling in connection with sensations 
is the criterion of truth. The Sceptics insisted that we 
only know appearances and that there is no criterion of 
truth. They argued that any assumed criterion would 



GRyECO-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY 41 

have the same source as the conviction which was to be 
tested by it. We only have probability, but that may 
approximate certainty. The Eclectics believed that we 
may trust what is immediately given in consciousness. 
Antiochus, an Eclectic, contended that Scepticism de- 
stroyed itself. Thus, the Sceptics held that we can arrive 
at probable truth ; but if the true cannot be known, how 
can we know that we have the appearance of truth, that 
what we know is probably true } Further, Scepticism 
averred that there is no such difference between true and 
false interpretations as that we may distinguish them, 
nevertheless it undertook to define and reason ; this is in- 
consistent. 

4. Teleology. — The Stoics held that the being and 
course of the world are determined according to a rational 
purpose. They undertook to hold this teleological con- 
ception along with the view that the course of the world 
is determined by a law of necessity. The Epicureans had 
a mechanical conception of the universe, but they assumed 
that some of the atoms had the power of self-determination. 

5. Ethics. — While it is not our purpose to trace the 
history of Ethics, the ethical temperament of the Grseco- 
Roman Philosophy calls for the presentation of two widely 
divergent ethical theories which were developed in this 
period. The Stoics advocated a theory which may in 
a general way be characterized as Perfectionism, i.e. they 
held that the end of conduct is the perfection of the in- 
dividual. They believed that the ideal man is one who 
is in harmony with nature. " Nature " had for them a 
two-fold reference. It signified first the nature of the 
universe. As thus used, they insisted that men should 
freely accept the course of the world, for the order of the 
world is the true order of experience. " Nature " also 
signified for them the nature of man, not the individual 



42 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

man, but the universal man ; that is, In this reference 
" nature " means essential human nature. The later 
Stoics gave greater emphasis to this second meaning. At 
root, these meanings are one ; for the Stoics believed that 
the nature of man is one with the nature of the world. 
To live according to nature Is to oppose sensuous inclina- 
tions, to subdue passions, to lead a life of reason, a life 
of justice and sympathy : this Is the " duty " of man. 
This virtuous life will be accompanied by mental quietude, 
because It means the mastery of all that might disturb. 
But this " happiness " Is not the end to be sought ; It 
is a state attendant upon the attainment of the end. 

The Epicureans declared that " self-love is the centre 
of all virtues " ; and in this they advocated what Is com- 
monly called a theory of Hedonism. Hedonists hold 
that happiness is the highest good, and that the end of 
life is the attainment of happiness. According to Epi- 
curus, the Ideal state Is one of unperturbed satisfaction; 
and the ideal man, while not Indifferent to pleasures, is 
Independent of them. He would give mental joys, 
aesthetic enjoyments, the first place. Epicureanism was 
necessarily individualistic ; It did not recognize social 
obligations and could not command heroism. One should 
do justice and cultivate friendship ; but only because, and 
in so far as, they minister to the satisfaction of the self. 
Few, if any, Hedonists of the present would agree In all 
particulars with the Epicureans ; and the same may be 
said of Perfectionists and the Stoics. 

Summary: The prevalent conception of reality is 
materialistic. Eifort is made to describe and explain the 
cognitive process ; and there Is recognition of two factors 
in cognition — the subjective and the objective. The 
Socratic Philosophy was intellectualistic ; the knowing 
subject was thought of as essentially intellect. The Stoics 



NEO-PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY 43 

and the Eclectics indirectly assign value to feeling, while 
they directly conceive man as a thinking being. For 
Epicureanism, " man is a feeling being." The inconsist- 
ency of fundamental doubt of the validity of knowledge 
is exposed. This indicates that Philosophy must begin 
by accepting the trustworthiness of cognition ; to do other- 
wise is to invalidate all thinking, even our doubt. The 
doctrine of innate ideas which first appears definitely 
in this Philosophy raises a question which is much dis- 
cussed long after this period : Is man at birth mentally 
" a blank tablet," or is he born with a mental furnishing ^ 
and. If he has a mental furnishing at birth, what can we 
say definitely respecting it ^ 

§ 19. General View of Neo-Platonic Philosophy. — 
We cannot rest in a Philosophy which accounts the world 
or ourselves unreal ; neither can we rest in a Philosophy 
which cuts us off from real knowledge — i.e. valid knowl- 
edge — of the real world. Previous to the rise of the 
Neo-Platonic Philosophy there had developed a wide- 
spread distrust of man's ability to attain the truth. With 
the belief that reason is unable to respond adequately to 
man's demand for actual and valid knowledge of the world 
with which he is in constant and unavoidable commerce, 
there arose doubt as to whether reason has authority to 
dictate our beliefs. When men became convinced that 
the conclusions of reason are out of harmony with our 
daily experience of real knowledge of a real world, they 
began to ask whether there is not some other source of 
knowledge and some other standard of truth than reason. 
Judaism and Christianity insisted that they were in pos- 
session of knowledge which is derived from a source higher 
than reason ; they claimed that it was received by im- 
mediate communication from God, the source of truth. 
Philosophic thought acted upon this suggestion. 



44 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

In addition to this philosophic dissatisfaction, there was 
extended religious unrest and hunger ; the prevalent ma- 
terialistic Philosophy could not satisfy the longing and 
demands of the religious consciousness. At this juncture 
some thinkers seized upon the suggestion of a " super- 
ordinary " mode of cognition ; and from this there de- 
veloped the Pagan, or Anti-Christian, Neo-Platonism. 
Previous to this, however, an allied Jewish philosophy had 
been constructed and the Mediseval Philosophy, which 
we will study later, accepted a super-rational source and 
standard of truth. In all ages since, there have been those 
who have insisted that there is a super-rational mode of 
obtaining knowledge, viz. by spiritual illumination. This 
doctrine is known as Mysticism. Neo-Platonism is the 
real source of all later philosophical mysticism. 

§ 20. Neo-Platonic Doctrines. — i. Philo represents 
Jewish Neo-Platonism. — Moved by the eclectic spirit 
of his age, he sought to harmonize Greek Philosophy and 
the religious thought of the Old Testament. His super- 
ordinary source of truth was the Nous, by which we im- 
mediately lay hold of truth in contemplation. Man 
acquires the Nous in the renunciation of self and conse- 
quent absorption into unity with God. The body, being 
matter, drags the soul down ; but the soul may rise to 
union with Deity through the Nous. 

2. PlotinuSy the founder of Pagan Neo-Platonism, held 
that it was the task of Philosophy to bring us to conscious- 
ness of our essential oneness with God. With this con- 
sciousness there comes the mystical ecstasy in which the 
knower becomes one with what is known and thus attains 
knowledge of the true, for he shares in the divine contem- 
plation. Matter, an emanation from individual souls, 
has neither quality nor being ; the world-soul, an emana- 
tion from the world-reason, gives ideas to matter; the 



NEO-PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY 45 

world-reason is an emanation from the Primal. Of the 
Primal, or God, we cannot say any more than that he is 
and that the universe is an efflux, or overflowing from the 
unchanging God. Jamblichus developed a polytheistic 
theology from the system of Plotinus ; and opponents of 
Christianity utilized the teachings of Jamblichus with the 
hope of reviving interest in the heathen religions and 
worship. 

§ 21. At the Close of Ancient Philosophy. — i. Point 
of View. — At the close of the Ancient Philosophy, 
thinkers are considering subject and object, idea and 
sense-object, activity and passivity of the mind, change and 
permanence, motion and rest, unity and manifoldness, 
mind and matter, freedom and necessity, mechanism and 
teleology. Those who do not accept some form or 
modification of Neo-Platonism regard the principles in 
each of these pairs as inherently exclusive of each other, 
with possible exception of the last pair, — mechanism 
and teleology. Hence the prevailing conception of the 
universe outside Neo-Platonism was fundamentally dual- 
istic. But despite this, when Justinian forbade the teach- 
ing of Philosophy at Athens, reflective thought was striv- 
ing after a single primal reality which shall be the ground 
of the being and order of the cosmos. That is. Philosophy 
was seeking a monistic ultimate, and this ultimate was 
generally conceived as spiritual. 

2. Philosophical Doctrines. — We have seen that differing 
philosophical doctrines developed from Greek philosophical 
activity. A clear definition of these differences will tend 
to a better understanding of the subsequent course of 
Philosophy. It must be remembered, however, that the 
lines of difference are not always sharply drawn, and that 
the names given these doctrines, together with their defi- 
nitions, are to be taken as applicable only in a general 



46 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

way to individual thinkers. Monism is the doctrine that 
there is only one ultimate real ; Pluralism, that there are 
many ultimate reals ; Dualism, that the universe is derived 
from two fundamental principles. Any view is said to 
be dualistic if it regards the phenomena or realities of 
the universe as reducible to two orders which are inherently 
exclusive of each other; e.g. Plato's world of Ideas and 
world of objects. Sensationalism is the doctrine that ideas 
are constituted solely of sense-elements ; Rationalism, 
as opposed to Sensationalism, is the view that elements 
of knowledge are contributed by the mind. The Sophists 
were sensationalists ; Democritus and Plato were ration- 
alists. Idealism — known also as Spiritualism — holds 
that the universe " is the embodiment of reason " ; Ma- 
terialism insists that matter furnishes a sufficient explana- 
tion of the universe. The Socratic philosophers were 
idealists and rationalists ; the Stoics and Epicureans were 
materialists. We have learned that the Stoics conceived 
man to be a thinking being ; and the Epicureans regarded 
him as a feeling being. We have also called attention to 
the fact that every experience can be stated in one of three 
ways : as a knowing, feeling, or doing experience. The 
Socratic Philosophy gave supremacy to knowing, i.e. 
to intelligence ; so did the Stoics. This attitude toward 
man and related philosophical questions is known as 
Intellectualism. The Epicureans and the Neo-Platon- 
ists and Mystics give supremacy to feeling, or affection 
as it is termed in Psychology ; and this attitude is called 
Affectivism. In our further study we shall discover that 
some regard the self as essentially will, or volition ; for 
these, man is a willing being. This attitude is known as 
Voluntarism. 



DIVISION B: MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY 
CHAPTER VI 

GENERAL VIEW; PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY; SCHOLASTIC 

PHILOSOPHY 

§ 22. General View of Mediaeval Philosophy. — i. 

Relation to Ancient Philosophy. — Ancient Philosophy, 
during the greater part of its history, developed in rel- 
ative independence of religious instincts and ideas ; but 
in Neo-Platonism this apparent apartness of Religion 
and Philosophy ceased. Mediaeval Philosophy is domi- 
nantly religious. In its beginning it was closely related 
to Neo-Platonism; but it was moved by purposes, and 
took on forms, which clearly distinguish it from that 
Philosophy. Its life and distinguishing characteristics 
have their origin in devotion to Jesus and in the acceptance 
of him and the religious teachings of the Bible as revela- 
tions of the highest truth. Throughout the Mediaeval 
Age, Philosophy continued to claim the whole field of 
scholarly thought, although Mathematics and the Natural 
Sciences were not pursued with ardor except by a few. 
Roger Bacon is the most notable representative of inde- 
pendent and efficient scientific research during this age. 
2. Divisions. — Mediaeval Philosophy will be treated 
under the following heads : I. The Patristic Philosophy 
(150-800 A.D.) ; II. The Scholastic Philosophy (800- 
1450 A.D.) ; III. The Transition (1450-1625 a.d.). The 

47 



48 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

Patristic Philosophy falls naturally into two periods : i. 
Period of Growth (150-430 a.d.) ; ii. Period of Decline 
(430-800 A.D.). The Scholastic Philosophy divides 
readily into three periods : i. The Platonic Period (1000- 
1200 A.D.) ; ii. The Aristotelian Period (1200-1300 a.d.) ; 
iii. Period of Separation (1300-1450 a.d.). 

I. The Patristic Philosophy 

§ 23. Point of View. — The Patristic Philosophy was 
developed by the early expounders of Christian doctrine. 
These teachers are known as the Church Fathers, and the 
Philosophy derives its distinctive name from this fact. 
It regarded the Bible as a source of knowledge super- 
rationally communicated. In holding to the possibility 
and value of knowledge so obtained, it was in agreement 
with Neo-Platonism. But it differed radically from that 
Philosophy in some particulars, among others in this : 
The content of the super-rational knowledge of the 
Patristic Philosophy was fixed, — it was the content of the 
Old and New Testaments ; whereas the knowledge to 
be obtained through mental ecstasy — the super-rational 
knowledge of Neo-Platonism — had no fixed content. 
The widespread opposition to Christianity set the task 
for these first exponents of Christian Philosophy. They 
undertook to defend Christian truth ; and in order to 
defend it, they were obliged to discover and specify the 
particulars of Christian doctrine. Much of the content 
of the Christian doctrine was believed by the Fathers to 
have been obtained through a super-rational mode of 
communication. This content was accepted as valid 
because of faith in its source and the mode in which it 
was communicated. From this the Christian doctrine 
itself came to be known as the Christian faith, or simply 
the faith. Hence in the writings of the Fathers and those 



PATRISTIC AND SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY 49 

who succeeded them, we find that the term " faith " 
signifies the mental process by which the Christian 
doctrine is appropriated, and also the doctrine itself. 
Faith thus conceived is set over against reason. Reason 
signifies intellective activity and the knowledge obtained 
through intellective activity ; and faith signifies a mode 
of cognition distinct from intellection, also that content 
of knowledge which is distinctively Christian. From 
these distinctions as to mode of cognition and knowledge 
contents, there arose the question of the relation of faith 
and reason, and the kindred question of the relation of 
Revelation and Philosophy. 

Man is regarded as central to the universe, and it is 
believed that his destiny gives significance to all historical 
movements. In other words, this Philosophy is anthro- 
pocentric. Revelation is thought of as progressive and 
as determined with a view to the gradual enlightenment 
of mankind ; that is, revelation is teleologic. In fact, 
the Fathers held that all history is teleologic. 

i. Period of Growth 

§ 24. Doctrines. — i. Revelation and Philosophy. — 
All but a few of the Fathers assumed the inner harmony 
of Philosophy and Revelation and insisted that Chris- 
tianity is the highest Philosophy. 

2. Mind and Matter. — Most of the Fathers held to the 
ultimate distinctness of mind and matter and the im- 
materiality of the soul. A few had a materialistic con- 
ception of mind. 

3. God and Reality. — The dominant Patristic Philos- 
ophy conceived God as personal and spiritual, the creator 
of the world and man. Origen insisted that reality is 
spiritual in its nature, that God is the true real, that 
the spiritual ideas in man constitute the real in him, that the 

E 



so INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

highest reality in God is the creative will, and that will is 
the essential expression of personality. He was a Volun- 
tarist. 

4. Augustine ; His Doctrine and Method. — Augustine 
was the philosopher and the theologian of the early Chris- 
tian community ; and his philosophy is the philosophy 
of much of the religious thought of to-day. He attained 
conceptions which seem almost modern. His starting 
point is experience of self ; in this he advanced beyond all 
who had preceded him. He argues thus : I know that 
I have sensations ; this indubitable fact carries with it 
the certainty that I am ; and this certainty also attaches 
to all phases of consciousness, since consciousness is 
unitary. He held that reason furnishes the standard for 
— i.e. the norms of — truth and right and beauty ; the 
authoritativeness and the sameness of these norms for 
all subjects constitute the warrant of their universal 
validity. 

His Doctrine of Reality. — We find reality in our con- 
sciousness of self ; and we are conscious of ourselves as 
being and knowing and willing ; therefore being, knowing, 
and willing are attributes of reality. We may not affirm 
knowing and willing of a body, hence a body is a defective 
reality. Man does not have fulness of being and knowl- 
edge, and he is not perfectly free in willing ; hence 
man is also a defective reality. God alone is the perfect 
reality. 

His Doctrine of Knowledge. — We attain knowledge by 
reflecting upon our sense-impressions and our intellectual 
life. We need Divine aid both in reception of truth and 
in reflecting upon it; and this aid is given in the Bible 
and the gracious illumination of the individual. Faith is a 
condition of knowing and is ultimately resolved into 
knowledge ; it is not opposed to reason. 



PATRISTIC AND SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY 51 

ii. Period of Decline 

§ 25. Period of Decline. — Philosophical discussion 
degenerated to what was little better than word-juggling. 
It aroused mental activity, but was out of touch with 
the world of reality. Apart from the work of two men — 
Erigena and Gerbert — there is little in this period that 
would be of value for our study. Erigena was virtually 
a Neo-Platonist. He held that God is the substance of 
the world, and that God himself is without mode of being, 
but takes determinate form in the world. The doctrine 
that God is the substance of the world is Pantheism. 
Gerbert, who travelled extensively, came into contact 
with Arabians and became interested in their scientific 
researches. He urged that the pursuit of empty word- 
subtilities be given up and that thought be directed 
to the study of nature. But Christian thought at large 
did not turn to scientific methods and investigations until 
much later. 

II. The Scholastic Philosophy 

§ 26. General View. — i. The Task of Philosophy. — 
It was now generally accepted that the Fathers had settled 
the form and substance of truth. The Christian doctrines 
as set forth in the Patristic Philosophy were also regarded 
as the standards, and truth and untruth were determined by 
conformity or non-conformity to these teachings, or dogmas. 
In this period, the religious consciousness has the chief place 
in philosophical thought. Primacy over reason is given to 
faith, and reason is made to serve the interests of faith. 
The task of Philosophy is to explain and justify Christian 
dogma. 

2. The Form which the Problem Assumed. — The ablest 
exponent of Patristic Philosophy had established con- 



52 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

sciousness as the starting-point of philosophical inquiry. 
Scholastic Philosophy does not continue the development 
of Augustine's thought ; it reverts to a question which was 
discussed by Plato and Aristotle — the question as to 
whether reality is in the universal or the particular (§§ 14, 
4; 15, 3). Out of the controversy which was consequent 
upon this statement of the philosophical problem, there 
developed three philosophic doctrines ; these are known 
as Realism, Nominalism, and Conceptualism. These 
doctrines did not originate in this period ; but the interests 
of the church at this time gave them such value as to 
bring them into prominence. They are involved in sub- 
sequent philosophic thought ; in fact, this question of 
reality is even now a matter of controversy, but presents 
itself in a somewhat different form. 

Realism. — The Realists held that universals alone are 
real. " Rose," the universal, is real ; a particular rose — 
as that rose in the vase — is an imperfect copy, an in- 
complete and changeful expression, of the universal 
" rose," and it is by that much unreal. This is readily 
recognized to be the same with Plato's doctrine of the Idea 
and the sense-object. 

Nominalism. — The Nominalists insisted that the uni- 
versal is a mere word ; the more extreme would say that 
it is a mere sound. Thus, " rose," the universal, is a mere 
word ; and there is no objective reality corresponding to 
this word. Only the independent particular is real. 
We may have a number of objects each of which is a rose ; 
but the " rose " class is merely a mental construct; there 
is no such objective reality. What is true of groups is 
also true of parts of an individual object ; they are mental 
figments. 

Conceptualism. — Conceptualism is intermediate be- 
tween Realism and Nominalism. According to it the 



PATRISTIC AND SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY 53 

universal " rose " is a mental construct; but it is true for 
individual flowers, because it has ground in the characteris- 
tics which are common to certain flowers. The univer- 
sal has no objective reality, merely as a universal^ but it is 
objectively real in all individuals which have the common 
marks. This connects directly with Socrates' doctrine 
of the concept. 

These views variously modified are present in subsequent 
Philosophy. The Schoolmen, the learned men, — or Doc- 
tors, — of this period contrasted these doctrines in certain 
concise formulas. The doctrine of Realism was said to 
be Universalia ante rem (Universals are before the thing, 
or sense-object) ; the doctrine of Nominalism, Universalia 
post rem (Universals ajter the thing) ; the doctrine of 
Conceptualism, Universalia in re (Universals in the thing). 

§ 27. What gave this Discussion Importance. — To 
the church, this controversy was no mere dispute about 
words ; grave consequences were involved in it. The 
church declared in favor of Realism, because the leading 
Doctors believed that it was vital to the church and its, 
dogmas. According to Realism, only the universal church 
is real ; hence authority is in the universal church. Ac- 
cording to Nominalism, the so-called universal church is 
a mere term. It is a convenient term for thought and inter- 
course ; but the only real church is the particular church. 
If Nominalism be true, it would seem to follow that in- 
dividual experience is the only real expression of religious 
reality ; and leaders in the church believed that this would 
destroy the reality and authoritativeness of general dogmas. 
Realism was also accordant with the doctrine of the Unity 
in the Trinity ; whereas Nominalism would involve the 
conclusion that each of the three persons in the Trinity 
is an independent reality, and that the Oneness of the 
Trinity is a mere mental concept, i.e. Nominalism led to 



54 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

TrI-thelsm. It Is not strange, therefore, that the church 
held with Realism and condemned Nominalism ; and as the 
Philosophy of this age is the product of the church. Realism 
was the prevailing philosophic doctrine. But extreme 
Realism tended toward Pantheism, and this led some to 
revolt from it. It must not be concluded that this dis- 
cussion is simply an incident in the historical past of Phi- 
losophy. This question is with us to-day in the inquiry 
as to what may be said of the reality of the laws of nature 
and the reality of scientific concepts — as atoms, electrons, 
sensations, memory, etc. 

i. The Platonic Period 

§ 28. Representative Teachers. — In this period, the 
Platonic Philosophy stated the problem, and it largely 
determined the generally accepted doctrine and its inter- 
pretation. We will give the views of three teachers — 
a representative of each of the three types of doctrine dis- 
cussed in the two sections preceding this. 

1 . Anselm was a Realist, — This is shown in his argu- 
ment for the existence of God. It is sufficient for our 
purpose here to state that his argument is determined by 
his belief that reality is in the universal, not in the 
particular. He also believed that faith precedes knowl- 
edge, that faith and reason are in agreement, and that the 
church doctrines are rationally intelligible. 

2. Roscellin represents Extreme Nominalism. — He in- 
sisted that only individuals are real, and that a universal is 
merely a human device for the inclusion of different reals 
or qualities. He was a Sensationalist and a Tri-theist. 

3. Abelard was opposed to Realism because of its ten- 
dency to develop into Pantheism ; he contended that it 
was inherently pantheistic. Abelard laid the foundations 
of Conceptualism. As stated by him, this doctrine would 



PATRISTIC AND SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY 55 

run thus : The universal exists before the particulars in 
the mind of God, as a type ; after the particulars in the 
mind of man, as the result of conceptual thought ; in the 
particulars, as likeness of qualities and relations, i.e. as 
likeness of accidents. The prevalent thought of this 
period regarded the Christian dogmas as the standard of 
truth, and as authority for reason in otherwise doubt- 
ful cases ; but Abelard insisted that in doubtful cases 
reason should be recognized as judge. He was opposed 
in this ; and the opposition to him developed a Christian 
Mysticism. 



CHAPTER VII 
SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY (continued) ; the transition 

it. The Aristotelian Period 

§ 29. General View. — Aristotle's principal writings 
were unknown to the Fathers and to the eariier Schoolmen. 
They were recovered during the latter part of the Platonic 
period, and their recovery imparted a new zest to philo- 
sophic study. Aristotle's dominance in reflective thought 
began, and all subsequent Science and Philosophy have 
been greatly influenced by him.. Settled dogma had 
become authority for faith; Aristotle became authority 
for reason. 

1. Philosophy and Theology; Faith and Reason. — 
Two kinds of knowledge are recognized : That which is 
attained through faith ; and that which is acquired through 
reason. Philosophy and Theology, reason and faith, 
are regarded as harmonious ; but distinct provinces are as- 
signed them. It was held that Philosophy deals with truths 
which may be attained and comprehended by reason ; 
and that Theology deals with truths which are beyond 
the reach of reason, but may be acquired through faith 
in the Christian revelation. Philosophy has rationality 
for its guide ; Theology is guided by revelation. " Theol- 
ogy views truth in the light of Divine revelation ; Philos- 
ophy views it in the light of reason." 

2. Arabian Influence. — The Mohammedan conquests 
brought Arabian scholars into contact with the results 

56 



SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY 57 

of the Grseco-Roman scientific activity and put the works 
of Aristotle into their hands. They achieved much in 
Science ; but, with the exception of Averroes, they ac- 
compHshed little in general Philosophy. Jewish students 
became acquainted with the work of the Arabians ; and, 
through their extended commercial relations, they fur- 
thered the distribution of the Arabian thought throughout 
the West. The Jews themselves made no material con- 
tribution to Philosophy ; Maimonides, their ablest thinker, 
simply gave a Jewish dress to Averroes. Scholastic 
Philosophy proper had no special scientific interest, except 
in the instance of Albert the Great and Roger Bacon ; 
and they seem to have been aroused by the scientific 
activity of the Arabians. 

3. Moderate Realism. — Moderate Realism was the 
view generally held of the relation to reality of the uni- 
versal and the particular. It may be stated thus : The 
universal exists before particulars in the mind of God, as 
a type ; after particulars in the mind of man ; in particu- 
lars as the essence of each particular. Comparison of this 
with Abelard's statement of Conceptualism shows that 
these doctrines differ at one point ; and the difference is 
important. Conceptualism finds the universal in like- 
ness of accidents ; Moderate Realism finds it in the essence, 
not the accidents, of particulars. According to Abelard, 
the universal is a mere thought-construct, and is grounded 
in phenomenal likeness ; according to Moderate Realism, 
the universal is grounded in identity of essence. This 
modified Realism connects directly with Aristotle ; its 
universal corresponds to Aristotle's Form. 

§ 30. Other Doctrines. — i. Philosophy and Theology. 
— Albertus Magnus held that the realm of faith lies be- 
yond the world of reason, and that it is the continuation 
and completion of reason. In relating Philosophy and 



58 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

Theology, Thomas Aquinas, who studied under Albert, 
distinguished three orders of truths. The mysteries 
of faith — as the doctrine of the Trinity — are in the 
highest order, and he assigned these mysteries to Theology. 
Truths of the next lower order — as those relating to 
man's destiny and the existence of God — he assigned to 
both Theology and Philosophy. Truths of the lowest 
order he sets over to Philosophy. Roger Bacon taught 
that Theology is based on the authority of the Divine 
will, all other knowledge on experience or reason. 

2. Cognition. — Albert insisted that the mind can only 
know what is within itself ; and he inferred from this that 
the immediate object of knowledge is an idea. The Stoics 
and Epicureans held the same view as to what the im- 
mediately known object is. Until relatively late in the 
modern age of Philosophy, it was held, without serious 
question, that what we perceive is a state of consciousness. 
Thomas Aquinas sought to explain the process in cogni- 
tion. He taught that the soul and the object interact and 
this interaction produces a copy of the object in the mind, 
and that what the subject perceives is this mental copy 
of the object, and not the object itself. Thus, in seeing 
a tree, or hearing a song, the mind and the object interact 
and produce a mental copy of the tree or the song ; and 
we perceive this mental representation of what is itself 
external to the mind. 

3. Man. — Aquinas developed Aristotle's doctrine of 
Forms and applied it to man. He distinguished two 
classes of Forms — Inherent and Subsistential ; the latter 
have being within themselves. The former realize them- 
selves in matter; the latter are active intelligences and 
realize themselves apart from matter. These two orders 
of Forms are, according to him, united in man ; and man, 
as subsistential Form, may exist apart from the body. 



SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY 59 

4. I ntelle dualism. — The philosophers of this period 
followed Aristotle in giving supremacy to intellect 
over will and feeling. Averroes, the noted Arabian 
philosopher, went so far as to deny volition to the Supreme. 
He contended that the subject wills, and only wills, be- 
cause he has a sense of imperfection ; and, as the Supreme 
is perfect, we may not think of him as willing. This view 
is also found in Modern Philosophy. 

5. Science. — Albert made original scientific researches 
and was himself an authority in Natural Science for his 
period. Roger Bacon's great work in the sciences, his 
intense ardor, and the persecution he had to endure are 
well-known facts. Three centuries passed before Christian 
thought gave itself to scientific investigation; but, in 
the meantime, some of the ablest minds took part in 
preparing the way for its ultimate recognition as a worthy 
line of study. 

Hi. Period of Separation 

§ 31. General View. — The Patristic Philosophy as- 
sumed the harmony of faith and reason, but the Philosophy 
of this period held that that which distinguishes the Chris- 
tian faith is of a realm distinct from reason. Religion was 
even thought to be independent of a reasoned explanation 
or foundation for the truth it declared ; it was regarded 
rather as an attitude of submission to authoritative state- 
ment. In keeping with this, the church Doctors taught 
that the church doctrines needed no reasoned justification. 
An ardent and influential Mysticism developed ; it had 
its source in the teachings of Thomas Aquinas. Intel- 
lectualism was prevalent in this period, so much so that 
although Mysticism has a natural affinity for Affectivism, 
Eckhart, a typical Mystic, was an intellectualist. Duns 
Scotus was by way of exception a voluntarist. 



6o INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

§ 32. Particular Doctrines. — i. Thomas Aquinas had 
assigned some Christian doctrines — as creation and im- 
mortality — to a field common to Philosophy and Theol- 
ogy; Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, Doctors of 
this period, assigned all religious truths to Theology and 
gave Philosophy a purely secular field. They contended 
that the church, and not reason, is the authority for faith ; 
and that a proposition may be both true and false — say 
true according to reason and false according to faith. 

2. Cognition. — Duns Scotus held with Thomas Aqui- 
nas that what we apprehend in cognition is a mental 
copy of the external object. William of Ockham believed 
with Scotus and Aquinas that an idea is interposed between 
the subject and the object; but he differed from them in 
holding that this interposed idea is a mere sign of the object, 
not a mental copy of it. Both views have been held in 
some form down to the present. 

3. Mysticism. — Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa are 
representative Mystics. They were men of unusual 
ability. Our limitations do not permit such a statement 
as would adequately indicate their influence upon sub- 
sequent Philosophy. Eckhart gave German Philosophy 
its earliest form of expression. Both he and Nicholas 
were learned in Science. Nicholas insisted that the earth 
revolves around the sun, anticipating Copernicus in this. 
German Mysticism has its source in Eckhart. For him 
the church doctrines are temporal symbols of eternal 
truth, and this truth is purely spiritual. He was an in- 
tellectualist ; but he believed that eternal truth, which is 
the spiritual essence of all that appears, may be had by all 
the pious, and only by the pious. Both he and Nicholas 
were extreme Realists. Nicholas taught that God, the 
One, is real; and that the Many come to reality in the 
One. 



THE TRANSITION 6i 

III. Time of Transition 

§ 33. General View. — The Natural Sciences begin to 
receive such attention as had not been given them in the 
Mediaeval Philosophy, and scientific methods and ends are 
coming to definition. Among the thinkers of this period 
we find Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Kepler, and Galileo. 
Hitherto the Aristotelian astronomy had been accepted, 
and the earth was conceived as the centre of the universe. 
The new astronomy and the new conclusions in Science 
gave a new view of man's position in the universe and a new 
estimate of his importance. The new Science would lead 
to the conclusion that the earth and man are relatively 
unimportant. As a consequence, thinkers were inclined to 
doubt the older conceptions and to seek a new point of 
view. Independent Philosophy discarded Aristotle ; in 
discarding him it rejected what was true in his system 
along with what was false. The Christian conception 
of God and man and the world had been identified by most 
teachers with the Aristotelian science ; and this led those 
who held to the Scholastic Philosophy to attack the new 
Science. 

§ 34. Transitional Schools. — i. The Italian School 
was naturalistic and insisted that the universe and all its 
phenomena, including mental and moral phenomena, may 
be explained in terms of the physical world. Bruno, the 
ablest of this school, held that God, an eternal spirit, 
is the original matter of this world and the only reality. 
But he also held that the universe is composed of a num- 
ber of ultimate monads ; and in writing of these, he some- 
times speaks as if he were a Pluralist. Campanella, a 
Sensationalist, contended that we perceive, not objects, 
but states of consciousness which objects arouse in us ; 
and that sense-qualities — as color and taste — which we 



62 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

assign to objects are states of consciousness which are 
for us signs of the objects. 

2. The German School was distinctly Mystical. Jacob 
Boehme, its most notable representative, sought to unite 
religious Philosophy and Science. His favorite thought 
of the world was that it is an organism developing outward 
from within. According to him, the highest knowledge 
comes of illumination, not reflection. All creature con- 
sciousness is, in his view, God's consciousness ; never- 
theless he thinks of God as somehow other than the 
universe. 

§ 35. Summary of Characteristics of the Mediaeval 
Philosophy. — i . General. — The Mediaeval philosophic 
aim was definitely religious. The relation of Philosophy 
and Theology, hence also of reason and faith, was a 
dominant question. It passed through the following 
stages : (i) They were assumed to be identical ; (2) They 
were regarded as supplementary, with some province in 
common ; (3) They were thought to be supplementary, 
with different provinces. Faith and Theology were gen- 
erally deemed to be the higher in rank. Their relation, 
as conceived, may also be stated thus : (i) In the Patristic 
Period the task assigned Philosophy was that of deter- 
mining and defending Christian dogma ; (2) In the 
Scholastic Period, Philosophy was subject to the Chris- 
tian dogmas, being required to accept these dogmas as 
criteria of validity ; (3) By the close of the time of Transi- 
tion, religion and Philosophy are set in a relation somewhat 
like that which obtained in the Greek Philosophy, but 
with a noteworthy difference. The Greek Philosophy 
down to Neo-Platonism did not have a determinative 
religious aim, and it made no endeavor to find a philo- 
sophic justification for religious faith. In contrast with 
this, the Mediaeval Philosophy owes its being and its 



THE TRANSITION 63 

distinguishing qualities to the religious life. The early 
Christians felt called upon to give a systematic and 
reasoned statement of their views to the world that mis- 
understood them, and to defend these views against the 
attacks of their enemies. In doing this, they were forced 
to relate their religious life to Philosophy. The effort 
to relate Philosophy and the religious life discovered an 
important fact : Philosophy will not submit to external 
authority ; it cannot and be true to itself. It cannot 
accept aught the acceptance of which is not justified by 
reason ; and it is bound to accept whatever bears the 
certification of reason. But while Philosophy may not 
submit to external authority, even though it speak in the 
name of religion, it may not be indifferent to the religious 
consciousness, to its instincts and its contents ; for re- 
ligious experience gives content to our general experience, 
and questions respecting object and subject cannot have 
full answer apart from the recognition of the reality and 
the significance of the religious consciousness. 

2. Various Doctrines. — Attempts to explain the cogni- 
tive process have led some to conclude that what is 
immediately known is a mental image of the external 
object; others hold that the known object is a state of 
consciousness which is a sign of the object. According to 
either view, what the subject immediately knows is a 
subjective state, not the external object. The doctrine 
of Reality remains a question of difference. There are 
Realists, who hold with Plato, and Nominalists, according 
to whom the universal is a mere device for facilitating 
thought. Moderate Realists and Conceptualists are 
found ; and they agree that, as to the world of nature, the 
universal is real, but that it has no reality apart from the 
particular. Conceptualism finds the universal and its 
reality in the phenomenal likeness of particulars ; Moder- 



64 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

ate Realism finds the reality of the universal in the essen- 
tial likeness of individuals. The tri-phasal character of 
consciousness is recognized ; and some give emphasis and 
authority to intellection, others to the will, still others to 
feeling. Realism shows pantheistic affinities. An im- 
plicit Dualism pervades much of Philosophy. This is 
manifest in the assumed mutual exclusiveness of mind 
and matter, and of subject and object, and in the asserted 
apartness of faith and reason which we find in the later 
Mediaeval thought. The way is prepared for a more 
general recognition of the worth of scientific studies, for 
freedom to pursue them without incurring authoritative 
opposition, and for the development of Science. 



DIVISION C: MODERN PHILOSOPHY 
CHAPTER VIII 

GENERAL VIEW 

§ 36. Introductory. — i. Some Contrasts. — The Pre- 
Socratic Philosophy occupied itself mostly with the object ; 
Modern Philosophy begins with the subject. Mediseval 
Philosophy is restricted by its partial aim — which was 
religious — and by its submission to authority ; Modern 
Philosophy acknowledges no restrictions except those 
involved in the demand that reflective thought shall be 
true to reason. Hitherto the problem of Reality has been 
resolved into the question as to whether reality is in the 
universal or the particular, and Realism has signified the 
doctrine that the universal is real. The Modern Age 
states this problem differently and in a way that seems to 
bring it nearer the common conception. Modern Phi- 
losophy studies the reality of the world of other persons 
and things and events ; it would know what is the nature 
of the reality of the objective world, what the reality of 
the universe is. We shall learn further on that the doc- 
trine of Realism to-day is something very different from the 
Realism which we have found in our study thus far. 

2. Cognition. — In the Summary at the close of § 18 

we note that philosophers were undertaking to describe 

and explain the cognitive process. Two factors were 

recognized — the object and the subject; and question 

F 65 



66 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

had been already raised as to the activity and passivity 
of the mind in cognition. Democritus, the Atomist, 
regarded the mind as active in attaining knowledge; and 
the Socratic philosophers certainly held the same view. 
But there were those who insisted that ideas are composed 
solely of sense-elements ; they would even reduce the 
thought-products of reflection to sensation. Out of the 
discussion incident to this study of cognition, there de- 
veloped two opposed attitudes. These attitudes repre- 
sent opposing views of the relation of the mind and the 
object in perception. There were those who would begin 
with the object in explaining this process ; they would em- 
phasize the impression which the object makes upon the 
subject through sensations which it arouses. They would, 
for example, describe your perception of a tree thus : You are 
looking over the landscape ; the tree intercepts your vision ; 
it acts upon you through your visual sense-organs and 
arouses sensations ; and these sensations are in some way 
so combined as to give you a perception of the tree. 
Similarly as to the dinner-bell which breaks in upon your 
study. This is a very general, yet sufficiently specific, 
illustration of what is called the sensational theory of 
cognition. It contends that there is nothing in the in- 
tellect which has not been in the senses. According to 
this theory, we have a datum, a somewhat given, to con- 
sciousness ; and this datum coming from without is the 
sole material of knowledge. As thus viewed, experience 
is merely datum to consciousness, conceived apart from 
mental activity, and hence does not include any content 
of consciousness that comes of thought. Any theory of 
cognition which limits experience to sense-data and finds 
its point of beginning and the total material of knowledge 
in experience, is known as Empiricism. Our experience 
comes of commerce with other persons and things and our 



GENERAL VIEW 67 

Interest In events. In every moment of our Intercourse 
with the objective world, we are mentally active; and 
all actual experience, viewed as a process, has an element 
of mental activity. Hence experience as conceived by 
Empiricism Is Incomplete ; In fact, it is not real experi- 
ence, it lacks an essential element. There Is no such ex- 
perience as this Empiricism assumes ; for there Is no ex- 
perience apart from mental activity. 

The opposing theory begins with rational activity, or 
reason. It contends that there is no sensation apart from 
mental activity; that there is no experience which is a 
mere datum to consciousness, or Impression upon It, from 
without ; and that rational activity Itself always contrib- 
utes somewhat to perception. Inasmuch as this theory 
emphasizes the rational factor and would find the key to 
the problem In the activity of reason. It Is known as Ra- 
tionalism. Rationalism and Empiricism are thus seen 
to be opposing theories of cognition. Empiricism In Its 
crudest and extremest form makes knowledge to come to 
man from without; Rationalism In Its extremest form 
would make knowledge purely subjective. It would come 
wholly from within. It Is doubtful If any one at present 
takes either extreme view. These two theories, as thus 
described, are opposed philosophical methods or modes 
of approach to the problem of knowing. One approach Is 
by way of the rational activity of the subject; the other 
by way of the object regarded as acting upon the sense- 
organs of the subject. 

3. Immediate Object of Knowledge. — Up to the begin- 
ning of the modern age of Philosophy and down to a rel- 
atively late period in this age. It seems to have been 
assumed that the immediate object of knowledge Is sub- 
jective, — In and of the subject; and that the subject 
passes by some mental process from this subjective object 



68 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

to mental grasp of the external object. Some have held 
that the object, through its action upon the sense-organs 
of the subject, produces in the subject a mental image 
of the object ; others, that it produces a state of conscious- 
ness which is a mere sign of the object. Some conceive 
of this image or state of consciousness as the product of the 
interaction of subject and object. But all, at the begin- 
ning of the modern age of Philosophy and for some time 
after, held that the immediate object of knowledge is an 
idea or a state of consciousness, and not the external 
object. Further on we shall find that this assumption is 
challenged. 

4. Rationalism. — We have found that Philosophy is 
unwilling to submit any of its questions to external au- 
thority for final settlement. It holds that reason is the 
sole authority for reason. In this relation, reason signifies 
the mind as active, with special emphasis upon intel- 
lective activity. The Socratic philosophers appealed to 
reason alone ; Augustine found the standard of truth in 
reason ; and the endeavor of Mediaeval Philosophy to 
relate faith and reason concluded the discussion of this 
question. That conclusion is that reason must pass upon 
all claims to validity ; and it will accept no certificate of 
validity except such as reason itself issues. As Philosophy 
is the reasoned consideration of experience, its conclusions 
must be the conclusions of rationality. This philosophical 
attitude — that of unwillingness to submit the settlement 
of philosophical questions to authority — is known as 
Rationalism ; and, in this sense, all Modern Philosophy is 
rationalistic. Rationalism as a philosophical attitude 
is to be distinguished from Rationalism as a theory. As 
a theory, it is opposed to Empiricism ; and when we speak, 
as we shall, of Idealistic and Realistic Rationalists, we 
have in mind those who are opposed to Empiricism, those 



GENERAL VIEW 69 

who hold that the mind contributes content to knowl- 
edge. 

§ 37. Schools in Modern Philosophy. — The Modern 
Schools will be treated in the following order : Sub- 
stantialists (1625-1750) ; Earlier Empiricists (1625-1820) ; 
Idealistic Rationalists (1750-) ; Realistic Rationalists 
(1750-) ; Later Empiricists (1820-). Following this, we 
will append a concise statement of the differing philo- 
sophical attitudes of the present. 



CHAPTER IX 

SUBSTANTIALISTS : EARLY EMPIRICISTS 

I. The Substantialists 

§ 38. General View. — The philosophers whose views 
we are about to consider, were extreme Rationalists, at 
least in purpose. They would find the basis of Philosophy 
in reason apart from experience of the external world. 
Descartes, from whom Modern Philosophy dates, takes 
this position definitely ; and those of this school who come 
after him, do not free themselves from the limitations of 
this fundamental assumption. In constructing their 
Philosophy, they make much of substance. It is with 
them the ultimate reality ; and the differences in their 
teachings arise from their differing conceptions of sub- 
stance. All of them conceive substance as that which 
exists " in such a way as to stand in need of no other 
thing in order " that it may exist. Substance manifests 
itself in some mode or modes, but it is not a mere mode ; 
it is that which exists in some mode. What we know 
about substance, we know through its having marks or 
qualities ; but these marks or qualities are accidents of the 
substance, not the substance itself. They agree so far; 
but they differ in their conception of the nature of sub- 
stance. They agree also in regarding the changes of the 
universe as being mechanically effected ; they believe that 
these changes are effects produced by causes external to 
the objects in which the changes take place. 

70 



SUBSTANTIALIST^ 71 

§ 39. Doctrines of Representative Substantialists. — 

Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz are representative Sub- 
stantialists. 

1. Philosophic Method. — Descartes believed that ex- 
perience — and experience with him is sense-experience — 
is deceptive, and that only that knowledge is valid whose 
origin is in human intelligence and whose basal content is 
contributed by reason. He also believed that the prin- 
ciples of intelligence have their expression in mathematics ; 
and he concluded from this that mathematics would furnish 
the true philosophic method. But mathematics is a de- 
velopment of ideas that are immediately (or intuitively) 
known, ideas whose truth is self-evident ; and he held 
that we should similarly deduce Philosophy from some 
indubitable principle. He found such a principle in the con- 
sciousness that he doubted. He could not doubt the fact 
of his doubting; hence it was evident to him that he 
thought. This is the origin of his famous, Cogito, ergo 
sum. He is not to be understood as arguing from the fact 
of his thinking to the fact of his existence. " Therefore 
I am " is implicit in "I think." What he would assert 
is, that he has an immediate certainty of his own existence. 
This was his indubitable principle ; but, in making his 
deductions from it, he regarded it as the same with cer- 
tainty of his own existence as a thinking substance. That 
is, Descartes assumed that his immediate apprehension of/ ^ 
himself as doubting was the same with knowledge of him-^^ 
self as thinking substance ; and he believed that he had C3L- 
discovered this without appeal to sense-experience 
Spinoza and Leibniz adopted Descartes' method, t 
method of deduction from rationality; and Spinoza was 
even more severely mathematical than Descartes. 

2. Substance. — Descartes begins with self as thinking 
substance; and from the existence of self he undertakes 





72 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 



\ 



to prove the existence of God. Consideration of his argu- 
ment for the existence of God does not fall in with our 
purpose at this point; what we would note here is, his 
belief that the existence of self involves the existence of 
God. His conception of substance is, that it is that which 
has no need of any other that it may exist ; and he holds 
consequently that God is the sole primary substance, for 
God alone has no need of any other that he may exist. The 
self as thinking — i.e. the mind — is in his view dependent 
upon God for being; it is, therefore, created or relative 
substance. Following this he grounds his belief in the 
reality of material substance upon two facts : that God 
would not give us over to deception, and that material 
objects force themselves upon our attention. In this way, 
Descartes finds one primary substance, God, and two 
created substances — mind and matter. 

Spinoza's conception of substance differs from Descartes' 
in one important particular. To Descartes' definition of 
substance as that which exists by itself, he adds an attribute 
— it is that which is conceived by itself alone. From this he 
concludes that, since substance is not dependent upon any- 
thing for its conception, there is only one substance. For 
him there is only one reality, and God is that reality. 

According to Descartes and Spinoza, substance is inde- 
pendent existence ; according to Leibniz, it is independent 
activity. He believed that there are many independent 
individual existences ; and that activity is the essential 
characteristic of each of these. He called them monads. 
Descartes' system was dualistic. Spinoza was a Monist, 
and Leibniz was a Pluralist. 

3. Leibniz^ s Monads. — Leibniz's monad is in no sense 
a physical entity ; it is a force-centre. The monads are 
conceived by him to be independent centres of activity, 
each of which is sufficient unto itself, These naonadg 



SUBSTANTIALISTS 73 

combined into groups compose the objects which make 
up the universe. In each organic group — as a plant, an 
animal, or a man — there is a central monad. This 
central monad most fully and definitely represents the 
idea of the group ; and it is also a peculiar representation 
of the universe, for the universe has a specific and 
particular representation in every monad. Man is a 
self-conscious group-monad. Below man the monads 
have lessening degrees of consciousness until in plants and 
inorganic objects consciousness is wholly wanting. The 
perfection of the monad is its conscious representation 
of the universe. Above man is God, the highest monad ; 
the universe is perfectly represented in him. Every 
monad is active toward the expression of the ideal which 
is completely represented in God. 

4. Mind and Matter. — According to Descartes, mind 
is thinking substance and matter is extended substance. 
Bodies are distinguished from one another by diiferences 
of form, size, place, and motion ; and form, size, place, and 
motion are modes of extension. Minds differ as to modes of 
consciousness — judgments, ideas, and will. He believed 
color, taste, and sound to be modes of consciousness, not 
qualities of perceived objects ; i.e. they are not properties 
of the object, but states of consciousness of the subject. 
Democritus had propounded a similar doctrine ; he taught 
that color, odor, taste, and sound arise in sense-perception. 
With Spinoza, thought and extension are not substances ; 
they are attributes of the one and only substance — God. 
They are two aspects, but not the only aspects, of the one 
substance. Leibniz's monads are immaterial. 

5. Knowledge. — We have stated Descartes' view as to 
how valid knowledge may be attained. His criterion of 
truth was clearness and distinctness. By "clearness" he 
meant what is immediately present to the mind ; by '' dis- 



74 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

tinctness," what is in itself clear and exactly defined. We 
have this clearness and distinctness in our knowledge of 
self in self-consciousness ; and he held that to be true which 
is thus clear and distinct. Spinoza did not criticise his 
own processes ; he naively assumed that what he held 
to be knowledge could be accepted without question. To 
clearness and distinctness he added another mark of 
validity — adequacy. He believed that what is obtained 
through sense-experience is inadequate ; that which is 
attained through reason, by deduction, he regarded as 
adequate. He also accepted the fact and adequacy of 
intuitive knowledge. In this mode of cognition, he be- 
lieved that we see everything in the light of God, the one 
substance. Leibniz describes the monads as "window- 
less " ; nothing " can enter them or depart from them." We 
might conclude then that for him knowledge of the external 
world is impossible ; for, according to this conception, the 
monad can only know its own states. But Leibniz avoided 
this consequence, for he also held that every monad " is a 
mirror of the cosmos" ; i.e. that the cosmos is represented 
in the monad. It follows, then, according to his view, 
that the more clear and definite the consciousness, the 
better and fuller the knowledge of the universe. The idea 
in the conscious self is one with the idea in the universe, 
and knowledge of the self is knowledge of the cosmos. 

6. Mechanism and Teleology. — According to these 
philosophers, nature is perceived as subject to mechanical 
law. Every event is the necessary consequent of some 
preceding event. But Leibniz gave the succession of 
events a teleological significance ; for he conceived the 
whole course of nature and history as progress in the ex- 
pression of the ideal which is represented in God, the cen- 
tral monad. 

7. Parallelism. — Spinoza was a Monist, nevertheless 



SUBSTANTIALISTS 75 

he sharply distinguishes extension and thought. He 
conceives them as two orders which are parallel ; and 
he holds that for every mode of thought, there is a parallel 
mode of extension, and that the changes in these orders 
run parallel with each other. The unity of the two orders 
in any instant is in their having the same content of sub- 
stance ; this identical content expresses itself in the one 
instant in a mode of thought and a mode of extension. 
Thus, when I will to sit down and sit down, according to 
Spinoza, my seating myself is not caused by my will ; 
but the one content of substance expresses itself in my 
will and in my sitting down. He proffers in this a parallel 
dualism of phenomena, which is applicable in the descrip- 
tion of related phenomena of mind and body. Ideas 
are causally related to ideas, and motions to motions ; 
but they are in separate orders, orders which do not 
interact. 

8. Pre-established Harmony. — Leibniz conceives the 
monads to be absolutely independent in action ; no one 
of them ever influences another. Nevertheless he believes 
that the changes of the universe are orderly. How is the 
orderliness of these independently active ultimates to be 
explained 1 Leibniz does this by his doctrine of pre- 
established harmony. Every monad is within its limi- 
tations the same with the central monad ; the Creator 
has so made it. Each monad is active in the direction 
of expressing the idea of the central monad ; hence the 
harmony of the activity. The concurrent action of the 
mind in willing to sit down and of the body in sitting, comes 
of the pre-established harmony of the mind and the body. 
This harmony is pre-established, not by the ordering of 
each event, but by giving to each monad an ideal in keep- 
ing with the ultimate end, which is the expression of the 
Divine ideal. 



76 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

II. The Earlier Empiricists 

§ 40. General View. — The Sophists were Empiricists, 
and since their time Empiricism has had continuous rep- 
resentation in Philosophy. It is so consonant with the 
" common-sense " view of the questions involved that 
it finds ready acceptance, especially when it is set in con- 
trast with the subtilties of the Mediaeval Philosophy. 
The fruitless word-combats of the Schoolmen, the apart- 
ness from life of their discussions, and the opposition of the 
Schoolmen to the scientific method prepared the awaken- 
ing mind of the Renaissance to welcome thought which 
appeared to deal with facts instead of abstractions, and 
fitted it to give a sympathetic hearing to a Philosophy 
which pursued a method of observation and induction. 
But Empiricism possibly won most favor from the fact 
that It studied man ; for the time in which It came to 
flower was a time when man and the study of man were 
glorified. The Earlier Empiricism was thus the product 
of the enlightenment which followed the Renaissance. 
This was also the period of the Substantialists. 
These schools were contemporaneous. 

Francis Bacon had prepared the way for this Philosophy. 
In his "Novum Organum," he shows conclusively that we 
can never attain knowledge of the world of nature by argu- 
ing from general truths, and that such knowledge may be 
gained by a study of particular facts. He was not the 
founder of the Inductive method, but he presented this 
method so effectively as to secure attention ; and with this 
he gave method and spirit to Modern Empiricism. Bacon 
virtually confined his studies to Science, as distinguished 
from Philosophy proper. Hobbes, for a time Bacon's 
secretary, adopted Bacon's method and applied it to 
General Philosophy. The Empiricists who come after 



THE EARLIER EMPIRICISTS ^^ 

Hobbes agree with him in two particulars. They hold 
that we do not know the reality of objects, and that the 
immediate object of knowledge is some state of conscious- 
ness. Empiricists approach Philosophy by a study of 
cognition ; and they begin this specific study with an 
analysis of the cognitive process. In this analysis they 
undertake to distinguish the part which sense-experience 
has in this process from that of the mind. They would 
pass from the object through various assumed stages of 
the process to completed knowledge. It belongs to Psy- 
chology to seek an orderly description of processes in con- 
sciousness ; whereas Philosophy would discover the import 
of the cognitive consciousness for the great questions asked 
respecting the world, of which the subject has experience, 
and the subject who has experience of the world. From 
this it is evident that Empiricism arises from an endeavor 
to apply the Psychological method to Philosophy. Our 
first interest in these philosophers is their Epistemology. 
They hold that we do not know reality, that we only know 
appearance. This is the doctrine of Phenomenalism. 

§ 41. Specific Doctrines of Early Empiricists. — Three 
men represent this school — Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. 
Locke was an Empirical Realist, Berkeley was an Empirical 
Idealist, and Hume was an Empirical Sceptic. They all 
accepted that the immediate objects of knowledge are ideas. 

I. Innate Ideas. — Cicero, of the Grseco-Roman 
school, held that certain ideas — as duty, freedom, im- 
mortality — are inborn. This doctrine of innate ideas 
persisted in Philosophy ; and it was accepted that these 
ideas are authoritative and that they constitute rational 
knowledge. Descartes held that all presentations which 
are as clear and distinct as consciousness of self are innate ; 
Spinoza begins his Philosophy with the innate idea of 
substance ; according to LeibniZj all ideas are innate. 



78 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

As the doctrine developed it came to mean, not that man 
has these ideas at birth, but that man is so constituted that 
with the development of the individual subject certain gen- 
eral notions will develop. Locke denied that there are in- 
nate ideas which are authoritative ; but he recognized that 
" there are natural tendencies implanted in the minds of 
men." According to him, " there is nothing in the in- 
tellect which has not been in sense," and the mind at 
birth is like a wax tablet with no writing on it. He in- 
sisted that the mind of every individual is at the begin- 
ning free from pre-determined notions. 

2. Cognition. — Locke believed that the capacity of 
the mind for knowing is merely its capacity for receiving 
impressions, and that all ideas are presentations to the 
mind, not constructions of the mind. He held that our 
knowledge of the external world is through sensation. In 
sensation simple ideas impress themselves upon the passive 
mind ; and these ideas constitute sensitive knowledge. In 
sensitive knowledge we have intuitive certainty that the 
idea is present ; but, as knowledge of the external world, 
it lacks certainty and is inadequate. In reflection, the 
subject is conscious of the operations of his mind as it 
combines simple ideas into complex ideas, as it perceives 
relations and separates ideas from other ideas which accom- 
pany them. In all these operations, the content of con- 
sciousness is furnished by the senses ; and the knowledge 
attained is valid within the world of ideas, and only there. 
We also have intuitive knowledge of our own states. 

Hume held that all knowledge is reducible to impressions. 
We are shut up within the circle of impressions and can 
never get beyond ourselves. There is no knowledge of an 
external world ; we only have knowledge of these im- 
pressions and of the ideas which are memory images of 
impressions. 



THE EARLIER EMPIRICISTS 79 

3. Reality. — Locke accepted the reality of ideas and 
of spiritual and material substance. He conceives sub- 
stance to be the unknown substrate of qualities, to be 
that in which the qualities of an object inhere. He divided 
qualities into two classes — primary and secondary. The 
primary qualities are solidity, extension, figure, motion or 
rest, number; they represent the nature of objects. The 
secondary qualities are color, taste, etc. These secondary 
qualities are what they are because of the effect of objects 
upon our sense-organs ; the object itself does not have 
color or taste. That is, the secondary qualities are de- 
pendent upon the mental and physical organization of the 
subject. Berkeley argued that all qualities, primary as 
well as secondary, are dependent upon mind. He held 
that all we can know of any object is what we can get in 
sense-experience, and that all we can thus obtain is sensa- 
tions. Sensations are for him ideas of sense; and the 
objects of the external world are complexes of ideas of 
sense. An object is merely the complex of perceptible 
qualities. There are no objects outside consciousness ; 
nature is merely a succession of ideas, and natural laws are 
ideas of succession. With Berkeley, idea meant " object 
presented to the senses, or represented in image." " To 
be is to be perceived." He held, therefore, that reality 
is necessarily particular and concrete. Nevertheless, he 
accepted that we may so think a particular as to render 
it universal. Thus, in reasoning about triangles in general, 
the triangle which we draw, or image, is an equilateral, 
an isosceles, or a scalene triangle; but we think of it as 
representing the characteristics which are common to all 
triangles. He would say that this general idea is valid 
for reasoning ; but it is not a complete reality, for it is not 
" an object presented to the senses, or represented in an 
image." As a consequence, he declared " material sub- 



8o INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

stance " to be unreal ; but he assumed the reality of 
" spiritual substance." 

Hume declared that impressions and ideas are the only- 
realities ; and that view reduces all reality to ideas. These 
ideas are individual and disconnected. The mind itself is 
a stream of disconnected ideas, and different movements 
and situations have no identity or bond. There is no self, 
no world, no knowledge. 



CHAPTER X 

IDEALISTIC RATIONALISTS 

III. Idealistic Rationalists 

§ 42. Idealism Defined. — i. Objects are Embodiments 
of Ideas. — At the beginning of our study we described 
characteristics of experience which are of special interest 
to Philosophy (§ 2). One of these characteristics is that 
other persons and things and events have meaning for us ; 
no object is for us a mere actuality. A study of the illustra- 
tion given in the section referred to above will make this 
evident. Your attention is arrested by a sound, looking 
you see a horse running madly toward you, and you 
hasten to shelter. Every particular of this experience 
has meaning. Your visual experience has the meaning 
of a runaway horse bearing down upon you, and that means 
danger to you. The place to which you flee has for you 
the meaning of safety. Even the sound has meaning; 
it signifies that something is occurring to which it is worth 
your while to give attention. All with which we have to 
do is qualified with meaning. To say that every object 
has meaning, is to say that objects embody ideas. That 
the particulars of the universe are embodiments of ideas 
is a cardinal doctrine of Idealism. 

2. Reality is Rational. — Another characteristic of ex- 
perience is our consciousness of the reality of ourselves and 
of that with which we have to do. What is it to be real ? 
It may be difficult if not impossible, to give a final answer to 
G 81 



82 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

this question ; but we are ready, at this point, to note a 
certain aspect of reality. Reality is more than existence. 
Whatever is, is in some sense or degree real ; but to be 
real is more than to exist. All being is necessarily of 
some sort ; it is, as we have said above, being with meaning. 
Being and meaning are inseparable aspects of reality; 
and by so much as reality has meaning by that much it is 
intelligible and may be known. Idealism holds that all 
reality is the embodiment of mind ; and that whatever 
is, is rational. 

3. Experience has Duality of Aspect. — It arises in the 
subject-object relation and is a consciousness of self and 
of object. A study of the example given in § 2 will make 
this clear. Every selected particular — as the hearing, 
seeing, fleeing — has in it a subject aspect and an object 
aspect. We do not know of any experience, we cannot 
conceive an experience, in which either aspect is wanting. 
Idealism holds, not only that these aspects are inseparable, 
but that there is no experience where either subject or 
object is absent. Those who accept this doctrine insist 
that there is no subject who is not experiencing; and, as 
experience can only occur in the subject-object relation, 
there is no subject apart from this relation. They also 
assert that there is- no reality — i.e. no real object — 
which is independent of consciousness. That subject and 
object are interdependent, not independent of each other, 
is a principle of Idealism. 

What we have just given is by no means a complete 
statement of Idealism. Other characteristics of this 
doctrine will appear as we proceed. 

§ 43. Historical. — Idealism has its roots in the Socratic 
Philosophy. Plato held that each particular is the ex- 
pression of an idea, and that the object comes to be in 
order that the idea may have embodiment. He likewise 



IDEALISTIC RATIONALISTS 83 

believed that reality is in the idea ; and from this it follows 
that for him the objective world was an expression of 
reality. He also held that reality is intelligible ; and that 
we may and do know the real. Aristotle was also an 
Idealist. He taught that objects owe their being and 
form to universals, each object being a development of 
a universal, the universal itself determining the form of 
the matter of which the object is constituted. In this, 
he, to be sure, conceives of matter as independent of the 
idea, or universal, except as to the form which it takes ; 
nevertheless, the Idealistic element in his teaching is 
evident. So far as subsequent Philosophy accepted the 
Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions, it was Idealistic. 
Spinoza's Idealism is obvious ; and he profoundly in- 
fluenced German thought, giving it an Idealistic cast. 
Berkeley set forth a distinct and extreme doctrine of 
Idealism. According to him, all objects other than per- 
sons are only ideas of sense. He insisted that " there is 
no world without the mind, distinct from the ideas which 
are within us " ; and that nature has existence solely in our 
experience. He was the author of the formula, Esse est 
percipi — to be is to be perceived ; and this would easily 
lead to the conclusion that the reality of things is In our 
perception of them, not in their perceptibility. Late in 
life he seems to have modified this doctrine, but he never 
worked the modification into his system. Kant revolted 
from Berkeley's Idealism and from Hume's Scepticism. 
He believed that both doctrines were irrational. Begin- 
ning with Kant we will consider Idealism as represented 
by him, and by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. 

§ 44. Kant. — I. Introductory. — We shall merely give 
a cursory statement of the philosophical problem as con- 
ceived by this master mind, without undertaking to set 
forth in detail the arguments by which he would sustain 



84 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

his conclusions. Our study of his system will necessarily 
be limited to those particulars which are directly related 
to the purpose of this Introduction. Criticism has modi- 
fied some of his doctrines and has rejected others ; but we 
cannot undertake here to note specific views or methods 
concerning which there is reason for dissenting from him. 
Some of these points of difference will appear later. Kant's 
motive came from Hume's conclusions. If Hume were 
right, there is no knowledge and scientific judgments can- 
not be rationally justified. Kant was unwilling to accept 
such a conclusion ; and he set out to investigate knowl- 
edge, with a view to determining its validity and limita- 
tions. Hence his philosophy is primarily a theory of 
knowledge, or an epistemology. 

2. His Conception of the Cognitive Process. — Conse- 
quent upon a critical study of cognition, Kant concluded 
that there can be no knowledge without sense-experience. 
There must be sense-experience that we may attain knowl- 
edge; but there must also be that in our cognitive con- 
sciousness which Is not derived from sense-experience. We 
now give a general sketch of the cognitive process as 
conceived by him. 

Perception. — External realities act upon the sense- 
organs of the subject, and the subject in consequence re- 
ceives disconnected and chaotic sense-data. These data 
are not knowledge, but are material from which knowledge 
is to be constructed. Take, for example, our frequently 
used illustration of the horse running away. The data 
which came to you through the action of certain realities 
upon your sense-organs did not come to you as a horse 
running away; the mere data had no order or meaning. 
This passive reception of sense-data Kant speaks of as 
perception ; but it is not for him perception of objects. 
In his study of perception, he established a fact of prime 



IDEALISTIC RATIONALISTS 85 

importance for Philosophy : Nothing enters into conscious- 
ness as a mere datum ; the mind deals with all it receives. 
He likewise called attention to the combining, or synthetic, 
activity of the mind. This synthetic activity of the sub- 
ject makes for the unification of the disconnected sense- 
data. We perceive objects in related positions ; they are 
apprehended as co-existing in apartness from each other; 
and we also have a consciousness of succession in our 
experiences. In other words, our perceptions have space 
and time characteristics ; they are not in disorder, but are 
given a space-order and time-order. He holds that the 
synthetic activity of the imagination gives this space-form 
and time-order to the chaotic sense-data. Space and time 
are of the mind, and are contributions of the mind to 
perceptions. Being constituted as we are, we treat in this 
way the data which we receive in sensation. According 
to Kant, space and time do not come with the sense-data ; 
they are the contribution of sensibility. Sensibility with 
Kant includes imagination. The demand that there shall 
be in the cognitive consciousness an element which is 
not derived from sense-experience, is so far satisfied. 

The Understanding and Knowledge. — Kant held, how- 
ever, that perception does not complete knowledge. In 
combining sense-data into an image, the imagination 
works blindly in certain fixed ways ; whereas cognition 
is a distinctly conscious process. There is no attain- 
ment of knowledge apart from a conscious uniting of 
ideas. To conclude that 5 plus 7 equals 12, calls for con- 
scious determination of mental activity. The cognitive 
process concludes in a judgment; and a judgment is the 
assertion that certain ideas are conjoined. The synthetic 
activity of the imagination which completes the process 
in sensibility is, for Kant, the unconscious activity of the 
understanding; the synthetic activity in judgment, by 



86 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

which ideas are united, is conscious activity of the under- 
standing. You know that horse as one, as in a certain re- 
lation to you, and as having certain characteristics. We 
know sensible objects in terms of quality, quantity, and as 
being in relation. These are general forms in which all sen- 
sible objects are known. According to Kant, the under- 
standing judges the space- and time-ordered material 
prepared for it, judges it by means of these conceptions — 
relation, quality, quantity, etc. These concepts are its gen- 
eral forms of judgments ; being forms of judgment, they 
are known as categories. In judgment we combine ideas ; 
and the understanding in judging combines the manifold 
elements of perception into one experience. Any single 
object, as a book, has many particulars in it; but these 
particulars are synthesized into one experience. The 
sense-data of an observed object are received as a series 
continuing during the observation ; but these perceptions 
are united into one experience by the understanding. 
The conceptions, or categories, in terms of which the un- 
derstanding frames its judgments and thus constitutes 
knowledge, are supplied by the mind. All that sense-ex- 
perience contributes is the chaotic and disconnected sense- 
data, the mere material of knowledge ; the mind orders 
and unifies the data, it contributes that which gives mean- 
ing to the material. 

3. As to the Objectivity of what is Known. — From the 
foregoing, it appears that, according to Kant, the objects 
of knowledge are subjectively constituted. But, if the 
only objects which can be known are objects which are 
thus constituted, it would seem to follow that the world 
which each subject knows is a world whose appearance 
is constituted by the subject himself. The characteristics 
of the known world, the forms in which it appears, do not 
come from the external world of realities ; they originate 



IDEALISTIC RATIONALISTS 87 

in the subject and are the productloin of the subject, not 
a reproduction by him. We might seem justified, then, in 
concluding that the individual subject's world and knowl- 
edge are merely his own, and that this world is not an 
object for other subjects. This, if true, would be a 
serious criticism of Kant's doctrine ; for he held that that 
only is valid knowledge which is universally valid, and 
that that only is truly objective which is object for all. 
But he would deny that his doctrine leads to the con- 
clusion that the individual subject's world and knowledge 
are merely that subject's own. He held that the principles 
according to which the sensibility and the understanding 
act in constituting objects from sense-data, are grounded 
in the nature of mind. These principles are the principles, 
not of the individual mind, but of the universal human 
reason, of the super-individual consciousness. In Kant's 
view, the individual subject does not determine the char- 
acteristics of the objects which he knows ; they are con- 
stituted, not by our known, or experienced, self, but by 
the super-conscious self which is the ground of our " em- 
pirical self." This unknown, but only real. Self is in- 
dependent of conditions and experience ; and the princi- 
ples of the understanding are the expression of the activity 
of this super-conscious Ego. Hence the world which we 
know is, for Kant, truly objective, because it is object for 
all as it is for each. 

4. Reason and the Regulative Ideas. — Kant gave to the 
term " reason " a broader and a more restricted meaning. 
In its broader meaning, it stands for the whole mental ac- 
tivity as related to knowledge ; in its more restricted appli- 
cation, it signifies " a higher function of the mind than the 
understanding." The understanding occupies itself with 
the material which is given it through the sensibility, i.e. 
with the material of sense-experience. Reason, in its nar- 



88 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

rower meaning, is occupied solely with itself and makes in- 
quiry into its own nature. This inquiry is not determined 
by the forms of the knowing process ; it is purely contem- 
plative. But while it is merely contemplative, the in- 
quiry is not haphazard and purposeless ; the reason has 
a purpose and the inquiry is regulated by certain Ideas. 
The purpose is to discover a final reason for all that is and 
all that occurs. Kant finds that the reason is insistent in 
its demand that we seek a principle which shall be the 
ground of explanation for all phenomena ; and, since this 
principle is all inclusive, it will necessarily be a principle 
of unity. From a study of this demand of reason, he 
further concludes that there are three Ideas which regulate 
the synthetic activity of reason as it searches for such a 
principle of unity. These Ideas are the Self, the World, 
and God. By World, he means not the world of phenomena 
which is constituted by the understanding, but the totality 
of things-in-themselves from which we receive the un- 
ordered material for knowledge. By Self, he means not 
the known self of experience, but the super-conscious Self 
to which we have already referred. Space and time are 
synthetic forms of sensibility, the categories are syn- 
thetic forms of the understanding; the reason regulates 
its synthetic activity by the three Ideas just named. It 
does not constitute objects by means of them; but it 
unifies all the particulars of experience by assuming that 
the Self, the World, and God are realities, and by referring 
all phenomena to these Ideas as their ground principle of 
explanation. Thus, phases of inner experience more 
directly related to our consciousness of personal identity 
are referred to the Self as their principle of unity and 
explanation ; and all phenomena of inner and outer ex- 
perience more directly related to sense-data are referred 
to the World as a system of related realities for their 



IDEALISTIC RATIONALISTS 89 

principle of unity and explanation. And by setting before 
itself God as " self-subsistent, unconditioned, and creative 
reason," reason " is enabled to give the greatest unity, 
extent, and system to our empirical knowledge." Accord- 
ing to Kant, we must regard the Self, the World, and God 
as realities, even though they are not objects of knowledge. 
His doctrine respecting this will be further treated under 
the next two topics. 

5. Reality; Phenomena and Noumena. — According to 
Kant, known objects are phenomena, not realities. These 
objects are constituted by sensibility and the understand- 
ing out of sense-data. The space and time characteristics 
and their categorical forms are given them by the mind. 
The mind has contributed to the sensible material all that 
the subject is conscious of ; hence we do not perceive things 
as they are in themselves, but we perceive objects as the 
mind makes them to appear to us. With Kant, then, 
an object is not a thing in itself, but a phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, Kantian objects, or phenomena, are not 
mere seeming, not pure illusions. These phenomena have 
a reality which is relative to the universal human reason 
of which we have spoken, reason in this relation signifying 
the cognitive faculty. In contrasting phenomena and 
realities, Kant speaks of the latter as noumena. A nou- 
menon is not an object; in fact, it cannot become an 
object of knowledge ; it is " the idea of an object which is 
not an object of sense." Things-in-themselves, the super- 
conscious Self, and God are examples of noumena. Reali- 
ties are noumena ; they are ideal objects and cannot be- 
come objects of sense ; hence they cannot be known. 
That reality cannot be known, is a cardinal Kantian doc- 
trine. What is more, according to Kant, knowledge gives 
us no warrant to assert that noumena really exist. It 
follows that, so far as knowledge goes, we may not affirm 



90 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

that there is any real Self or World, or that God is. But 
it is also true that no man has warrant to deny their 
actuality ; for, though the understanding does not give 
knowledge of what is not phenomena, it suggests the possi- 
bility of the existence of noumenal reality. 

6. That Noumena are Real, not Simply Ideal. — The 
agnostic conclusion, that knowledge does not give warrant 
for asserting or denying the actuality of supersensuous 
reality, opens the way to the more constructive part of 
Kant's system. He insisted that the regulative Ideas of 
reason have a significance which calls for more than ex- 
perience can supply. Reason, as " a higher function than 
the understanding," makes a demand which experience 
cannot satisfy ; it demands more than the understanding 
can give. We are not bounded by experience, even though 
our knowledge is thus limited. We are conscious of our- 
selves ; this is an assured fact. But the objects of the 
world of knowledge are not conscious of themselves. 
Kant held that the self of experience is a known self, not 
the knowing Self. The knowing Self is a superconscious 
Self, a self that is not known and cannot be known. But 
that we are conscious of ourselves is an indubitable fact ; 
and this fact shows that we are not shut up within the 
world of knowledge, that we are not mere phenomena. 
The noumenal Self is regarded as an actuality, even though 
it cannot be known. For we must assume that there is 
a knowing Self if we would render the fact of self-con- 
sciousness intelligible. We do not know this supercon- 
scious Self; but we posit, or affirm, that this ideal Self 
is a reality. Further, we act as well as know ; and, in 
our acting, we judge that there is that which we ought 
to do. In this, also, we distinguish between ourselves and 
the objects of the known world ; " ought " has no meaning 
for them. We are certain that we are subject to the moral 



IDEALISTIC RATIONALISTS 91 

imperative, Thou oughtest. This law Is universal and 
unconditional ; and " it has no meaning unless I can do 
what I ought to do." The reality of the moral law is in- 
dubitable. But freedom is essential to the reality of the 
moral law; therefore we must believe that we are free. 
The free Self is a posited reality. Kant held that we do 
not know that we are free ; for freedom is supersensuous 
and cannot be known. Nevertheless we affirm our free- 
dom ; it is an affirmation of faith. Faith is, with Kant, a 
rational belief; and, in the realm beyond sense, it is as 
universal and necessary a principle as the categories are 
in the realm of experience. Here Kant reached the end 
for which he set out. From the posited reality of the free 
Self, he argues to the existence of God and the immortality 
of the soul. 

7. Mechanism and Teleology. — Kant holds that " the 
very nature of intelligence compels us to regard every 
whole in nature as ... a mechanical system." He con- 
ceives such a whole to be an aggregation of parts which 
are externally joined and related. Objects and parts of 
objects are conceived as Influencing other objects and 
parts of objects, from without. Hence every event In the 
world is known as the effect of a cause which is externally 
related to the object in which the event takes place. Never- 
theless, Kant recognizes that this does not afford a com- 
plete explanation of the world of nature. He allows that 
the parts of organisms have their significance because of 
the idea, or significance, of the whole. In organisms, 
the whole appears as constituting the parts ; they are, 
and they are what they are, because of their relation to an 
end, and that end is expressed in the whole. Kant argues 
that this demands a cause " that acts by ends, i.e. a will " ; 
and he agrees that such a cause Is not mechanical. He in- 
sists, therefore, that we are compelled to utilize the teleologl- 



92 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

cal conception in the explanation of organized beings ; and 
that this forces us to conceive nature as a system in which 
changes are determined with respect to ends. According 
to Kant, this teleological conception does not come of 
sense-experience, neither is it a category; hence it is not 
an element of knowledge. It merely conditions our knowl- 
edge of nature. He holds, therefore, that all objects are, 
and must be, mechanically related and determined ; 
but he concedes that the teleological idea Is essential to 
the extension of knowledge and the fuller apprehension of 
natural objects and events. It is noumenal, however, 
and falls within the field of the reason as distinguished 
from the understanding. 

8. His Dualism. — Despite Kant's Insistence that 
reason demands a ground principle of unity, his system 
has many dualistic features. 

Subject and Object. — He conceives the subject to be 
passively, as well as actively, related to the activity of the 
opposing object. The data which come to the under- 
standing through the sensibility are set over against the 
understanding, as something foreign to it. The activity 
of the subject Is related by Kant to something which is 
Independent of the consciousness of the subject. There 
Is a definite dualism In his conception of the supercon- 
scious and unknowable Self, as subject, and the empirical, 
or known, self, who Is object. In his treatment. Inner and 
outer experience appear as parallel kinds of knowledge, 
whereas his system should have led him to treat them as 
dual aspects of a unitary knowledge. 

Phenomena and Noumena. — Kant presents two worlds 
for acceptance : the world of sensibility and the under- 
standing, and the world of reason. The former is a world 
of phenomena ; the latter Is a world of noumena. The 
world of phenomena Is known ; the world of reality is 



IDEALISTIC RATIONALISTS 93 

unknowable, it Is a posit, or affirmation, of faith. The 
world of phenomena is constituted by us ; the noumenal 
world conditions our thought. Man is of both worlds. 
As of the known world, he is under the law of necessity ; 
as of the world of reality, he is free. 

Perception and Conception. — Kant regards perception 
and conception as essential elements of knowledge, dif- 
fering in kind, not degree. In connection with this sharp 
distinction between perception and conception, he relates 
the sensibility and the understanding to each other as 
distinct faculties. They are regarded by him as depart- 
ments of mental activity, not as aspects of a unitary 
activity. 

9. Summary. — Kant was a Realist in so far as he held 
that there are " realities which are independent of con- 
sciousness." He was an Idealist in so far as he taught 
that the mind contributes to the object, and that the ex- 
ternal object exists only for a subject. His Idealism 
has a subjective cast; and, as he gives intelligence the 
primacy in his Epistemology, his system may be classed 
as Intellectual Idealism. Although he held that freedom, 
the immortality of the soul, and God are not objects of 
knowledge, he insisted that they have all the reality that 
may be ascribed to known objects. He established three 
facts : that self-consciousness and consciousness of object 
are inseparable ; that the mind is active in perception ; 
that the teleological conception is essential to Philosophy. 
He also served in directing attention to the synthetic 
activity of the mind, and in undertaking to give it critical 
and extended treatment. The synthesizing mind unifies 
the diverse elements of experience and makes the experi- 
ence of the past an element in the experience of the pres- 
ent. By constituting a unitary experience out of ele- 
ments which are diverse and which enter experience at 



94 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

different times, it gives us a consciousness of self-sameness. 
It likewise presses us to seek a ground principle of unity 
for the World and the Self. His service to Philosophy is 
of incalculable worth ; but he left the problem unsolved. 
According to his Epistemology, we know phenomena and 
only phenomena. The philosophers who followed him and 
who recognized the cogency of his reasoning were shut 
up to one of two positions : they must accept that all is 
phenomenal and that the noumenal is for exact thought 
a fiction ; or they must show that reality may be known. 
He had separated the subject from reality. Rationality 
will not accept such a conclusion as satisfactory ; and those 
who came after him sought to open a way to reality. 



CHAPTER XI 

IDEALISTIC RATIONALISTS (continued) 

§ 45. Fichte. — I. His Motive. — Fichte's earlier phil- 
osophic thought was largely derived from Spinoza ; but 
he was distressed by Spinoza's insistence that the universe 
including man is subject to necessity and that freedom is 
an illusion. In this particular, Spinozism seemed to 
him both unanswerable and unbearable. Kant's Critique 
of the Practical Reason gave him relief and turned the 
current of his thought. In Kant's system, he had found 
ground for asserting that man is not subject to the in- 
variable law of the physical world. But he was dissatisfied 
with Kant's dualistic conception of necessity and freedom. 
According to Kant, the physical world is a realm of neces- 
sity; whereas the noumenal Self is of a world in which 
the order is free and uncaused. This gives us two anti- 
thetical worlds, each having its own principles and order ; 
and man is in both. Fichte could not accept such a con- 
clusion ; he was too conscious of the reason's command 
that we seek a ground principle of unity, and he was too 
certain of the fundamental unity of all that is, to give full 
consent to such a doctrine. He insisted that one of these 
orders — that of necessity or that of freedom — is ultimate 
and, therefore, primal ; and he felt that one of them must 
be reduced to the other. Ultimately he came to agree 
with Kant that the imperative, " Thou oughtest," with 
its implicate of freedom, is an indubitable fact. He says, 
" That I myself am a freely acting individual must be the 

95 



96 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

fundamental thought of every true philosopher." But 
Idealism is in his view the inclusion of the phenomenal 
series within consciousness. This means for him that the 
necessitated series is an aspect of a series which is essentially 
free. 

2. His Epistemology. — Fichte objects to the dualistic 
features of Kant's account of cognition — e.g. the sharp 
distinction between sensation and thought, and the as- 
sumption of things-in-themselves which are independent 
of consciousness and yet obtrude into consciousness. He, 
Fichte, had no need of the Kantian thing-in-itself, for he 
has the ego originate the process which gives sensations. 
He holds that the ego must act, and must act freely. The 
necessity that it act, is in its own nature ; for it is only in 
acting that the ego can become — i.e. come into self-con- 
sciousness. The lowest form of this activity is uncon- 
scious, and the product of such activity is sensations. 
They seem to come from a source that is other than our- 
selves and to be thrust upon us, simply because they are 
our unconscious creation ; but they really have their 
origin in us. He holds further that the ego in creating 
sensations has limited itself and has, in this self-limiting 
act, become self-conscious. Although self-consciousness 
is of the nature of the ego, we are only self-conscious as we 
distinguish self from what is not-self. In perceiving the 
sensation as other than itself, the ego becomes self-con- 
scious and posits itself as real. In creating the non-ego, 
the ego gives it — the non-ego — space form and time 
form. Hence we know all objects as spatial and all 
changes as occurring now or then; and we can only know 
them thus. In all cognitive and practical dealing with 
objects, we find ourselves conditioned by space and time. 
Reflecting on the non-ego, the ego passes to fuller develop- 
ment of the non-ego in terms of the categories. In this 



IDEALISTIC RATIONALISTS 97 

higher stage, the self Is still limited by what It has created ; 
for the ego in all its dealings with objects is conditioned 
by their quality, quantity, etc. Thus the ego passes from 
sensation through perception and reflection towards com- 
plete knowledge. This higher knowledge Is a completer 
knowledge of self and is attained through the ego's own 
activities. The highest stage for the finite ego is reached 
in the apprehension of the moral imperative ; and here 
the ego Is fully conscious of itself as self-determined. 
The world which Is known In the process outlined above 
is the creation of the ego and exists only in the ego; and 
this is, according to FIchte, the one world of reality and 
knowledge. In short, the conscious self is the sole reality. 
3. The Ego. — Kant distinguishes the empirical self 
from the superconsclous Self. Fichte's Ego presents 
itself in two aspects : the ego which is limited by con- 
sciousness of the not-self, and the Ego which brings the 
not-self into existence and determines its characteristics. 
The first of these Is the Individual subject; the other is 
the Universal Ego which creates the finite ego, or individ- 
ual subject. The finite ego Is a self-limitation of the 
Universal Ego. The Universal Ego is the self of practical 
thought. We have seen that knowledge is knowledge of 
the ego Itself and is attained by the ego through reflection 
upon its own activities; it is purely subjective. And 
since he holds that the Ego is the only reality, Fichte's 
reality is also subjective. His Idealism has, therefore, 
been known as Subjective Idealism. Nevertheless, the 
object — i.e. the not-self — has one characteristic of ob- 
jectivity; it is object for all as it is for each. The world 
of objects is not the creation of the individual finite subject, 
but of the Universal Ego. This gives ground for uni- 
versality in characteristics of objects and principles of 
cognition ; they are created by one Ego and for one in- 



98 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

elusive end. FIchte's Universal Ego is the Absolute, and 
is impersonal. This distinguishes it from Kant's super- 
conscious Self, which is individual, conditioned, and per- 
sonal. 

4. His Teleology. — According to Fichte, things do 
not come to be, neither do events take place, simply be- 
cause something else is, or some other event has occurred. 
All things and events are linked to the ego ; but the linkage 
is not external and mechanical. The bond which unites 
things and events is immanent; it is the purpose of the 
ego. The world which we create and know, is created in 
order that we may perform our task, in order that we may 
do our duty. 

5. His Idealism. — We have said that Fichte's Idealism 
is subjective. It is also distinctly ethical. Moral obli- 
gation is at the foundation of his system. For him the 
characteristic spiritual quality of man is will, not intelli- 
gence. The end of man is the performance of his task. 
In this, as in the attainment of knowledge, man is limited 
by the not-self. We can neither know anything nor do our 
work apart from the not-self; nevertheless the not-self 
limits our knowledge and thwarts our performance. 
Hence life is a continuous struggle. The process is unend- 
ing ; but virtue and development are in the striving. 

§ 46. Schelling. — i. His Statement of the Problem. — 
In his earlier philosophical studies, Schelling was greatly 
influenced by Fichte ; in fact, he at first adopted Fichte's 
system, and he began a work which was to supplement 
what his master had done. But he was from the first 
much disturbed by a feeling that Fichte erred in not rec- 
ognizing the reality of the world of nature; and ulti- 
mately he became convinced that Fichte's conception of 
the object as a purely subjective product does not properly 
interpret nature. Schelling was certain that " there exist 



IDEALISTIC RATIONALISTS 99 

things outside of us," and that what is thus objective Is 
not the product of the subject. Being assured of this, 
he made it his task to construct a philosophy which would 
recognize the reality of both matter and mind, subject and 
object. His thought was in constant change, and his 
views at different periods of his activity were by no means 
consistent ; nevertheless he was true to his purpose through 
all these changes. 

2. Matter and Mind. — Fichte begins with mind and 
ends with mind ; Schelling begins with unorganized matter 
and represents the human organism as evolved from un- 
organized matter. During this evolution, spirit enters 
into immanent relation with what is evolved, and does 
this in ever increasing degree. With him, matter is not 
Inert, It Is unconscious activity of spirit; it is the lowest 
expression of spirit, spirit's expression of itself to the senses. 
From unorganized matter, he would pass through the plant 
and animal until we have In the brain of man the highest 
product of matter. Schelling regarded spirit as invisible 
nature. What is subjective Is the Invisible expression 
of spirit ; and in man the Increasing immanency of spirit 
In the higher evolved products of matter Issues in perfect 
ideality. Objectively regarded, man is the perfected 
evolution of matter ; subjectively regarded, he is Ideality 
perfected. The objective world is a manifestation of 
spirit, the same principle whose activity Is the inner 
world of experience. The same spirit is in man and nature. 
Since matter and mind, man and nature, have the same 
root, they are not alien to each other. 

3. His Absolute. — The ground principle of unity Is 
denominated by him the Absolute. In his earlier thought, 
he conceives the Absolute to be distinctionless. No attri- 
bute may be affirmed of it ; it is neither matter nor mind, 
subject nor object ; it Is mere self-identity. The Absolute 



100 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

and the universe are simply two " aspects of one and the 
same thing." Later, however, in his Philosophy of Re- 
ligion, he recognizes a personal God. 

4. Knowledge and Reality. — According to Schelling, 
there is no thing-in-itself from which the knowing subject 
is cut off. The known world is a world of reality, not a 
world of phenomena. In this he breaks with Kant. 
Nevertheless his conception of the ultimate reality — 
the Absolute as he termed it — makes it unknowable. 
It may not be said to be of any kind, for it is distinctionless. 
What is not of any assignable kind cannot be known. 
Kant's limitation of knowledge arises from the limitations 
of our mental constitution ; Schelling's comes of the con- 
ception of the Absolute as being without distinction. 

5. His Ideal sm. — With Schelling, the highest ex- 
pression of reality is in genius ; the highest objective ex- 
pression is in art. Kant's Idealism is intellectual with 
subjective features; Fichte's is subjective and ethical; 
Schelling's is objective and sesthetical. 

§ 47. Hegel. — I. Nature of Reality. — We have said 
that Idealism conceives reality as being with meaning. 
Thus in the illustration which we have so often used — 
that of the horse running away^ — the reality of that mov- 
ing mass was for you inseparably associated with its 
meaning. That object from which you ran was not a mere 
that without significance; it was for you an embodiment 
of danger. The idea of which it was the expression was 
an essential element of its reality. Hegel calls attention 
to the fact that " reality " is used in two relations. When 
a man's" purpose — e.g. to found a hospital — has been 
carried out, that man's idea has had expression given it. 
The hospital, as a reality, is the expression in actual being 
of the founder's idea. The hospital is the idea realized ; 
in that institution, the idea of the founder has come to 



IDEALISTIC RATIONALISTS loi 

concrete objectivity. This Is " reality " in one of the 
two relations noted by Hegel. If we should say of the 
institution, " That is a real hospital," we would indicate 
by that statement that the institution completely expresses 
its own ideal nature. This is " reality " in the other re- 
lation. We see that " reality " is in both relations the 
correlate of " ideality." In other words, reality is the 
concrete expression of ideality, and ideality is the essential 
nature of reality. An object is actualized — i.e. realized 
— idea ; and reality is significant being. In keeping with 
this, Hegel held that " all reality is rational." By this 
he meant that the essential nature of all reality is kindred 
with mind. 

2. Ultimate Reality ; The Absolute. — From this it 
follows that, for Hegel, ultimate reality is rational. Be- 
cause he so conceives it, he speaks of it as the Absolute 
Idea ; for in his thought the Absolute is unconditioned 
reality. In characterizing the ultimate reality as the 
Absolute, he means that it is self-subsistent and self- 
explanatory; its reality is complete and underived. But 
to understand what he means by the Absolute Idea, we 
must also note his conception of rationality. The term 
" rationality " is usually restricted in its application ; for 
it is generally taken to refer solely to man's intellective 
capacity, to his faculty for framing judgments of truth. 
In other words, when men speak of " rationality," they 
do not as a rule include the willing and feeling functions 
in their thought. And the term " thought " generally 
suffers a similar restriction, for It is usually assumed to 
denote merely the intellective activity, or that which is 
the product of purely intellective activity. But these 
terms and the ideas to which they correspond are not so 
restricted by Hegel. He believed that the mind acts as 
a unit, and that will and feeling and the understanding, 



102 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

or judging activity, are not really distinct forms of activ- 
ity, but are three inseparable aspects of one activity. 
For reasons which seemed good to him, he assigned to the 
terms " rational " and " thought " a wider meaning than 
that usually given them. He would include in the single 
term all three aspects of mental activity. Hence, in speak- 
ing of the ultimate reality as the Absolute Idea, he means 
that the ultimate reality is rational in this inclusive sense. 
He proves to his own satisfaction that the Absolute is 
Person and is One. In his conception of the Absolute, he 
differs from both Fichte and Schelling. Fichte's Absolute 
is impersonal ; Schelling's Absolute is distinctionless and 
undefinable, no attribute may be assigned to it ; hence it 
may not be thought of as having personality. Hegel 
insisted that an undefinable Absolute, or Pure Being, is 
pure nothing. With Schelling, mind and nature, as 
distinguished, are wanting in the ultimate reality ; in 
Hegel's conception of the ultimate, mind (or Spirit) has 
supremacy over nature. 

3 . The Absolute as the True Universal. — For Hegel, 
the universe is a setting-forth, or an expression, of the 
Absolute Idea. Every particular of nature and history, 
every object and every event, is a manifestation of the 
ultimate reality. No particular is a complete actualization 
of the Idea ; but it is a true realization of the Idea for 
that particular's place and part in the system. From 
this it is evident that, in Hegel's view, the Absolute Idea 
is the only true, the only complete, universal. In this 
he advanced beyond Aristotle. According to Aristotle, 
the universal which thought discovers — e.g. " man," 
" horse," or " dog " — is concrete in the individual, i.e. 
in the individual man or horse or dog. The Aristotelian 
universal has no reality except as it is actualized in the 
particular ; and it is real in the particular as the essence 



IDEALISTIC RATIONALISTS 103 

of it. From this it follows that there is for Aristotle no 
particular which is a mere particular ; for its essence is a 
universal, and it is itself the realization of a universal. 
But Hegel insisted that such universals or ideas are only 
partly true to the essential nature of objects. Such uni- 
versals include the likenesses of individuals, but they have 
no place for the differences. He held that the whole nature 
of every object, what is revealed in the differences as well 
as in the likenesses, is the manifestation, or actualizing, 
of the true universal. From this it follows that, for him, 
the universal is not a mere distinctionless identity; it is 
many in one, diversity in unity. In an organism, the idea 
which is the universal — i.e. the essential nature — of each 
of the parts as parts of the organism, completes itself in 
the harmonious diversity of the parts. For example, 
the idea of the body of a man taken as a whole is the idea 
of each part of the body as a part of the whole. As the 
universal of the body, it includes, and thus unifies, the 
parts. In a word, Hegel's Absolute is the complete uni- 
versal in which all likenesses and differences are imma- 
nent. 

The Categories. — From the preceding it appears that 
with Hegel the true universal is mind (or Spirit), and that 
every particular is a finite expression of this universal. 
In his view, therefore, the essential nature of every object 
is constituted by mind. Hence, whatever is true of ra- 
tionality is true of reality ; and in whatever measure any 
object is a manifestation of reality, in that measure will 
it have the characteristics of reason. This leads him to 
differ from Kant's conception of the categories — relation, 
quality, quantity, etc. For Kant, they are not char- 
acteristics of reality, but are imposed by the subject upon 
sense-perceptions. According to Hegel, they are not 
mere processes of thought, they are characteristics of 



104 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

objective realities ; every object is a concrete identity, 
and the categories are diverse aspects of it. 

4. Knowledge and Reality. — According to Kant, we 
know phenomena, and only phenomena ; we do not, and 
cannot, know reality. Hegel held, on the contrary, that 
reality is cognizable; and he offered incisive criticism 
of Kant's agnosticism and proffered extended argument 
in support of his own doctrine. Kant's doctrine that there 
are things-in-themselves which are independent of cogni- 
tive consciousness, is vital to the Kantian system. Fichte 
and Schelling had rejected this Kantian conception ; 
Hegel contended that it was inherently inconsistent. He 
calls attention to the fact that Kant conceives these things- 
in-themselves to be causes of sensations. In conceiving 
them thus, he relates them to the consciousness of the 
subject through the sensations. These sensations enter 
into consciousness as content of knowledge, and by that 
much the things-in-themselves are not of a world which is 
independent of the subject. He argued further that we 
cannot affirm such realities without giving them some char- 
acteristics which relate them to consciousness ; we at least 
think of them as conceivable entities. Hegel conceived the 
universe as a system, and all objects as particulars of the 
system and so related to each other. For him, no object 
is what it is, no object even exists, by and for itself; its 
existence is only possible through its relation to other 
things, through its relation to all the particular realities 
of the system. The conscious subject is one of these 
realities ; in fact, the conscious subject is that for which 
the object exists. The end of the object is the fuller life 
of the subject; and, for the development of the subject, 
it must be in relation to consciousness. In the develop- 
ment of the life of the subject, the ideality of the object 
is realized. For such reasons, he refused to accept the 



IDEALISTIC RATIONALISTS 105 

doctrine that there are realities independent of con- 
sciousness. 

Limitations of Knowledge. — Hegel agreed with Kant 
and Schelling that knowledge is subject to limitations, 
but he differed from them as to what sets the limitations. 
Schelling found the limitation in the nature of the Ab- 
solute. He held that we may not give the Absolute any 
attribute, hence it cannot be known. Kant found the 
limitation in the nature of intelligence. Hegel found it in 
the limited nature of the object when apprehended apart 
from the world system. No object by itself expresses the 
whole of itself; no object in any single relation fully ex- 
presses its reality. To separate the arm in thought from 
the body is to exclude from thought what is essential to 
the meaning, and hence to the reality, of the arm. The 
significance of a book to the author is not the same with 
its meaning to the publisher or the reader. Its complete 
reality is not expressed in any one of these relations. 
Knowledge is subject to limitations ; but it is not limited, 
according to Hegel, because intelligence is incapable of 
apprehending reality; it is limited because the whole of 
reality is not expressed in any one relating of an object. 
Nevertheless, what we apprehend is reality. 

5 . Identity of Subject and Object. — What did Hegel 
mean by asserting the identity of subject and object t 
Of course he did not mean to affirm that they are spatially 
one, that you and the building which you perceive are 
spatially identified. Kant opened the way toward HegeFs 
view by distinguishing between externality for conscious- 
ness and externality to consciousness. Objects known 
through sense-perception are known as " out from," or 
external to, each other ; they are for consciousness external 
to one another. And, if the subject be regarded as an 
object among other objects, the other objects appear '^ out 



io6 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

from," or external to, the subject ; that is, they are external 
for consciousness. But these objects are actually per- 
ceived ; hence they are not wholly apart from conscious- 
ness. In some very real sense they are not external to 
consciousness, but are in consciousness. Since Hegel 
believed that every object is in its essential nature con- 
stituted by mind, and is in nature one with mind, it would 
follow for him that the essential nature of objects is not 
subject to spatial limitations. There is no spatial apart- 
ness to ideas ; they do not displace one another. The same 
idea may be in the mind of any number of subjects ; the 
same meaning may have expression in many particulars. 
An object — say a book — is for itself the idea which it 
embodies ; and it is so much of the Absolute Idea as it 
expresses. The degree in which it embodies the Absolute 
Idea is the degree of its reality. Now, assume that you 
know the book, that you have to some extent come into 
possession of its contents. So far as you have made its 
contents yours, that far the book is for your consciousness 
what it is for itself. In that degree, the object as it is 
in itself is also in your consciousness. If the book should 
become for your consciousness all that it is for itself, then 
its reality would be wholly realized in you. In that case, 
the identity of yourself as subject and the book as object 
would be complete ; it would have no externality for you. 
Complete knowledge means complete identity of subject 
and object. Complete identity is only attained in self- 
consciousness. In self-consciousness, self as object pre- 
sents no externality, no aspect of apartness, to self as 
subject. 

6. The Self. — Hegel held that the self is freely self- 
determined ; and he agreed with Kant that the self is 
more than the conscious self at any moment. He sub- 
mitted self-consciousness to an exhaustive analysis ; and, 



IDEALISTIC RATIONALISTS 107 

as a result of this study, he arrived at the conclusion that 
" all consciousness is an appeal to other consciousnesses " 
than the consciousness of the instant, or of the private 
self. Thus, the knowledge which we have of ourselves 
at any moment is really knowledge of what we have been, 
not of what we are in the instant of knowing. It may be 
knowledge of just the instant previous ; it may be knowl- 
edge of some time farther in the past. But this much is 
certain : you may at some future moment know by re- 
flection what you are now, but you do not know in this 
instant what you are in this instant. Not only is this true ; 
but no self is a real self when isolated from other selves. 
To think of a person as separate from his relations to 
others is to separate him in thought from much of his real 
self. The idea of personality includes the social virtues ; 
these virtues have no significance, and can have no ex- 
pression, apart from social relations. Hence the real 
self is an actual social self. In short, Hegel taught that 
the real self is more than the conscious self of any instant, 
more than the self of one's private individual experience. 

7. Conclusions. — There are few, if any, students of 
Philosophy who agree wholly with Hegel in his application 
of the principles of his system ; and there are not many 
who accept his reasoning in all instances as conclusive. 
But not a few men of repute in philosophic circles believe 
that he, in principle, gave the final answer to some ques- 
tions, and that he indicated in general the true course 
for Philosophy. They would hold that he established 
certain facts, of which we note only four. First, the unity 
of subject and object is the point of beginning for Epis- 
temology ; to separate subject and object is to destroy 
experience and make Philosophy impossible. Second, 
judgment in the same instant unites and distinguishes 
subject and predicate, object and characteristic; i.e. 



io8 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

synthesis and analysis are aspects of an irresoluble activity. 
Third, perception and conception are not distinct activi- 
ties, they are inseparable factors of a unitary activity. 
Lastly, we know reality. We have called attention to 
particulars in which Hegel differed from Kant; but it 
must not be thought that their systems are so fundamentally 
opposed as these references might seem to Indicate. On 
the contrary, sympathetic students of both systems in- 
sist that Hegel developed the Kantian principles, giving 
them proper criticism and correct statement. They 
hold that Hegel's doctrine tends to unify our conception 
of the universe by reason of its more inclusive and con- 
sistent application of Kantian principles. For example, 
Kant saw that his mechanical conception of the world 
was defective; but he so qualified his recognition of this 
defect as to leave his known world a world of externally 
related objects and mechanically related events. In 
Hegel's system, Kant's acknowledgment that the teleo- 
logical conception is essential to an intelligible under- 
standing of experience has its realization in the acceptance 
of the teleological relation of universal and particular, and 
in the doctrine that all processes are really immanent and 
developmental, and not mechanical. The inclusiveness of 
his thought is seen In the fact that the relation of the con- 
cept, or universal, and the object is at once logical, teleo- 
logical, and essential ; and the universal is conceived as 
the source of differences as well as likenesses. In this we 
have the Socratic, the Platonic, and the Aristotelian views 
Included, with advance beyond Aristotle. Hegel's system 
is generally known as Absolute Idealism. 



CHAPTER XII 

REALISTIC RATIONALISTS ; LATER EMPIRICISTS 

§ 48. Realism. — i. Definition. — The German his- 
torians classify the various systems of Philosophy as 
Idealistic and Realistic. The preceding chapter has in- 
troduced us to Idealism ; we come now to the consideration 
of Realism. Idealism holds that subject and object are 
interdependent realities ; Realism insists that they are 
independent realities. From the fact that the horse from 
which you fled existed before you saw it and continued to 
exist after you ceased to see it, Realists argue that objects 
are in no way affected by being known or ceasing to be 
known. If ideas should vanish, it would make no dif- 
ference to objects ; such is the conclusion of Realism. But 
it is doubtful if any Realists would agree to the converse 
statement — if objects should vanish, ideas would remain 
unaffected. From this it would appear that the subject 
is recognized as in some degree dependent upon the object. 
Hence the description of Realism given above should be 
further defined. What Realism insists upon in respect 
of subject and object is that the reality of each is in no 
way dependent upon its being related to the other. 
In other words, the reality of any particular — any sub- 
ject or object — is wholly independent of the subject- 
object relation. The question, then, that remains to be 
answered is. What do we mean by reality t What is 
it for any thing to be real .? A further difference be- 
tween Idealism and Realism develops from the realistic 

109 



no INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

doctrine of a world constituted of objects which are in- 
dependent of relation to a subject. This doctrine is that 
the independent objects of the external world awaken 
ideas in us. The cognitive process is believed to originate 
thus. 

2. Kinds of Realism. — The various forms of Realism 
may be reduced to two types : Representative Realism and 
Presentative Realism. According to the former, the 
tree which you perceive, by its action upon your sense- 
organs, awakens in you an idea which is an image of the 
tree ; some, however, regard the idea as a symbol of the 
object. But all Realists of this class would agree that what 
you perceive is not the tree itself, but an ideational rep- 
resentation of the tree. Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, 
and Locke are examples of philosophers who held a doctrine 
of Representative Realism. Presentative Realism is the 
doctrine that through the action and reaction of the in- 
dependent subject and object, the subject has an immediate 
perception of the object, without the mediation of an in- 
tervening idea. That is, you perceive the tree, not a state 
of consciousness, not some idea which is in some way a 
representation of the tree. Reid and Hamilton, whose 
views will be stated later, are examples of teachers who 
claimed to be Presentative Realists. At the present time 
there is a revival of Realism ; and the proponents of the 
New Realism believe that their Realistic doctrine is free 
from the innate weaknesses of Representationism. In its 
latest form, it is spoken of as the New Realism or Critical 
Realism. 

§ 49. Realistic Rationalism. — i. Rise and Charac- 
teristics. — Idealistic Rationalism arose in Germany 
through Kant's recoil from Hume's scepticism ; Realistic 
Rationalism arose in Scotland at the same time and from 
a similar impulse. Reid, a contemporary of Kant, had 



REALISTIC RATIONALISTS iii 

accepted Locke's presuppositions and had also virtually 
accepted Berkeley's conclusions. But the sceptical 
doctrine which Hume so incontestably drew from Locke's 
and Berkeley's principles forced him to reexamine his 
philosophy. As a result of this study, Reid insisted that 
philosophers had erred in assuming that " all the objects 
of knowledge are ideas " in the subject's mind. In order 
to combat this error and to lay the foundation of his own 
philosophic faith, Reid undertook the study of sense- 
perception. He and those who adopted his principles 
believed that a true theory of knowledge could only be 
found thus. Hence they sought a description of the cogni- 
tive process, instead of endeavoring to discover the signifi- 
cance of experience for questions respecting itself and 
the world. In other words, they took a psychological, 
and not a philosophical, point of view. In fact, Hamilton 
— usually accounted the most notable of the Scottish 
school — insisted that Psychology is synonymous with 
Philosophy. Realists have generally approached Phi- 
losophy through Psychology ; and they have been in- 
clined to state the problem of Philosophy as the giving 
of a reasoned account of the process in cognition, and they 
have tended to ignore, or exclude, questions respecting 
the nature of reality. 

2. Views of Representative Teachers. — (i) Reid. — Reid 
believed that Hume's philosophic doubt came of the as- 
sumption that the immediate objects of perception are 
ideas of external objects, not external objects themselves. 
This assumption shuts the subject up with himself; 
if there were an external world, no one could know it, and 
the subject has no rational ground for asserting that any 
reality besides himself exists. Reid desired to set the 
subject free and to bring him into immediate relation with 
the object. He held that in perception we come into im- 



112 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

mediate relation with the object which is in presentation, 
and that the reality of the object is not dependent upon 
its being perceived. According to Reid, the unit of 
knowledge is a judgment, not a particular impression or 
an idea. He also held that " all knowledge must be 
built upon principles which are self-evident," and that 
the subject in judging organizes sensations according to 
these principles. " Judgments of existence, substance, 
quality," etc. — Kant's categories — " are implied in the 
judgment unit." Except for his assertion that the sub- 
ject is in immediate relation with the real object, this is 
very much like Kant's teaching; the resemblance to 
Kant's doctrine of the categories and the synthetic 
activity of the understanding, is obvious. Reid's criticism 
of Representationism — a theory held by Idealists as well 
as Realists — may be regarded as final. 

(2) Hamilton. — Hamilton's philosophy contains Kant- 
ian elements. He held that the reality of the external 
world is independent of its being an object of consciousness, 
and that the mind is " the universal and principal con- 
current cause in every act of knowledge." So far he is 
in virtual agreement with both Reid and Kant. Beyond 
this he parts from Reid, for he holds that " the immediate 
object of perception is some quality of the organism " of 
the subject, and not the thing which is apprehended ; 
and he differs yet more in what is known as his doctrine 
of the Relativity of Knowledge and the Philosophy of 
the Unconditioned. 

Relativity of Knowledge. — With Hamilton this doc- 
trine signifies that we do not know any object out of 
relation to other objects. Thus, that chair is known for 
itself as being like other objects and different from them, 
as related to them in space, as " before " or " behind," 
as " larger " or " smaller," etc. This doctrine of the 



REALISTIC RATIONALISTS 113 

Relativity of Knowledge is to be taken in conjunction 
with his insistence that we do not know objects, that we 
only know their phenomenal states. This is true not only 
as to objects of external perception, but as to the self. 
The known self is for Hamilton a phenomenal self, not the 
real self ; so also is the known world a phenomenal world, 
not the real world. The influence of Kant is evident. 

Philosophy of the Unconditioned. — Hamilton argued 
that to think anything is to condition it; and from this 
he concluded that we cannot know the infinite ; hence 
God is unknowable. This limitation of knowledge is 
due to the weakness of our faculties. He, nevertheless, 
held that we have grounds for a rational belief in the 
reality of the external world, and the self and God. 

3. Relation to Other Schools. — The Scottish Realists 
are Empiricists in that they undertake to ground Phi- 
losophy in the Psychology of cognition. This would class 
them with Locke and Berkeley. Berkeley is an empirical 
Idealist; the Scotch Realists are empirical Realists. 
Their empiricism explains the sympathetic attitude of 
the Later Empiricists toward them. But Reid and Ham- 
ilton are Rationalists in that they find the constitutive 
factor of knowledge, not in sense-data, but in the rational- 
ity of the subject. 

Later Empiricists 

§ 50. General View. — Hume's Empiricism is rooted 
in the older Associational Psychology ; and the Later 
Empiricism is based upon that same Psychology 
somewhat modified. This Psychology undertook to 
construct a theory of perception ; and in that theory it 
gave to the doctrine of the Association of Ideas a place 
analogous to that which Kant assigns to the synthetic 
activity of the mind in his Epistemology. Empiricists, 



114 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

beginning with Hume and some of the Scotch Realists, 
adopted this doctrine as the basis of their Philosophy. 
Kant has sensibility and the understanding order the 
sense-data and thus constitute objects and construct 
knowledge. According to the Associational Psychology 
and the Philosophy which is based upon it, the sense-data 
order themselves and thus constitute knowledge. These 
data are conceived to be disconnected units, unchange- 
able in their nature and, in the later form of the doctrine, 
of one kind ; and every sensation, feeling, or idea is a 
group of these units. This school in Psychology holds that 
sensations, feelings, or ideas which occur once in connection 
or close succession, tend to grow together and so form a 
larger complex unit ; and the subsequent occurrence of 
any one of the components of this complex unit tends to 
call up the other components. Thus, the word " house" 
and the idea of an external object of a certain general 
character have been connected in our experience ; and, 
if either is presented in consciousness, the other is as- 
sociated with it in consciousness. Similarly, also, the 
sight of a horse running away is associated with the idea 
of danger to any one who may be in the course it is taking. 
What we have thus described and illustrated is known as 
the law of the Association of Ideas. Hume and the Later 
Empiricists held that all the products of mental life, all 
the particulars of consciousness, are constituted by this 
mechanical ordering of the disconnected units of sense- 
data. In the extreme form of Empiricism, there is no 
place for a rational factor in cognition ; knowledge is, as 
to both content and form, a datum to the subject. Hume 
has ideas relate themselves by this law to other ideas ; 
but the Later Empiricists found it necessary to recognize 
a rational factor. The doctrine of association which we 
have presented above is to be distinguished from the 



LATER EMPIRICISTS 115 

conception of association which is held by most psy- 
chologists now. The earlier conception of it was that 
it was explanatory of all forms of consciousness. But this 
view is now generally discarded ; and psychologists are 
inclined to regard association as simply one kind of mental 
reaction, and as a mode of activity which needs explana- 
tion and is, therefore, incapable of explaining experience 
in general. 

These thinkers agree in holding that we only know phe- 
nomena. Realistic Rationalism is peculiarly a Scottish 
philosophy ; Empiricism is peculiarly English, although 
one Scotch thinker — Bain — and one French thinker — 
Condillac — adopted it. Scotch Realism and English 
Empiricism differed fundamentally in this, that Realism 
had a definitely rationalistic cast and Empiricism was just 
as certainly a form of sensationalism. But they were in 
accord at one point : both believed that the key to Phi- 
losophy would be found in Psychology. Scotch Realists 
gave impetus to the study of Empirical Psychology, and 
some of them — as Brown — were hearty in their support 
of Associationism. 

§51. Specific Views of Later Empiricists. — We will 
only consider two representatives of this school — John 
Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer. Spencer is not easily 
classified ; we place him here, however, because of his 
methods and his immediate philosophic affiliations. 

I. Mind. — Mill held that mind is " a series of feelings 
with a background of possibilities of feelings." The psy- 
chical unit for him is a feeling ; and Spencer also reduces 
all forms of consciousness to simple feeling. Sensations, 
feelings, and ideas are said to be constituted of feeling 
units in various combinations. The groups of units which 
constitute sensations, emotions, and ideas are composed 
of units which are held by us in "inseparable association " 



ii6 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

through their constant conjunction in experience. This 
" inseparable association " in experience is declared to be 
their only bond. Mill recognizes that it is difficult to 
reconcile this view with self-consciousness. He acknowl- 
edges that we are driven to believe that a series of feelings 
can be aware of itself, or that the mind is something differ- 
ent from the series of feelings. 

2. Knowledge. — Mill declared that we only know par- 
ticular phenomena ; the universals of geometry may not 
be true in another world. We say that two straight lines 
cannot enclose a space ; but Mill held that it is not impos- 
sible they should. It only seems to us impossible because 
two straight lines and the non-enclosure of space have al- 
ways been associated in our experience ; and this " insep- 
arable association " makes it impossible for us to conceive 
of two straight lines enclosing space. The notion that 
3 plus 4 equals 6 is not inherently contradictory ; it 
appears contradictory to us because 3 plus 4 and 7 have 
always been associated in our experience. All so-called 
universal truths are for Mill simply instances of " inseparable 
association." Spencer says that what is " primarily known 
is . . . that there exists an outer object." This seems 
to be a definite affirmation of immediate, not inferential, 
knowledge of external objects. But he says elsewhere 
that " we can know only certain impressions produced on 
us," and that we are " compelled to think of these in 
relation to a cause," and from this there develops " the 
notion of a real existence which generated these impres- 
sions." It is difficult to reconcile these two statements : 
that we know the external object primarily, and that 
we can know only Impressions. 

3 . Relativity of Knowledge. — We have made mention 
of Hamilton's doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge. 
Spencer gave this doctrine a development peculiar to him- 



LATER EMPIRICISTS 117 

self. He held that to know Is to limit or relate. Thus, 
in knowing this desk, I separate it from a whole which is 
left unrelated and unlimited. This desk is for me, there- 
fore, a limited and related part of an unlimited and unre- 
lated whole. Now, this whole, being unrelated and un- 
limited, is unknowable. From this it follows that this desk 
— so also any other object — exists as a part of an unknow- 
able whole. There must be an unknowable that there may 
be a known object. The objects of science are, according 
to Spencer, known but unreal; the objects of religion are 
real but unknown. 

4. Objective Reality. — According to Mill, extra-mental 
existence is actual, but it cannot be known. Spencer 
affirmed that subject and object, mind and matter, are 
absolutely distinct, but are identical in nature. We can 
never know what that nature is. In holding to the in- 
dependent reality of the object, he is a Realist; but in 
defining reality as persistence in consciousness, he would 
seem to be an Idealist. 



CHAPTER XIII 

PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT OF TO-DAY 

§ 52. Questions settled ; Points of Difference. — Our 

study thus far is a general characterization of philosophic 
thought up to the latter part of the last century. It is 
such a statement of Philosophy's own report of itself as 
comes within the purpose of this Introduction. At the 
present time, systems and theories are undergoing vigorous 
criticism. In the nature of the case, a period of criticism 
cannot be readily defined. We can do no more than sug- 
gest points of general agreement and indicate some of the 
outstanding features of philosophic discussion. There is 
general objection to any theory of Knowing which does 
not give the subject grasp of trans-subjective reality. An 
Epistemology, which does not connect the subject with 
what is other than the mere product of his own mental 
activity, is spoken of as subjectivistic ; and to prove con- 
clusively that a theory of cognition is subjectivistic would 
mean its rejection by teachers of Philosophy. There is a 
like accord in the rejection of an Epistemology which ob- 
viously makes knowledge a mere datum to the subject. In 
other words, Sensationalism is a theory whose history is 
complete. If one should also say that Representatlonism 
has had its day, and that its record is closed, there would be 
few to demur. One of the fundamental questions con- 
cerning which there is sharp difference at present may be 
stated thus : How, and to what extent, may Philosophy 

118 



PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT OF TO-DAY 119 

keep in touch with the concrete ? It has been charged 
against Philosophy that it is apart from life, and that it 
concerns itself with the abstract, with mere fictions which 
are little, if any, more than empty names. If this be true, 
the mother of the sciences has forgotten her mission ; 
for it is the task of Philosophy to help us discover the 
nature of the realities with which we are in constant 
commerce. These realities are concretes, and we must 
never get out of touch with them. What it means for 
our study that we avoid abstractions and keep in the 
realm of the concrete, will become evident later. Another 
question arises from two demands which are certainly not 
easily reconciled. One of these is the demand of reason 
that we shall not give over the endeavor to ground all 
the particulars of experience in a fundamental principle 
of unity. It is generally recognized that Kant was right 
in regarding this as an insistent demand of reason. The 
urgency of this demand is manifest in the unremitting en- 
deavor of Philosophy to find an ultimate reality which 
shall be the ground of all being and activity. But it is 
charged against Monistic systems — i.e. systems which 
derive all phenomena from a unitary ultimate — that they 
rob the individual subject of his individuality. Now, if 
reason demands a unitary ground for all experience, ex- 
perience just as certainly demands that our free initiative 
— an essential of personality — shall remain inviolate. 
Philosophers are not yet agreed as to these demands and 
their possible reconciliation. A third leading particular 
of difference arises from this question : How may we con- 
strue experience so that rational activity shall always be 
recognized as inseparably intellective, emotional, and 
volitional } How shall these phases of mental activity 
be related to each other and to life activities in general ? 
Some have given primacy to intellection, others to voli- 



I20 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

tlon, still others to feeling. How shall these differences 
be settled ? A conclusive answer to this question would 
mean much for philosophical theory. 

Idealism and Realism continue to represent opposed 
views ; but the matter of difference is not what it was at 
the beginning of the Modern Age. They differed then as 
to the source of knowledge. Idealism believed that the 
source of knowledge is in the subject; Realism would 
find it in the object. Realism now agrees that there is a 
subjective element in knowledge; and Idealism — Per- 
sonal Idealism possibly excepted — holds that there is 
an objective element in knowledge. The difference at 
present is in respect to the relation of subject and object 
to each other, and the position to be assigned experience in 
constructing Philosophy. The Realist would begin his Phi- 
losophy with the subject and object conceived as independ- 
ent realities. The Idealist insists that we do not know, 
and cannot conceive, subject or object apart from experi- 
ence; therefore, since Philosophy deals with subject and 
object, it must begin with experience and never break with 
experience. Or the Idealistic doctrine may be stated thus : 
Experience is constituted in the subject-object relation 
and cannot continue apart from that relation ; hence, if 
our analysis gives us subject apart from object, or object 
apart from subject, we have no experience left and nothing 
with which to construct a Philosophy. 

There is urgent advocacy of Personal Idealism and 
Pragmatism. We cannot at this point give a detailed 
statement of these theories ; what follows will serve our 
purpose. Personal Idealism is the theory that " all 
reality is in souls and their experiences." It is evidently 
a form of Berkeleyism. Pragmatism — known also as 
Humanism and Radical Empiricism — has able propo- 
nents. This theory agrees with Idealism in asserting the 



PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT OF TO-DAY 121 

interdependence of subject and object, and it agrees with 
Realism in holding that only the particular is real. Its 
Empiricism is shown in its insistence that a large element 
of knowledge is a mere datum, a something which cannot 
be subjected to the forms of knowledge. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE PROVINCE OF PHILOSOPHY 

§ 53. Historical. — Ancient Philosophy dealt with all 
questions raised by cultured thought ; it investigated 
the whole system of things, man included. It gives us 
Metaphysics, Cosmogonies, Theology, Anthropology, Psy- 
chology, Ethics, Logic, Esthetics, Politics, Mathematics, 
Physics. In the Aristotelian period of Mediaeval Phi- 
losophy, Mathematics and the Natural Sciences began to 
be cultivated apart from General Philosophy. Later, the 
Arabians and Jews, having become acquainted with the 
works of Aristotle, pursued philosophic studies with ardor, 
but gave special attention to Science. Still later, there 
appeared Christian thinkers in this distinctive field of 
study, notably Roger Bacon and Copernicus. In respect 
of time, Francis Bacon marks the close of the Mediaeval 
Age and the beginning of the Modern ; but his scientific 
method and spirit are characteristically modern. Since 
Bacon the line of scientists has been unbroken. He re- 
garded his work as Philosophy ; and it is certain that he 
greatly influenced philosophic thought. It is also true 
that modern philosophers have forwarded the scientific 
movement. Some, as Descartes and Leibniz, were them- 
selves notable scientists ; and the more pretentious systems 
of Philosophy have sought to relate themselves to the 
whole range of cultured thought. Hegel's work was en- 
cyclopaedic ; and the same might be said of that mapped 
out by Spencer. But until relatively late, there has been 

122 



THE PROVINCE OF PHILOSOPHY 123 

no urgent insistence that a separate realm of thought 
should be assigned to Science. At present, however, 
philosophers of widest range of work recognize that there 
is ground of distinction between Science and Philosophy. 
§ 54. The Plain Man and the Scientist, or Common 
Sense and Science. — Our earliest view of the world and 
life is the uncritical " common sense " view; and that is 
the conception which most, if not all, of us have of ex- 
perience. Relatively few men have given their opinions 
concerning the ordinary and commonest experiences severe 
and methodical criticism ; and still fewer have undertaken 
to organize their views into systems of thought. Never- 
theless, the general dissemination of scientific education 
and the scientific spirit of the age have given the Plain 
Man something in common with the Scientist. The boy 
says that the apple fell because the stem broke ; but, if 
he is pressed to explain why it fell when the stem broke, 
he will say that the earth attracted it. He has learned 
so much as that at school. The illiterate dweller by the 
sea says that the moon causes the tides ; and he says that, 
not only because he has heard that such is the case, but 
because he has noticed that the tidal movements and the 
changing and rising of the moon occur in close connection. 
The view of the Scientist is virtually the same with that 
of the boy and the shoreman ; but he would state it dif- 
ferently. The Plain Man has not given the views which he 
holds in common with the Scientist the rigid criticism and 
the extended application that the Scientist has given them. 
The Scientist not only refers the falling of the apple to the 
influence of the earth, but he adds to this the statement 
that the earth is influenced by the apple ; and in addition 
to this he will give the law which determines the relative 
measure of their influence. He will likewise set forth 
carefully elaborated reasons for what he says respecting 



124 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

the falling of the apple and the relation of the moon to tidal 
movements ; and he will explain apparent exceptions and 
irregularities. He will also show how the succession of 
night and day, the changes of the moon, and the changes 
in the location of groups of stars are related to the falling 
of the apple. Beside this, the Scientist will generally re- 
port facts with greater exactness, for he has been trained to 
observe. In a word. Science gives our knowledge greater 
accuracy, and it systematizes and extends it. Special 
training in interpreting observations and making calcula- 
tions, the accumulated body of critical observations which 
are at hand, and the invention of instruments and develop- 
ment of methods enable the Scientist to correct and extend 
knowledge. 

§ 55. Science and Philosophy. — All our knowledge 
of ourselves and the world comes to us through our ex- 
perience of the world of persons and things and events. 
Science enlarges experience and gives it definiteness. 
Having noted so much as this, we undertake now to dis- 
tinguish the field of Science and the province of Philosophy. 

In the case of the falling apple. Science deals with the 
process, or event, and the objects involved in it; and that 
is true of all its thought. Objects and changes make up 
the subject-matter of Science. The term phenomena has 
come to be used of the particulars of its subject-matter; 
it is applied both to objects and changes. With this in 
view, we may for the present say that Science studies 
phenomena ; it endeavors to relate phenomena to each 
other. For example, it tries to discover how the moon 
and the tides and their changes are related ; in other words, 
it would find the order of their related changes. To take 
again our former illustration. Science undertakes to dis- 
cover in what way your hearing the noise and seeing the 
horse and fearing and fleeing are related to one another. 



THE PROVINCE OF PHILOSOPHY 125 

To begin with, it assumes that these changes in your con- 
sciousness are related to phenomena which are external 
to you. Science does not ask after the nature of the 
reality whose phenomena, or appearances, it studies ; it 
does not inquire as to what stuff it is made of. It merely 
studies the way this assumed reality behaves. Also, when 
Science concludes that the changes in the moon are caus- 
ally related to tidal movements, it is not required to go 
farther and explain the nature of causal connection, to 
state what it is in either the moon or the sea or both that 
links them. It accepts that phenomena — as a running 
horse, or darting flames — have meaning for you, and 
it classifies the changes in your consciousness attendant 
upon your discovery of meaning in phenomena ; but it 
does not inquire as to what must be your essential nature 
that you should find ideas in things and happenings, or 
what the nature of phenomena is that ideas should be 
found in them. Philosophy recognizes that reality in you 
finds expression in consciousness of yourself and of the 
external world, and that reality in the world of nature ex- 
presses itself in filling space, in being extended ; and it 
seeks to know how it is that your reality, apparently so 
different from that of things, can have commerce with 
things. It asks after the essential nature of reality in 
mind and reality in matter, reality in the subject and in 
the object. 

Science employs certain concepts in its thinking and its 
descriptions — as atoms, electrons, energy, space, time, 
etc. ; and it treats them as real. It assumes that there is 
an external world, that changes in nature follow a fixed 
order, and that every event is determined by an ante- 
cedent event. Philosophy criticizes these, and all other, 
assumptions ; and it inquires into the reality of all 
concepts. 



126 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

Science is of course a general term for the many special 
sciences, each of which studies a certain group of phe- 
nomena. It groups, and thus classifies, its objects accord- 
ing to discovered likenesses. Botany, for example, groups 
its objects into families, genera, species, and varieties. 
Science also notes likenesses of conditions and results; 
and by its study of these likenesses and results it is en- 
abled to state the conditions under which certain events 
will take place, or it can predict what will result from a 
given set of conditions. Thus, it is said that a low barom- 
eter generally presages a storm. These discovered re- 
lations of conditions and results, when formally stated, 
are known as scientific laws. Now, the findings of some 
of the special sciences can be to some extent related to 
one another ; as in the instance of Biology and Physiology 
and Botany. But it is not the task of Science to complete 
the relating of the work of the special sciences ; it leaves us 
with unrelated groups of related objects and processes. It 
is the task of Philosophy to relate all particulars and groups 
to the whole of all that is ; it sets out to make it plain 
that all-that-is is a rational system. Each special science 
tests its conclusions by their consistency with all that falls 
within the province of the special science itself and of 
those more immediately related to it. Philosophy criti- 
cises all processes of thought, even its own ; and it tests 
conclusions by their consistency with the whole of experi- 
ence. 

§ 56. Descriptive and Normative Sciences. — In what 
precedes we have had in mind sciences which give us con- 
clusions as to what is; they describe objects and processes 
and are, therefore, known as Descriptive Sciences. There 
are Sciences, however, that do not merely describe actual 
objects and state the fixed order of change in nature. 
These other sciences come of the fact that we judge opin- 



THE PROVINCE OF PHILOSOPHY 127 

ions as true or false, and conduct as good or bad, and prod- 
ucts — as those of nature and art — as beautiful or want- 
ing in beauty. In these judgments, we set value on what 
we have under consideration ; and we determine its worth 
by applying standards of truth or goodness or beauty. 
That is, we judge what is by comparing it with what ought 
to he. These sciences apply ideal standards to conclusions 
and conduct and objects ; they determine the value of 
phenomena in respect of truth, goodness, and beauty. 
They seek regulative principles or rules ; and these regu- 
lative principles are not statements of what occurs under 
certain conditions, but of what ought to be or occur. They 
are known as the Normative Sciences ; and there are 
evidently three — Logic, Ethics, and -Esthetics. Science 
assumes that man is a moral being, and that we may dis- 
cover what constitutes truth, goodness, and beauty. Phi- 
losophy inquires as to the reality of the moral order, as to 
the nature of morality, as to the source and validity of 
these concepts. Here, as elsewhere in the realm of 
thought. Philosophy has for its province ultimate ques- 
tions respecting the validity of the assumptions of all 
forms of thought, the nature of reality, and the ground of 
Being and Change. 



PART III 

ELEMENTS OF GENERAL PHILOSOPHY 

CHAPTER XV 

EXPERIENCE 

§ 57. Standpoints of Psychology and Philosophy dis- 
tinguished. — I. How Psychology views Experience. — 
You hear a clear sound ; you conclude that it is the tele- 
phone bell, not the door bell ; you go to the telephone and 
enter upon conversation. Psychology has its own in- 
terest in this experience, and its study is determined by 
this interest. The particulars of special value to this 
science are the changes which occur in your consciousness. 
It analyses the experience and distinguishes the auditory 
sensation, the localization of the source of the sound, the 
fact that you distinguish the clang of the bell from that of 
the door bell, the motor reactions (in localizing the sound 
and going to the telephone and taking up the receiver), 
and the attendant sense of effort and tone of pleasure or 
displeasure in being thus interrupted. To be sure, this 
is only a general and partial indication of what Psychology 
finds pertinent to its purpose. It will be seen, however, 
that the Psychologist is specially interested in the changes, 
or processes, in consciousness. He assumes the reality 
and separateness of the physical world — the bell, your 
body and brain and nervous system and muscles, etc. ; and 
he accepts what the physical sciences have to say of the 

128 



EXPERIENCE 129 

processes in the physical world which are more immediately 
related to your experience. He makes some study of 
these physical processes ; but his assumptions and investi- 
gations have as their end the scientific study of the phases 
of consciousness. In order that he may pursue his study 
critically and thoroughly, he distinguishes these changes 
in respect of their characteristics ; and he classifies them 
as sensations, ideas, feelings, attention, perception, etc. 
He undertakes to discover the fixed order of these mental 
processes ; and, having discovered an order of change, he 
states the order as a psychological law. His purpose is 
a scientific description of experience. We conclude, there- 
fore, that experience is for Psychology a phase, or mode, 
of change in consciousness. 

In studying the procedure of the Psychologist, as illus- 
trated above, it becomes evident that he separates, or 
abstracts, the phases of the experience from you, the sub- 
ject of them. His immediate interest is in the phases and 
modes of change, not in you. Thus he notes your sensa- 
tions, not you ; your ideas, not you ; your motor reaction, 
not you. These processes are necessarily regarded as 
apart from, or external to, each other ; but you do not ex- 
perience them as distinct from you, or external to each 
other. You and your ideas and sensations and feelings 
are not distinct, although you and they are distinguish- 
able by thought. The processes thus abstracted are bare 
concepts ; separate from you they have no reality, they 
cannot have any reality. Nevertheless, they are rightly 
treated by Psychology as reals ; for every science must deal 
with its concepts as though they were reals. But it must 
not be forgotten that the concepts of Psychology, being 
abstracted from the subject, have no reality in themselves. 
They are not the subject, neither can we constitute the sub- 
ject by aggregating these abstracted phases. We can 

K 



130 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

never constitute a real by aggregating abstract particulars 
none of which are in themselves real. 

2. Hozv Philosophy views Experience. — We will see 
in a general way how Philosophy would interest itself in 
the illustrative case given above. Philosophy notes that 
the sound has meaning for you. You recognized the sound 
as something to which you should give attention ; then 
you interpreted it as meaning that the telephone bell was 
ringing; and this you interpreted as a possible call for 
you. Along with your finding meaning in the object of 
your attention and as a part of that meaning, Philosophy 
notes that you assigned value to the sound as first appre- 
hended, and to the sound when distinguished as the tele- 
phone bell, and so to all the distinguishable moments of 
the experience. You gave them such value that you di- 
rected your attention and your motor activities with a 
developing purpose, up to the beginning of the conversa- 
tion. In other words. Philosophy recognizes that you 
think and feel and will with reference to objects ; you relate 
your entire self to them. It further notes that your ex- 
perience is in all stages of it a thinking-feeling-willing 
awareness, or consciousness. Every moment of it in- 
volves you as subject and something as object; and there 
is in the whole of it a conviction of the reality of yourself 
and the object. The distinctive interest of the Psycholo- 
gist is in the sensations, ideas, feelings, etc., quite apart 
from you and the objects with which you are in relation. 
The interest of the Philosopher, on the other hand, is in 
you as a thinking-feeling-willing reality and in the object 
as a reality which is significant for your thought and feel- 
ing and will. That is. Psychology is not distinctly in- 
terested in the subject as a subject^ nor in the object as an 
object; whereas Philosophy studies the related subject 
and object. It is a critical consideration of experience, as 



EXPERIENCE 131 

such ; and experience only arises In the subject-object re- 
lation. Philosophy seeks to know the nature of the reality 
in us and the world ; and it is in experience that we know 
ourselves and know the world of other persons and 
things and happenings. Experience is real, and it gives 
us our conviction of the reality of the world and ourselves ; 
and Philosophy holds that a critical study of experience 
will open the way to a knowledge of what the world is and 
what we are and what is our destiny, a way also by which 
we may reach a rational answer to the questions of the 
religious consciousness. 

Since Philosophy studies the related subject and object, 
it does not regard experience as a mere phase or mode of 
consciousness ; it is for Philosophy a concrete whole of 
consciousness. Experience subsists in the subject, and 
can only subsist thus ; but the subject only experiences 
when related to an object. Hence we may not abstract 
experience from the subject or the object, certainly not 
from both. To reason to ultimate conclusions respecting 
anything, we must think of it in its true relations. To sep- 
arate experience or any phase of it from the subject is to 
take it out of its true relations and to relate it externally 
to the subject and to experience ; whereas it is in and of 
the subject and is therefore internally related. 

Summary : Psychology conceives an experience as a 
phase or mode of consciousness ; for Philosophy, an 
experience is a concrete whole of consciousness. Psy- 
chology abstracts the phases of consciousness from the 
subject and treats these concepts as its distinctive subject- 
matter; and it seeks the order of processes in conscious- 
ness. Hence, for Psychology, experiences are unrelated 
to the self as subject; and they are externally related to 
each other. For Philosophy, experiences are organically 
related to the subject and to each other; and the subject, 



132 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

consciously related to an object, and the object, attended 
to by a subject, are its immediate interest. It is the aim 
of Philosophy to discover what a critical study of experi- 
ence will yield us respecting the nature of the reality of 
subject and object. 

§ 58. Dual Aspect of Experience. — Early In our study 
we said that experience has two contrasted aspects ; and, 
In the preceding section, we have noted that experience is 
always of a subject who is consciously related to an object, 
i.e. the experience has a subject-aspect and an object- 
aspect. As this fact is cardinal for Philosophy, we shall 
give it more detailed consideration here. For our present 
study, we recall that in considering your experience with 
the telephone bell, we found that it was a thinking-feeling- 
willing experience. All experience has these character- 
istics. In solving a problem, you direct your attention 
to the analysis of the problem and determine the whole 
thought-process ; and this directing of the thought-process 
is evidently a matter of your will. During your endeavors 
to effect a solution, you have a feeling of satisfaction or dis- 
satisfaction with possible methods and with results 
achieved. The dealing with the problem yields one ex- 
perience, every moment of which has these three charac- 
teristics. These characteristics of experience are insepa- 
rable, nevertheless we may give special emphasis now to 
one characteristic, and again to another. 

I. Duality of Experience as Thinking. — You see a 
painting — say a landscape — or hear music. The ex- 
perience of color or tone you refer to something other than 
yourself, something which is relatively independent of 
you and your act of seeing or hearing. This is true even 
of perception of sound when we do not perceive any occur- 
rence which might answer as the source of the sound. 
Thus, we hear what sounds like an explosion, but we do 



EXPERIENCE 133 

not see a gun fired or a blast sprung. Nevertheless we 
refer the sound to some unperceived source which is 
regarded as other than ourselves. In perceptions the 
object-aspect is usually so distinct and pronounced as to 
hold our attention and thus obscure the subject-aspect; 
but the subject-aspect is present even though it is 
vague as compared with the other aspect. The subject 
regards the object as other than himself and distinguishes 
it as spatially apart from himself. This " otherness " 
of the object involves the reference to the self and is only 
possible because of the subject-aspect of the perception. 
We have one experience with duality of aspect. 

The above holds true also for experience which is dom- 
inantly ideational — as in describing a journey which we 
have taken, or in demonstrating a proposition. In describ- 
ing the journey, we have images for our objects. The 
images which we construct and In constructing which we 
reinstate the experiences of the journey, are for the subject 
who is telling the story, other than himself. So also as 
to the geometrical figure and axioms and mathematical 
principles utilized in the demonstration of a proposition. 
We have in both cases idea-data for object reference in the 
experience, and these have their objectivity through their 
being distinguished by the subject from himself. This 
last involves the subject-aspect. 

2. Experience in Connection with Effort to do Something; 
i.e. Conative Experience. — This is experience as willing. 
A complete volition, e.g. that of going to the post-office, 
takes the form of action in which there is effort to accom- 
plish what is purposed. The object-aspect of experience 
so regarded is obvious ; for, in solving a problem or going 
to the post-office, you are directing your thought and 
energy toward something. You are conscious of the 
effort as yours ; it is begun and carried through for your- 



134 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

self. You relate the principal object — i.e. the end — 
and all subsidiary objects to yourself. In the urgency of 
the purpose, the end or the means for securing the end 
may have the chief place in attention; but the effort is 
sustained because the subject relates the end and the 
steps taken to attain the end to himself. Experience as 
conation has duality of aspect. 

3. Experience as Feeling or Affection. — When attend- 
ing to an object, e.g. when listening to the rendition of a 
musical composition, there Is a tone of pleasure or displeas- 
ure in our experience. This tone is "known as Feeling, or 
Affection. It arises from the value we set on this object; 
and feeling, or affection, may in general be described as 
our " sensitiveness to the values of objects." In the 
contemplation of an object, there is this attendant tone 
which lies between the extremes of pleasure and displeas- 
ure ; and there must be apprehension of an object in order 
that there may be feeling. It may be that the object is 
subjective in character, as when you recall your enjoyment 
of a beautiful sunset or when you attend to the present 
discomfort of a severe toothache ; but then, as always, 
there is an object. We conclude, therefore, that the feel- 
ing-characteristic of experience presents a subject- and 
an object-aspect. 

§ 59. Characteristics of Consciousness and Experience. 
— We have spoken of two characteristics of experience : 
that there is always a feeling-thlnking-willing conscious- 
ness ; and that it has two inseparable aspects. We now 
call attention to certain other characteristics which are 
important for our study. 

I. The Objects of your Experience are Many, hut the Sub- 
ject of them is One. — The things and persons and events 
to which we, each of us, direct our attention are past 
numbering. It is probable that no two instants of life 



EXPERIENCE 135 

find any one of us with exactly the same mental content. 
But in the case of each of us, the numberless objects of 
interest and ends of endeavor are all related to one subject. 
I am the I that was a pupil in the primary school, the I 
that was passed from grade to grade, the I who am now a 
teacher. This I is the one subject of all the objects in 
the unnumbered experiences that make up my life between 
the first day in the schoolroom and the present moment. 
Those experiences were the experiences of one self, of an 
identical subject. Our experiences seem quite distinct and 
individual ; nevertheless our consciousness is not many, 
but one. It is the unitary consciousness of one subject. 
We find a suggestive analogy in organisms. Varied ele- 
ments are appropriated by the plant or animal. Those 
elements, as they are at the time of their being appro- 
priated, seem quite apart and distinct from one another. 
But when they have been appropriated by the organism, 
they are organized into a whole which is a unit, into one 
plant or one body. The plant or the body is, to be sure, 
a very imperfect individual as compared with conscious- 
ness ; nevertheless it is a unit. In the next paragraph we 
shall see how the apparent distinctness of our experiences 
is lost in the unitary nature of our consciousness. 

2. The one Subject of the many Experiences of each of us 
is in Constant Change. — You are the identical self of the 
years of your boyhood ; but that same self is now a very 
different self. Once you thought as a child, and felt and 
acted as a child ; and now you think and feel and act, 
but not as when you were a child. Your conceptions 
of yourself and the world and life, your likes and dislikes 
and ideals, have so changed as to present few points of 
likeness with what they then were. Our moods change 
from hour to hour. Nay more, the consciousness of any of 
us in any instant is in some respect different from the 



136 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

consciousness of the preceding and following instants. 
Every subject is the same self through all his changes of 
consciousness ; but, although he can never become another 
self, he is ever becoming other than what he was. A 
growing organism presents an illustrative analogy. A 
tulip is throughout its life constantly becoming other than 
what it was ; but it never becomes another tulip, nor some- 
thing which is not a tulip. So with us, the subject is the 
same subject, but a changing subject. In other words, 
the subject is identical, but not static. 

3 . Experience is a Development. — We have spoken of 
experience as " any whole of consciousness." This would 
seem to imply that consciousness is made up of succeeding 
wholes. But our present study will make it clear that 
consciousness is not so constituted. When one listens 
to a musical presentation, his previous musical experience 
determines to no small extent the experience which comes 
with the present listening. The same presentation will 
have a greatly different value for a subject before he has 
had critical musical training from what it would have 
after such training. There was a time when sentences 
in our mother-tongue had little or no significance for us, 
and a time still later when this was also true of the terms 
and symbols of arithmetic. Now we understand our 
mother-speech without conscious effort ; and there are 
those of us who readily follow processes In higher mathe- 
matics. This gain In comprehension comes of the fact 
that any present experience is not wholly a new experience ; 
it has In it, as a largely determinative element, our ex- 
perience up to that present. The experience of the present 
is a combination of past experience and of what comes into 
consciousness In the present. This combining of the past 
and present In consciousness Is frequently spoken of as 
Apperception; and Kant would say that It comes of the 



EXPERIENCE 137 

synthesizing activity of reason. This much is certain : 
your experience in any instant has in it what is of the past 
and what is new. From this it becomes evident that 
experience as a whole is a development; it is not con- 
stituted of a series of independent experiences. Experi- 
ence is continuous ; it is a stream or flux, not a series in 
the strict sense of that term. Our apparently distinct 
experiences are really emphasized moments of one con- 
tinuous experience. 

4. Experience as the Realization of the Object hy the Subject. 
— But how is it possible that experience should persist ? 
Hume regarded perceptions as " distinct existences," and 
he confessed himself unable to " explain the principlea 
that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or 
consciousness " ; but he recognized that they are united. 
Mill acknowledged that he could not reconcile his serial 
view of consciousness with self-consciousness. We have 
concluded that consciousness is not constituted of a series 
of experiences, but is a continuity. If it be a continuity, 
the experience of any instant does not vanish with the 
instant ; it persists. How does it persist } We appeal to 
experience for the answer. We think of the pianist as 
having mastery of the piano in the measure in which the 
significance of that instrument for a thinking-feeling- 
acting being has become a part of himself. That is, the 
reality of the piano, as a musical instrument, has become 
in some measure an element in his own reality. This has 
come through his experience with the piano. There is in 
the instrument content for consciousness, meaning for a 
subject; and experience is the process in which this con- 
tent has come to reality in the pianist. This content hav- 
ing become an element of a subject's reality, it persists 
in and with the subject. The next paragraph will con- 
tinue our answer to the question asked above. 



138 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

5. Experience as the Process in which the Subject realizes 
Himself. — In the preceding paragraph we have noted 
that experience is a process in which we organize the ap- 
propriated meaning of things into our own reality. This 
aspect of the process is analogous to that in which an 
organism sustains life and develops. The plant takes 
up material from the soil and the air and organizes it into 
root, stem, leaf, flower, and seed. The self is such an 
organizing principle ; but there is another aspect of its 
organizing activity for which it is not easy to find a 
fitting analogy. We have called attention to the fact 
that extended critical experience in any department of 
life makes for skill in that line of activity. This is but 
another way of saying that the subject is developed in 
that particular. One says of a certain man, " He is a real 
mechanic." This statement means that the subject 
spoken of has so far realized in himself the significance of 
objects for mechanical thought and effort that he has 
developed his own reality well toward the mechanical 
ideal. We have each of us acquired some facility in relat- 
ing objects to ourselves. We can use the pen or the type- 
writer with such ease that the effort required does not in- 
terrupt the course of our thought. This means that we 
have not only organized the reality of these objects into 
our reality, but that we have also organized our activities ; 
we have organized and thus developed our own reality. 
The self is the organizing principle of experience and life ; 
and experience persists because it is an element in the sub- 
ject as organized. 

6. Conclusions. — In a plant and animal the unit or- 
ganism builds up its own particulars and orders them in 
respect of each other. Thus, in a body the individual 
organism appropriates content and disposes the content 
into flesh, skin, blood, hair, etc. It builds up the mem- 



EXPERIENCE 139 

bers ; and, in so doing, it organizes the appropriated con- 
tent and develops itself. The subject in his experience 
appropriates content for himself as a thinking-feeling- 
acting unit ; he organizes this content into his reality, 
and thus develops and organizes his own reality. The 
relation of the activities of an organism to the appro- 
priated material and to the parts of the organism is in- 
ternal, or immanent. The relation of the activity of the 
subject to the particulars of his experience is develop- 
mental and immanent. There is nothing like this in the 
relation of the machine to what organizes it, or to its own 
parts, or to the material which it works. We conclude, 
therefore, that the mechanical idea and mechanical rela- 
tions are not applicable to experience ; they are mislead- 
ing. For the study of experience, we must recognize 
that it has its origin and its being in organic relations. 

In concluding our consideration of this subject, we recall 
some facts noted above. Experience is a continuous 
whole. What appear to us to be separate experiences are 
emphasized, or selected, wholes of experience, selected 
to serve the subject's momentary purpose. In view of 
this, it may be well to modify our provisional definition 
of an experience as conceived by Philosophy and to state 
it thus : an experience is a selected whole of consciousness. 
Every whole of consciousness has three characteristics ; it 
is a thinking-feeling-willing awareness. And every whole of 
consciousness has two aspects : a subject-aspect and an 
object-aspect. We may also, without danger of confusion, 
speak of any content for consciousness which we have 
organized into our own reality as an experience ; or we may 
use this same term to signify the process by which content 
for consciousness is realized in the self. 



DIVISION A: COGNITION AND REALITY; 
EPISTEMOLOGY 

CHAPTER XVI 

SCEPTICISM 

§ 60. Historical. — The uncritical, or naive, man never 
doubts but that it is possible to know objects. Most men 
are certain that they know objects and occurrences ; and 
they would be surprised if one should seriously assert that 
there is no assurance whatever that any of their sup- 
posed knowledge is valid. But some philosophers have 
doubted the possibility of attaining valid knowledge ; 
and others have gone so far as to declare that knowledge of 
what is real is impossible. Scepticism, or doubt of the 
possibility of knowledge, began to take form with the 
Sophists. According to Protagoras, knowledge of an 
object is only the momentary opinion of the individual 
knower ; it is not valid, because it is not universally true, 
i.e. true for that individual always and for all subjects. 
His doctrine is, to be sure, a modified form of doubt ; for 
he grants a knowledge of changing appearances which is, 
at the time of the perception, true for the individual who 
perceives. But Protagoras denies knowledge of reality, 
and he also denies that different subjects have a common 
content of knowledge. With Gorgias scepticism became 
absolute ; he denied both the fact of reality and the 
possibility of knowledge. The Sceptics, a Graeco-Roman 
school, were open proponents of doubt. Pyrrho, whom 

140 



SCEPTICISM 141 

we know through his pupil, Timon, was a thoroughgoing 
sceptic. He taught that knowledge of things is impossible, 
and that the principle of doubt is itself open to doubt. 
Some of those who came after Pyrrho were ready to grant 
that we may attain degrees of probability approximating 
certainty. Hume seems to have been the last thorough- 
going sceptic of prominence. The prevailing form of 
modern philosophical scepticism is expressed in the doctrine 
that the objects of perception are only temporal and spatial 
appearances, or phenomena ; that we do not, and cannot, 
know reality. This view takes various forms ; but in 
general it would mean that in seeing or touching this 
desk — i.e. in perceiving it — you do not perceive the 
reality itself, but the appearance of a reality, the reality 
being itself unperceived. The doctrine just described is 
known as Phenomenalism. 

§ 61. Our Purpose. — We do not purpose in this chap- 
ter to establish the validity of knowledge ; neither will 
we undertake a detailed examination of Phenomenalism 
at this point. That will come later. We wish to set 
forth the irrationality of general philosophic doubt, to 
indicate the inherent inconsistency and intellectual folly 
of asserting or assuming that we cannot attain to such a 
degree of validity as will satisfy the demands of reason. 
In other words, this chapter is merely a general criticism 
of philosophic scepticism. 

§ 62. Grounds of Doubt. — Why have thoughtful men 
doubted the possibility of knowledge ^ Facts of common 
experience seem at first sight to justify their questioning. 

I. The sun appears larger at some times than at others ; 
a tree appears blue at a distance, near at hand it is seen to 
be green ; a man appears larger when standing by a small 
boy than when he stands by a large man ; a stick which is 
straight in the air will appear broken if part of it be thrust 



142 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

obliquely into water. These experiences show that the 
same object appears different at different times, from dif- 
ferent points of view, and in different relations. Other 
examples abound. Thus, a weight seems heavier and a 
road longer when we are weary than when we are in full 
vigor; an object may feel cold to one hand and warm to 
the other hand of the same subject; and persons do not 
agree as to the size of the full moon. That is, the same 
object will be differently perceived by different persons, 
also by the same person in different moods. Now, the 
sun and the man cannot be both large and small, the tree 
both green and blue, the stick both straight and broken ; 
and the same may be said of the other differing perceptions 
of the same object. Such experiences, it is said, indicate 
that our knowledge is a momentary and individual knowl- 
edge of appearances and does not have validity for all 
subjects and all experiences of the same subject. The man 
who would be rational must, therefore, be sceptical respect- 
ing knowledge. 

2. In our study of Experience, we found that every 
present experience is largely determined by past experience. 
The farmer concludes that the soil and exposure of a cer- 
tain field are such that it would be well to use it for the 
culture of grapes. The geologist says that the valley he 
is studying has been greatly affected, if not caused, by 
glacial action. They both base their judgments upon 
opinions which they, at the time of their viewing the field 
and the valley, assume to be true. This is true of all of us 
in our attaining knowledge ; we all begin with something 
which we accept as true. If we are asked to prove that 
these basal judgments are true, we must argue from other 
judgments which are yet more general. To justify these 
more general opinions, we must find premises that are 
still more fundamental. From this it is evident that the 



SCEPTICISM 143 

ultimate basis of our knowledge is some principle which is 
taken to be true without proof. In view of this, it is 
claimed that what we call knowledge rests upon an un- 
proven basis, and that our knowledge must in consequence 
lack validity. 

3. Much of our knowledge is incomplete and imper- 
fect; it is not certain that our knowledge of anything is 
complete. We are constantly supplementing and revis- 
ing what we know or think we know. This is so notably 
true in the realm of science that examples need not be 
given. Our knowledge of the external world comes to 
us through sensation and is, therefore, subject to this 
limitation. The blind do not know colors, and the deaf 
do not know sounds ; and some who have vision and 
hearing do not see and hear all that is visible and 
audible, because their sensibility in these respects is 
not sufficiently acute. We have reason to believe that 
animals can see and hear and smell what we cannot. In 
addition to this, it is not certain that we are so furnished 
with sense-organs as to give us a complete knowledge of 
things and happenings. We are far from having made a 
complete account of the knowledge possible through our 
normal sensibility ; and the foregoing considerations would 
indicate the possibility that what we perceive is but a very 
small fraction of what exists and occurs. The sceptic in- 
sists that this fact puts our present knowledge in doubt. 

4. We have spoken of thoroughgoing scepticism the na- 
ture of whose doubt is so radical as to call for special men- 
tion. It is frequently called Pyrrhonism after the founder 
of the ancient school of sceptics. This name is, how- 
ever, sometimes applied to views which are by no means 
so consistently extreme as those of Pyrrho and his fol- 
lowers. For a Pyrrhonic sceptic, this universe is a universe 
of unreason, " a chaos of unrelated phenomena." Objects, 



144 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

events, and experiences cannot be reduced to order. This 
disorder and unreason is even a characteristic of mental 
operations, and as a consequence we ought to doubt our 
doubts. Hume's scepticism is related to that which we 
have just described. He held that " a true sceptic will 
be diffident of his philosophic convictions," and that 
" in all the incidents of life, we ought still to preserve 
our scepticism." He also says that " all who reason or 
believe anything" are guilty of folly. From this it is evi- 
dent that he felt bound to doubt the validity of his prin- 
cipal doctrines, and among these doctrines we find his 
doubt of reason. 

§ 63. Scepticism Examined. — We are not at liberty 
to reject a doctrine simply because its logical consequences 
are alarmingly destructive. But if it involves conclusions 
which are grave and revolutionary, this fact should put 
us on our guard ; and we should submit the doctrine to 
exacting criticism before accepting it. Now, the logical 
consequences of scepticism are revolutionary. If the 
sceptic is right, the assertions and procedure of ordinary life 
are irrational, for we make assertions which imply a valid 
knowledge of things, events, and persons ; and we base 
our life activities upon the certainty that we have knowl- 
edge which will hold true. Scepticism likewise robs the 
processes and findings of science of all value. The reason- 
ing which leads to such destructive conclusions must be 
itself without flaw. If there is no knowledge which is 
valid, no knowledge upon which we may confidently rely, 
none that will stand the test of reason, then all thinking 
and all speech are folly. We cannot know that there is 
anyone to whom to express thought, or anything to think 
about, or anyone to think. To accept this, would be the 
suicide of reason ; and the argument in support of such a 
conclusion must be unimpeachable. 



SCEPTICISM 145 

1. As to the sceptical argument which is based upon 
the asserted variant perceptions of the same object by 
different subjects, or by the same subject in different moods 
and relations. A study of Appearance and Reality will 
best discover for us how differing perceptions arise and 
what their significance is for Philosophy ; and that study 
comes later. We shall then see whether variant percep- 
tions furnish ground for concluding that we know appear- 
ance only, and not reality. At this point, however, we call 
attention to two facts. First, despite these differing per- 
ceptions the object is somehow and to some extent known ; 
for it is known to be the same object. The doubter grants 
this fact; indeed he bases his argument upon it. It is 
evident, then, that our knowledge in such instances is not 
wholly invalid ; it has some worth. The second fact is 
this : the sceptic affirms knowledge — that the object is 
the same — and he makes this assertion of valid knowl- 
edge a premise for his argument that there is no valid 
knowledge. His premise and his conclusion cannot both 
be true. 

2. As to the argument based upon the fact that the 
ultimate basis of knowledge must be some principle which 
is taken to be true without formal proof. This statement 
is not open to doubt. All science assumes the uniformity 
of nature. It postulates that, as nature now acts under 
any given conditions, so nature has acted in the past and 
will act to-morrow. Our fundamental assumption in 
practical life, in Science, and in Philosophy is that the 
universe, including man, is intellectually reliable. This 
implies first that reason is self-consistent. That is, in 
fact, simply saying that self-consistency is essential to 
right reasoning. If any view includes two particulars 
which are inconsistent with each other, that is of itself 
an indication that further thought is required. We will 



146 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

not have come to complete rationality respecting the 
matter in question until we have found what reconciles 
the conflicting particulars or what gives ground for the 
rejection of one of them. The assumption that reason 
is self-consistent is really no assumption; it is merely 
another way of saying that reason is what it is. Self- 
consistency is of the nature of rationality. Our assump- 
tion that the universe is universally reliable implies, 
secondly, that the universe is intelligible. To question 
the intelligibility of the universe, to doubt whether it has 
a discoverable meaning is to begin our study with a pre- 
supposition which renders investigation fruitless. The 
assumption that the universe with which we have inter- 
course has a discoverable meaning, is essential to the study 
of the experience which arises from our dealings with per- 
sons, things, and events ; hence it is a reasonable assump- 
tion. The self-consistency of reason and the intelligibility 
of the universe justify us in holding that any characteris- 
tic of thought which is essential to the self-consistency of 
reason and the intelligibility of the universe, may be taken 
to be true. 

We will now apply the test of self-consistency to the 
reasoning of the philosophical sceptic. The sceptic is a 
sceptic because he is unwilling to accept mere assertion 
as valid knowledge. He holds that that only is knowledge 
which has for its ground an assignable reason, that an 
affirmation which is not so grounded is without value. 
But this holds also for his doubt; for his doubt is an 
affirmation of the invalidity of knowledge. His affirma- 
tion of invalidity must, therefore, be based upon an as- 
signed reason. But to assign a reason is to declare that 
he has some valid knowledge, and this is inconsistent with 
his assertion that there is no valid knowledge. A reasoned 
scepticism is inherently self-contradictory. 



SCEPTICISM 147 

3. As to the incompleteness and consequent imperfec- 
tion of our supposed knowledge. It is true that our 
knowledge is incomplete ; but incompleteness is not to be 
confounded with invalidity. Our earliest geometrical 
knowledge was valid although it was the mere beginning ; 
our later advanced mathematical acquirements do not put 
in question the first facts acquired in arithmetic. What we 
came to know in the study of the first proposition of geom- 
etry made possible what came after ; it in fact constituted a 
part of the later knowledge. Mere extension of knowledge 
does not prove the initial forms of it invalid. The dis- 
covery of the law of gravitation did not render invalid 
previous knowledge of physical facts ; it simply gave more 
adequate explanation of them. Incomplete knowledge 
only becomes untruth when it is taken to be the whole 
truth. A being endowed with a sense not had by us might 
have elements in his knowledge which are not in ours ; but 
that does not force the conclusion that ours is without 
value. The blind and the deaf are cut off from knowledge 
which we have; but blindness does not invalidate the 
knowledge which comes through hearing and touch, nor 
deafness that which we attain through touch and vision. 
Knowledge obtained through the senses which we have 
would still be truth, even though it were but a part of 
the truth. 

There will always be a possibility that our judgments 
will need correction. The Copernican theory led men to 
correct some of their astronomical ideas ; but the observed 
facts of eclipses and the lunar month and the like remained, 
and these facts constituted a body of knowledge. This 
theory did not make it necessary that any astronomical 
facts should be discarded ; it opened the way to a new and 
more adequate explanation of known facts. We call 
attention to an important fact in this connection : Thought 



148 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

corrects itself. The latest conclusion, that which is free 
from some particular of error, has come by way of knowl- 
edge ; and the extension and completion of knowledge 
must necessarily come thus. This puts in evidence the 
authority of thought to sit in judgment on itself, and its 
efficiency in so judging. Cognitive experience is its own 
lawgiver and judge. This is to be seen also in the fact 
that the denial of knowledge involves an affirmation of 
knowledge. 

4. From what precedes it is clear that reasoned scepti- 
cism is irrational. All thinking assumes the competency of 
thought, it assumes that reasoned thinking will lead to 
valid conclusions. Scepticism itself makes this assump- 
tion in presenting reasons for its doubt. In addition to 
this, the scepticism which we have thus far examined, 
bases its doubt upon what must be valid if its objection 
holds. Its thesis and its argument are inconsistent. 
So much seems evident; but thoroughgoing scepticism 
requires further consideration. The radical sceptic doubts 
his doubt; and in this his scepticism differs from that 
which we have thus far examined. According to radical 
scepticism, it is useless to ask that reason be self-consistent. 
Hume accepted the fact of the unity of consciousness, and 
along with this he insisted that perceptions are absolutely 
distinct existences. He declared that both these were 
for him assured principles, although he at the same time 
recognized their inconsistency with each other. And this 
was not strange, for he also asserted the falsity of reason. 
To state it briefly, the thoroughgoing sceptic consistently 
refuses to be bound to self-consistency ; he takes this 
position in order that he may be consistent. Such a 
scepticism cannot be refuted by its own principles. 
It will not accept what is not proved, and it holds a con- 
ception of the world and life which makes it impossible 



SCEPTICISM 149 

to frame a cogent argument. There is that, however, in 
the preceding statement which makes the case clear to us. 
Radical scepticism refuses to be bound to self-consistency ; 
such a doctrine proclaims itself irrational. 

§ 64. Conclusion. — As previously indicated, the logi- 
cal consequences of the doctrine we have been examining 
are so destructive as to forbid its acceptance unless the 
reasons proffered in its support are unimpeachable. It 
fails to meet this test ; it is inherently inconsistent. The 
philosophical sceptic is irrational in his attitude and pro- 
cedure. The process and activities by which we examine 
and judge knowledge must be the processes and activi- 
ties of cognition itself. If we deny the reliability of 
cognition or put it in doubt, we deny or put in doubt the 
validity of our scepticism ; for the doubt must itself come 
through the knowing process. We may with reason doubt 
particulars of knowledge ; but, in doing this, cognition 
is judging itself. The cognizing activity of reason is also 
the explanatory and critical activity of reason. In the 
nature of the case, there can be no explanation or criticism 
of knowledge except upon the assumption that the knowing 
activity is reliable. " The validity of knowledge as such 
is an ultimate and inevitable assumption." 



CHAPTER XVII 

SOLIPSISM 

§ 65. The Doctrine Stated. — The world of persons and 
things seems to us to be very real. In our normal ex- 
perience, we never appear to ourselves to be the only 
reality. On the contrary, each of us thinks of himself 
as a single reality among an incalculable number of reali- 
ties ; for the world in which we are and the particulars 
with which we have to do, are taken by us to be real as we 
ourselves are. It is the task of Philosophy to criticise 
any view which may possibly be open to doubt ; but this 
element of experience — assurance of the reality of things 
and other persons — is so accordant with the whole of 
experience that Western Philosophy has accepted it as a 
true account of the world. It is doubtful if any Western 
thinker has ever seriously insisted that he was himself the 
sole reality ; but some philosophers have propounded 
views which their critics declare involve the strange 
doctrine that nothing but the individual self exists. This 
doctrine is known as Solipsism. But, while it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to find a Western thinker who 
would deny that there is any reality other than himself, 
there have been philosophers who insisted that we have 
no evidence that anything else than the self exists. Ac- 
cording to them you know that you yourself are ; but the 
reality of all else, of the persons with whom you have inter- 
course and of the objects you handle, is for you only prob- 
lematical. A few seem to hold to the reality of other 

ISO 



SOLIPSISM ' 151 

persons as Indubitable ; but they either deny the reality 
of things, or hold their reality to be doubtful. They 
insist that our supposed knowledge Is not knowledge of 
things as they are. They assert that the world you know 
is no more nor less than an idea in your mind ; and It Is 
by no means certain that the external world, granting that 
there is one, is what you take it to be. The term Solipsism 
has also been applied to this doctrine. Solipsism in this, 
its epistemologlcal, reference takes various forms ; but 
It may be said In general to stand for the doctrine that, 
granting that there is trans-subjective reality, what any 
of us knows is not that reality, it is rather the projection 
of the subject's own subjectivity. In other words, the 
world which each subject knows has its existence solely In 
that subject's consciousness. It Is evidently a form of 
Subjectivism. 

§ 66. Our Purpose. — We do not purpose to examine 
Solipsism, using that word rigorously as signifying the 
doctrine that the individual subject Is the sole reality. 
That view has no standing place in the province of reason. 
Neither will we at this point give a detailed study of 
Subjectivism with a view to establishing the actuality of 
knowledge of objective reality; that study comes later. 
In this chapter we examine the doctrine that the world 
of our experience is the construct of the Individual subject. 
For example. In the instance of the book which you think 
you are holding In your hand and reading ; granting that 
there is some reality other than your own self in a certain 
conscious state, you do not apprehend that objective 
reality. In connection with your relation to that reality, 
you have certain sense-impressions ; what these are in 
detail is determined by what you are. You project them 
out from yourself; and, thus projected, they become for 
you the symbol of an unapprehended reality. You call 



152 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

It a book ; but its details as a book it has received from 
you. A study of this form of SoUpsism will show that it 
is inherently inconsistent. 

§ 67. The Doctrine Explained. — Professor Karl Pear- 
son gives a very able, reasoned statement of this doctrine. 
It has the form of a scientific description ; but it is in effect 
an argument in support of this thesis : Granting that there 
is an external world, even then the world as known to us 
is merely a projection of our individual subjectivity. He 
says : — 

"How close then can we get to this supposed world 
outside ourselves ? Just as near but no nearer than the 
brain terminals of the sensory nerves. We are like the 
clerk in the telephone exchange who cannot get nearer 
to his customers than his end of the telephone wires. We 
are indeed worse off than the clerk, for to carry out the 
analogy properly we must suppose him never to have been 
outside the exchange^ never to have seen a customer or anyone 
like a customer — in short, never, except through the telephone 
wire, to have come in contact with the outside universe. Of 
that ' real ' universe outside himself he would be able 
to form no direct impression ; the real universe for him 
would be the aggregate of his constructs from the messages 
which were caused by the telephone wires in his office. 
About those messages and the ideas raised in his mind by 
them he might reason and draw his inferences ; and his 
conclusions would be correct — for what .f* For . . . the 
type of messages that go through the telephone. Some- 
thing definite and valuable he might know with regard to 
the spheres of action and of thought of his telephone sub- 
scribers, but outside those spheres he could have no ex- 
perience. . . . He could never have seen or touched a 
telephonic subscriber in himself. Very much in the posi- 
tion of such a telephone clerk is the conscious ego of each 



SOLIPSISM 153 

one of us seated at the brain terminals of the sensory nerves. 
Not a step nearer than those terminals can he get to that 

* outside ' world. . . . Messages in the form of sense- 
impressions come flowing in from that * outside world/ 
and these we analyse, classify, store up, and reason about. 
But of the nature of ' things-in-themselves,' of what may 
exist at the other end of our system of telephone wires, 
we know nothing at all." . . . 

" So it is with our brain. The sounds from [the] 
telephone . . . correspond to . . . sense-impressions. 
These sense-impressions we project as it were outwards 
and term the real world outside ourselves. But the things- 
in-themselves which the sense-impressions symbolize, the 

* reality,' as the metaphysicians call it, at the other end 
of the nerve, remains unknown and u knowable. Reality 
of the external world lies for science and for us in com- 
binations of form and color and touch — sense-impres- 
sions as widely divergent from the thing * at the other 
end of the nerve ' as the sounds of the telephone from the 
subscriber at the other end of the wire. ... As his [the 
telephone clerk's] world is conditioned and limited by his 
particular network of wires, so ours is conditioned by our 
nervous system, by our organs of sense. Their peculi- 
arities determine what is the nature of the outside world 
which we construct. It is the similarity in the organs of 
sense and in the perceptive faculty of all normal beings 
which makes the outside world the same, or practically 
the same, for them all. ... It is as if two telephone ex- 
changes had very nearly identical groups of subscribers. 
In this case a wire between the two exchanges would soon 
convince the imprisoned clerks that they had something 
in common and peculiar to themselves. That conviction 
corresponds ... to the recognition of other consciousness." 

§ 68. Examination of the Preceding Exposition and 



154 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

Argument. — i. The foregoing exposition affirms and Im- 
plies certain realities and relations ; and these are made 
the basis of the explanation and argument. The nerves, 
the brain, the flowing in of messages from without, the 
similarity of sense-organs, the situation of the ego at the 
brain terminal of the nerves, and the likenesses of our 
experiences are regarded as settled facts. If the nerves, 
the coming of messages along the nerves, the situation of 
the ego, and other stated and implied actualities are not as 
Pearson says, the exposition and argument fail, and his denial 
that the realities of the external world are known fails also. 

2. If, as he says, the ego is no nearer the external world 
than the brain terminal of the nerves, then the nerves are 
external to the ego ; so also are other persons and their 
experiences. But, by his own admission, the nerves, and 
the work which the nerves do, are all known. This would 
indicate that we do know the external world as it is. If 
his thesis is true, his affirmation of knowledge respecting 
nerves and sense-impressions is without warrant. If he 
is warranted in these affirmations, his thesis is false. 

3. He accepts the fact of the practical agreement In 
experience of different subjects. He must account for this 
agreement ; for his view — that our knowledge is purely 
subjective and personal — would seem to preclude such 
agreement. In stating the ground of this agreement, he 
says that the organs of sense and the perceptive faculty 
of all persons are the same. Here again he affirms exact 
knowledge of what is objective — not merely knowledge 
that something is, but knowledge of what it is. But this 
does not agree with his thesis, for his thesis denies the 
fact of such knowledge. 

4. His assertion that the ego is seated at the brain 
terminal of the nerves, is crassly materialistic and without 
warrant. It conceives mind spatially. Science gives 



SOLIPSISM 155 

no warrant for such a statement. We have reason to con- 
clude that physiological processes related to sensations — 
as of color, sound, taste, etc. — are located in the brain. 
But the psychical processes — the color, the sound, or the 
quality of the taste — have never been found there. 

5. If the Subjectivism which we have just examined 
would be consistent, it must go further and assert that the 
reality of all except the individual subject is in the highest 
degree doubtful. Pearson says, "The field [of science] is 
essentially the contents of the mind." According to this, 
the subject-matter of geology, botany, and chemistry 
is the consciousness of the individual student. Other 
students and the contents of their consciousness are for 
each of us simply states of our own individual conscious- 
ness. We have no warrant for asserting that rocks, 
plants, animals, and other persons have an existence apart 
from our personal and private consciousness. We have 
seen in what precedes that the Subjectivist cannot assume 
the reality of the external world in order to explain his 
consciousness ; for the assumption and the explanation 
involve him in inconsistencies. To be consistent, the 
Subjectivist must also hold that the house in which I am, 
the grounds on which it stands, the chair on which I sit, 
the pen with which I write are for exact knowledge 
mere states of my consciousness. In a word, the only 
reality for each of us is his own states of consciousness ; 
but all thinkers agree in rejecting this extreme doctrine. 

§ 69. Conclusions. — Our study of Philosophical Scep- 
ticism led to the conclusion that rationality requires us 
to assume that experience gives us valid knowledge, and 
that we must leave to cognition itself to fix the degree of 
validity of particular cognitions. Whether you are right 
in concluding that the telephone bell rang, that the un- 
signed letter is from a certain correspondent, that the 



156 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

markings on Mars are canals, or that Chemistry is right in 
treating radium as an element — the validity of these or 
other particulars of what you hold for knowledge, can only 
be determined by assuming the validity of knowledge as 
such. We are not free to doubt the validity of knowledge. 
Our study of Solipsism forces the conclusion that, if we 
would preserve self-consistency in thought, we must accept 
that there is other reality than states of consciousness and 
that the individual subject knows what is not purely sub- 
jective. Your world of other persons and things and events 
is not a mere projection of your consciousness. In dealing 
with the world known to you — in thinking about it, 
feeling with respect to it, handling its objects, and taking 
part in its doings — you are dealing with what is not 
merely your states of consciousness or the reflection or 
representation of those states. Following upon these 
conclusions, two questions call for answer. Granting 
the validity of knowledge and that we may have knowl- 
edge of what is not purely subjective, granting also that 
the world of each of us is not a mere expression or pro- 
jection of the self, we have still to determine whether what 
we know is the reality of objects or merely appearance. 
Thus, in apprehending a chair or a portrait, do I apprehend 
the reality in each of these or merely the appearance of 
a reality ? This is one question. The other arises out 
of the Solipsistic view that knowledge is purely personal. 
You and I see a house. Is the house known by you the 
same with the house known by me } Are the objects of 
your external world objects for all subjects as they are 
objects for you ? Or to make it more general, granted 
that the individual subject knows what is not purely sub- 
jective, is there in objects as known by the individual 
subject that which is common to the cognitive experience 
of all subjects ? These questions will occupy our attention 
in a number of the chapters which follow. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

APPEARANCE AND REALITY 

§ 70. The Question Stated. — In answering the ques- 
tion, Do we know reality ? we will first consider experiences 
which seem to support the doctrine that we know Ap- 
pearance only, and not Reality. 

1. We are so impressed with the reality of persons and 
things, there is such a general agreement between the 
world as we think of it and the experiences which we have 
in dealing with it, that it scarcely occurs to us to question 
whether the world as we know it is the world of reality. 
We uncritically accept that we know the world in its reality, 
that what we see and hear and smell and taste and touch 
is reality, not appearance. But certain experiences have 
led men to doubt the correctness of this common conviction. 
A piece of cloth may have a different color in lamplight 
from that which it has in sunlight; and this is also true 
of gems. In the shadow of the bridge, the clear water 
of the brook is a dark brown. From some points a round 
disk is seen as oval, and the parallel rails of the railway 
seem to meet in the distance. Such experiences have led 
men to distinguish between appearance and reality. 
Many have conceived of reality as that which is back of 
appearance ; and they have also concluded that what we 
know is the appearance of things, not the reality of them. 

2. Besides these common experiences there are facts 
which the analytical study of perception forces us to take 
account of. We commonly think of the red or pink color 

157 



iS8 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

of the rose as being in the rose, of the sound which comes 
of the plucking of the harp string as being in the harp. 
For the uncritical man, the taste quality of his experience 
in eating an orange is in the fruit, independent of its being 
experienced by him or any other person. But very early 
in the history of Philosophy, men began to question 
whether color, sound, smell, and taste are qualities of the 
object considered apart from the subject. These and 
other qualities were put in a class by themselves as qualities 
which are not actual qualities of objects, but marks rather 
as to how objects affect us. Many, if not most, thinkers 
now hold that all the qualities which we assign to objects 
are not purely of the object, but that the qualities which 
objects have as we perceive them are conditioned by the 
subject. They hold that at least two factors enter into the 
determination of the qualities which objects are perceived 
to have — the nature of the object and the nature of the 
subject. From this some would conclude that we per- 
ceive the appearance of objects, not their reality. 

3. It is likewise urged that this conclusion would follow 
from the scientific conception of the constitution of matter. 
According to that, the top of this desk is not continuous 
as it appears to be ; it is constituted of atoms no two of 
which are in actual contact. That is, the appearance of 
the desk, and of all other objects, is quite other than the 
reality of the objects ; they appear to be continuous, but 
are in reality discontinuous. We do not perceive them as 
they are really made up ; we perceive them merely as 
they appear to us, and the appearance is not identical 
with the reality. 

4. From the preceding it is evident that we cannot an- 
swer the question. Do we know reality .? until we have 
determined the relation of appearance and reality. Those 
who answer our question in the negative generally assume 



APPEARANCE AND REALITY 159 

that appearance and reality are separable In fact just as 
they are in thought, and that one may know appearance 
without at the same time knowing reality. In fact they 
are regarded by many as actually exclusive of each other ; 
to cognize appearance is not to cognize reality, and to know 
reality would be to know it apart from its appearance. 

§ 71. Criticism of the Doctrine that Appearance and 
Reality are, for Cognition, mutually exclusive. — The 
doctrine which we are to examine in this section regards 
appearance as a seeming, back of which there is a reality. 
For this doctrine, appearance is not mere illusion. 

I. As to the Argument which is based upon the Fact that 
the Qualities which we assign to Objects are Phases of our 
Consciousness. — That experience which you interpret 
as a bird flying is a phase of your consciousness ; but such 
a statement is not a complete account of the experience. 
We have examined the doctrine that the objects of ex- 
perience are only modifications of the individual conscious- 
ness, and have rejected it because of its irrationality. The 
doctrine under review also rejects it. It recognizes that 
your experience in seeing a bird or hearing the door-bell 
is not purely subjective ; it is experience with respect to 
something which is actually other than yourself. What 
the doctrine under consideration holds is, that the per- 
ceived qualities and relations which you Interpret as a bird 
or a door-bell are appearances ; and, being appearances, 
they are other than, and exclusive of, the reality of the 
object. This view declares that we know that the object is, 
but we do not know the nature of the reality of the object. 
In reply we say that, in knowing how the object appears, 
we know something of the nature of the reality. We know 
that the reality which appears as a bird presents certain 
marks which enable us to identify it. So with all objects 
of perception, they present certain qualities in certain 



i6o INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

relations to one another. The related qualities which con- 
stitute the appearance of an object to a subject are the 
expression (literally, the thrusting out) of the reality itself as 
it is related to a subject. In knowing the appearance, we 
know something of the nature of the reality ; for we know 
how it expresses itself to a subject. Appearance is not 
exclusive of reality ; it is, on the contrary, expressive of 
reality. 

2. As to the Varying Appearances of the same Object in 
Varying Relations. — We have such experiences in the case 
of lavender-colored cloth which appears gray in lamplight, 
the circular disk when viewed otherwise than perpendicular 
to its plane, the moon in its changes, and a straight stick 
thrust obliquely into water. What was urged in the pre- 
ceding paragraph holds here. In the instance of each of 
these perceptions, we not only know that a reality is ; 
but, in knowing its varying appearances, we know how 
it behaves in certain relations. But knowledge as to how 
a reality expresses itself in certain relations is knowledge 
of the reality ; and this knowledge is obtained in the per- 
ception of its appearances. Knowledge of appearances, 
then, is not apart from knowledge of reality ; the appear- 
ances are expressions of reality to a perceiving subject. 

3. As to the Scientific Doctrine that the Constitution of 
Objects is not what it appears to be. — Sense-objects — 
e.g. the leaf of a book, or the top of a desk — appear to be 
continuous ; but it is said that science has discovered that 
they are really made up of atoms no two of which are in 
immediate contact with each other. That is, the matter 
of sense-objects is discontinuous, not continuous. From 
this, it is concluded that perception yields us knowledge 
of appearance only, not knowledge of reality. In review- 
ing this argument, we should first note that the atomic 
conception of the constitution of matter is regarded by 



APPEARANCE AND REALITY i6i 

many as an hypothesis rather than a determined actuality. 
But if the atomic constitution of matter should come to be 
accepted as incontrovertible, that would not make against 
the doctrine that we know reality in perception. If the 
top of that table is known to be discontinuous, it is known 
to be so constituted by inference from knowledge obtained 
through sense-perception. That is, the doctrine of the 
atomic constitution of sense-objects is reached through 
inference from observed facts. Inference has supple- 
mented and extended the knowledge obtained by direct 
observation. This fact does not prove that we do not 
know reality in our perception of objects ; it simply shows 
that there are some facts respecting reality which we ob- 
tain, not in perception, but by inference from knowledge 
of reality attained in perception. In other words, it would 
show that the knowledge of objects which is attained 
through sense-perception is incomplete ; but incomplete 
knowledge is valid if we recognize its limitations and do not 
regard it as complete. The revelations of the microscope 
supplement the knowledge of unaided vision. What we 
attain through aided and unaided vision is in both cases 
knowledge obtained in perception of appearances. All our 
knowledge of sensible objects is knowledge of reality ; for 
it is knowledge obtained by interpreting the behavior of 
reality in various relations. Appearances are modes in 
which reality manifests itself ; they do not exclude reality 
from cognition, they express it to the knowing subject. 

§ 72. The Doctrine that Appearances are Illusory. — 
It is obvious that whatever knowledge we may have of 
objects is obtained through perception of appearances ; 
i.e. it is mediated by appearances. If, then, it be true 
that appearance is illusory, it follows of necessity that 
reality cannot be known. This doctrine is based upon a 
conception of the nature of reality which makes it im- 

M 



i62 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

possible that reality should be known. From these con- 
siderations, it is evident that the doctrine which we are now 
examining differs essentially from that which we reviewed 
in the section preceding this. That doctrine regards ap- 
pearances as expressions of a reality which is back of them ; 
according to this doctrine appearances are illusory. This 
latter view has been clearly stated and ably advocated by 
Bradley in a work entitled Appearance and Reality. A 
full examination of this teaching does not fall within the 
scope of this Introduction ; we will merely present certain 
features of it which are pertinent to the question now 
before us. 

I . General View. — According to this doctrine, ap- 
pearances are " illusory," " self-contradictory," " irra- 
tional," and " essentially made up of inconsistencies." 
This condemnation of appearance and consequent denial 
of the possibility of attaining knowledge of reality is based 
upon a distinctive conception of the nature of reality. A 
doctrine which is so revolutionary in its conclusions as this 
ought to have an assured basis; and we naturally ask, 
What is the warrant for a theory of reality which leads to 
such conclusions '^. The argument which sustains this 
doctrine is grounded on two postulates ; one of these is 
explicitly stated, and the other is persistently applied. 
The first of these postulates is, that the one criterion of 
reality is self-consistency ; no exception can be taken to 
this. The second postulate is, that Identity and Diversity, 
and Unity and Plurality are inherently contradictory. 
It is clearly shown that in all appearances we have Identity 
and Diversity, Unity and Plurality ; and, if Identity be 
contradictory of Diversity, and Unity be contradictory 
of Plurality, it would follow from the self-consistency of 
reality that appearance misrepresents reality. From this 
it is concluded that we must get beyond appearance if 



APPEARANCE AND REALITY 163 

we would attain reality. The doctrine is as old as the 
Eleatics, and the line of argument by which the writer 
seeks to sustain it is virtually the same with that used 
by the Sceptics. 

2. These Postulates applied to Experience. — Every 
known object is known as having various qualities. For 
example, we speak of the piece of marble as " white with 
party-colored veins," " partly smooth and partly rough," 
'' square," " heavy," " beautiful." That is, it is many in 
one. But how can we constitute one out of many t If 
we had all the qualities and added them together, we would 
still lack the characteristic of wholeness. How shall we 
account for the wholeness of the whole t We are told that 
to affirm that many are one, or that one is many, is to 
affirm the identity of contradictories. By a similar argu- 
ment change is condemned. The plant full grown is 
diverse from the plant partly grown ; yet we speak of them 
as the same plant. It is for appearance one plant; but 
it also presents different appearances. To say that that 
which is after a change is the same with that which was 
before the change, is "to assert two of one"; but this is 
inconsistent. Hence what changes is not reality ; and, 
so far as we know change, we do not know reality. This 
analysis is also applied to relation, cause, and other modes 
in which we cognize ; and a similar conclusion is drawn in 
each instance. Bradley likewise insists that we do not 
know a real self ; for the self we know is many states of con- 
sciousness in one, a diverse unity ; and this inconsistency 
shows that we have only apprehended appearance. ReaHty 
is not presented in appearance : this is the conclusion. 
Hence we cannot know reality. 

3. Law of Identity Misinterpreted. — This doctrine has 
its origin in a misinterpretation of the logical law of Iden- 
tity. According to this erroneous interpretation, if I 



i64 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

should say, " An Italian is a European," the statement 
would not accord with reality, because " Italian " and 
"European" are not absolutely indentical; each idea is in 
some particulars diverse from the other. But to require 
that the subject and predicate shall be absolutely identical 
would bring thought to a dead stop. There can be no 
progress in thought unless subject and predicate are identi- 
cal in some particulars and diverse in others. Judgments 
of the form A is A and B is B would meet the require- 
ment of absolute identity ; but thought confined to such 
judgments cannot move. It cannot connect A and B 
with each other, or with anything else than A or B. This 
interpretation of the law of Identity condemns all thought, 
for thought is impossible except as we apprehend Plurality 
in Unity and Identity in Diversity. In thus making prog- 
ress in thought impossible, this interpretation condemns 
the argument by which it is sought to sustain the doctrine 
under consideration. Thought is " illusory," it does not 
deal with reality ; it would follow, then, that the thought 
of this argument is " illusory." What does the law of 
Identity demand ^ For example, what does it demand in 
the judgment, " An Italian is a European ? " It requires 
that the concept " Italian " shall include marks which 
are identical with marks included in the concept " Euro- 
pean." In respect of the concrete Italian and European, 
it demands that an Italian shall have some characteristic 
which is identical with a characteristic found in all Euro- 
peans. This law requires that the subject and the predi- 
cate have a common ideational content; and thought 
requires that each shall have ideational content that is not 
had by the other. In a word, Identity and Diversity, 
Unity and Plurality are not contradictories ; they are 
complementaries. There can be no thought except as we 
apprehend Identity and Diversity, Plurality and Unity, 



APPEARANCE AND REALITY 165 

and as we recognize that each member of these pairs is 
complementary to the other. We are unready to accept 
a doctrine that makes all thought " illusory." 

4. Is Reality Alien to Thought? — According to the 
doctrine under consideration, reality is alien to thought. 
What, then, is its conception of reality .? Reality is for 
this view *' mere sentient experience," an experience in 
which " all distinctions lapse " ; it is an experience of all- 
alike sentience. No such experience is known ; it could 
not be known to the subject of it, for it is purely sentient. 
That reality is all-alike experience, is an assumption 
following a course of reasoning in which another postulate 
is introduced. This postulate is that " there is no being 
or fact outside that which is commonly called psychical," 
i.e. experience is the only reality. The argument con- 
densed runs thus : Reality is self-consistent ; Identity in 
Diversity and Plurality in Unity are inconsistent ; hence 
reality must be absolute Identity, simple Unity. There 
must be in it no diversity and therefore no distinctions. 
But reality is experience ; hence reality is experience in 
which there is no diversity. It is assumed that mere 
sentient experience meets these requirements ; it is ex- 
perience, and there are no distinctions in it. 

Two objections present themselves. This conception 
rests upon the assertion that Identity and Diversity, and 
Unity and Plurality, are contradictories ; and the asser- 
tion that they are contradictories rests upon an inter- 
pretation of the logical law of Identity which invalidates 
all thought and which logic refuses, in self-defence, to 
accept. Since logic refuses to accept this interpretation 
of the law of Identity, the claim that reality must be 
absolute Identity fails of justification. The second ob- 
jection has respect to the assumed " mere sentient ex- 
perience." It has been suggested that we may find such 



i66 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

experience in the instance of the infant before conscious- 
ness of the distinction between self and not-self has been 
developed. Is there experience where there is no con- 
sciousness ? Such sentience, if it be possible, has no right 
to the name experience ; for surely there is no experience 
apart from consciousness. By what right do we take 
that to be the reality in experience which lacks the essential 
characteristics of experience as known to us } But leav- 
ing this aside, mere sentience is not experience ; no more 
can be said of it than that it is the material out of which 
the subject constructs experience. Further, what war- 
rant have we for assuming that the earliest and simplest 
experience of the infant is absolutely unorganized, that 
there is in it no distinction of quality or relation ^ If we 
speak of the little chick pecking at a seed as having an 
experience, even that has distinction and relation in it. 
The seed is distinguished from other objects, and its posi- 
tion is distinguished from other positions. We have no 
warrant for asserting that there is an experience of ab- 
solute Identity, an experience in which there is no dis- 
tinction of quality or relation. We decline to accept 
the conception of reality propounded in this doctrine ; 
and we discover no reason for holding that the nature of 
reality precludes its being known. 

§ 73. Shall we discard the Concept Reality.^ — Some 
have suggested that we discard the concept " reality.'* 
If we should adopt this suggestion, we would have no 
need to solve the problem of the relation of appearance and 
reality. The most cogent reasons urged for our ceasing 
to inquire as to whether we can know reality are (i) That 
the search for reality is fruitless, because what we seek is, 
and always must be, beyond us ; (2) If we could arrive at 
reality, it would have no special value for us, because it 
could only be known and stated in terms of appearance ; 



APPEARANCE AND REALITY 167 

and (3) We do not need the concept. This view is not a 
distinct philosophical doctrine ; it is an attitude. 

1. It is true that reality is always beyond us and is, 
because of this, elusive if we separate it in thought from 
appearance and then try to image it. Those who make this 
suggestion seem to be seeking an intelligent grasp of reality 
apart from appearance. That is, of course, impossible ; 
for we can only conceive what is not present in sense- 
perception, by an ideational production of appearances. 
It is thus we present to ourselves a triangle, a house, a city, 
or any object which may be apprehended through sense- 
perception. The imaged appearance makes it idea- 
tionally present. To image a pure concept — a^s justice, 
goodness, time, or reality — by itself is impossible. We 
can only have it present ideationally by imaging an object 
or occurrence whose qualities and relations — i.e. whose 
appearances — express the concept. Concepts have their 
reality in objects, and cannot be imaged apart from them ; 
but we do not discard concepts because of this. We can- 
not think without them. 

2. It is true that, if reality could be known, it could 
only be known and stated in terms of appearance. An 
object can only be known when it is in presentation to a 
subject ; and the form in which it is presented to the sub- 
ject is its appearance to that subject. Thus, the pen with 
which I am writing is known by me in the forms in which 
it has been presented to me ; and these apprehended 
forms are its appearances to me. What I know of it and 
what I may state of that knowledge is known and stated 
in terms of appearance. So likewise as to reality ; our 
knowledge of it and our statement of that knowledge 
would be in terms of appearance. But, is the appearance 
an actual presentation of reality "i This is the important 
question. Are the appearances in and through which 



i68 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

you have come to know the house in which you live, actual 
presentation of the house reality ? If they are not, and 
if appearance in general is not actual presentation of reality, 
this fact might be urged as a reason for discarding the 
concept of reality. But, if an appearance is an actual 
presentation of reality, — and we shall later argue that it 
is, — when we know appearance, we therewith know 
reality, for appearance is in that case reality's own pres- 
entation of itself. 

3. To the assertion that we do not need this concept, 
we reply that Philosophy cannot solve the problem set it 
if it shall refuse to seek the nature of reality. That has 
been its quest from the beginning. If we give up our 
endeavor to determine whether we know reality, we for- 
sake our task. This quest is a persistent element of ex- 
perience. We are constantly asking, " Is it real ^ " and 
we subject to this test all that is proffered as knowledge. 
"That bridge appears to be safe; is it really safe .^ " 
We put such questions every day. The all-around 
sceptic, the man who doubts scientific and philosophic 
statements, takes this attitude because he wants to know 
the reality of things. He doubts because he can only 
be satisfied when he is made certain he has attained the 
reality of things. He demands, all of us demand, that 
seeming or appearance shall be related to reality. This 
question will not down. This persistent call for reality 
and refusal to be satisfied with mere seeming is an abiding 
element of experience ; and philosophy may not ignore it. 

4. The search for reality cannot be satisfied short of 
assurance that we have intercourse with what is objective, 
with reality which is other than the individual self. We 
have a common conviction that the world of persons and 
things and events which we know and with which we have 
dealings, is a world of realities. Is this conviction un- 



APPEARANCE AND REALITY 169 

justified ? That with which we have dealings, is it other 
than that which we know ? Are these objects, as we know 
them, realities or only appearances ? It will not do to 
wave this question aside. Our life loses its ethical quality 
if we cease to recognize that we are dealing with what is 
real ; it becomes pretence. 

§ 74. Conclusions. — I. If we were cut off from know- 
ing reality, we could not know that the objects of our 
knowledge are only appearance and not reality. For 
to know that they are appearance and not reality, we 
must be able to distinguish them from what is not mere 
appearance, i.e. from reality. In other words, reality 
must be known in order that we may know that an ob- 
ject of cognition is not reality. 

2. There are two facts which we hold fast : (i) That we 
know ourselves ; (2) That we are reality, not mere phe- 
nomena. Introspection shows that we do not know Self 
apart from a phase of consciousness. You know yourself 
as hearing something, as feeling disturbed by uncertainty 
as to what caused the sound, and as determining to find 
out the source of the noise. Your Self always appears to 
you in what you call a phase of consciousness. Phases of 
consciousness do not exist by themselves. They have a 
relation to the Self similar to that which the varying 
qualities of objects have to objects. The Self reality comes 
to expression in these phases ; that is, the Self becomes an 
object of cognition in your apprehension of yourself as 
willing, feeling, and knowing. Your moods, attitudes, 
and longings are not apart from your Self; neither are 
they separable from the Self. We do not, and cannot, 
know the phases of our consciousness without at the same 
time knowing the Self. 

3. We also recognize that these phases of the Self vary, 
that consciousness changes ; but this does not lead to the 



lyo INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

conclusion that the Self is phenomenal. On the contrary, 
the continuous change in consciousness makes for our 
assurance of our reality. If our consciousness were with- 
out change, if it were an all-alikeness, we could not know 
it. To know any object we must distinguish this of it from 
that of it. For example, in knowing a watch, we dis- 
tinguish one side from the other, the dial from the works, 
the hands from the dial, etc. This is true of the simplest 
object, as a piece of wood. If there were no distinction 
in an entity, it could not be an object of knowledge. We 
distinguish one phase of our experience from other phases 
of our experience, and we apprehend these phases and 
moments as phases and moments of a whole experience 
which is the experience of an identical Self. The phases 
and moments of my experience are also phases and mo- 
ments of my Self. Our changes of consciousness to- 
gether with our experience of self-sameness, the fact that 
I am I through all my varying phases of consciousness, — 
this is the ground of my assurance of my own reality. 
Each of us in respect of his phases of consciousness is 
many ; our consciousness is many in one. This is only 
possible if there be some common principle in which the 
many are grounded. The Self which is the subject of 
these phases is such a principle. The Self being unitary, 
our experience is unitary ; and its phases and moments 
are, for knowledge, appearances of Self as object to Self 
as subject. These conclusions follow: (i) The Self is 
diversity in unity, the unification of apparently con- 
tradictory elements ; (2) In knowing the phenomena of 
consciousness, we therewith know the Self; (3) In know- 
ing the Self, we know reality ; (4) Variability of appearance 
is consonant with reality. 



CHAPTER XIX 

APPEARANCE AND REALITY {continued) 

§ 75. Appearance is Reality Expressed. — Another view 
of the relation of appearance to reality remains to be 
discussed ; viz., that appearance is reality expressed. 
Your knife as seen by you is the reality of the knife pre- 
sented to vision ; the roughness or smoothness of the sur- 
face of the stone is the reality of the stone present to 
tactual sense ; the clang of the bell is the reality of the 
vibrating bell present to audition. Appearance as thus 
conceived is not mere semblance or seeming; it is not 
thrown off from the reality ; it is the reality itself present to 
perception. The appearance of any object is the nature of 
the reality of that object as it presents itself to rationality. 
If we should accept this account of the relation of ap- 
pearance to reality, it would follow that when we know 
appearance, we therewith know reality. 

1. Appearance cannot arise from nothing; it must be 
an expression of what is actual. To appear is to become 
an object of perception ; appearance is always to a subject. 
To constitute an appearance, an object reality must be in 
presentation to a subject reality. That is, appearance 
is always in the subject-object relation ; and it is the ex- 
pression of an object reality to a subject reality. 

2. From the foregoing it follows that appearance and 
reality are correlatives in cognition. They are not 
mutually exclusive ; they are inseparable, neither can be 
without the other. Apart from the subject-object re- 
lation, there is no appearance to be related to reality ; in 

171 



172 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

that relation the reahty becomes object In the appearance 
which is the expression of its nature in the particular rela- 
tion in which it appears. Of course there cannot be an 
appearance except there be an appearing reality. 

3. We have insisted that appearance and reality are 
correlatives for cognition, and that there is no appearance 
apart from the subject-object relation. Does it follow 
that there can be no reality apart from that relation ? 
In answering this question, we must keep in mind the 
fact that we are not studying the nature of reality, we are 
considering reality in respect of cognition. With this in 
view, the question may be stated thus : Can there be some- 
what for experience which is not in present experience? 
There may assuredly be reality apart from human ex- 
perience of it. We do not say that nothing exists apart 
from relation to a human subject. The objects discovered 
in scientific research and unscientific endeavor do not 
come into existence in the instant of their discovery. 
What we say is that reality is more than mere existence. 
The significance of reality will be considered more fully 
later; it is sufficient for our present discussion to note 
that, for cognition, reality includes expressibility to a sub- 
ject. There are, doubtless, many realities which are not 
in present presentation to a human subject ; but, by so 
much as these realities are, they are expressible to and 
perceptible by a subject. They are possible presentations ; 
and this is included in the idea of their reality. A subject 
can relate them to himself as objects ; and, in this relation, 
they express their reality in appearances. The fauna and 
flora of an unexplored region are realities for human ex- 
perience ; when discovered, they become realities in 
human experience. Reality is possible, as well as actual, 
content of consciousness. Appearance is reality in pres- 
entation to a subject. 



APPEARANCE AND REALITY 173 

§ 76. The Apparent and the Real. — i. Why Appear- 
ance and Reality have been Conceived to he Mutually Ex- 
clusive. — There must be some reason for the persistency 
with which many have urged that reality is not present in 
appearance. This urgency has its origin in those ex- 
periences in which the apparent and the real are not in 
accord with each other. We find such experiences in the 
case of the straight stick which is apparently broken when 
it is thrust obliquely into water, the apparent con- 
verging of the parallel lines of the railway track, and the 
varying color of objects in varying lights. Such experi- 
ences are common ; and they are so intimately related to 
practical undertakings that they have led men to con- 
clude that the reality of an object is not necessarily the 
same with what the object seems to be. In situations 
which we believe to be critical, we are given to asking, 
" Is it real, or does it only seem so t " Even in the lowest 
stages of human existence, man is compelled to distinguish 
between what is apparent and what is real. The pres- 
ervation of life is dependent upon ability to make this 
distinction. The primitive fisherman would strike in 
vain for the coveted fish if he did not distinguish be- 
tween its apparent and its real position in the water. It 
was necessary that primitive man should learn the nature 
of the objects with which he had to deal, the objects es- 
sential to the support of life ; and for this, he must dis- 
tinguish between what they might seem to be and what 
they really were. This necessity is upon us also. Ex- 
perience has taught us that the apparent is not always the 
same with the real ; and this has not unnaturally led to 
the virtual acceptance of a world of appearance distinct 
from the world of reality. Appearance has been conceived 
as uncertain and inconstant semblance ; reality is thought 
of as reliable and unchanging. This is, at least, the Plain 



174 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

Man's view of it ; and in these experiences and this con- 
ception we find that which commends the doctrine that 
appearance and reality are mutually exclusive. 

2. Appearance and Perception. — An appearance is 
related to the object and the subject. In the former re- 
lation, it is the expression of the object reality ; in the 
latter, it is the subject's interpretation of this expression. 
The former is for the perceptive activity of the subject; 
the latter is the perception. You sat at your desk writing 
with your attention centered upon the work at hand. You 
came to a halt in your writing and heard an insistent 
noise. You listened attentively and then said to yourself : 
" There is a game of ball on at the park ; and some one has 
made a good play." You interpreted what was pre- 
sented and concluded that it was a sound, and you con- 
tinued the interpreting until you had assigned to the sound 
the meaning indicated ; and the interpretation was an 
essential part of the perception. There is no perception 
without thought; and the simplest thought is an inter- 
pretation, a judgment. In discussing those experiences 
which seem to indicate that an appearance is a changeful 
and unreliable semblance rather than an actual presenta- 
tion of reality, it is essential that due value be given to 
the interpretive activity of the subject. This makes it 
necessary that we distinguish between appearance as the 
expression of object reality and appearance as expressed in 
the subject's perception. They are not separate in ex- 
perience ; but confusion will be avoided if we at this point 
distinguish them in thought. For the remainder of this 
chapter, we shall narrow the meaning of the term Appear- 
ance and shall apply it to the object-reality's expression 
of itself for experience ; and the term Perception will 
signify the appearance as interpreted by the subject, the 
expression of reality in experience. 



APPEARANCE AND REALITY 175 

We have learned that our judgments respecting objects 
do not always accord with the reality. You saw something 
in the gloaming and concluded that it was a large dog in 
a threatening attitude ; but closer inspection showed that 
it was only a bush. We thought it was a street-car we 
heard ; but when it came around the corner, we saw that 
it was an automobile truck. The development of our 
knowledge of the external world has been attended by 
constant correction of conclusions which we have formed ; 
and it has been greatly aided by our consciousness of the 
fact that we must exercise care if we would avoid error. 
But the element of error in these judgments is not due 
to the unreliability of appearances as expressions of reality 
for experience ; it arises from our misintrepretation of 
these appearances. The error is in the perception as we 
constitute it. The disagreement is not between the ap- 
pearances and the reality; it is between reality and the 
element of error in our interpretation. 

§ 77. Sources of Error. — i. The experience of any 
instant is not a wholly new experience ; it is a combina- 
tion of past experiences and the experience of the moment. 
Past experience greatly affects our perceptions. Lack of 
the experience had in acquiring a particular language — 
say the French — would make an address in that language 
seem an unmeaning jumble of sounds ; whereas one who 
had had experience which had given him mastery of the 
French would find significance in every sentence of the ad- 
dress, and meaning in the gestures and the facial expres- 
sion of the speaker. The man who is expert at detecting 
counterfeit bank-notes is thus expert because his extended 
experience conditions his perception and so enters into 
his judgments. In a word, when we perceive an object, 
our perception is conditioned by our previous experience 
with that object or objects like it. We know by the laws 



176 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

of perspective, that the rectangular top of the table is 
a rhomboidal presentation to the percipient ; but we rightly 
judge it to be rectangular, not rhomboidal. We are ac- 
customed to seeing such an object, and we judge correctly 
without hesitation. From certain points of view, a cir- 
cular disk is apparently oval ; but that will deceive few 
persons, because most of us have seen like objects in a 
similar relation so often that we are not likely to frame 
an erroneous judgment respecting their shape. Previous 
experience, or lack or paucity of previous experience, 
affects judgments and so conditions perception. 

2. An object is not known by itself; it is known in re- 
lation to the subject and to other objects. Turner's 
Venice, if viewed from a proper distance and in the 
right light, is definite in outline, and the lines and colors 
of the painting have significance ; but, viewed close at 
hand, it is to most persons a mere jumble of colors. Our 
perception of objects and our judgments respecting them 
are conditioned by the relation in which they come to 
presentation. A radical change in the attire of one whom 
we know may lead us to think him a stranger; One who 
is expert at spearing or shooting fish will judge correctly 
as to the position of the fish, even though the line of direc- 
tion to the fish is broken to vision, just as the straight stick 
is when thrust obliquely into water. But to most of 
us this presentation of the fish is in relations to which we 
are relatively unaccustomed, and we are not suflficiently 
experienced to judge aright. The difficulty does not 
arise from disagreement of appearance with reality; it 
arises from our erroneous judgment, and this is due to 
insufficiency of experience. The appearance is a true 
presentation of reality in those relations. The laws of 
refraction require that the straight stick shall seem broken 
in those relations ; it must, if it shall be a true presentation 



APPEARANCE AND REALITY i77 

of the reality when so related to a subject. The hue of 
the cloth and the gem should vary in varying lights. In 
none of these instances is there any falsity in appearance, 
or any disagreement between appearance and reality. 
We standardize the color of objects by their color when 
seen in relatively colorless light. As this is the standard, 
one is liable to misjudge the color of an object when he 
sees it in lamplight or gaslight ; for this is not the stand- 
ard relation for color. But this error is not due to un- 
reality in appearance ; it is constituted by us in judging, 
and it comes of want of such experience of these objects 
in these unusual relations as is necessary to a correct 
perception of them. 

3. The principles above stated and illustrated hold 
true for illusions in general — as those respecting the size 
of objects. They also hold true for those experiences 
which are, by way of distinction, called hallucinations — 
as when we think we hear some one speak, although no 
one has spoken within our range of hearing; or when a 
man thinks he feels the movement of the fingers of his 
amputated arm. In our hallucinations, we are dealing 
with reality; there is at least a real cortical change, an 
event in the central nervous system. Our accompanying 
judgment respecting it is erroneous. When we wish 
to decide as to whether our perception is correct, we try 
to set the presentation in other relations. Thus, we may 
test the stick by passing the hand along it or by taking 
it out of the water. We make certain of the color of the 
cloth or gem by putting the object in the sunlight or where 
disturbing shades may not fall on it; and we test the 
spectre by trying to touch it or photograph it. That is, 
we determine the correctness of our perceptions by so 
relating presentations that our experience may be most 
effectually utilized in judging them. 

N 



178 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

4. Conclusion. — Every appearance is a true expres- 
sion of reality in the relations in which the subject-object 
relation is constituted. All seeming disagreement be- 
tween appearance and reality is constituted by the erro- 
neous judgment of the subject. In knowing appearances, 
we therewith know reality. 



CHAPTER XX 

REALITY 

§ 78. Kinds of Reality. — This chapter deals with our 
conviction of the reality of the things we handle, the per- 
sons with whom we have intercourse, and the happenings 
in which we are interested. The book you were reading 
to a friend last evening, that friend and those with whom 
you are acquainted, and the incidents in their lives and 
yours of which you spoke, are realities. The colors in 
the illustrations of the book are real ; so also are the rela- 
tions of the lines of the drawings, and even the thoughts 
which you interchanged respecting the illustrations. The 
furnishings of the room were in actual position-relation, 
and there was an actual passing of time. Things, events, 
and persons are concrete object- realities in the world 
which we know through sense-experience. " Red," 
" loud," " hard," " soft," etc., are quality realities. 
"Here" and "there," "then" and "now," are relational 
realities. Qualities and relations have no reality by them- 
selves ; but there is no known reality that does not have 
some quality and exist in some relation. There is no 
experience that does not include experience of quality 
and relation ; they are in experience and are as real as 
the experience itself. Notions — as space, time, and 
number — and qualities have a reality different in kind 
from that of objects. Hence in affirming or denying reality, 
we should keep in mind the world of thought in which 
we are moving and the kind of reality under consideration. 

179 



i8o INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

§ 79. Degrees of Reality. — Whatever is, is in some 
sense real ; but all objects do not express reality in the 
same degree. Our moods are real. My present joyous- 
ness is as certainly real as the objects of the external 
world. This joyousness may have ceased by to-morrow, 
and a mood of sadness may take its place ; but my pres- 
ent mood is a reality, and that of to-morrow will be a 
reality. We are as certain of the reality of our feelings 
and our ideas as we are of our own reality. But our moods 
as such do not have the concreteness which we take to be 
a characteristic of reality ; they are not so content-full, so 
substantive as is the self. Then, too, our moods and our 
ideas are thought of as having their being in us ; they have 
no existence by themselves. They come to be in us, and 
they cease to be when they cease to be of us. Com- 
paring our moods with our self, we note that the moods 
are inconstant and their duration uncertain ; whereas the 
self has a quality of permanency which is revealed in our 
consciousness of self-sameness. Reality In its perfection 
would be content-full, concrete, self-existent, and un- 
varying in its nature. It is evident that no finite self is 
a perfect expression of reality ; but it Is also obvious that 
a self expresses reality In a higher degree than do the moods 
of the self. The self has a greater r.elatlve Independence ; 
it is manifestly concrete and content-full, and it has the 
characteristic of permanence. What is true of our moods 
compared with the self is also true of the qualities and 
relations of objects. The color of the flower, the tone of 
the bell, and the taste of the apple are real ; their reality 
Is as certain as the reality of the flower, the oell, and the 
apple. And the relative positions of the objects which 
we see and touch are as assuredly real as are the objects 
themselves. But these qualities and relations do not 
give so full an expression of reality as do the objects. 



REALITY i8i 

Compared with the objects, they are relatively dependent 
and changeful and are wanting in content-fullness ; they 
do not express so high a degree of reality. The subject 
expresses a higher degree of reality than the moods of the 
subject; the object as a whole, a higher degree of reality 
than the qualities and relations of the object. If we would 
deal accurately with experience, we must recognize dif- 
ferent kinds and degrees of reality. 

§ 80. Reality as the Common Content, or the Universal, 
in -Experience. In our sketch of the views of the Sophists, 
we stated that they held that a subject perceives merely a 
particular appearance, one that is particular and indi- 
vidual in all its characteristics. Thus, according to their 
teaching, when I see a horse, I only perceive that momen- 
tary and changing appearance. What I perceive is an 
isolated and independent element of my consciousness ; 
it has its complete being, whatever that may be, apart 
from all else. In this section, we purpose to examine 
experience with a view to determining whether the Soph- 
ists are right in this contention. 

I. Particular Experience in Respect of Extent. — In the 
simplest form of experience, the object is "this thing" 
or " that thing " ; it is in " this place " or in " that place." 
It is distinguished as " this " or " that," and as being 
"here" or "there." The qualifications "this" and 
" that," and " here " and " there," seem to be separative 
and particularizing; they apparently serve to separate 
the qualified object or place from other objects and places. 
And they doubtless are expressions of separating and 
particularizing thought ; they denote an isolating and 
separative experience. But they are not merely separa- 
tive ; they conjoin. When we think of any object as 
" this thing " or " that thing," we set it apart from all 
other objects ; but the thought which sets it apart rec- 



1 82 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

ognizes the actuality of other objects. There can be no 
setting apart without such recognition. In the statement, 
" I prefer that cane," the thought expressed in the word 
" that " includes recognition of the existence of other 
canes than the one which is designated. In any experi- 
ence of " this " or " that," there is a real, but possibly 
undefined, consciousness of a whole in which the selected 
particular has its being and with all the particulars of 
which it is conjoined. Similarly in the expression, " You 
will find him there^"* there is consciousness of the whole of 
space ; the place designated is simply the centre of atten- 
tion for the moment. This much is evident : we qualify 
a particular thing or quality or relation by such partic- 
ularizing and separative terms, because that which we 
thus qualify does not exist in our experience apart and by 
itself; it is of the universe, and the universe is in the 
background of our experience when we particularize. 
When we individualize an object — a thing, an event, a 
quality, or a relation — we actually conjoin it with all else 
in the very experience in which we distinguish it from all 
else. Every object of your experience has its being in 
the universe of your experience ; it is a part of the universe 
as you conceive it and is organically united in your ex- 
perience with everything with which you have had com- 
merce. An arm has its being and its meaning as an or- 
ganic part of a body. When we think of a man's arm, our 
thought involves an implicit recognition of his body. So 
every particular of your experience has its being and its 
meaning for you in its organic union with your experience 
as a whole ; and when you think that object apart from the 
whole, there is involved in your thought an implicit rec- 
ognition of the whole. No portion of experience can be 
particularized without implication of the whole of experi- 
ence. No particular experience is merely a particular 



REALITY 183 

experience. No experience is simply an experience of 
the particular object. 

2. Particular Experience in Respect of Time. — Our ex- 
perience of events gives a time element to consciousness. 
For us, every event occurs " now " or " then." The ele- 
ment of experience which we express by such terms as 
" now " and " then " separates the time of that event 
from the whole of time. A statement is made in your 
hearing and you say, " I have heard that before.^'' In 
that thought you separate a portion of time from all 
the rest of time. But in so isolating that moment of 
time, you recognize that the previous experience did not 
have its being apart and by itself, but in the whole of 
experience regarded temporally. Every experience derives 
its temporal being and meaning from its being included 
in the total of experience. An experience has its origin 
in what is " past " to the experience, and it has its com- 
pletion in what is " future " to it. That is, the experience 
of each of us is In reality one developing experience. The 
total of your experience is not a sum of experiences ; it 
is a whole from which you separate particulars and so 
think of them as isolated and independent experiences. 
But these so-called separate experiences are incomplete 
If separated from what precedes and what follows. This 
indicates that no experience selected from the total of a 
subject's experience is a mere particular In respect of time; 
it has that in it which is common to all the subject's ex- 
perience. 

But this Is not all. " Now " and " then " are common 
to your experience and mine. " Now " Is the same for 
both of us ; any moment in the past of the world's changes 
is the same for both of us, the same in respect of time how- 
ever much it may bring us that is different content to us in 
other respects than temporally. This temporal unity In 



1 84 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

experience is internal and organic, not external and me- 
chanical. The parts of a chair are made separately and are 
put together afterward. The parts of an organism — as the 
body of a plant or an animal — come into being in the 
whole body ; they are united in their coming to be. That 
is, they are united in the ground, or source, of their being. 
So the experiences of all individuals have their temporal 
unity in their coming to be; and the moment of their 
occurrence is an essential element of time. In respect 
of time they are organically related. As to the time ele- 
ment, the experiences of all individuals have a ground 
unity. 

3. Particular Experience in Respect of the Subject. — 
Is there complete experience which is wholly that of the 
particular subject? In other words, is there a purely 
" private " experience } The question is not as to whether 
there are elements of experience which are the " private 
property " of the Individual subject. It is this : Take 
any moment of your experience, is such a moment ever 
made up of elements which are entirely yours, in which 
there is no element which you have in common with 
others t It would appear from the preceding paragraph 
that there is no experience which is wholly that of a par- 
ticular subject; in the matter of the time element, our 
experiences have a common content. But this is not all ; 
there are other elements of experience which are had in 
common. They enter into all human experience. Ex- 
perience is largely effected by language; our meditations 
are mediated by unuttered speech. Our apprehension 
of our own pleasure or displeasure, our purposing, and our 
knowledge of ourselves — all these activities are carried 
on with the aid of language. Now, language is not a col- 
lection of mere vocables. The experiences of men have 
been a factor in the coining of words and phrases ; for 



REALITY i8s 

language has come of endeavor to express experience. 
Words and phrases are a Hving embodiment of a common 
experience. They express attitudes toward the universe 
and life ; they affect and reveal our experience. Hence, 
in acquiring our mother tongue, we acquire a content of 
experience which is not merely ours as individuals. Lan- 
guage, attitudes toward life and its great questions, and 
forms of thought become ours as members of society. 
There is in them a common inheritance of experience, and 
they affect our thought and feelings and purposes some- 
what as they affect the thinking and the life of others. 
How much of our knowledge of the world is our individual 
creation ? Can we truly say that any of it originated with 
us and is purely our own } By far the greater part of the 
experience of each of us comes to us from a common 
source of human experience ; much of it is universal. Our 
individual experience points beyond us to others ; it has 
in it elements which are not individual and " private," 
but common and " public." 

4. Conclusions. — We find that every experience of an 
individual subject is organically related to all that subject's 
experience. To separate any moment of experience from 
the whole is to lessen its significance, to sunder it from that 
in union with which it has its life. When we give atten- 
tion to any part of our experience, the whole of experience 
is the necessary background of such particularized ex- 
perience. We find, further, that the experience of any one 
subject includes content of the experience of other subjects. 
There is experience which is common to all men — as the 
rising and setting of the sun, the changes of the moon and 
seasons ; the distinguishing of positions and time ; count- 
ing and measuring ; longing, fearing, and purposing ; a 
sense of opposition between right and wrong ; a sense of 
the reality of self and other persons, of things and events. 



1 86 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

This much at least may be said of this universal in experi- 
ence: it is subjective reality, and it comes of experience 
with objective reality. It is reality. We may not ques- 
tion this fact ; for to do so would be to land in scepticism 
with its destructive contradictories. This reality is not 
merely subjectively real. It must arise from commerce 
with what is objectively real, with what is possible object 
for all subjects. Only thus can we account for its being 
in the experience of all. We have already seen (§ 59, 
4 and 5) that experience is the realization of objects by 
the subject. In his experience, the artisan obtains mastery 
of the tools of his craft ; what those tools are for thinking, 
feeling, and doing has become a part of his own reality. 
We have each of us in our experience thus realized within 
ourselves what the common objects of life are for our 
doing, thinking, and feeling. The common object-reali- 
ties thus realized become a common subjective reality, 
the universal reality of experience. 

§ 81. The Nature of Reality. — We discussed the.nature 
of reality in §§ 42, 2 ; and 75, 3. We now purpose to give 
it fuller consideration. 

I. Few will controvert the statement that whatever is, 
is real ; but we too readily conclude from this that to be 
real means to exist. Reality, however, is more than mere 
existence. Mere being is impossible ; to conceive mere 
existence would be to conceive nothing. Whatever is, 
has some quality ; it is being of a kind. In keeping with 
this, Idealists have regarded reality as being with meaning; 
and they have insisted that we may not strip being of 
meaning or sunder meaning from being. In separating 
them, we lose both. Since reality is being of a kind, it is 
being with a nature. Men have felt this, and they have 
sought to know what that nature is. That has, in fact, 
been the quest of Philosophers from the beginning. The 



REALITY 187 

earliest of them sought to know what the world Is made of ; 
and in that they were inquiring after the nature of 
reality. 

2. If we inquire of the Physical Sciences — Physics, 
Chemistry, Mechanics, and Biology — we shall find that 
they agree in conceiving reality as active. The atoms, 
electrons, and ions of Science are centres of energy. When 
the sciences have reduced the reality with which they deal 
to its lowest terms, they find that they have being with 
energy. The Biologist's irreducible unit is also being 
with energy. That is, the ultimate of reality as conceived 
by Science is active being. This conception determines 
its descriptions of objects and processes and is the import 
of its conclusions. When we speak of reality as active 
being, " active " is not used as signifying in motion; 
neither is it to be taken as the synonym of " dynamic," 
as though it meant having the property of producing motion. 
These conceptions are mechanical and would relate the 
activity externally and mechanically; and we wish to 
avoid spatial and mechanical suggestions so far as pos- 
sible. In characterizing reality as active being, the activity 
we have in mind is such activity as is present in the growth 
of plants and animals. The activity which effects and 
determines the growth of a body is in the body and of the 
body ; it is, in a word, the immanent activity of the body. 
This activity serves to give expression to the nature of the 
reality. The result is in one instance a rose, in another 
a geranium, in another a sheep, in yet another a dog. 
Stating it generally, we may say that the growing body is 
a developing expression of the nature of the reality which 
is thus embodied. Hence, in characterizing reality as 
active being, we have in mind activity which is immanent 
and developmental. This conception of activity has its 
best illustration in the changes in our own consciousness. 



i88 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

The self is reality ; the self is active being, and the changes 
in the self are immanent and developmental. 

This conception accords with what we have previously 
said respecting reality. We have held that it is being 
with meaning. That being true, it is in its nature intel- 
ligible ; it may be known if it shall come into presentation 
to a subject. We have also concluded that reality is 
active being. That being true, it can express itself. As 
to nature, then, reality is expressible and intelligible ; it 
can be presented to a subject and it can be known. This is 
what is meant when it is said that " the reality of an en- 
tity is in its perceptibility." 

§ 82. Reality comes to Expression and Development in 
the Subject-Object Relation, and only in this Rela- 
tion. — 

I. Reality as Object. — Reality is being with meaning. 
But meaning implies an intelligent perceiver, and it is 
obvious that the meaning of reality cannot be developed 
except there be a subject to whom the object has mean- 
ing. The full significance of an axe or a gun can only be 
realized when it is related to a man. It is generally agreed 
that there can be no color, taste, or sound apart from sen- 
sation. We may not affirm them or other qualities of an 
object except as it is in presentation to a subject. The 
color of the painting, the flavor of the fruit, the smooth- 
ness and hardness of the marble, and the tone of the 
harp are not realized, do not come to full expression, unless 
the painting, the fruit, the marble, and the harp are re- 
lated to a sentient being. Their meaning can only be 
developed when they become objects for an intelligent 
subject. When the activity of the object and the subject 
are interrelated, then the reality of the object is developed, 
then and then only does its nature find completed expres- 
sion. It is, of course, impossible to conceive a reality or 



REALITY 189 

to think intelligibly of any reality except as it is set in the 
subject-object relation. 

2. Reality as Subject. — Rationality — i.e. thinking, 
feeling, and purposing — is one mark of reality as subject. 
We too often think of ourselves as first being rational and 
then becoming conscious of objects; whereas we must 
be conscious in order that we may be rational. To be 
rational is to think and feel and will ; and we only think 
and feel and will when we think of some object and feel 
concerning some object and will respecting some object. 
Our rationality is developed and finds expression in ex- 
perience and through experience ; and we have no experi- 
ence except as we are related to an object. In a word, it is 
in our 'conscious relation to objects that the rational na- 
ture of each of us comes to realization. Consciousness 
of self is another characteristic of subject-reality. We 
only know an object as we distinguish it from what is not 
itself. You can only be conscious of yourself as you dis- 
tinguish yourself from what is not yourself. That is, 
we come to consciousness of ourselves in the experience 
in which we become conscious of other objects. Hence 
the nature of our reality, in respect of consciousness of 
self, is developed, and so finds expression, in the subject- 
object relation. 



CHAPTER XXI 

IS THE COGNITIVE EXPERIENCE RESOLUBLE ? 

§ 83. What the Resolution of Cognitive Experience 
Signifies. — A card is handed you, and you perceive that 
it is a photograph. This may be taken as an illustration 
of cognitive experience. It has been held that this ex- 
perience yields two factors upon analysis — a mental 
factor and a physical factor. Speaking in general terms, 
the physical factor includes the photograph and your phys- 
ical organism, with special reference in the case of the 
latter to your sense-organs of vision and touch, and your 
nervous system. Thus conceived, the object is thought 
to act upon your sense-organs and, through afferent 
nerves connecting the sense-organs with the cerebral cor- 
tex, to cause effects in the cortex. These effects are that 
particular of the physical factor which is most directly 
related to the mental factor. These two factors — the 
mind and the affected cortex — are set over against each 
other; they are conceived to be independent realities, 
each being thought to be complete in itself without regard 
to the other. Those who follow this method insist that 
Epistemology must begin with such an analysis and must 
undertake to construct the cognitive experience out of the 
action and reaction of these two factors. 

The analysis of experience which we have just described, 
regards experience as a result, i.e. as an accomplished fact. 
Experience may also be conceived as a process, and there 
are those who prefer so to regard it. Many who conceive 

190 



THE COGNITIVE EXPERIENCE 191 

experience thus, Insist that we must follow the genesis 
of perception if we would construct a theory of Knowing. 
In order to trace the genesis of Knowledge, they analyze 
the cognitive experience into a physical process and a psy- 
chical process. In the instance of the illustration used 
above, this analysis would give us stimulation of the retina 
by the card, consequent excitation of the optic nerve, trans- 
ference of this excitation to the occipital lobe of the cere- 
brum, and consequent changes in the cortex. This method 
also discovers psychical changes — known as sensation 
and ideation ; and these conclude in the judgment that the 
card is a photograph. These psychical changes are con- 
comitant with the cortical changes. Here we have the 
outline of a scientific description of the process in cogni- 
tion. It is held that an acceptable theory of knowledge 
can be had if we shall study perception in its genesis, and 
that such an analysis as we have roughly sketched presents 
perception in process. It will be noted that the two 
factors of the former conception and the two processes 
in the latter are in mutually exclusive realms ; and they 
— the factors and the processes — are represented as hav- 
ing a distinct apartness in nature and in operation. 

§ 84. Why Cognition is thus Analyzed. — Can Phi- 
losophy forward its work and interest by trying to resolve 
the cognitive experience } This is the question we have 
to answer. The interest of Philosophy in the study which 
we now have in hand is distinctly practical. It is a mis- 
take to assume that Philosophy is moved by mere curi- 
osity in any of its investigations. We will note the prac- 
ticality of its interest at this point. Suppose I say, " The 
telephone bell just rang ; I heard it." That is an assertion 
of perceptual experience and knowledge on my part. 
What about the reality of the bell .? and what does this 
experience mean for that reality ? Philosophy asks these 



192 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

questions. The earliest, and the abiding, desire of Phil- 
osophy is to determine what the world is made of and 
what we ourselves are. Or, to state it briefly and compre- 
hensively. Philosophy wishes to know the nature of reality. 
In trying to satisfy this desire, men have thought it nec- 
essary to justify our certainty that our world of persons 
and things and happenings is real. We doubt the phil- 
osophical value of this inquiry. All thinking and all 
intersubjective intercourse assumes the reality of our- 
selves and our world ; it cannot do otherwise. But the 
question of the reality of the world has been raised ; and, 
in seeking an answer, men have been led to inquire respect- 
ing the validity of knowledge. Is my knowledge of the 
world valid for you ? Does cognition put us in possession 
of reality ^ Nothing else than commerce with reality can 
meet the demands of thought and the requirements of 
life. Now, it has been held by many that, if we would 
satisfy this desire, our first step is to resolve the cognitive 
experience as indicated above. Can the resolution of the 
cognitive experience into two factors or two processes 
forward this interest ^ We think not. 

§ 85. The Resolution of Cognitive Experience criti- 
cised. — This method would seem to commend itself to us, 
for it is in keeping with the method usually followed by 
Science. In scientific investigations, we believe that we 
can best understand a complex reality if we shall break 
it up into its elements and then discover how these com- 
bine. This is the method of Chemistry, Biology, and 
Psychology ; and, in our Historical Introduction, we have 
called attention to efforts made to apply the analytic 
method in Philosophy. (See especially §§ 18, 2; 36, 
2-4; 40;/4i.) Why do we decline to adopt it.^* 

I . It has proved Ineffective and Unsatisfactory. — After 
we have separated the mental and the physical factors, 



THE COGNITIVE EXPERIENCE 193 

we have to decide which of these shall be accepted as the 
controlling factor in any given case. Was it the card or 
your mind which determined what you saw when the card 
was handed you ? The Plain Man will say that it must 
be the card ; and not a few thinkers will agree with the 
Plain Man. The thinker who holds this view will prob- 
ably refer your perception to the physical factor as a 
whole — the card and your body, with special reference 
in the instance of the body to your organs of vision and 
your nervous system. Similarly, it would be said that 
the vibrating bell and my reacting physical organism 
determine what I perceive when I hear the bell. Empiri- 
cists take this view ; and the more pronounced would 
substantially agree with Locke's theory, and he would say 
that ideas are impressed on our minds when you see the 
card and I hear the bell. This approach regards the par- 
ticulars of our knowledge as a contribution of the object 
to the subject, a contribution made through sense- 
experience. But this is unsatisfactory. Whether we con- 
ceive perception as resulting from the interaction of physi- 
cal and mental factors or as resoluble into concomitant 
physical and psychical processes, there is one fact that 
renders this method ineffective. That fact is, that con- 
ditions of the cortex and changes in the cortex bear no 
resemblance whatever to knowledge ; they and knowledge 
have no discoverable community of nature or similarity 
in expression. Such conditions or changes have no de- 
finable likeness to our consciousness of color or sound, or 
taste, or to our feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. 
But if this method shall advance our thinking, it must find 
such likeness there. We have separated the physical and 
psychical factors, but we cannot so construe their com- 
bination as to show how knowledge results. Analysis 
yields two processes ; but these processes are in spheres 



194 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

which are conceived as radically different in nature, and 
we cannot logically connect them so as to show how knowl- 
edge arises. Why should a process In the cortex be ac- 
companied by the perception of a photograph ? The 
method under consideration does not help us to answer 
this question. We have the knowledge previous to the 
analysis ; but we cannot construct the knowledge from 
what the analysis discovers. This method Is Ineffective; 
In the hands of Empiricists It yields nothing which makes 
for or against the validity of knowledge. It separates 
subject and object, and It cannot unite them. 

Rationalists begin with the mental factor. Some, Kant 
for example, believe that the mind determines form and 
contributes matter of knowledge. According to Leibniz, 
all there Is In knowledge Is contributed by the Intellect. 
They agree In recognizing a fact overlooked by extreme 
Empiricists — viz., that your perception (of the photo- 
graph) and my perception (of the ringing of the telephone 
bell) are accomplished through thinking. According to 
those who hold that the subject determines the form of 
knowledge, you perceive a photograph because you have 
given photographic form to material furnished you in sen- 
sation. So also as to my perception of the bell. For them, 
the form which Is given by us to the sense-data is not a 
purely individual, or personal, construction ; it is deter- 
mined by principles of thought which are common to all 
subjects. Hence all normal subjects give the same form 
to the same material of experience. 

The doctrine just stated Is unsatisfactory; It raises a 
question which it cannot answer. Is that which stimu- 
lated sensation in your Instance really a photograph, 
just as it is known to you? Is It In my Instance actually 
a bell, constituted as it is known by me? If this doctrine 
be true, we have no warrant that the world which we know 



THE COGNITIVE EXPERIENCE 195 

IS the world of reality. This question demands answer of 
those also who hold that the mind contributes content 
and form to knowledge, and who at the same time sunder 
subject and object in their study of cognition. The an- 
alytic method cannot meet this demand. We have found 
that Empiricism cannot pass from object to subject; it 
is also true that the Rationalist who thus analyses cog- 
nition, cannot pass from the subject to the object. This 
method fails to connect the knower with reality which is 
other than himself. In resolving the cognitive experience, 
we sunder the subject and the object; and we cannot, 
from the sundered subject and object, reconstruct the 
knowledge which we broke up in our analysis. The sun- 
dered subject and object cannot testify respecting the 
validity of knowledge ; but they were separated in order 
that we might obtain such testimony. This method is 
ineffective. 

2. In this Resolution of Experience, Knowledge Vanishes. 
— This treatment of cognitive experience gives us changes 
in consciousness instead of knowledge. When you hear 
the door-bell, there is doubtless a change in your con- 
sciousness ; but that change is not knowledge. The knowl- 
edge is the apprehended meaning of an occurrence, the oc- 
currence being an object in the external world. So when 
I see the morning paper, there is a change in my conscious- 
ness ; but the item of knowledge is not this change. The 
knowledge is the meaning of an object external to me. A 
process in consciousness or a state of consciousness is not 
meaning and is not to be taken for knowledge. In the 
proposed analysis of cognition, knowledge disappears ; 
and no reflection upon the resulting factors or processes 
can recall it. 

3. The Analysis leads to incorrect Views respecting 
Knowledge. — Many who follow this method have con- 



196 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

eluded that the primary object in cognition is a state of 
consciousness. For example, I see this book. According 
to this view, the action of the object, the book, on my 
retinae has caused a change in my cortex and there occurs 
a resultant or attendant change in my consciousness ; 
and I have, in consequence, a mental picture of this book. 
The term " picture " is, of course, not to be taken too literally. 
What I know primarily is thought to be a mental repre- 
sentation or symbol or presentation of the book, not the 
book itself. This state of consciousness, describe It as 
one may. Is held to be what is* primarily cognized. Among 
those who accept this doctrine, there is great difference of 
opinion as to how this ideational object connects me with 
the book ; i.e. how I arrive at knowledge of the book 
through knowledge of the state of consciousness. But the 
essential fact for us here Is, that I am said to have a state 
of consciousness for my immediate object. 

Others who adopt this analytic method tend to the doc- 
trine held by Kant : that the known world is a construct 
of the subject. According to this view, all that you are 
conscious of when you see, handle, or taste the orange is 
supplied by you and is determined by what you are. You 
have no rational grasp of the reality of that which you call 
the orange. We do not know the reality of objects, the 
things-in-themselves ; we know the appearances of things- 
in-themselves, and we impose the known appearances upon 
unordered material which Is given us in sense-perception. 
What we know is the appearance (constructed by the 
understanding) of something which does not itself appear. 
We cannot, upon the ground of knowledge, affirm that this 
non-appearing reality exists ; we posit it, i.e. we affirm 
that it Is, although we do not, and cannot, know that it 
exists. 

The resolution of cognitive experience shuts us up to one 



THE COGNITIVE EXPERIENCE 197 

or the other of the two views just described. They are 
both open to serious criticism ; but they have been so 
extensively held and are so important as to call for sep- 
arate study. 

§ 86. Is the Primary Object in Cognition a State of Con- 
sciousness .f* — I. Logical Consequences of this Doctrine. 
— If it be true that the primary object in cognition is a 
state of consciousness, then the only world which any one 
can know is the world of his own consciousness. This is 
Subjectivism; and we have rejected Subjectivism be- 
cause it is incurably inconsistent as well as destructive. 
(See Chap. XVII, ) It shuts the subject up within him- 
self; he and his knowledge are enclosed in a sealed cham- 
ber, a chamber that is without door or window or sky- 
light. No way is left by which we can get into knowing 
relation with anything outside ourselves. We cannot 
know that there is an external world or that there are any 
other selves. You cannot know that you have a body ; 
what you think you know as your hand is, so far as your 
knowledge of it goes, merely a state of your consciousness; 
You may assert that there is an external world ; but your 
belief that there is anything beside your conscious states 
is either fantasy or groundless assumption. According 
to Subjectivism, there is no way by which to test the va- 
lidity of my assumption that there are other realities than 
my conscious states ; for I can only know that there is 
something else by knowing what is not of my conscious- 
ness, and such knowledge is held to be impossible. If the 
doctrine under consideration be true, I cannot argue from 
the fact that I have a certain consciousness to the con- 
clusion that there must be something else than myself, 
from the fact that I see a tree to the conclusion that there 
is a real object external to me ; because, so far as we know, 
this consciousness may have its origin in me. This doc- 



198 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

trine makes attempt at social intercourse folly ; it converts 
conscious life, the great reality for each of us, into an il- 
lusion ; and it is the death of Science. Subjectivism is, 
however, the logical consequence of resolving the cogni- 
tive experience into a physical and a mental factor, or 
into psychical and physical processes. This analysis 
affirms knowledge of an external world. It does so in 
teaching that there is a physical factor or process, and in 
stating what that factor does or what is the course of the 
process. This aifirmation cannot be reconciled with the 
doctrine which follows from the analysis. We are unready 
to accept any theory or procedure which is inconsistent 
with itself and which commits us to intellectual despair. 

2. It Misconceives the Subject and Object and their Re- 
lation to each other. — The subject and the object are 
conceived to be independent of each other and are thought 
to be in a purely external mechanical relation, such a re- 
lation, for example, as a hot stove and an iron lying upon 
it. We speak of the stove as causing the iron to become 
hot; and in this we are describing an event in terms of 
cause mechanically conceived. Similarly, the stove as 
an object is regarded as causing certain sensations in the 
subject, and the subject is thought to react upon these 
sensations. From this it would seem natural to conclude 
that a state of consciousness — whether it be known as 
idea, impression, or sensation — is the object first per- 
ceived. This account appears at first sight to be reason- 
able ; and it would be conclusive if the subject and object 
were independent of each other and if cognition were a 
purely mechanical process. 

Cognition is not, however, a mere mechanical process ; 
and the subject and object are not complete apart from 
each other. The relation of the percipient to the stove 
is not the same with that of the stove to the iron lying 



THE COGNITIVE EXPERIENCE 199 

upon it. The stove and the iron do not exist for each 
other; neither knows that the other is. In this respect, 
they are independent. But this is not true of the stove 
and the individual subject. The stove exists for a subject ; 
its characteristic qualities — those which we have in mind 
when we speak or think of a stove — are not realized ex- 
cept when it is object for some subject. A subject must 
consciously relate it to himself if its significance shall come 
to realization. Not only is the object dependent upon its 
relation to a subject for the expression of its reality, but 
there is no subject reality outside the subject-object rela- 
tion. We are real subjects only as we think, feel, and will ; 
and we cannot think, feel, and will except we are related 
to an object. Subject and object have no such independ- 
ence as is assumed in the resolution of the cognitive ex- 
perience ; for neither is complete apart from the other. 

Another fact shows that the relation of the subject to 
the stove is very different from that of the stove to the 
iron which lies upon it. When one looks at a stove or 
thinks about it, he, the subject, determines the relation in 
which they stand to each other. He may relate his 
thought to its appearance, its value on the market, its 
weight, its usefulness, or any one of a number of partic- 
ulars which give the stove meaning for life. Beside this, 
the experience is on another and higher level than any that 
may be conceived respecting the iron and the stove. In 
the latter, we have two objects ; in the former, we have a 
subject and an object, and the subject consciously deter- 
mines the relation. The relation of the iron and the stove 
is determined /or both of them ; the relation of the subject 
and the stove is determined hy one of them, by the subject. 
Resolution of experience errs seriously in treating the sub- 
ject as an object. A subject relates himself and objects; 
an object is related. We note still another fact : the real- 



200 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

ity of the object, its meaning for life, becomes content 
of the subject's consciousness ; it becomes a part of the 
subject's reality. The relation thus constituted is not 
external, like that of bricks in a wall ; it is immanent and 
organic, like that between a plant and what it appropriates 
from its environment and assimilates to itself. We con- 
clude, therefore, that the doctrine under consideration 
misconceives the subject and object in regarding them as 
independent and complete apart from each other; it errs 
in treating the subject as an object; it errs also in assum- 
ing that the subject and object are mechanically related. 
3. It misconceives Idea and the Relation of Idea to Sub- 
ject and to Object. — This doctrine interposes ideas between 
subject and object, and it has the subject cognize an idea 
of the object. That is, the idea of the external object 
is the subject's primary object. This idea is also regarded 
as a state of consciousness. But an idea is not a mere 
state of consciousness ; it is the conceived meaning of an 
object. Your idea of a house is not a mere state of your 
consciousness ; it is your conception of the meaning of a 
house in the system in which we are. It is not an image 
of a building ; it is the significance of the building for 
thought and feeling and action. So far as it is your idea, 
it owes its being to your mental activity. Ideas have no 
being in themselves ; they come to be, and they continue 
to be, through the mental activity of a subject. Failure 
to recognize this fact is certain to lead to erroneous con- 
clusions. Now, those who hold the doctrine which we are 
examining conceive the mind as something apart from the 
idea and as possessing the idea ; whereas the idea is the 
subject judging. Your idea of the house is yourself giving 
intelligent form to the meaning of that object. This is the 
idea as related to the subject. The idea abstracted from 
the subject ceases to be a fact. But the doctrine under 



THE COGNITIVE EXPERIENCE 201 

consideration does just this ; it abstracts the idea from the 
subject, and it treats the idea as a mere state of conscious- 
ness and regards it as externally related to the subject. 
Having done this, it makes the idea the directly perceived 
object. The idea is, however, not a mere state of con- 
sciousness, and it is not externally related to the subject; 
it is the subject judging. 

What is the idea as related to the object ? This doc- 
trine conceives the idea as purely subjective; it would 
separate the idea from the object of which it is the idea. 
We have seen that my idea of a clock is not simply in and 
of myself. An idea is the conceived meaning of an object ; 
if you abstract the object, I will have no idea. I see a 
certain object and conclude that it is a clock having some 
features which are novel to me. My idea is not purely 
subjective ; it has an objective relation and aspect. If 
this objective relation is broken up, the idea vanishes. 
No idea is purely subjective. An idea is not a mere state 
of a subject; it is the significance for the subject of some- 
thing else than himself, and he can only apprehend that 
significance as he apprehends that something else. 

This misconception of the relation of the idea to the sub- 
ject and the object, has led in this instance to an absolute 
distinction between objects and ideas. This distinction 
and the resolution of cognition yield a dualistic concep- 
tion of reality. The physical and the psychical are set 
over against each other. What we have taken to be a uni- 
verse, what reveals itself as a whole with all its parts or- 
ganically related, is cloven into two portions each of which 
is complete apart from the other. If we undertake to 
relate these realities — the psychical and the physical — 
in respect of their nature, we can only say that each is 
what the other is not. This would resolve the universe 
into a " duoverse " of orders which are mutually exclusive, 



202 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

being independent of each other and opposed in nature. 
If such a " duoverse " were possible, there could be no 
meaning in one order for the other. Our one certainty 
is the reality of the mental world ; we know that we think 
and feel and will, and this is in the psychical realm. This 
certainty explains the tendency of those who hold a doc- 
trine of dualism to make a state of consciousness the pri- 
mary object in cognition; and this theory of cognition has 
reacted on the dualistic doctrine of reality and has tended 
to confirm the dualism of those who accept it. We con- 
clude, however, from our study, that the attempt to resolve 
cognitive experience is due to a misconception of idea and 
of the relation of idea to subject and to object. 

4. The Primary Object is not a State of Consciousness. — 
A state of consciousness is not perceptible. A conscious 
state has no existence by itself; it is in the subject's ex- 
perience. It is not something which the subject possesses ; 
it is the subject himself experiencing. If I undertake to 
make my feeling consciousness my object, what introspec- 
tion gives me is not my feeling, but myself as feeling. If 
I seek a state of cognitive consciousness, what I get is not 
a knowing consciousness, but myself as knowing. That 
is not all. When we undertake to attend to our conscious- 
ness at any time, the attempt to do so effects a change. 
That is, the consciousness which we sought has ceased 
to be, and what we have for our object is ourselves 
remembering. A concrete state of consciousness can 
never be made an object. When one perceives a knife 
or a pen, the primary object of his cognitive activity 
is the knife or the pen, not a state of consciousness. 
We know nothing about states of consciousness in per- 
ception until we have reflected upon the process and 
have submitted it to analysis. When you see a blue 
book, touch a rough surface, or hear a creaking sound, 



THE COGNITIVE EXPERIENCE 203 

your object is the blue book, the rough surface, or 
the creaking sound, not a process in consciousness nor a 
state of consciousness. 

The resolution of the cognitive experience favors the 
doctrine which we have just examined and rejected ; but we 
cannot give a final answer respecting the resolubility of 
cognition until we have examined a kindred doctrine, the 
doctrine that the known world is a construct of the sub- 
ject. 

§ 87. The Kantian Limitation of Knowledge. — i. The 
Doctrine Stated. — We have given an extended statement 
of Kant's doctrine in § 44, and we refer to that for par- 
ticulars. A brief statement, relating his view to the ques- 
tion now under consideration, will be found in § 85, 3. 
The gist of his doctrine for us at the present is, that we 
only know appearances and these appearances are the 
construct of subjective activity. The appearances are not 
fantasy; they are not conjured up by the individual 
subject. The material of knowledge is given us through 
sense-experience ; it comes to us unordered, and order 
and meaning are given it by the mind. Knowledge is 
limited to what is received through sense-experience and 
has form and meaning given it by the understanding. 
The real world, the world whence the material of knowl- 
edge comes, is not known by us ; and its reality cannot 
be inferred from what we know. We posit, or afhrm, its 
existence; and we are to act as if it really were. This 
positing activity is apart from, and quite other than, the 
knowing activity of the subject; it is an act of faith. 
Kant thus sets faith over against knowledge. 

2. This Doctrine cuts the Subject off from Objective Reality. 
— His doctrine is in this particular open to the objection 
urged at length in § 86, i. Its logical consequences are 
virtually the same with those of the doctrine criticised 



204 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

In that sub-section. To be sure, he held that the Indi- 
vidual subject does not fix the form and meaning of the ob- 
jects which he perceives, for he taught that the forms of 
the objects are constituted by a super-conscious self 
which is the ground of the self of experience. By this, he 
made the world which is known truly objective In one 
respect; it is object for all. But knowledge remains sub- 
jective, for we do not apprehend reality. We only know 
the world as subjectively ordered, not as it is objectively 
real. He acknowledges that his view sets this limitation. 
That being the case, it commits us to Subjectivism ; and 
we have definitely rejected that form of epistemological 
doctrine. 

3. We object to his Sundering of Knowledge and Faith. 
— He says we do not know, and we cannot know, that 
the external world is ; but we are to affirm that It is and 
that It furnishes material for knowledge of the world of 
Science. He has man as will affirm that something is, 
although man as intellect does not know it to be. This 
would destroy the subject's psychical unity. It cleaves 
the unitary self into two parts which function In quite 
different ways and independently of each other. To tear 
the self apart thus would be the death' of both Intellect 
and will. He could not have constructed such a theory 
but for the defective Psychology of his day. The faculty 
Psychology was prevalent at that time. It conceived the 
mind as constituted in three departments — intellect, 
feeling, and will ; and these were regarded as separate 
activities, independent of each other and externally re- 
lated. It Is now recognized that the subject's activity is 
unitary, and that the subject is in every moment a think- 
ing-feeling-willing subject. Kant's conception of the 
subject refusing to affirm as a knowing subject and, at 
the same time, affirming as a willing subject is Irreconcll- 



THE COGNITIVE EXPERIENCE 205 

able with man's psychical unity. Faith and knowledge 
may not be set over against each other thus ; there is no 
knowledge apart from rational faith, and no rational faith 
apart from knowledge. Kant's view would commit us 
to internal conflict. According to him, we must treat that 
as true which we do not know to be true ; and we 
must regard the world of appearances as though it were 
a true expression of the world of reality, although we have 
no ground for so regarding it. Philosophy cannot rest in 
this ; and, as a consequence, those who followed Kant 
sought to connect the subject with objective reality. 

Kant's doctrine of the limitation of knowledge owes its 
origin, in part at least, to his conception of the relation of 
the subject and object. He conceives the subject and the 
objective world as externally related ; and cognition was 
for him the result of the mechanical action and reaction 
of the subject and the thing-in-itself. Elsewhere in his 
teaching he acknowledges the inadequacy of mechanism 
as an explanatory theory. We can scarcely imagine what 
it would have meant for Philosophy if the great Kant had 
recognized that the subject and the object are organically 
related, and that cognition is not a purely mechanical 
process. 

§ 88. Summary. — Resolution of the cognitive experi- 
ence has been found to be ineffective and unsatisfactory. 
It results in the sundering of the subject and the object ; 
and no acceptable interpretation of the resultant factors 
or processes will give the subject rational seizure of the 
object. Knowledge vanishes in the analysis and cannot 
be reconstituted. This method shuts us up to Subjec- 
tivism. This is shown in two doctrines which have been the 
logical outcome of its application to the problem of knowl- 
edge : the doctrine that the primary object in cognition 
is a state of consciousness, and the Kantian doctrine of the 



2o6 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

limitation of knowledge. We conclude that the cognitive 
experience is irresoluble. Knowledge is for Philosophy 
a primal and ultimate fact ; and we shall so regard it. 

It has been thought that this analysis would aid in 
establishing the validity of knowledge. But analysis of 
cognition does not help to answer the question raised ; 
it creates difficulties which cannot be overcome. We 
must assume the fact and the validity of knowledge ; we 
cannot think or speak rationally unless we make this as- 
sumption. We have seen that those who express doubt 
of knowledge or of its validity assume its validity in their 
doubt, and in the reasons they assign for their doubt. 
(See Chap. XVI.) Fortunately, we do not need to de- 
monstrate the validity of knowledge ; cognition deter- 
mines its own validity. We may err in particular judg- 
ments ; but knowledge must discover and correct the error 
if it shall be corrected. Knowledge passes judgment on 
itself; it is at once the court of original jurisdiction and 
the court of last resort in all controversies respecting 
validity. 



CHAPTER XXII 

THE TRI-PHASAL CHARACTER OF COGNITIVE ACTIVITY 

§ 89. Historical. — All experience is reducible to three 
elemental modes of consciousness — thinking, feeling, 
willing ; or intellection, affection, volition. Thinkers 
have tended to give unequal emphasis to these three phases 
of experience ; many, if not most, philosophers have as- 
signed preeminence to some one of them. This followed 
not unnaturally from the earlier conception of them as 
independent elements of consciousness. From this differ- 
ing emphasis there have arisen three philosophic attitudes. 
These attitudes are so marked and so determinative of 
philosophic conclusions as to furnish a principle by which 
we may classify philosophies ; and Intellectualism, Vol- 
untarism, and Affectionism are now recognized as terms 
which characterize distinctive forms of philosophic 
thought. Although these terms are virtually self-defin- 
ing, we add something by way of more specific description, 
limiting our statement to the consideration of the terms 
as they are related to cognition. 

I. Pure Intellectualism would regard Reason as Solely 
Intellective. — According to it, so far as reality may be 
known, it will be known because the intellect, acting by 
itself, apprehends it. Not all, however, who give a pri- 
macy to thought in cognition, hold a doctrine of pure intel- 
lectualism ; on the contrary, most Intellectualists of the 
present assert that all rational activity, the cognitive 
not excluded, has volitional and affective aspects, as well 
as an intellective aspect. The primacy which Intellec- 

207 



2o8 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

tualists of to-day assign to thought is really an aspectal 
primacy. For them, this phase -derives its aspect of pri- 
macy from the fact that in the study of cognition they are 
regarding experience from the intellective point of view. 
Greek philosophy gave preeminence to the intellective 
factor of rational activity. Averroes, the Arabian phi- 
losopher, was an Intellectualist ; and Albertus Magnus and 
Thomas Aquinas are representative Mediaeval Intellec- 
tualists. The Substantialists and Kant belong here. 

2. Voluntarism gives Primacy to the Will. — It holds 
that consciousness is under the control of the will, that ex- 
perience originates in the determination of the will, and 
that will determines what shall be the content of experi- 
ence. According to this doctrine, thinking is only for 
practical ends, and thought is merely an instrument of 
the will. The Romans and the Hebrews were Voluntarists. 
They gave greater significance to what we commonly call 
practical considerations than to theoretical; and with 
them the personal will takes precedence over the intellect. 
As earlier representative Voluntarists, we may name Avice- 
bron (a Jew who came into intimate relations with the 
Arabian philosophy), Augustine, Duns Scotus, and Will- 
iam of Ockham ; as later, De Biran, FIchte, and Schopen- 
hauer. Lotze had a voluntarlstic tendency. Personal 
Idealists and most Pragmatists are also Voluntarists. 

3. Affectionism gives Primacy to Feeling. — For the 
present, this attitude is more prevalent in Psychology than 
in Philosophy. Some psychologists would derive intel- 
lection and volition from feeling ; and this comes of their 
undertaking to construct all forms of consciousness out 
of sensation. We speak of this psychological doctrine 
because philosophical conclusions are involved in it. Af- 
fectionism holds that reality enters experience through 
feeling, not through thought. Neo-Platonists and most 



COGNITIVE ACTIVITY TRI-PHASAL 209 

Mystics belong here. With them the highest form of 
knowledge, the only true knowledge, is little else than 
" uninterrupted feeling." Their " super-rational " mode 
of cognition is immediate appropriation of reality through 
feeling. There have been few teachers of philosophy who 
have held a definite and declared doctrine of Affection- 
ism. Nicholas of Cusa and the Victorines — Hugo and 
Richard — are representatives. We believe that Jacobi 
and Fries may be so classified. Pragmatism as held and 
stated by James seems to be Affectionism ; for he insisted 
that Philosophy comes through "passionate vision," and 
that logic follows and furnishes reasons for the doctrines 
thus obtained. 

§90. Consciousness is Unitary. — i. The older Psy- 
chology regarded intellect, feeling, and will as depart- 
ments of mental life independent of one another. In 
keeping with this conception, you might be active intel- 
lectually without attendant feeling or volitional activity. 
Each of these faculties was even conceived as a thing-in- 
itself ; and a distinct ofiice in mental life was assigned to 
each of them. This faculty psychology has no acceptance 
at present, nevertheless expressions are to be found in the 
philosophic literature of to-day which indicate that thought 
has not wholly freed itself from bondage to this discarded 
conception. Consciousness is unitary ; man, in his ra- 
tionality, is a unit. He has one rationality, not three ; 
and that one rationality has three inseparable modes. We 
do not think and only think in one moment, and will in 
another, and feel in yet another. There is no experience 
which is now intellective, now volitional, and at another 
moment affective. The unitary experience may not be 
broken up thus. Any portion of concrete experience, 
select it by what rule we may, is a thinking-feeling-willing 
experience. 



2IO INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

2. No One of these Modes is Complete in Itself. — We 
cannot think without feeling and willing, neither can we 
will without thinking and feeling, nor feel apart from 
thinking. Feeling is the agreeable or disagreeable tone 
attendant upon our thought of a person or thing or event. 
One cannot have a feeling — say of sympathy for the 
suffering or scorn of evil-doing or dislike of what is ugly — 
unless some person or thing or act be an object of thought. 
That respecting which we have the feeling, must have some 
meaning for us. In a word, feeling involves thought. 
The feeling in any instance may be instinctive, or it may 
follow upon careful reasoning; but, in either case and 
every case, thinking is essential to feeling. Volition in- 
volves feeling. Of several objects proffered me or several 
courses open to me, I choose one, preferring it to the others. 
This preference comes of my feeling respecting the objects. 
Taking all things into consideration, I am more favorably 
disposed toward the chosen object or course than toward 
the others. In other words, there is no volition apart 
from feeling, for feeling has to do with the directing of 
volition. It is obvious that we cannot will except we have 
thought of some object, the object respecting which we 
will. These considerations force the conclusions that 
feeling and volition involve intellection, and that volition 
involves feeling. In the next section we shall attend to 
facts which show that every moment of intellective ac- 
tivity is feeling- and will-directed. It will suffice here 
to take note of one fact ; interest and attention are es- 
sential to thought. We must give attention to that about 
which we think, and we only give attention to that in 
which we have interest. The interest may be only mo- 
mentary, but for that moment we have interest in it. There 
can be no sustained attention without volition, and feel- 
ing is essential to interest. These modes of experience 



COGNITIVE ACTIVITY TRI-PHASAL 211 

are inseparable; each is dependent upon the others, and 
can only be if the others are. 

§ 91. Feeling and Will are involved in Cognition. — 
We have insisted that knowledge cannot be a mere datum 
to consciousness. In concluding that the rumbling you 
hear is caused by an automobile, not a street-car, you re- 
late the object to yourself and make mental seizure of it; 
the knowledge that it is an automobile, is not a mere gift 
to you, but becomes yours through your rational activity. 
The discussion v/hich follows will bring to notice the voli- 
tional factor of cognitive activity and will therein support 
our contention that knowledge is not a gift to conscious- 
ness. 

I. Will and Feeling are present in the Inception of the 
Cognitive Effort. — Our activity in perceiving an object 
or in seeking exact knowledge of it, is not a mere general 
awareness of the object ; it is a selective awareness. Thus, 
my perception that an object is a book, is not a general 
undefined awareness ; it is an awareness in which this 
object is selected out from all-that-is and is made the ob- 
ject of thought. This selection is due to present interest 
in that object; and where there is interest, there is feel- 
ing. Having selected this object, my further interest in 
it may be due to my seeking information, mental recrea- 
tion, first editions, beautiful typography, or any one of a 
number of other ends. This interest will lead to a selec- 
tive apprehension of the book, the selection being made in 
keeping with my special interest and purpose. Interest 
and purpose determine the initiation of the cognitive pro- 
cess. We give thought to objects because we believe 
that they may, or do, have present or future value for us, 
and because of our assumption or assurance of their present 
or future adaptation to our purposes. That is, considera- 
tions of interest and purpose determine cognition at its 



212 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

inception ; and interest and, purpose involve feeling and 
will. The purpose of cognitive effort may be the acquire- 
ment of knowledge for purely personal satisfaction, quite 
apart from what are commonly called practical interests. 
We find this often in those who are highly cultured ; it 
seems to be present also in the wonder and the intellectual 
curiosity of the child. But whether we enter upon cog- 
nitive endeavor with a view to the attainment of knowl- 
edge, or in order that we may better further some of the 
innumerable practical interests to which we give atten- 
tion, we are seeking to satisfy the self. This end involves 
feeling. We conclude, therefore, that feeling and will 
are involved in the initiation of the cognitive process. 

2. They are -present in the Cognitive Process. — The 
activity which directs our cognitive effort is the same with 
that which initiates it. We too often regard the cognitive 
process as consisting in the bare relating of ideas ; and we 
think of it as void of feeling and undirected by any purpose 
other than the attainment of some truth which is as yet 
wholly undefined. Not so ; the process is directed to an 
end. By so much as we are rational, we are seeking some- 
thing in particular. It is this which sets us upon the 
endeavor to know; and we hold our attention to the se- 
lected object, and direct our thinking, in view of the selected 
end. Volition is essential to the continuance and comple- 
tion of the cognitive process. This is illustrated and con- 
firmed in our experience in study and in scientific investiga- 
tion. 

But feeling is just as essential as thinking and willing. 
The simplest cognition issues in a judgment; a judgment 
is the unit of thought. Aristotle perceived this truth 
(§ 15? 7)) ^"^^ Kant recognized that cognition is completed 
in a judgment (§ 44, 2). When we attain knowledge of 
an object, that knowledge affirms or denies something in 



COGNITIVE ACTIVITY TRI-PHASAL 213 

respect of the object. You conclude that a certain building 
is a school-house. If you were asked why you take it 
to be a school-house, you might point out the perceived 
particulars in the building and the grounds which lead 
you to this conclusion. If further pressed, you can only 
reply that these characteristics of the building and grounds 
are for you a sufficient reason for your judgment in the 
case. In other words, you are satisfied with that judg- 
ment. But an experience of satisfaction involves feeling. 
What is true in this respect of so simple a cognitive pro- 
cess, is true also of more elaborate processes, of extended 
processes of reasoning. In our thinking, we are constantly 
applying this law of Sufficient Reason ; and that means 
that we reject what dissatisfies us and accept what satisfies 
us. Feeling is always present in logical processes. So also 
as to judgments of value ; as when we are determining the 
value of a certain object or course of action for the secur- 
ing of an end which we have in view, or the relative worth 
of two or more objects or courses of action from which we 
have to make choice. In answering the questions which 
arise in such relations, feeling is attendant upon intellec- 
tion and has an important part in determining our con- 
clusions. Our experience in judging fact or value may be 
stated thus : " I have a conviction that that is right." 
Such a conviction is implied in every judgment ; and con- 
viction is, in its nature, a feeling-thought. It is also a 
determination of the subject to accept a certain conclusion 
as final for that time ; and this involves volition. In 
judgment we have a feeling, and a volitional, as well as an 
intellective, factor. 

§ 92. Cognition is characteristically a Thought Process. 
— The process is a process of feeling-directed and will- 
directed intellection. Practical ends beyond the present 
activity are often, if not usually, sought; but the present 



214 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

activity is for knowledge. Therefore we speak of the whole 
as " thought." The objective world is realized in our 
consciousness through the thought factor of rational 
activity ; the reality of the external world is thus ap- 
propriated by us. By this we mean that what the world 
is for beings that are intelligent and emotional and capable 
of bringing things to pass — all this becomes ours through 
that factor of rational activity which expresses itself in 
intellection. For this reason also, we call cognition a 
thought process when we wish to speak of it in general 
terms. Hence, when we use the term " thought " in 
speaking of rational activity, it is not to be taken as im- 
plying that such activity is a purely intellective process ; 
on the contrary, thinking is regarded as an intellect-, 
feeling-, and will-directed process. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

A CONSTRUCTIVE STUDY OF COGNITION 

(See Chapters XVI, XVII, XIX, and § 80) 

§93. Review. — Thus far in our study of Cognition, 
we have given special attention to the consideration of 
defective views and inadequate methods which have 
developed in the course of philosophical inquiry. We 
discussed Scepticism and found it to be inherently self- 
contradictory, as well as untrue to experience. From this 
we concluded that criticism of knowledge always assumes 
that cognition is reliable, even when the criticism expresses 
doubt of the possibility of attaining valid knowledge ; in 
other words, we cannot avoid accepting the validity of 
knowledge. The discussion of Solipsism led to the con- 
clusion that Subjectivism cannot be self-consistent, except 
at the cost of denying that there is any other reality for 
knowledge than the individual subject's own states of con- 
sciousness. As a consequence, "the Solipsist refutes him- 
self by beginning to prove his doctrine to others ; " for 
he recognizes those whom he addresses as real and thinks 
them to be other than himself. Hence, the world of 
things, events, and other persons with which we have 
daily commerce, is a world of realities ; and these realities 
are not mere copies or material embodiments of our in- 
dividual states of consciousness. 

Phenomenalism — the doctrine that we know only ap- 
pearances — was our next study. An extended consider- 
ation of this doctrine led us to conclude that appearances 

215 



2i6 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

are modes in which reality expresses itself; that every 
appearance is a true expression of reality in certain 
relations ; and that, in knowing appearance, we there- 
with know reality. In our study of Reality, we en- 
deavored to discover whether a cognitive experience is 
ever an experience of a mere particular object, also whether 
it is ever merely the experience of an individual subject. 
We concluded that no experience is ever of a mere par- 
ticular, that a universal element is always present ; and 
that no experience of any subject is complete apart from 
the whole of that subject's experience. We likewise dis- 
covered that no subject has an experience which is entirely 
" private " ; every experience of each of us has that in it 
which is " public." There is in every experience that which 
is common ; that is, it has that in it which is possible ex- 
perience iO'T all subjects, that which is actual experience 
for all who are in conscious relation to the same objects. 

§ 94. The Universal in Experience. — Our present 
study connects immediately with the fact to which we 
reverted at the close of the last section — the fact that 
every experience has a universal element in it. 

If a number of subjects — say five — look at the moon, 
no two will have exactly the same experience in all details ; 
nevertheless their perceptions will so far agree that, if 
any one of them shall speak of the moon, all the others will 
know what he means, and they will attach the same gen- 
eral significance to what he says. In the consciousness 
of each of these five men, there is that which is common 
to the consciousness of all. This common experience re- 
specting the moon makes it possible that they shall have 
intelligent intercourse with each other concerning it. 
You and I could not understand each other if it were not 
that we have some experience in common. Whenever 
either of us begins to speak of something in respect of 



A CONSTRUCTIVE STUDY OF COGNITION 217 

which the other has had no definite experience, the speaker 
can only be understood if he shall connect what he says 
with the previous experience of the hearer. As a matter 
of fact, we do understand each other. We hold intelligent 
intercourse about the world of happenings and per- 
sons and things, the world as it is presented to us in sense- 
experience ; and we find that this intercourse is dependable. 
If you make statements to me respecting an object, state- 
ments which are the result of a critical study of the object, 
I will find upon trial that my own experience with it will 
have a measure of agreement with yours. 

Our previous study led to the conclusion (§ 69) that the 
world in which we find ourselves and with which we have 
to do, is not a projection of our individual consciousness. 
We concluded thus, because the assumption that the world 
which I perceive is a projection of my individual conscious- 
ness, is found upon examination to be inherently self- 
contradictory. The fact of experience to which attention 
is called in the paragraph preceding this, takes us a step 
further. That fact may be stated thus : The perception 
of an object gives a common thought-content to those 
perceiving it. It follows from this that the being and 
meaning of the object perceived are not dependent upon 
the individual subject's perception of it. Your experience 
in respect of an object arises from your being related to it ; 
and the experience of other subjects arises from their 
being related to it. Since you and they acquire a common 
thought from perception of the object, it must be that 
the object is common to you and them. It is truly ob- 
jective. 

In our consideration of Appearance and Reality, we 
discovered that, in knowing appearance, we therewith 
know reality. From this it would follow that the common 
object of the five men who perceive the moon is an ob- 



2i8 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

jective reality. This objective reality, as realized in the 
common thought-content of those who perceive — e.g. 
the moon as realized in what is common to the experience 
of all who perceive it — is trans-subjective reality; and 
this reality is known. We know trans-subjective reality. 

§ 95. Concepts and Objective Reality. — A study of 
concepts and their relation to reality leads to the same 
conclusion as that reached in the preceding section. 

I. An Illustration. — We apprehend a number of ani- 
mals as having, each of them, four legs, a wool pelt, like 
anatomical particulars, and the same general import for 
thought and for practical life. No two of them are ex- 
actly the same in all particulars ; but all of them have the 
four legs, the wool pelt, and they are alike in certain par- 
ticulars of anatomy and in respect of their place in the 
world and their relation to our life. Although they are 
distinguished from one another in many details, in their 
likenesses and their significance for our thought and our 
activity, each has that which is common to all. Their 
common import for our thought and our practical life — 
i.e. the idea which is common to them — is what we mean 
by concept. A concept is the idea which is common to a 
number of objects. 

By common consent, a word is accepted as representing 
this idea. In the illustration we have just used, that word 
would be " sheep " in our language ; and its equivalent 
would be found in the languages of all peoples who have 
experience with such animals. This word, or name, helps 
to fix the idea and makes it, the idea, available for thought 
and intercourse. The word is the conventional symbol 
of the concept and is often called a concept. For ex- 
ample, the word " sheep " would be frequently spoken of 
as a concept. But it is well to remember that the common 
idea or meaning, the common import for thought and activ- 



A CONSTRUCTIVE STUDY OF COGNITION 219 

ity, IS the concept proper ; the word is simply the spoken 
or written symbol of the idea-concept. 

2. A Concept is a Condensed Judgment. — When we 
group a number of objects and assign them a common 
name, we judge that they have a common significance for 
our thought, for our commerce with the world of sensible 
objects, and for our intercourse with other persons. In 
fact, as we shall see just below, a concept is generally, 
if not always, the result of many judgments. The word 
by which we designate it, is the expression in language of 
this concentrated judgment. It is thus language has de- 
veloped. Even proper names had at first a meaning and 
use beyond the mere designation of the individual person 
or thing ; they were significant of some attribute of, or 
some circumstance respecting, the person or thing. Thus, 
Jacob meant " supplanter " and was thought to express 
a personal characteristic ; similarly Esau signified " hairy" 
and was given him because of his hirsute appearance. 
Among primitive peoples names express judgments re- 
specting the persons or things named. This is exemplified 
in the name which the natives of Central Africa gave 
Stanley — Bula Matari, breaker of rocks. It occurs with 
us to-day in the naming of places and things ; e.g. Bridal 
Veil Falls, Hell Gate, Bartholdi Statue. The connecting 
of characteristics with objects is an act of judgment. 
We have seen above that concepts arise thus. In reality, 
every concept is the result of a series of judgments. The 
concept " man " is for you and me an idea which includes 
many particulars, all those characteristics which we take 
to be common to all men ; and each of these particulars 
comes of a separate judgment. 

3 . Dependence of Thought on Concepts. — We employ 
concepts in all cognitive activity. Take for example a 
simple perception, the perception that a certain flower 



220 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

is a rose. It would be stated thus : That is a rose. The 
ideas expressed by " that " and " rose " are concepts. 
" That " is notably general. It expresses the idea of 
objective specification and is applicable to any specified 
object. It is common to all specified objects. " Rose " 
is an idea common to a certain group of plants or flowers, 
according as it is used with the more general botanical, or 
the less general floral, significance. Thought, as activity 
which seeks meaning, is effected through concepts. Kant 
recognizes this. He says, " All thought is nothing but 
conception by means of concepts." This is true of per- 
ception as well as reflective thought. " Perception with- 
out conception is blind." Since concepts are condensed 
judgments, many of the commonest being the concen- 
tration of many judgments, if follows that thought and 
concepts develop together. 

4. Dependence of Thought and Concepts on Each Other. — 
An examination of experience makes it evident that con- 
cepts and thought are dependent upon each other and de- 
velop together. It is seen in individual experience. When 
we first became conscious of ourselves and the world, our 
stock of ideas was very meagre. During the earlier period 
of our life, preceding our entering school, we were con- 
stantly enlarging our knowledge of objects, our grasp of 
their import ; that is, our concepts were developing. This 
augmentation of our stock of concepts continued through 
all our student life and will not cease until our mental 
vigor begins to decline. It is manifestly true of the race. 
The intellectual development of any people is attended and 
effected by their acquirement of new concepts. Some 
of those more lately developed will be recognized in the 
following word symbols : " automobile," " aeroplane," 
" wireless." Each of these concepts embodies thought. 
Not only are new concepts developed ; but the concepts 



A CONSTRUCTIVE STUDY OF COGNITION 221 

themselves develop significance with enlarging experience 
and thought. When the child first appropriated the idea 
which we express by the word " school," the concept did 
not have so full a content as it did after he became a 
pupil ; and it has a much larger content to the young man 
graduating from college than to the same student while 
in his preparatory course. When Morse sent his first 
message, " telegraphy " meant much less than it does to- 
day. They mistake who speak of concepts as imprisoning 
or petrifying thought ; on the contrary, concepts are the 
product of the life of thought, and they are essential to the 
being and development of the thought-life. 

5. The Ground of the Concept. — Objects which differ 
in detail are apprehended as having likeness in appearance 
and in significance for life activities. The concept is the 
common idea, or import, of the objects which exhibit 
such likeness ; and it is objectively expressed in the char- 
acteristics common to these objects. For example, the 
concept which has its linguistic expression in the word 
" sheep," has objective expression in the characteristics 
which are common to the animals thus grouped and named. 
So with other concepts. The ground of the concept, or 
common import, of a number of objects will be the same 
with the ground of likeness of appearance or characteristics 
of these objects. What, then, is the ground of likeness, or 
phenomenal oneness, of the objects of which a concept 
is the common idea .? The characteristics of an appearance 
express the nature of the reality that appears ; and like- 
ness in appearance implies likeness in nature of the reali- 
ties which appear. Phenomenal oneness, or likeness, of 
objects must be grounded in oneness of nature, in oneness 
of reality. These objects are embodiments of a common 
reality. Concepts are objectively grounded in the com- 
mon reality of objects. 



222 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

We have found that the objective ground of a concept 
is the common reality of the objects to which it is appli- 
cable. But we have not fully answered our question ; 
for there is no concept without thought, and the concept 
must be subjectively grounded. It has its subjective 
ground in the cognitive activity of the subject. This 
has become evident in our discussion of " The Concept 
as Condensed Judgment " and " The Dependence of 
Thought and Concept on each other." So much, then, 
for the concept as idea: it has its origin in cognition of 
objective reality which is common to a number of objects. 

We now seek the ground of the word-concept. The 
word " oak " is the speech symbol of the idea-concept 
which is grounded objectively in the reality which is 
common to all trees of that class. This idea has come 
into our experience in our cognition of this common ob- 
jective reality. But this word " oak " passes current in 
intellectual intercourse ; and it passes current, because 
the object which it names has, in some measure, the same 
import for all who have had experience with it. It is 
accepted and used for the expression of thought, because 
men have acquired a common thought-content in their 
experience with reality which is common to a number of 
like objects. We have seen (§ 94) that such a common 
element in experience comes of cognition of trans-sub- 
jective reality — reality which is object for all subjects. 
From this it follows that word-concepts are grounded in 
knowledge of trans-subjective reality. They testify to 
the fact that we have such knowledge ; for they owe their 
being to it. 

§ 96. '' Identity in Difference." — In the last section, we 
recognized that the individual animals classed as " sheep " 
differ in particulars ; no two of them are identical in all 
respects. Now, if their likeness in appearance comes of 



A CONSTRUCTIVE STUDY OF COGNITION 223 

their being expressions of a common reality, how is it that 
such differences appear ? Would not their identity in 
nature demand identity in characteristics ? This raises a 
question as to whether identity and difference are incom- 
patible and hence mutually exclusive. We give it a brief 
discussion here because of its bearing on our conception of 
the relation of knowledge of an object to the object known. 

1. What Identity Signifies. — The term "identity" 
is confessedly ambiguous, and much confusion has arisen 
from its use ; but we cannot avoid employing this term 
and the kindred term " same," despite the ambiguity 
which attaches to them. " Identity " sometimes signifies 
" individual sameness " — as when we say of two men, 
" They attended the same college." In "the same college" 
we have numerical identity, an instance of a single object 
which is the same with itself. But, if one should say 
of the same men, " They have the same mode of thought," 
the statement would express " distinguishable likeness " 
in two objects — the modes of thought of the two men. 
When we speak of the identity of reality, or nature, in 
all " sheep," it is obvious that we do not mean that the 
same individual real is in all ; we simply affirm likeness 
of reality in all. However much sounds may diifer, every 
sound is a sound, whether it be the filing of a saw or the 
singing of a mocking-bird. In respect of their likeness, 
they are the same, they have identity; for they are, all 
of them, sounds. So always with what is common to 
any group of particulars, i.e. with universals. Thus the 
apple and the peach are rosacea (of the rose family) ; they 
and the common rose have likeness which the botanist 
recognizes. To that extent they are identical with each 
other and with the common rose. We regard those objects 
as identical which present distinguishable likeness. 

2. Concrete Identity is " Identity in Difference.^'' — 



224 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

We know, as a matter of fact, that the particulars of every 
group present differences. We are conscious of self- 
identity ; this is for each of us indubitable. But in my 
consciousness of self, I have experience of identity through 
differencing changes. Your consciousness of your own 
identity is of an identical self that is different from your 
former self. There cannot be experience of identity apart 
from difference ; for identity can only be apprehended 
when different terms or relations are compared. The 
Secretary of State says, " That is the pen with which the 
bill was signed." In this statement he affirms identity; 
but he also implicates difference — a difference in time 
relation and a difference in that the pen is not now being 
used for that purpose. The identity is identity in dif- 
ference ; and it is in the contrast that the identity gets its 
significance. There cannot be any bare distinctionless 
identity; for identity is a relation, and there can be no 
relation except between different terms. Hence reality 
is unity in diversity ; and the reality common to a group 
includes both the likenesses and differences of the in- 
dividuals which embody it. What we are here insisting 
upon — that identity is always " identity in difference " 
— is conceded by most, if not all, philosophical writers 
of the present. 

3. " Identity in Difference " of Knowledge and the 
Object. — We have said that experience is the realization 
of the object as content of consciousness ; that the object, 
as somewhat which has import for the subject, is realized 
in the subject. That being true, we may affirm the identity 
of knowledge of an object and the object. Our individual 
and finite knowledge is, to be sure, incomplete and im- 
perfect ; but there is, in this incomplete knowledge, some 
appropriation of the reality of the object, and our knowl- 
edge and the object are to that extent identical. Liszt 



A CONSTRUCTIVE STUDY OF COGNITION 225 

had a remarkable conception of the reality embodied in 
the piano, of its significance for thought and feeling and 
will. The extent to which this was realized in him, was 
the extent of his knowledge of the piano ; and, in that re- 
spect, his knowledge was identical with its object. But 
while it is identical with, it is also other than, and different 
from, its object. Cognitive experience is a consciousness 
of " identity in difference " of knowledge and object. 

§ 97. The Particulars of Experience are organically 
Related. — If this be true, it follows that the factors of 
cognition are organically related, for cognition is a process 
in consciousness. 

I. Characteristics of Organic, as distinguished from 
Mechanical, Relatedness. — A mechanical whole — as a 
machine or a brick wall — is constituted by putting its 
parts together. We have the parts before we have the 
whole, and we construct the whole by combining the parts. 
The construction is accomplished by a man or some men ; 
i.e. by what is other than the whole. In the constitution 
of an organism, — as a plant or an animal, — a radically 
different procedure presents itself. The parts of an or- 
ganism are constituted in and through the whole ; and this 
is true of an organism in all stages of its existence. The 
trunk, the branch, the leaf, the bud, and the flower are 
products of the activity of the whole. So with the parts 
of the body. 

Organic activity is developmental. The full-grown 
plant, in its typical and essential characteristics, is the 
realization of what was implicit in it from the beginning. 
Thus, an oak and a horse are, in their typical characteristics, 
the developed expression of what was implicit in the cells 
from which they sprang. The reality in the original cell 
of an organism comes to explicit embodiment by an inner 
and developmental process. The oak itself determines 
Q 



226 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

the being and typical characteristics of its parts. So the 
unit whole, i.e. the organism, determines the being and the 
character of the parts ; and, in so doing, it reveals its 
own character. In respect of the way in which they are 
constituted and of the relation of the whole to the parts, 
the organic and the mechanical differ radically. As 
mechanically conceived, an object is constructed from 
without and according to an ideal which is external to 
the incomplete object. As organically conceived, an ob- 
ject is developed through the activity of the object; and 
it is at every stage the expression of an ideal which is 
implicit in the object. 

If we wish to make an intelligent statement as to how a 
machine is constituted, we may begin with the parts. 
By noting the significance of the various parts for the ma- 
chine and the purpose it is to serve, we shall be able to 
obtain a conception of the machine. But this is not the 
logical procedure in the instance of a plant or an animal. 
We cannot give a satisfactory account of the genesis of 
a plant by beginning with its developed parts, for the plant 
itself constitutes the parts. If we sum up the various 
parts of a plant, we will not have the living plant; for 
we shall yet lack that unitary whole by reason of which 
the parts have their being and typical characteristics. 

The primary reality in an organism is protoplasm, the 
physical basis of life. Most, if not all, biologists are 
unready to speak of protoplasm as organized, because the 
term "organized" is reserved by them for what is, by 
ordinary vision or with the aid of a microscope, percep- 
tibly constituted of differing parts each of which has 
its own office. But all agree that it is complex, not simple. 
If this complex be broken up, we no longer have what will 
develop into an organism. It is the primary reality in 
organisms. We cannot tell how the elements of this com- 



A CONSTRUCTIVE STUDY OF COGNITION 227 

plex when thus combined, constitute what will, under 
proper conditions, develop into a plant or animal. For 
a description of the processes by which organisms come to 
be, this complex reality is a primary and irresoluble reality. 

2. All Particulars of Experience are constituted by and 
in the experiencing Self. — The particulars of your experi- 
ence — your judgments, memories, images, emotions, 
purposes — are not made ready apart from you and then 
imparted to you. On the contrary, they come to be 
through your activity in your commerce with objects. 
Their origin and their relation to you, as an experiencing 
self, are radically different in kind from the origin of the 
parts of a machine and the relation of the parts to the ma- 
chine. The origin and relations of the particulars of your 
experience are of a kind with the origin and relations of the 
parts of an organism to the organism. The parts come to 
be through the interrelated activity of the plant and its en- 
vironment; just so the particulars of the experience of 
each of us come to be through the interrelated activity 
of each of us and our individual environment. Any selected 
experience, also every selected part of an experience, is 
organically related to the self, and to all the particulars 
of that self's experience. 

The subject develops his potential reality in experience 
(§ 59? S)- We come to consciousness of self only in our 
experience of what is other than self. This is the law of 
self-consciousness : one is conscious of self only as he is 
conscious of some object. It is in experience, with its 
duality of aspect, that self-consciousness develops. But 
self-consciousness is an essential element of subject reality ; 
and it is through experience that we come to the realiza- 
tion of the reality which is implicit in us. We are rational ; 
and we too often think we have spoken the whole truth 
when we say that, being rational, it is possible that we 



228 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

should know. But it Is also true that we develop our 
rationality in experience. Without experience we would 
not be actually rational ; and, if we were not implicitly 
rational, we could not have human experience. Further, 
it is in our experience of persons that we come to know 
that we are persons, not things. The apprehended dis- 
tinction between persons and things and the consciousness 
that we are persons, and quite other than things, develop 
together. This development makes explicit what was 
implicit in the subject, and it is effected through the im- 
manent activity of the subject. A process in which what 
was implicit is thus realized, is an organic process ; it is 
of a kind with what we perceive in the development of 
organisms. 

Experience also reveals its organic character in this, 
that we cannot obtain a satisfactory account of it by 
studying its factors apart from each other, and thus apart 
from the experience as a whole. We have learned that, if 
we undertake to find knowledge in the psychical and phys- 
ical factors regarded apart from each other, the attempt 
ends in failure. Reflective thought cannot discover the 
cognitive experience in these processes or factors, abstracted 
from the experience. We may find the factors in the ex- 
perience, but not the experience in the factors. We have 
simply to accept knowledge as a primary irresoluble fact ; 
in this respect, we have to accept it much the same as the 
unreflective accept it. These facts support our conten- 
tion that the particulars of experience are not mechan- 
ically related, and that cognition is an organic process and 
knowledge is an organic product. 

§ 98. Conclusions ; Questions. — In closing this con- 
structive study, we restate some of the more important 
conclusions, and suggest answers to certain questions of 
fundamental import. 



A CONSTRUCTIVE STUDY OF COGNITION 229 

1 . Conclusions Restated. — Our constructive considera- 
tion of cognition leads to conclusions which are in full 
agreement with what .we discovered in our earlier study 
of experience (Chap. XV) and our examination of de- 
fective theories of knowledge. Concrete experience is 
complex, however simple and primary the experience 
may be. It is unitary ; but its unity is the unity of diverse 
particulars, the coherence of differents. Any selected 
whole of experience presents duality of aspect; and to 
separate the subjective from the objective, is to destroy 
the experience. We have to accept the validity of the 
conviction that the world of persons and things and oc- 
currences is real, and that the objects of that world are 
not dependent upon our individual perception for their 
being and meaning. We do not constitute the objects 
of that world, neither do we constitute the relations in 
which we perceive them. We apprehend the objects in 
their relations, and our knowledge is our report respecting 
the objects and their relations. We know them as they 
appear. Their appearance is the expression of the reality 
— i.e. of the nature — of the objects ; hence our knowl- 
edge is knowledge of objective reality. 

2. Questions. — We have found that the subject and 
the object are organically related. The subject is other 
than the object, and the object other than the subject; 
nevertheless they are indissolubly united in knowledge. 
These conclusions raise questions which call for answer. 

(i) Some have asked how it is possible that mind and 
object should be thus intimately related, seeing that the 
object remains other than the mind. Or, the query may 
be stated thus. How is it that mind, which is unextended, 
apprehends what is apart from the subject.^ We frankly 
confess that we do not know how the mind becomes con- 
scious of the object; but we know that it does become 



230 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

aware of It. All experience testifies to this, for there is 
no experience In which there is not awareness of an object ; 
and, in addition to this, we have shown that we know 
trans-subjective reality. This question Is, In effect, a 
demand to be shown what constitutes the subject a 
thinklng-feellng-wllling self ; it Is a request that we indi- 
cate what gives the mind capacity for determining the 
meaning and value of things, events, and persons. The 
only possible reply Is that experience yields the fact that 
mind does just this ; experience itself comes of this func- 
tioning of the mind. 

(2) Although the question just considered cannot be 
answered in the terms in which it is stated, something re- 
mains to be said respecting the ability of the mind to 
apprehend what is other than the mind. In the beginning 
of our study, we assumed that the universe is intelligible. 
This Is an inevitable presupposition If our thinking shall 
settle anything. To begin with denying intelligibility to 
the universe, would be to invalidate our conclusions pre- 
vious to entering upon study. Neither can we leave the 
question open ; for the study of experience assumes that 
the world which is presented to us in experience, may be 
understood and will give response to intelligent Inquiry. 
This presupposition Is also justified by experience. The 
predictions of Science, — e.g. of eclipses and comets by 
Astronomy, and of reactions by Chemistry, — the cer- 
tainty which attends our every-day activities, all advance 
in knowledge, and the great body of Indubitable facts 
which are in the possession of the race, all testify that the 
universe Is intelligible. The universe as a whole and 
persons, things, and events have meaning and value. 

We hold that both subject and object contribute to 
the knowledge of an object. We have also insisted that 
the reality of an object only comes to expression in the 



A CONSTRUCTIVE STUDY OF COGNITION 231 

subject-object relation. In illustration and enforcement 
of this last statement, attention was called to the fact 
that color, sound, taste, etc., are not, and cannot be, 
wholly objective. The color of the violet, the acid of the 
vinegar, the perfume of the rose, and the tone of the violin 
come to realization only when they are objects for a subject. 
It would seem, then, that when you see a flower, hear a 
bell, taste an orange, or feel cloth, you contribute some- 
thing to the perception. But this is not all. If knowledge 
be an indissoluble union of subjective and objective ele- 
ments, it follows that the subject contributes to knowledge. 
These facts make it necessary that we determine whether 
the subject's contribution to knowledge introduces an 
element which is foreign to the object. If it should in- 
troduce anything foreign, that foreign element would 
vitiate the report which knowledge gives of the object. 

We grant that the knowing activity of any finite indi- 
vidual is imperfect; our knowledge is certainly incom- 
plete, and much of it calls for correction. But the ques- 
tion before us concerns the knowing act as such, and not our 
finiteness and imperfection. The question is not. Does 
my imperfection, my finiteness, so affect my knowing as 
to render my knowledge of an object imperfect ^ This 
is the question. Is there in the knowing act as such that 
which introduces into the knowledge of an object what is 
foreign to the object 1 In answering this inquiry, we revert 
to our initial assumption : that the universe is intelligible. 
If the universe is intelligible (and, in consequence, the 
objects in the world-system), it must be because the modes 
in which objective reality reveals its nature are at one 
with the laws of the mind's functioning. If the mind should 
function after one order and objective reality should 
express its nature after another order, the world would 
not give intelligent response to the mind's inquiries. 



232 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

That the order of rational activity and modes of object- 
expression are at one, is really implicate in our funda- 
mental and inevitable assumption. And we repeat here 
the contention which we urged above : The experience of 
man at large shows that the assumption Is accordant with 
actuality. Since the mind functions after an order which 
is identical with that of the object's expression, the judg- 
ments of the mind respecting the object are one with the 
modes of the object. Mind does not contribute to knowl- 
edge any element which is foreign to the object. 

(3) We have insisted upon the distinct " otherness " 
of subject and object. Now, if the object be distinctly 
" other " than the subject, how can they come into the 
intimate relation indicated by the term " organic " ? 
We reply that they can, because the subject is the com- 
plementary " other " of the object, and the object is the 
complementary " other " of the subject. Instead of 
thrusting each other away or holding each other at a dis- 
tance, each is essential to the other. Experience is neces- 
sary to the development of the subject. The personality 
implicit in each of us at birth becomes explicit through 
experience, through commerce with objects, and only thus ; 
that is, we come to our own through intercourse with the 
objective world. On the other hand, the object needs 
the subject for the actualizing of its potential reality. The 
instrument is dumb if it be untouched by the musician ; 
and this is true of those objects which we call " natural." 
Their perfume, color, strength, potential usefulness, and 
beauty are for a subject; and their nature cannot find its 
complete expression apart from a subject. The object 
exists for the subject as the subject does not for the object. 
The object as such does not know the subject, but is known 
by the subject ; it does not relate itself to the subject, but 
is related by the subject. The object is not dependent 



A CONSTRUCTIVE STUDY OF COGNITION 233 

upon the individual subject for its being and nature ; 
it has a being that is its own. But the object finds its 
completion only as mind directs both the use of the object 
and its own activity in keeping with the activity of the 
ultimate reality, and thus in keeping with the fundamental 
order of the universe. The world of persons and things 
and events in which we find ourselves, is a universe of 
objective reals ; and the world we know and with which 
we have commerce, is this objective world of reality. 



DIVISION B : THE CATEGORIES AND 
REALITY; ONTOLOGY 

CHAPTER XXIV 

GENERAL VIEW OF THE CATEGORIES 

§ 99. Introductory. — You think of a house as occupy- 
ing space, of a train as arriving at a certain time, of a 
table as larger than a hat, of an orange as yellow, of 
velvet as soft and marble as hard, and of a fire or an ex- 
plosion as having a cause, of a man running as having 
a purpose in so doing. To make this more general, objects 
as thought of by you are set in space, they have quality 
and they exist in quantity; events are thought by you 
to be caused ; and in your conception of objects they are 
regarded as related to one another in position, order of 
occurrence, by comparison of quantity or value, or other- 
wise. That is, our thought of objects sets them in space 
and time ; it ascribes to them quality, quantity, motion, 
rest, cause, etc. ; and it relates them to one another. We 
also think of persons as having motives, as acting with 
purpose, and as seeking ends. 

Space, time, quantity, quality, relation, and purpose 
are obviously not things ; neither are they persons or 
events. They are modes according to which we think 
of things, events, and persons. We cannot form an image 
of space, time, or relation as such; but the notion of space 
is always present in our thought of sensible objects ; and 
the notion of time is present in our thought of changes 
or events. Similarly with respect to quality, quantity, 

234 



GENERAL VIEW OF THE CATEGORIES 235 

relation, change, permanence, cause, etc. ; we cannot 
image them by themselves. They are notions, or pure 
conceptions. To repeat what we have already said, these 
notions are present in our thought of what is existent. 

Since the unit of thought is a judgment, we may speak 
of these notions as general forms, or modes, of judgment. 
These conceptions, or general forms of judgments, are 
known as Categories ; and, for the present, we may de- 
scribe the Categories as modes in which Being is thought 
of, or modes in which reality is known. This may be ac- 
cepted as a provisional definition of them. Our purpose 
in the study of these elements of experience is to discover 
what information they may yield as to the nature of 
Reality. 

§ 100. Historical. — i. Aristotle recognized the fact 
that there are general modes in which men think of objects, 
and he introduced this conception and the term " cate- 
gory " into Western Philosophy. The Greek term used 
by him, from which we have the word " category," had 
been previously used to signify an accusation; but in his 
use of it, the word acquired a philosophical reference. 
Interpreters of Aristotle have differed as to the significance 
he attached to this concept. Is a category for him merely 
a general mode in which we think of objects t That is, 
Is it wholly of the thinker and, hence, purely subjective ? 
Did he regard the categories merely as modes of thought, 
modes to which the subject is shut up, and so leave it an 
open question as to whether Being is itself thus limited, 
or determined .^ We agree with those who hold that 
Aristotle conceived the categories (i) As general modes 
in which Being is limited, or determined, as an object of 
thought ; and (2) As general modes " in which Being may 
be expressed." With him, quantity, quality, relation, 
place, time, etc., are not merely forms which limit 



236 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

thought. They do not simply determine how the subject 
shall think ; they are also modes in which Being mani- 
fests itself. They are not merely subjective modes, 
but are also modes of objective reality. The Stoics, 
Plotinus, and Augustine utilized the conception of the 
category ; but for some time previous to Kant it had 
virtually dropped out of philosophical discussion. He 
restored it to reflective thought ; and part of the large 
and valuable inheritance which he bequeathed to students 
of Philosophy is his demonstration of the importance of 
this conception. This much must be granted, even 
though we are forced to conclude that his doctrine of the 
categories is defective. 

2. Kant. — To give a full account of Kant's doctrine 
of the categories would virtually require the presentation 
of the entire Kantian philosophy. So full a discussion, 
however, is not necessary since it is our purpose merely 
to relate his conception of the categories to reality. What 
is given in § 44, 2 and 3, and the partial statement which 
follows, will suffice. Kant held that the space and time 
elements of experience are forms which the sensibility 
gives to the material of knowledge which is furnished by 
the senses ; and the understanding contributes the quantity, 
quality, relation, and other non-sensational elements. The 
categories were conceived by him to be modes of the 
understanding, — i.e. forms of the conceiving or judging 
activity ; because he held that the understanding is the 
faculty of conception, and that the categories are general 
concepts. Consistent with this, he did not regard space 
and time as categories ; for he insisted that these elements 
of knowledge are contributed by " sense," and not by 
" thought." From this it appears that, according to 
Kant, space and time and the categories — relation, 
quality, quantity, cause, etc., — are simply forms of the 



GENERAL VIEW OF THE CATEGORIES 237 

mind's activity. In his system, these modes of experiences 
are related to the subject, and not to the real external 
world. He argued that our objective world, the world 
which we know, gets these forms from the mind ; that the 
mind gives spatial, temporal, quantitative, qualitative, 
and causal character to the unordered sense-data with 
which it deals. Hence we may not say that the world of 
reality is in space and time ; neither may we affirm quality, 
quantity, relation, or cause and effect of things in them- 
selves. In other words, space and time and the categories 
are modes of the phenomenal world or world of appearance, 
not of the noumenal world or world of reality. 

Kant's refusal to regard space and time as categories 
came of his sharp and overwrought distinction between 
" sense " and " thought." He himself recognizes that 
there is no spatial or temporal perception apart from the 
activity of the understanding; from this it follows that 
the space and time elements enter cognitive experience 
through the judging activity of the mind. He was not 
wholly consistent, then, in refusing to list space and time 
with the categories. It is also evident that he gave the 
categories an external, or merely mechanical, relation to 
the material of knowledge; for he has the material of 
knowledge ordered in keeping with these forms. The 
forms are imposed upon the material ; they are not an 
expression of the nature of the material itself. He limited 
the categories to the province of sense-experience. He 
could not do otherwise ; for the understanding, in his 
system, only deals with material which is furnished by the 
senses. As a consequence, Kant's doctrine of the cate- 
gories leaves them unrelated to the moral order and to 
judgments of value and purpose. Having limited cogni- 
tive experience to the phenomenal world, a world formally 
constituted by the mind out of sensuous material, he was 



238 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

obliged to assign the moral order and judgments of value 
and purpose to a realm beyond experience. His refusal 
to recognize space and time as categories, the extreme 
subjectivity of his conception of the categories, and their 
inapplicability (as conceived by him) to the moral order 
and to judgments of value and purpose, lead us to con- 
clude that his doctrine is inadequate. 

3. Hegel. — The doctrine of the categories has a 
central place in Hegel's philosophy. In his Logic, he 
undertakes to set forth their nature and the mode of their 
development. Our present interest in his system does 
not require that we make an extended statement of his 
doctrine of the categories ; we only seek at this point to 
emphasize his conception of their relation to reality. For 
Hegel, all-that-is is a " unitary world of thought and 
things " ; and the categories are principles that obtain in 
this unitary world. They are principles of thought and at 
the same time principles of things. With Kant, they are 
" forms imposed by thought on sense ; " with Hegel, they 
are expressions of reality, of both subjective and ob- 
jective reality. Hegel held that the relation of the cate- 
gories to the material and product of thought is organic, 
not external ; and he also argued that the categories are 
so related to one another that they form a perfect system. 
Unlike Kant, Hegel includes in the categories those forms 
of thought under which we experience Personality. As 
a consequence, the moral order and judgments of value 
and purpose are not assigned by him to a world beyond, 
and other than, the known world. This is a distinct ad- 
vance beyond the Kantian doctrine. 

§ loi. The Categories and Reality. — i. Kant was 
clearly right in teaching that the categories are subjective. 
You see a bird flying, lighting on a branch, and later taking 
wing again as a boy throws a stone at it. So far as mere 



GENERAL VIEW OF THE CATEGORIES 239 

sense is concerned, you have a series of visual impressions ; 
but you judge that you have seen three objects, each of 
which remained identical with itself while it or a part of it 
was changing place. You have combined the different 
impressions and have given unity and identity to certain 
of those impressions — the bird, the boy, the tree, and the 
stone; and you have distinguished motion and rest. 
Apart from rational activity, no instant of sense-impres- 
sion lives beyond itself, neither will any of the impressions 
remain after that instant. But motion and rest and 
identity involve a continuity ; that is, there is a con- 
tinuity in experience of identity and motion and rest. 
It is evident that mere sense-impressions cannot con- 
tribute this continuity ; for, as we have said, they are only 
for the instant of their being. It is the combining, or 
synthetic, activity of the mind that gives you the ex- 
perience of unity, identity, motion, and rest. This simple 
experience illustrates a number of categories ; of these 
we name a few — individuality (of the bird, the tree, the 
boy, the stone), rest, motion, change, permanence, space, 
time, cause, purpose (of the boy). Mere sense does not 
give your thought these forms ; they are modes of your 
activity as a rational being. These and other categories 
are fundamental forms in which we think of persons, 
things, and events. In other words, they are primary 
forms of subject activity, fundamental forms in which 
subject reality expresses itself. 

2. The Categories and Objective Reality. — According 
to the paragraph preceding this, the categories are ele- 
ments which the subject contributes to experience. Does 
our mind contribute to our knowledge of an object any 
element which is foreign to that object t Are the spatial, 
causal, relational, qualitative, and quantitative elements of 
our knowledge of objects foreign to the reality of the ob- 



240 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

jects ? Does my mind, in giving these forms to its thought 
of objects, impose upon the world of reality what is alien 
to reality ? Are space, time, relation, etc., only subjec- 
tively real ? We have considered this question in § 98, 2 
(2) ; and we there assigned reasons for concluding that 
the mind, in its cognition of objects, does not contribute 
what is foreign to objects. In the course of that discus- 
sion, we concluded that the modes in which objective 
reality expresses itself are at one with the laws of the mind's 
activity; our judgments respecting objects are identical 
with the modes of the objects. We may err, and it is 
certain that our knowledge is incomplete ; nevertheless 
the act of knowing as such does not give to knowledge 
content which is foreign to the object. In respect, then, 
of the object, the categories are fundamental forms of the 
object's expression to rational activity. From this it 
follows that the categories are not limits set to the attain- 
ment of knowledge, as Kant thought; they are, on the 
contrary, expressions of the nature of reality. 

3. The Categories of Themselves give Content to Thought. 
— We have spoken of the categories as forms or modes; 
but it must not be assumed that they are, therefore, with- 
out content in themselves. Kant conceived them to be 
mere forms ; and Hegel seems to have followed him in this 
misconception, for he regarded the categories as mere 
unities in our consciousness, having no content which is 
their own. They, on the contrary, contribute specific 
and important content to our thought of the world. In 
making this statement, we do not have in mind the mere 
concept — say quality, quantity, relation, or change — 
abstracted from experience ; we refer to the category as 
it comes into experience. The categories are forms of 
thought in which we connect and relate objects. Thus, 
a stone is thrown against a pane of glass, and the glass 



GENERAL VIEW OF THE CATEGORIES 241 

breaks. Here we have two Incidents ; but, to think of 
the former of the two as related causally to the latter is to 
add content to the thought of these occurrences, a con- 
tent not present in the incidents considered apart from 
this category. To think of one event as occurring " be- 
fore " or " after " another gives a content to thought 
which is not present in the thought of the events without 
this relating idea. There is specific content in that special 
form of the temporal notion. To relate objects is to 
think them together. The thought, or idea, which con- 
nects them has meaning in itself and so presents content 
to thought. The categories are forms of thought; but 
they are not themselves without content. The form itself 
has significance, and that significance is material for 
thought; it has in it content for knowing, valuing, and 
purposing activity. 

§102. Characteristics of the Categories. — i. They 
have an Inner and Principial Unity. — The inner struc- 
tural unity of the categories has been generally recog- 
nized ; and not a few of those who have given them special 
study, have sought to reduce all of them to one. But 
this undertaking has failed ; for thought, they are pri- 
mary laws or principles. Although all efforts to reduce 
them have failed, they give evidence that they are at 
core one; for no one of them can be rightly described 
without reference to, or implication of, others. In our 
further study, we shall discover that space involves posi- 
tion relation, and time involves relation of sequence ; that 
change implies permanence ; that motion involves space 
and activity; and that purpose involves individuality and 
activity. In short, " the course of reflective thinking 
permits and requires free movement from each one to 
every other " of the categories ; " but the path Is not 
equally direct between them all." We conclude, there- 



242 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

fore, that they are forms of a principle common to all of 
them. Since they are expressions of reality, that common 
principle must be in the nature of the ultimate and highest 
reality, the Ground Reality of the universe. 

2. Classification. — No complete list of the categories 
has been given. Aristotle named ten, Kant found twelve, 
Hegel listed one hundred and fifty. It is also difficult to 
effect a wholly satisfactory classification of them. 

§103. Conclusions. — The categories are non-sensa- 
tional elements of experience. They are the primary 
modes of our thought of objects — of things, events, and 
persons ; and they are also the fundamental modes of 
Being. In other words, they are the fundamental forms 
in which reality, both subjective and objective, expresses 
itself. Since they are the modes in which objects are re- 
lated, they proffer content for thought. They are har- 
monious forms of a common principle, and that principle 
has its being in the nature of the Ground Reality of the 
universe. Their harmony and structural unity indicate 
that they constitute a system, and that the activity of the 
Ground Reality is coherent, orderly, and systematizing. 
We will not attempt to classify the categories and will only 
discuss those which are most usually considered. 



CHAPTER XXV 

RELATIONS IN GENERAL 

§104. Characteristics of Relation. — The word "re- 
lation " is in frequent use, and we have no difficulty in 
recognizing its significance in every-day intercourse. In 
this study, however, we are not dealing with a word, but 
with an element of experience, an essential element of the 
experience of each of us ; and what we seek is a satisfac- 
tory conception of this experience. 

I. I have an experience which I express in the judgment, 
*' The chair is in the room." In this experience, " the 
chair " and " the room " are known in relation to each 
other. We have one fact of relation, and the relation 
itself has two terms — ^^ " the chair " and " the room." 
You say, " The son is taller than the father." Your 
thought relates " the son " and " the father," and the one 
relation has two terms. It is obvious that a relation is 
necessarily of more than one term. Further, " the chair " 
is related to " the room " as content ; and, in relation to 
" the chair," " the room " is that which contains. This 
single space relation has two aspects — the space which 
contains and that which is contained. In " The son is 
taller than the father," we have a number of relations — 
the parental, the filial, quantitative, etc. ; and it is evident 
that each of these has two aspects. The parental involves 
the filial ; and the filial involves the parental. In the 
quantitative relation, " taller " involves " shorter " as 
its correlative. We may state the characteristic of re- 

243 



244 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

latlon to which we have here called attention thus : A 
relation has two terms and duality of aspect. 

2. Referring again to the illustrations given above, it 
will be seen that " the chair " qualifies our thought of 
" the room," and " the room " qualifies our thought of 
" the chair." So also in the instance of " the son " and 
" the father." Each object in these related pairs contrib- 
utes something to our thought of the other. When we re- 
late objects, the relating contributes content to our knowl- 
edge of the objects; we know something respecting them 
which we would not know if we apprehended them apart 
from each other. To think of " the son " by himself in 
respect of height, would not give the experience of " taller," 
which is had when " the son " and " the father " are con- 
joined in relating thought. We may state this charac- 
teristic of relation thus : Each of two related objects 
contributes content to our knowledge of the other; and 
that content is mediated by the relating idea. 

3. From what precedes it is evident that we relate ob- 
jects by thinking them in connection with each other. 
The relation is not itself an object of sense-experience; 
it comes into experience through our thought of the ob- 
jects when we take them in connection with each other. 
We perceive the two persons ; we think the relation of 
parent and child. We perceive each as having height ; 
we think the relative measurements. We perceive the 
chair and the room ; we think the " withinness " and 
" aboutness." The perception contributes sensational 
elements to experience ; the relating introduces an idea- 
tional element. We may state this fact thus : Relation 
is an ideational, not a sensational, element of experience. 

§ 105. All Thought is mediated by Relation. — Relation 
is essential to thought; there is not, there cannot be, 
any thought in which relation is not present. To think 



RELATIONS IN GENERAL 245: 

is to relate. The unit of thought is a judgment; and a 
judgment, in its simplest form, is a thought in which an 
object and a characteristic or determination of the object 
are related to each other. For example, " The book is 
new." This thought relates " the book " and " newness." 
Again, in the judgment, " The boat carried many passen- 
gers," " the boat " is related to " passengers." It is 
obvious that relation is an essential element of thought. 
" Relation is the mother of the categories " — a common- 
place of Philosophy — is justified, because all thought has 
its origin in the relating activity of the mind. As a con- 
sequence, all other modes must come of this same relating 
activity. Some have even thought to reduce all categories 
to this one. But it is one thing to recognize that other 
categories — e.g. space and time — , are forms of relation ; 
it is quite another thing to identify them with relation. 
Relation is indeed the mother ; but the children are them- 
selves, and each of them has its own place and function 
in thought. We cannot afford to ignore the irreducible 
differences which distinguish the categories, nor the shad- 
ing of thought which is present in the other categories 
(change, quantity, quality, identity, etc.), but is not dis- 
tinctly expressed in relation, as relation. 

§ 106. Relation and Reality. — We have discovered 
that relation is an ideational element of experience ; and 
this would seem, at first sight, to make it purely subjective. 
But we have also insisted that the categories are expres- 
sions of the nature of objective reality; and, if this be 
true, relation must be objectively real. The intelligibility 
of the universe involves the objectivity of relation. Phi- 
losophy, science, and inter-subjective intercourse proceed 
upon the assumption that the world and its particulars — 
things, persons, and events — are intelligible. We cannot 
avoid this assumption — that objects have meaning and 



246 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

that we can, to some extent, discover their meaning. 
What is it that gives meaning to an object — say a house, 
an apple, or an occurrence ? A building which we know 
as a " house " has meaning, first, because the different 
parts of it are so related to each other that they express an 
idea, the idea which we symbolize by the word " house." 
And second, it has meaning for life, because it is related 
to the world system and thus to us. An event is intelli- 
gible, it has significance for us, because its particulars are 
related to the whole of it and so give it meaning ; and also 
because the event as a whole is related to the system in 
which we are. The relation of an event and its partic- 
ulars to the course of events gives it significance for life. 
To make it general, an object is intelligible (i) Because its 
particulars are related in idea, and their relation to one 
another and to the whole constitutes the object a system, 
though it be but a limited system; and it is intelligible 
(2) Because it is itself a particular in the world system and 
is thus related to us. In a word, the universe of persons, 
things, and events is intelligible, because its particulars are 
related to one another and to the whole. To assume that 
we give to the world the relations, and hence the intelli- 
gibility, which we find there, and to assume therewith that 
the world of reality is possibly unrelated, is to go back to 
the Kantian Phenomenalism ; and this we have found 
reason to reject. In fact, Kant actually related his un- 
known world of reality to us ; for he held that it is the 
cause of sensible experience, that it sets the boundaries 
of knowledge, and that it is the world of the unities of 
reason and reality. In holding thus, he related that world 
specifically to us, and he conceived it as a unit of related 
parts. Relation is real objectively; and, in knowing, we 
think relations which are objectively real. 

§ 107. Is Relation External or Internal to the Related 



RELATIONS IN GENERAL 247 

Objects ? — The question of the externality or internality 

of relations has acquired special importance of late by 

reason of the discussions which New Realism has insti- 
gated. 

1. The facts seem at first glance to favor the view that 
relations are external. Suppose we take, as examples, in- 
stances of relation to be found in the page of a book. The 
page number, the page title, and the text are related. 
They certainly appear to common-sense to be independent 
of the relations which they sustain to each other. At 
first thought It seems obvious that the page number is 
itself, whether it be related to this text or not. Would it 
not be in another book just what it is in this book ^ So 
also as to the page title. If It were at the head of some 
other page in this book, or if It were by itself and not at 
the head of a page, would it not be just what it is here I 
Some students of Philosophy would answer these questions 
in the affirmative. They insist that the number, the 
title, and the text, if unrelated, would not be different 
from what they are as related. If related objects are in- 
dependent of the relation, it follows that relation is exter- 
nal to the objects related. This illustration would seem 
to close the Inquiry. But the case is not so simple as the 
doctrine of externality would Imply ; for some facts which 
should be considered, have been overlooked. 

2. An Instance of relation is a case of Many In One. 
For example, " The chair Is In the room." In judging 
thus, we do not think " chair " and " room " and " with- 
inness," and then adjoin them. We perceive a whole, 
the-chair-in-the-room ; and In this unitary whole, we 
distinguish " the chair," " the room," and the relation 
expressed by the word " In." In judging, we apprehend 
a whole; and in this whole, we distinguish the subject 
and predicate and their relation to each other. In " the 



248 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

book is new," we perceive the unitary whole, the-new- 
book ; and thought analyzes this unit and expresses in the 
judgment, both the unitary thought and that thought 
analyzed. An instance of relation is a unitary whole in 
which thought discovers related objects and a relating 
idea. A judgment — hence also a case of relation — is 
not a mere conjunction of ideas ; it is one idea in which 
analyzing thought finds ideas synthesized. It is a case of 
Many existing in One, and not a case of One constituted 
by the adjoining of Many. The One is for it the ground 
of the Many ; for a unit is " an original one, not a total." 

Those who insist that relation is external, misconceive 
the nature of that with which they are dealing. They re- 
gard an instance of relation as constituted by the adjunc- 
tion of independent particulars. Take the instance of 
" the chair in the room." According to this teaching, 
we have " the chair," " the room," and the relation, all 
of them independent of, and external to, one another. 
The result is a mere adjunction of these particulars ; 
and, inasmuch as the relation (of " withinness ") is some- 
how related to both the objects and is also external to them, 
it really separates them. A relation is a unitary thought ; 
and a collection of independent ideas would not be a unit 
idea. The mere adjunction of particular ideas cannot 
constitute a unitary whole; and the relating of objects 
does constitute a unitary whole. Hence, the relating of 
objects is not the linking in thought of independent par- 
ticulars through that which is external to what is related. 
Relation, subjectively regarded, is not external. 

3. In the instance of " the chair in the room," the rela- 
tion of " withinness," objectively regarded, is dependent 
for its being upon these objects thus related. We may 
have an abstract relational idea apart from objects. We 
may, for example, have the notion of " withinness " when 



RELATIONS IN GENERAL 249 

no objects are in presentation. But in such case, we have 
merely a notion of relation, not an actual relation ; and 
Philosophy is safe only when it keeps in touch with the 
concrete. There is no real relation apart from experience 
of related reals. Thus, the relation which we express by 
the word " greater," is not objectively real except when 
objective reals are related in respect of quantity ; but 
when such reals are so related, it is objectively real. When 
you conclude that " the book is new," you relate " the 
book " to your standard of " newness," this standard 
being for you an objective real. Relation, then, as an 
objective fact is dependent upon related objects ; it has 
no being apart from them. Beside this, relation derives 
its specific character in each instance from the nature of 
the related objects. Since relation has its being in, and 
derives its character from, the nature of the objects re- 
lated, it must be internal to them. 

What has just been said holds for relation as an objective 
fact. An analogous conclusion follows from a study of 
relation as a subjective fact. " The room " is a room in 
which " that chair " is ; and " the chair " is a chair which 
is in " that room." It is obvious that the relation of 
" withinness " has its being in, and derives its character 
from, the significance of each of these objects for the other ; 
" the chair " is content for " the room," and " the room " 
is space for " the chair." A relation has its subjective 
origin in the subject's apprehension that one of two per- 
ceived objects gives some meaning to the other, when they 
are thought together. It derives its being and character 
from the subject's conception of the meaning of each of 
the objects for the other. It is, therefore, internal to the 
objects as apprehended by the subject. 

§ 108. Does the Relating of Objects modify them.? — 
We have called attention to the fact that objects are modi- 



2SO INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

fied by their relations. This has, however, been denied ; 
and the question has acquired such importance of late 
that we think it well to give it fuller consideration. 

I. Are the page number, the page title, and the text 
of a page modified in their being related .? We have said 
that they seem to be independent of the relations in which 
they are found ; but, if objects are modified by their re- 
lations, they would not be the same if they were in some 
other book or were apart and by themselves as individual 
objects. What are the facts in the case 1 In this relation, 
the page number is an ordinal and signifies the place this 
page would have in the make-up of the book. Unrelated, 
it is a certain term in our series of cardinal numbers ; 
it would not imply pages or any other collection of objects. 
The page title by itself would express an idea ; here it sig- 
nifies that this idea is discussed in the text. In this re- 
lation, the text is not merely a number of connected state- 
ments ; it is an elucidation of the idea expressed in the 
page title. The page as a whole is a unit; and this uni- 
tary character cannot be accounted for if we regard it as 
made up of conjoined particulars. If we aggregate the 
significance of the particulars, the " oneness " of the page, 
i.e. its unitary quality, will still be lacking; and the 
" oneness " is essential to it as a page. This " oneness " 
qualifies the whole and thus modifies all the particulars 
of the whole. The significance of every particular is in 
some respect dependent upon the significance of the page 
as a unit. A change in relations does effect a change in 
the significance of the related terms. We recognize this 
in life. In interpreting documents and the utterances 
of public men, we take into consideration the relations in 
which the documents were drawn up and the words spoken. 
What we have said respecting the modifying of objects 
by relations, holds true even of spatial relations. Whether 



RELATIONS IN GENERAL 251 

a man lives on the east or west side of the street, would 
probably make no difference as to his character or pe- 
culiarities of speech ; but it would qualify him in respect 
of his place of residence. Objects are modified by their 
relations. 

2. The view set forth above is further sustained when 
we consider chemical and organic changes. The action 
and meaning of chlorine and sodium are both changed 
by their coming into such relation as to produce common 
salt; and the same is true of hydrogen and oxygen when 
they are so related as to form water. The modifications 
to which the constituents of plants and animals are sub- 
jected when they enter into organisms, are myriad. 

3. A question. How is it possible that a change in the 
relations of objects should be accompanied by a change 
in the objects ^ The following answer suggests itself. 
If the world is a system, — and it must be a system 
if it be intelligible, — any change in one or more ob- 
jects would be accompanied by an adjusting change in 
others. This would be necessary that the harmony 
of the system might be preserved. We find this to 
be true in systems established by us — as in a machine 
or a system of classification ; any change in one particu- 
lar forces change in other particulars. Those who have 
undertaken to elaborate systems of thought, have often 
found it necessary to effect such readjustments. Again, 
objects express their nature in relation, and only in relation. 
It follows, then, that a change in relation involves another 
expression of the meaning of an object. From this it would 
appear that an object is not fully known if it be known in 
only one relation ; and this we find to be true. The mean- 
ing of an object is only adequately known when we study it 
in many relations. In every new relation, it gives a report 
of itself which is not given in other relations. 



252 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

§ 109. The Ground of Relation. — Relation is an ex- 
pression, first, of the cohering and orderly activity of 
object reality. The cohering orderly activity of reality 
constitutes all its particulars in relation ; it cannot do 
otherwise. In other words, reality, by reason of its sys- 
tematizing activity, presents to the subject a world which 
is intelligible. Relation is an expression, second, of the 
rational activity of subject reality. The rational activity 
of subject reality expresses itself in an effort to understand 
the meaning of persons, things, and events. Subject and 
object reality are organically related ; for they are of the 
one world system. Object reality is the complementary 
" other " of subject reality, and the relating activity of the 
one is complementary to the relating activity of the other. 
(§ 98, 2 (3)). Relation, then, is grounded in the Ultimate, 
or Absolute, Reality which is the ground of the being and 
activity of all subjects and objects. 

§110. Conclusions. — Every case of relation is an 
instance of Many in One. We can recognize the Many in 
One ; but we cannot construct the One out of the Many ; 
for, if we should conjoin the Many, the " oneness," that 
which makes the related terms a One, would still be want- 
ing. Each of a number of related objects gives signifi- 
cance to all the objects with which it is related. There is 
no relational experience apart from experience of objects ; 
nevertheless, relation is an ideational element, and not a 
sensational element, of experience. Although relation is 
ideational and is, therefore, a subjective real, it is none the 
less objectively real. It comes into experience through 
the interpreting activity of the subject; and, in this in- 
terpreting activity, the mind reports what is real objec- 
tively. Relation is obviously internal to the unit which 
the relating thought apprehends. Certain facts go to show 
that it is internal to the related objects, (i) The objects 



RELATIONS IN GENERAL 253 

of a relation are not merely adjoined. Thought does not 
constitute a relational unit out of unrelated particulars ; 
it perceives the particulars in the relational unit. (2) Re- 
lation, objectively regarded, is itself an expression of the 
nature of the related objects and is, therefore, dependent 
upon them for its being and character. As it effects an 
expression of the nature of objects, it must be internal to 
them. (3) Different relatings effect different expressions 
of the nature of an object. This would indicate that re- 
lations are internal. The changes in the modifications of 
objects which accompany changes of relation, result from 
the new adjustments in the world system which neces- 
sarily follow when a particular of the system is subjected 
to change. Relation is grounded in the systematizing 
activity of the Ultimate Reality, the ground of being and 
activity. 



CHAPTER XXVI 

PERMANENCE AND CHANGE 

§ III. Introductory. — I insist that this dog-eared dis- 
colored book is the same with the beautiful book which 
I purchased some years since. That garden all aglow with 
bright flowers is, you say, the same plot of ground and 
collection of plants that gave no show of leaf or flower last 
January. That dilapidated old house in the alley is iden- 
tical with the attractive mansion that stood fifty years 
ago well back in spacious grounds. In giving expression 
to our experiences with these objects, we affirm both change 
and permanence of the same things ; and this is true of all 
persons and things with whom we have to do. It is also 
paralleled in our consciousness of self. Consciousness is in 
constant change ; and we are each of us certain that these 
changes are changes in an identical self. Our experience 
of self and the world is experience of change and perma- 
nence. 

§112. Historical. — The earliest Philosophers recog- 
nized the seeming stability and changefulness of the world ; 
and this led them to assume that the world-stuff is a sub- 
stance which readily changes its form (§ ii, i). But per- 
manence and change appear to be mutually exclusive; 
how can anything change and still be the same ^ The 
Eleatics felt this antithesis, and they undertook to solve 
this apparent contradiction in experience by denying the 
reality of change. They argued that change is incompre- 
hensible and, therefore, impossible ; and they insisted 
that our experience is an illusion. Heracleitus opposed the 

254 



PERMANENCE AND CHANGE 255 

doctrine of the Eleatics and taught that all is subject to 
change, except reason (which he regarded as the order of 
the world). The Sophists took an extreme opposing 
position ; they declared that we have naught but change. 
Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists held that all 
is changeable except the elements, and these are subject 
to change of place. Few, if any, moderns have openly 
accepted the view of the Eleatics ; but many thinkers 
have unconsciously regarded the world as static. It is 
easy for uncritical thought to conceive the world thus. 
Many of the changes in nature are so slow as to escape our 
attention, and much of the world seems to have a fixed 
form. Reflective thought is also liable at times to adopt 
this conception of the world ; it is specially liable to treat 
an object of study as static. Whatever we study must be 
held steadily in attention. Hence in our study of the 
world or some phase of experience, we tend to fix the world 
or halt the experience while we examine it. Change is, 
however, generally accepted as a fact; whatever doubt 
is raised, is as to the actuality of permanence. 

§ 113. Is Permanence Actual ? — As against the reality 
of permanence, it is said that we never have experience of 
an unchanging content. That is true ; but it is also true 
that we never have experience of mere change. Experi- 
ence of change is always of change of what persists. In 
our consciousness of self, we are not simply conscious of 
change or of changing states ; we are conscious of an 
identical self in changing states, i.e. of self as the persist- 
ing subject of changing states. We have experience of 
change through relating the experience of some moment 
with that of some preceding moment. For apprehension 
of change, there must be two related terms which have 
something in common. There must be something com- 
mon to this house in ruins and the beautiful mansion 



256 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

that once stood here, if we may truly say of the ruins, 
" These ruins are that mansion." That somewhat which 
is common to them has persisted through the changes ; it 
is a permanent. There must be some permanent that 
abides through all stages of change, somewhat that identi- 
fies the present object with that with which it is compared ; 
or we would not be justified in saying, " This is that." 
If there were no permanent, we would not have a case of 
change, it would be an instance of different objects. In 
addition to this, we know that the difference in two mo- 
ments of consciousness has more in it than can be expressed 
by " then " and " now " ; there is a difference of make-up. 
But despite this difference of make-up, or content, there is 
something common to the make-up' of those moments, 
common to all moments of our experience. According to 
Hume, experience consists of discrete momentary impres- 
sions ; in his Philosophy there was no persistent self, 
and our successive judgments were not in any way linked 
in consciousness. He felt the need of some principle 
which would " unite our successive judgments in our . . . 
consciousness " ; and he acknowledged that his system 
was defective for want of it. In other words, Hume saw 
that an adequate construction of experience requires the 
recognition of permanence as actual. There can be no 
change except in what persists. The reality of change 
involves the reality of permanence. 

§114. Change, Permanence, and Reality. — Reality 
is active Being. Since it is in the nature of reality to be 
active, what is real will be in constant change. Changing 
relations and consequent adjustment constitute the his- 
tory of reality. We become aware of change in objects by 
comparing different stages in their history. These stages 
are in fact different moments in a continuous process ; they 
are stages in an unbroken change, stages which our in- 



PERMANENCE AND CHANGE 257 

terest leads us to select for comparison. These stages 
are different expressions of the essential nature of the one 
individual real. The new book which I bought some years 
ago, has passed through changing relations ; and these 
relations have — according to the teaching of the pre- 
ceding chapter — conditioned, and therefore modified, 
the expression of its reality. It now appears old and 
worn. The barren garden of the winter and the resplen- 
dent garden of the season of flowers are the same garden 
in different relations, with continuously changing rela- 
tions and consequent readjustments between these two 
stages. It is the same real in different stages of its 
history. 

The essential nature of any reality is necessarily un- 
changing; and its essential nature will, of course, deter- 
mine the law of its changes. For example, we have the 
law of gravitation in material reality. This is the law, or 
general order, of change in objects in respect of mass and 
distance. What the change shall be in any particular 
case, depends upon this law and the relations in that case. 
The difference in any two or more instances arises from 
the difference in the relations. The law of change in 
matter, in respect of mass and distance, is not subject to 
change. This law is an expression of the essential nature of 
material reality. Permanence and change are both of 
them expressions of the nature of reality. 

§115. Conclusions. — Experience has its subjective 
origin and being in change which occurs in subject reality. 
The continuity of experience comes of continuity of sub- 
jective change. We do not have experience of mere 
change, but of change of some real which persists through 
all stages of change. If there were nothing permanent, 
there could be no change. In such case, what we take 
to be change in any object, would be the presentation of a 
s 



258 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

series of objects. Such a series, however, could not be 
known ; for cognition of the series would require that there 
be an identical subject experiencing the terms of the series. 
That is, there must be a permanent subject. The essen- 
tial nature of any real and its law of change are unchange- 
able. Permanence is grounded in the unchangeableness of 
what is essential to reality. Change is grounded in the 
nature of reality as active. 



CHAPTER XXVII 

INDIVIDUALITY 

We can only give a partial treatment of Individuality 
at this stage of our study, because this category finds its 
completion in Personality and we are not yet prepared to 
take up the consideration of Personality. The establish- 
ment of certain facts respecting individuality will, how- 
ever, be of great assistance in our study of categories whose 
consideration we are now ready to undertake; and we 
think it best to avail ourselves of such assistance. Per- 
sonality will be taken up later, and we will then complete 
what is begun in this chapter. 

§ ii6. An Individual Object. — i. Our experience comes 
of intercourse with individual objects — things, persons, 
and events. Thus far in this Introduction, we have spoken 
of objects when thought of singly as particulars, particular 
objects, or individual objects. We have refrained from 
calling them " individuals," because custom has reserved 
the term " individual " for use when speaking of persons. 
If it were not for this limitation set by custom, " individ- 
ual " would signify any single object, whether it were a 
person or a thing or a happening. We shall freely use the 
term " individuum " and its plural " individua " when 
speaking in a general way of individual objects of any kind 
whatever. 

2. When you perceive an object, — say a dog, — you 
perceive various parts, having various qualities and sus- 
taining various relations. That is not all you apprehend ; 
but you do apprehend those many parts, qualities, and 

259 



26o INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

relations. What you perceive is not primarily the diversi- 
fied Many; you apprehend the Many as One. Your 
individual object, the dog, is a complex unit. Further, 
the dog is not perceived by itself, as though it were all that 
is ; it is perceived in a surrounding, or context, and as 
distinguished from that context. An individuum may, 
therefore, be described as a unitary complex, conceived as 
distinct from all else that is. The relatively independent 
oneness of the individuum is what we mean by individ- 
uality. Every object of thought is an individuum. 
Hence individuality is a fundamental form of cog- 
nition. 

§ 117. Individuality as determined by the Subject. — 
A college may be, and often is, an individual object for 
thought and speech. So, too, may any particular ele- 
ment or combination of elements of collegiate being or 
activity — e.g. the faculty, a student, or an examination 
— be treated by thought as an individuum. Whatever 
is thus regarded is, for the time, conceived as having a 
distinct, if not an independent, being. This book is an 
individuum; so likewise is any leaf or page or smaller 
portion to which I may give attention. This last gives 
us the key to the subject's relation to the object, as an 
individuum. It is found in the expression, " to which I 
may give attention." We give attention to that which 
serves the interest of the moment. Our object is a selected 
portion of all that is present. For the surgeon, it may be 
the arm or the hand or some part of a finger. The army 
as a whole may be the object of thought of the general 
in command or of the historian ; or it may be a small de- 
tached force. Whatever acts as a unit from the subject's 
point of view, whatever thus satisfies his interest and 
serves his purpose, is for him an individuum. In a very 
true sense, the subject determines what shall be his in- 



INDIVIDUALITY 261 

dividual objects; he gives this form to objects. The 
fact that categories have a subjective origin would lead 
us to expect just this. 

§ 118. Individuality as determined by the Object. — 
I. From the common-sense point of view, that is an in- 
dividuum which stands apart by itself and has an appar- 
ently independent existence. If the Plain Man were asked 
to designate an individual object, he would probably 
choose something which stands out obviously separate 
from other things — e.g. a horse, a tree, or a stone. This 
agrees with what we found to be one characteristic of the 
subject's determination of an individuum ; the subject 
separates the individual object in his thought from its 
surroundings, or context. So regarded, an individuum is 
an object conceived as distinct from other objects and as 
having a relative independence ; and the more marked 
its independence, the greater the degree of individuality 
which we ascribe to it. We deem that man most distinctly 
individual, who is least determined by his social environ- 
ment. His apparent independence of his time and as- 
sociations is accounted by us a mark of individuality. 
The arm has a lower degree of individuality than the body, 
because it subsists in the body and has, therefore, rela- 
tively less independence. Thus we find ourselves assign- 
ing degrees of individuality to objects ; and the measure of 
their apparent independence or self-subsistence is for us 
the measure of their individuality. From this point of 
view, inorganic objects have a low degree of individuality ; 
and individuality increases as we pass upward through 
plant and animal life to man, in whom we find the highest 
finite individuality. Of course, nothing finite is wholly 
self-subsistent ; for whatever is finite is a part of a system 
and is dependent upon the system. The perfect individual 
would be self-subsistent; and the all-inclusive system 



262 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

would be the expression of the activity of the perfect in- 
dividual reality. 

2. Organic objects are constituted of parts which are 
perceptibly different in structure and which serve differ- 
ent ends. The root, trunk, branch, leaf, and flower of an 
apple tree differ in structure and functions. This is not- 
ably true of parts of the human body — as the eyes, ears, 
and arms. Each has a form which is its own, and it 
fulfils an office in relation to the body, which no other can 
fill. The leaf or flower of an apple tree cannot be replaced 
by anything else. Neither of the arms or hands of a body 
is identically what the other is, in respect of structure or 
functional relation. This distinctness of structure and 
function in parts of a highly complex organism gives a 
high degree of individuality to such parts. The quality 
of irreplaceableness has its fullest exemplification in the 
self-conscious individuum. No other person's conscious- 
ness can replace yours. The consciousness of each of us 
is unique. Uniqueness is a characteristic of individuality. 

§ 119. Conclusions. — An individuum is Many in One; 
the Many so cohere as to embody one idea. It is com- 
prehensive, including many; it is coherent, the Many 
functioning as One. As determined by the subject, i.e. 
as a mode of rational activity, it is a selected portion of 
what is objective, the selection being determined by the 
subject's purpose. The individuum, in relation to the 
subject, is an expression of the activity of the subject 
reality. Individuality is also a mode of object reality. 
Here we find degrees of individuality, the measure of it 
being determined by the object's approximation to 
self-subsistence and uniqueness. Self-subsistence and 
uniqueness are marks of objective individuality. Self- 
consciousness is individual, being unique. The perfect 
individuum would be the wholly self-subsistent, self- 
conscious individual. 



CHAPTER XXVIII 

SUBSTANTIALITY 

§ 120. Origin of this Category. — i. We have experi- 
ence of permanence in change. The clematis which you 
planted by the arbor, was a small slip ; and it had no 
flower bud on it. Now it covers the arbor and is itself 
covered with flowers. A few months since, it was bare 
of leaf ; now it is clothed with foliage. Year by year there 
have come to it seasons of barrenness and seasons in which 
it beautified the arbor with its foliage and flowers. You 
declare it to be the same plant through all these changes. 
A framed canvas was found in the garret. The head 
of the house recalled having taken something of the kind 
some years before as security for a loan, and that it was 
said to be a painting of merit; but when found it was 
impossible for the eye to trace a painting. In the hands of 
an expert restorer, it proved to be a marine view which 
had been done by a master. It was the same painting 
through all the changes. The persons and things whose 
history, or a part of whose history, is known to us, are in 
constant change; but they are, nevertheless, identical 
with themselves all through their history. We recognize 
them as the same; and we can only do this, if in every 
stage of our acquaintance with them, there is that in them 
which was in them in all our previous experience of them. 
We recognize a house as our former home, because there 
is that in it which gives us ground for assigning to it ex- 
periences of home life which we once had. It has greatly 
changed ; but there is that in it which was in it years 

263 



264 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

before. All experience of change involves the notion of 
a permanent persisting through change. This fact is so 
obvious that Heracleitus, " the philosopher of flux," rec- 
ognized an underlying principle of permanence. We have 
experience of self persisting through change. In every 
present experience of ours, there is that which was in all 
our past experience. We can each of us say, " I am the 
self that had certain experiences last vacation." The 
subject of those past experiences and the subject of the 
present experience are the same. Much of our experience 
at the present is very different from what it was then; 
but those experiences and this are experiences of the one 
self-conscious self who has persisted through all the inter- 
vening changes. We think of that which preserves its 
identity through changes, as being substantial. Experi- 
ence of permanence in change gives rise to the notion of 
substantiality. 

2. You would bend a stick ; but, in seeking to do this, 
you find that you are resisted. So also when you under- 
take to break a stick or a nut, these objects resist the 
change and evince persistence in retaining shape and indi- 
vidual wholeness. A child runs against a chair, but the 
chair does not move ; you strike your hand against the wall, 
but the wall persists in position. The notable fact for us 
here is that these objects persist in retaining position against 
our efforts to move them. The common thought connects 
such experiences of persistence with the substantiality 
of the object; and this is evidenced by the fact that the 
substantiality of an object is determined for us by the 
persistence with which it resists changeful tendencies. 
That is accounted a substantial machine or building which 
will present a large measure of resistance to incidents which 
would radically change its structure. That is a substan- 
tial man who will maintain his integrity — literally, his 



SUBSTANTIALITY 265 

wholeness — despite a strongly adverse environment. 
We likewise think of that which acts upon us as sub- 
stantial. The stone which falls upon the foot and the 
branch which strikes our face in its rebound, are thought 
of as substantial. We account either of these more sub- 
stantial than a handful of loose feathers ; they act with 
greater force. The notion of substantiality arises in 
our experience of a permanent in changing objects, also 
in our experience of the opposing activity of objects, as 
they effect change in us or resist activity which would 
effect change in them. 

3. This category is present in our thought of events; 
and it is the purpose of this study to discover its relation 
to reality. It is usually known as substance. But the 
term substance is closely associated in common thought, 
and in certain schools of Philosophy, with the concep- 
tion of an unchanging and unknowable substrate of states 
and qualities ; and this is a misconception and must 
be given up. We prefer a term for this category which 
is free from such association, if it may be had. Beside this 
the word substance has to most minds an implication of 
thinghood ; and we think it well to avoid such an impli- 
cation. We will designate the category by the term sub- 
stantiality. It does not suggest substrate, neither does 
it imply thinghood ; and the form of the word is congruous 
with the non-sensational character of the category. Sub- 
stance is that element in our conception of an object which 
leads us to think of the object as having substantiality. 
Substance is for us the objective ground of substanti- 
ality. 

§ 121. Historical. — The element of experience which 
we are now considering, has been diversely conceived by 
leaders in philosophic thought. " Substance " is the 
word generally used to designate the objective reality 



266 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

of that to which it is related. In reading Philosophy, 
one meets this term, or its equivalent, in the writings of 
almost every school and philosopher ; but the significance 
of the term, the reality which it is intended to symbolize, 
varies somewhat with the age and the school. In view 
of the importance attached to this notion and because of 
the diverse conceptions of the nature of the objective 
reality to which it is applied, we give a sketch of its his- 
tory. This historical study will make it evident that 
despite the diversity of views respecting substance, there 
are important particulars in which most philosophers have 
virtually agreed in their conception of it. 

I. Previous to Aristotle. — The earliest Greek philos- 
ophers questioned as to what the world is made of. One 
suggested that the world-stuff is water, another took it to 
be air, and yet another took it to be the Unlimited or 
Undetermined. All of them regarded it as a single change- 
ful substance. The Eleatics, the later lonians, and the 
Atomists difi"ered respecting the nature and kinds of the 
world-stuff. They queried as to whether the world- 
substance is static or changeable, and whether this sub- 
stance is one kind or many kinds. The Pre-Socratic 
thinkers do not designate the world-stuff by a term which 
is the exact equivalent of the word " substance." The 
word which they used means elementary principle, or first 
cause, rather than substance ; but the idea of substance was 
involved in their conception of the relation of this prin- 
ciple to the world. Whatever exists is, for them, some 
form of this principle or, for those who are Pluralists, 
some combination of the many principles. Plato's 
" ideas " had a place in his philosophy analogous to that 
of the " elementary principles " in the philosophy of 
those who preceded him. The " principles " of the Pre- 
Socratics and the " ideas " of Plato were conceived to be 



SUBSTANTIALITY 267 

permanent existents, which are the ground or cause of 
objects. 

2. Aristotle. — Aristotle was the first teacher who gave 
definition to this notion. The word which he uses when 
speaking of substance, is one whose root relates it to 
" being," and consequently to " essence." His doctrine 
accords with this fact. He recognizes two substances : 
a first and a second. A concrete individual is a first sub- 
stance ; e.g. " Socrates," in the judgment, " Socrates is 
a man." A general concrete {i.e. the universal in a class 
of concrete individua) is a second substance ; e.g. " man," 
in the judgment, " Man is mortal." Substance in the 
secondary sense is that which is common and essential to 
all the members of a class or genus. In a first substance, 
he distinguishes two elements : a substrate, Matter, 
which is of itself undetermined ; and a principle. Form, 
by which the substrate is determined and comes to be 
an object. With Aristotle, the matter of a rose-bush has 
of itself no defined characteristics ; but, in its union with 
the rose-bush Form, the characteristics of a rose-bush are 
developed. The rose-bush is potential in Matter; the 
rose-bush in the garden is this potentiality made actual 
by means of the Form. For him, the individual rose- 
bush Is a substance; and Its substantiality is in Its 
essential nature when thus actualized. The concept 
" rose-bush " was, In his view, a substance in a secondary 
sense ; and he so accounted it, because It Is the ideational 
expression of the essential nature of all rose-bushes. 

Aristotle speaks of qualities as " accidents," since they 
only exist In and with objects. Thus, the existence of 
" rotundity " is dependent upon the existence of some 
individual object, or some substance which is rotund. 
So with " sonority," " sweetness," and all other qualities. 
An existent quality is an accident of some substance* 



268 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

Some qualities of an object may be non-essential ; for 
instance, a particular tulip or man may have qualities 
which are not essential to the being of a man or a tulip. 
Non-essential qualities are not included in substance as 
conceived by Aristotle ; they are not regarded by him as 
of the substance of the object. He recognized also that 
some of the accidents of an individual object, or substance, 
are essential ; and he included essential accidents in his 
conception of substance. According to Aristotle, an 
object is a substance ; so also is a concreted universal ; 
and the substantiality of an object is in its actualized 
essence and is expressed in its essential qualities. 

3. Neo-Platonists and Scholastics. — With the Neo- 
Platonists, a substance is a concrete individuum, and 
substance is actual being. Their technical term for sub- 
stance is a word which is derived from a verb that means 
to stand under; it is the exact Greek equivalent of the 
Latin word from which we derive our English word " sub- 
stance." This helps to prepare the way for the later 
conception of substance as a substrate of phenomena. 
In the Scholastic philosophy, substance is conceived as 
that which exists by itself. It is used of the individual 
object as a whole, and is contrasted with the accidents of 
the object. 

4. Review and Summary. — We think it well at this 
point to note what the historical inquiry has thus far dis- 
covered to us. We find (i) That this category arises in 
experience of change and permanence ; and substance 
is conceived as the permanent in change. We find (2) 
That Aristotle teaches that an individual concrete is a sub- 
stance; and this substance owes its being to the activity 
of its Form, the Form effecting an objective expres- 
sion of itself by actualizing the potentiality of Matter. 
According to this, a substance exists through its own 



SUBSTANTIALITY 269 

Immanent activity; and a substance is an Immanently 
active individual. We find (3) That substance is con- 
ceived to be the essential nature, or Form, of the object, 
expressed In its essential qualities. From this It would 
follow that the substantiality of an object is grounded 
in its essential nature. We find (4) That, in the Neo- 
Platonlc philosophy, substance is the indlviduum as a 
whole; and that the technical term for substance tends 
toward the identification of substance with substrate. 
We find (5) That, in the Scholastic philosophy, a sub- 
stance is an indlviduum which has Independent existence, 
as distinguished from the accidents which have their 
existence In the substance. At the opening of the Modern 
Age of Philosophy, Substance was conceived (i) As the 
permanent in change; (2) As actual being which exists 
by itself; (3) As causal and, hence, active. 

5. In Modern Philosophy. — Descartes conceives sub- 
stance as independent self-subslstent being. God is for 
him the only true substance. He regards matter and mind, 
however, as relative substances, dependent upon the 
primary substance. He speaks of them as " created sub- 
stances." Matter is extended substance ; mind is con- 
scious substance. The substantiality of a thing is in the 
matter of which It is composed. Spinoza defines sub- 
stance as that which exists in itself and is conceived 
through Itself alone ; in brief, substance is self-subslstent 
and unlimited. Being unlimited, there can be only one 
substance; and God Is that substance. In Spinoza's 
view, thought and extension — Cartesian modes of mind 
and matter — are attributes of the only substance ; 
they are of "the essence of the substance." The primary 
substance of Descartes and the one substance of Spinoza 
are regarded by these thinkers as the ground of all that 
is. Substance is, for them, the permanent in all change ; 
and it is individual and causal. 



270 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

Leibniz defines substance as a force centre. He held 
that the universe is composed of an infinite number of 
substances. He terms these substances monads, God is 
the supreme Monad. All other monads are dependent 
upon the supreme Monad ; but, apart from this, each of 
the monads is self-sufficient and independent. All changes 
are within the monad and are due solely to the immanent 
activity" of the monad in which the change takes place. 
The monad preserves its individuality and is, therefore, 
permanent in change ; and it is active. 

Hobbes was a materialist ; but he held that we do not 
know what the substance of things is, and that we are 
only certain that it is different from our knowledge of 
things. According to Locke, "we accustom ourselves 
to suppose some substratum wherein [the qualities of an 
object] do subsist, and from which they do result, which 
therefore we call substance." It is " something we know 
not what." He assumed a material and a spiritual sub^ 
stance. Berkeley denied the reality of material substance ; 
and Hume necessarily denied the reality of both material 
and spiritual substance, for his philosophy has no place 
for a permanent. The notable fact for us is Locke's 
definition of substance as the unknown substrate of 
qualities and cause of their coherence. This is the con- 
ception of substance generally held by those who teach 
that we know phenomena only. 

Kant defines substance as the permanent in change ; 
and he also describes it as " self-dependent being." He 
argues that, as there is change, there must be a permanent 
which undergoes the change. He also taught that the 
notion of substance only holds for material objects, and 
that substance has no reality apart from its accidents 
and their relation. He nowhere clearly defines the natUi-e 
of substance. His refusal to recognize the substantiality 



SUBSTANTIALITY 271 

of the Ego is involved in his doctrine that the self we know 
is only a phenomenal self, not the real self. We have re- 
jected this Phenomenalism; and, doing so, we refuse to 
agree with him in his denial of the substantiality of the 
Ego. 

6. Conclusions. — Apart from Hume, permanence in 
change is accepted as a fact; and Hume confessed dis- 
satisfaction with his own system, because the only reality 
which it could recognize was a series of distinct perceptions 
which had no real connection with each other. He felt 
the need of a permanent. We find also that substance is 
thought of as concrete in the individual ; that there is 
general agreement in identifying it with the essential 
nature of the individual ; that many have regarded it as 
an unknown substrate of accidents ; that Phenomenal- 
ists think of it as the unknowable substrate of phenomena ; 
and that most thinkers have conceived it as causally 
related to objects and changes. Of these conceptions, 
three are important for our study: (i) That substance 
is the permanent in change ; (2) That it is active being ; 
(3) That it is conceived as concrete in individual objects. 
The first and third of these have been recognized by all 
schools and teachers ; and the second is involved in our 
experience of objects as effecting change in us and resisting 
change in themselves. 

§ 122. Substance and Substrate. — Many thinkers 
have conceived substance as a substrate in which qualities 
inhere, or as the unknown reality back of phenomena. 
This substrate is undetermined and unknown. Being 
undetermined, — i.e. without defined character, — it can- 
not change ; for change involves difference of characteris- 
tics. To say that an object — a coat or a boy — has 
changed, is to say that its present characteristics differ, in 
some particulars, from its characteristics in the past. 



272 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

This theory would ground substantiality in an undefined, 
unchangeable, unknowable somewhat. To this there are 
grave objections. 

1. The doctrine under consideration regards our world 
as a world of known appearances and unknowable reality. 
We have examined the dualism which separates appearance 
from reality (chapters XVIII and XIX, and § 87) and 
have concluded that it is neither consistent with itself 
nor accordant with experience; and our constructive 
study of cognition led us to conclude that we know ob- 
jective reality. We, each of us, know our self to be identi- 
cal with the self of our past experiences. The self we 
thus know, is the real self; the only actual self is the self 
of which we are conscious. This means that we know 
subjective reality. The world we know, then, is the world 
of reality ; and it is known in and with the cognition of 
accidents and appearances. The assumed unknowable 
substrate is a myth. 

2. This assumed substrate has no reality. The pro- 
ponents of the theory under consideration regard substance 
as being of itself without quality. Actual Being is, how- 
ever, being-of-some-sort. Pure Being, being-of-no-sort, 
would be pure Nothing. Those who set forth this con- 
ception, are led astray through failing to note what results 
from their process of abstraction. They begin with 
a substrate-with-inhering-qualities or a substrate-with- 
phenomena. This is a complex unit ; and every indi- 
vidual real is a complex unit. No element of a unit can 
exist apart and by itself; but those who hold this view 
abstract the substrate and conceive it as self-dependent. 
There is no substance without accident ; neither is there 
any accident apart from substance. To abstract acci- 
dents or phenomena, is to leave nothing ; for it leaves 
pure Being. It is impossible that Nothing should be the 



SUBSTANTIALITY 273 

ground of our experience of permanence through change 
and of resistance to change. 

§ 123. Substance and the Primary Qualities. — i. 

Some identify substance with the so-called primary quali- 
ties of an object ; and, as this theory is proposed with par- 
ticular reference to the substance of things, the primary 
qualities of the object are the primary qualities of matter. 
The distinction between primary and secondary qualities 
appears to have been first urged by Democritus. It was 
accepted by Descartes and Locke, and not a few since have 
undertaken to justify it. Locke held that certain qualities 
— as color, sound, flavor, odor, etc. — take their character 
from sensibility; he argued that they are what they are, 
because of our sentient organism. This is seen in the 
fact that the same object may have for different persons 
a different color or taste. If one of my hands be held 
for a time in very cold water, and the other in very warm 
water, upon laying both hands upon the same object it will 
seem warm to the one hand and cold to the other. These 
secondary qualities are said not to represent the properties 
of the object, but to owe their character to the subject. 
In other words, the secondary qualities are regarded 
as subjective, not objective. But those who hold for 
this distinction, insist that there are qualities which are 
solely objective ; that they resemble properties of the 
object. These latter are called primary qualities. They 
are listed differently by different teachers. Descartes 
recognized one fundamental quality, viz. extension; but 
he also names figure and shape. Locke designates the 
following as primary qualities : extension, figure, motion, 
rest, impenetrability or solidity, and number. They are 
In general those qualities with which Physics deals. Sub- 
stance is said by some to he these primary qualities and to 
possess the secondary qualities — weight, color, hardness, etc. 



274 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

2. This distinction is a convenience for Science ; but 
it is untenable from the point of view of Philosophy. 
The object possesses the primary qualities — extension, 
figure, motion, etc., — quite as much as it does the second- 
ary qualities. But a more fundamental objection to 
this theory is found in the fact that ideas of extension, 
figure, and all other qualities are just as dependent upon 
the subject as sound, smell, taste, and the other secondary 
qualities. All perception of quality requires the media- 
tion of the sentient organism and the mind of the subject. 
Perception of figure, motion, and rest is dependent upon 
the senses and the interpreting activity of the percipient ; 
just as much so as the perception of sound, color, and taste. 
In addition to this, it is a mistake to identify the substance 
of an object with a part, or with all, of the qualities of 
the object. Reasons for this statement will be set forth 
in the next section. The substantiality of an object is 
not grounded in its primary qualities. 

§ 124. Substance and the Totality of Qualities. — 
Another view of substance has been stated thus : Sub- 
stance is " the synthesis of all the qualities which appear 
to common sense as the qualities of a thing " during the 
whole time of its existence. If some quality " remains 
relatively unchanged while others change," that relatively 
unchanging quality, though it is not the substance, 
" would come to be considered the substance.'* This 
theory must be rejected. 

I. It conceives an object — and substance also — to 
be a mere aggregation of qualities. We have found that 
reflective thought is agreed upon one point — that actual 
substance is substance of an individuum. Now, an in- 
dividuum is not an aggregation ; it is not One consti- 
tuted through the conjunction of Many; it is not a syn- 
thesis of independents. It is a diversified unit, Many in 



SUBSTANTIALITY 275 

One. An aggregation of independents cannot constitute 
a unit. A unit is " an original one, not a total." The 
theory under consideration must either deny the sub- 
stantiality of the self, or constitute the self through the 
aggregation of states of consciousness. Neither of these 
positions can be sustained. The self is an individual real, 
it is a permanent through change, and it is an active being : 
these are the marks of substance. To assume that this 
substantial self is an aggregation of states of conscious- 
ness, is to misinterpret experience. The distinguishable 
states of consciousness do not constitute experience ; the 
states are themselves constituted in experience. The 
view under consideration misconceives individuality and, 
consequently, misconceives substance. 

2. An object is Many in One; the many qualities are 
in the one object. They are expressions, to a subject, of 
the nature of the object. The nature and relations of the 
object determine its qualities. The qualities of a peach 
and of a piano reveal the nature of these objects ; they 
do not make that nature to be what it is. A substance is 
immanently active. Its qualities are the result of its 
immanent activity; they do not cause it to be. The 
qualities are grounded in the substance; they are not 
the substance. The theory we are examining miscon- 
ceives the relation of qualities to substance ; and, because 
of this and the fact that it also misconceives individuality, 
we decline to accept it. 

§ 125. Substantiality and Reality. — Substance pre- 
sents three characteristics : it is active being ; it is actu- 
alized in individual reals ; it is permanent through change. 

I. The first of these marks identifies substance with 
reality as defined by us. The substance of an object is 
that which is essential to its being; it is that which, in 
interrelation with its environment, makes an object to 



276 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

be what it is. In seeking a definition of substance, we 
are seeking a definition of reality. It is a notable fact 
that those who would have us accept knowledge of phe- 
nomena as adequate to the demands of reason, either 
identify substance with appearance or undertake to in- 
terpret experience without this concept. But we have 
found that reason refuses to accept that the world with 
which we are dealing is merely a world of appearances ; 
the known world, the world with which we have inter- 
course, is the world of reality. Neither can we ignore the 
notion of substantiality and be true to experience. It 
persists in the thought of all of us and returns to confront 
the philosopher even after he supposes he had banished 
it. Our study reveals the fact that substance is one with 
reality, and that is why it persists. The substance of an 
object is its essential reality. The notion of substantiality 
arises from experience of reality. 

2. An individuum is Many in One ; the Many function 
as One. To state it otherwise, an individuum is a sys- 
tem. The parts of a true system inhere in the system ; 
and they work together to serve the purpose of the system, 
i.e. they cohere in their activity. Reality expresses itself 
in system. This is true of the universe as a whole, and 
of the individual objects of the universe. The individ- 
uality of an object comes of the coherent activity of its 
reality. Substance is individual because the activity of 
reality is a systematizing and, therefore, an individuat- 
ing activity. 

3. The essential nature of any real is necessarily un- 
changing. The nature of an object is expressed in its 
appearances ; its essential nature, in its essential qualities. 
The continuous internal adjustment of an object which 
is consequent upon its immanent activity and changes in 
its environment, will result in change of appearance. 



SUBSTANTIALITY 277 

But while the appearance of the object changes, its essen- 
tial nature is necessarily permanent. The appearance of 
the book has changed through much use ; but all that is 
essential to its being a book, has persisted through these 
changes. The permanent essential nature will express 
itself in a corresponding permanence of qualities. The 
old book still has the marks of a book. Experience 
develops the notion of substantiality as permanence in 
change, because the qualities which reveal the essential 
significance of the object persist through all changes ; 
and they persist because the essential nature of a real 
does not change. 

§ 126. Conclusions. — Substance is reality. The no- 
tion of substantiality is present in our thought of objects 
as changing and as resisting and causing change. Cogni- 
tion takes this form because experience comes of commerce 
with reality. Reality is immanently active causal being; 
because of this it yields experience of change and of re- 
sistance to change. Its activity is coherent and system- 
atizing ; as a consequence, reality is individual, and the 
notion of substantiality arises in our thought of concrete 
individua. A real is an expression of the essential nature 
of its reality ; and the essential nature of a real neces- 
sarily persists throughout the existence of the real. The 
permanence of the essential nature of a real expresses it- 
self in the persistence of the essential qualities of the real ; 
and experience of essential qualities persisting through 
changing appearances of the individual object, yields 
experience of permanence in change. 



CHAPTER XXIX 

QUALITY 

§ 127. Quality and Object. — i. A known object Is of a 
kind ; it is like other objects in one or more particulars, 
and different from them in others. If I say, " Sit on the 
chair, not on the stool," the chair and the stool are de- 
fined by sets of marks which distinguish them from each 
other, and from other objects. The glass of milk which 
you rejected because it was sour, was known by you as 
having a certain characteristic. If I say, "This is the thing 
I mean," I distinguish a certain object from others by its 
proximity and by the qualifying gesture which sets it 
apart for thought. For the occasion of this judgment, it 
is known by its proximity and the qualifying gesture. It 
is obvious that a known object is qualified, or defined, 
existence ; it is known through marks which are its own. 
These marks, or characteristics, are its qualities. 

2. There is no bare existence ; there is no Being with- 
out quality. Mere existence would be mere nothing. 
Whatever is, is of some kind ; and that kind is defined 
in the qualities of the Being. Not only is there no reality 
without quality; but quality cannot exist apart from 
a real. We cannot think a quality as having existence in 
itself. Our study of substantiality made it evident that 
quality has its being in a concrete individuum, and never 
apart from what is actual ; and that our thought of quality 
is always cast in that mould. Experience has even 
embodied this fact in language. Thought of actualized 
color, sound, taste, or other quality always takes some 

278 



QUALITY 279 

such form as the following : " This rose is a dark red," 
*' The piano's tone is melodious," " This apple is sweet," 
" He bows gracefully." The color is thought as having 
its reality in the rose ; the melodious tone, in the piano ; 
the taste quality, in the apple ; and the gracefulness, in the 
act of bowing. Reality implicates quality, and quality 
implicates reality. 

§ 128. Characteristics of Quality. — i. We speak of 
qualities as changing ; and this form of statement is con- 
venient and permissible, but it is not exact. A quality 
does not of itself undergo change. " Red " is always 
" red " ; it cannot become " blue " or " green " or any 
other color. " Sonority " is always " sonority," and 
" acidity " cannot become " sweetness " or " saltness " 
or " bitterness." The red cloth may take on another color 
through exposure to the sun; the melodious piano may 
acquire an unpleasant tone through neglect; the apple 
which was sour when it was unripe, may be sweet when 
it has ripened. But in these instances the substance of 
the cloth, the piano, and the apple has undergone change ; 
and this change is revealed in the changed quality of the 
objects. Quality, conceived by itself, does not change; 
but the quality of an object may change. Change occurs 
only in what is concrete ; and quality conceived apart from 
substance, is abstract, not concrete ; hence it cannot 
change. Quality of a concrete individuum is concrete, 
and it changes with the changing of that whose quality 
it is. 

2. Qualities have a subjective and an objective relation. 
A color, a sound, or an odor is, in my consciousness, my 
sensation. Similarly, extension, weight, taste, etc., are 
sensational elements of consciousness ; that is, they are 
subjective. They arise in the consciousness of a sentient 
and rational subject; and they cannot be conceived as 



28o INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

concrete except as we conceive a subject who senses them. 
But they are not purely subjective; they also define 
objective reality. Extension is a quality of the box; 
weight, of the piece of iron; and sonority, of the guitar. 
When you think of the box as extended, of the iron as 
having weight, and of the guitar as sonorous, you are not 
imposing upon these objects what is foreign to them. 
But these qualities can only be actualized in the subject- 
object relation. An object is not complete apart from 
its complementary " other," the subject. Quality is 
developed in the interrelated activity of subject reality 
and object reality. 

In criticism of the view just stated, some have said, 
" If the qualities of an object are real in the object, but 
only become actualized in the subject-object relation, 
tell us what the object is apart from this relation; de- 
scribe the object by itself, unrelated to a subject." Those 
who ask a description of an object out of relation to a 
subject, make appearance impossible, and then demand 
a description of appearance. They cut the object off 
from intelligence and then ask to be told what intelligence 
has to say of the object ; they make knowledge impossible 
and then demand knowledge. In describing an object, 
you necessarily conceive it in relation to a subject. If one 
should say, " An object conceived apart from relation 
to a subject is potentially what it is actually in the subject- 
object relation," we must relate the object to a subject 
in order to give meaning to this description. They fail 
to recognize that the conditions of the problem contradict 
each other. We are asked to think of an object out of 
relation to a subject. You cannot think an object with- 
out relating it to yourself as subject. 

3. The qualities of objects change as the relations of 
objects vary. The gown which is lavender in sunlight 



QUALITY 281 

appears gray in lamplight ; from some points a round disk 
will appear oval. We have examined such experiences 
and have concluded that relations modify the appearance 
of objects (§ "j^^. The examples just cited — of the 
lavender gown and the round disk — are instances of 
temporary changes of perceived qualities. In a much- 
used book and a faded ribbon, we have examples of changes 
that are permanent. The book and the ribbon have been so 
related that the adjusting activity of their reality has re- 
sulted in relatively fixed changes of quality. The book, 
once new and clean, is now old and soiled ; the ribbon 
has a duller hue, and some of the threads are much worn. 
The violin has acquired a richer and mellower tone. One 
has said that qualities are " the object's special way of 
behaving " ; and we may add that, while its behavior 
will always be relevant to its nature, it will differ in dif- 
ferent relations, i.e. it will also be relevant to its environ- 
ment. 

§ 129. Quality and Reality. — The reality of an object 
presents Itself to a subject in and through the qualities 
and relations of the object. The qualities of an object 
are its nature expressed to a subject. To sense-perception, 
it presents the qualities of matter and material objects — 
extension, motion, color, sound, taste, etc. To inner per- 
ception, it presents the fundamental quality of conscious- 
ness, with its three elementary phases — intellection, 
feeling, and volition. To rationality as intellection, 
reality presents itself as intelligible, as having meaning 
that may be apprehended. To rationality as feeling, it 
presents itself as that which satisfies ; a feeling of satis- 
faction attends the conviction that we are dealing with 
reality. To rationality as will, it presents itself as avail- 
able for practical activities ; its qualities indicate how it 
may subserve the subject's purposes. The value of an 



i 



282 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

object for thought, feeling, and action is revealed In its 
qualities. The manifold and variable qualities of objects 
are grounded in the inexhaustible richness of reality and 
the countless relations in which it is presented to us. 

§ 130. Conclusions. — The qualities of an object are 
the marks by which we distinguish it from other ob- 
jects. There is no reality without quality, and no quality 
apart from reality ; reality and quality are co-implicates. 
Quality, as mere quality, does not change ; but the quality 
of an object may change. Change in the qualities of an ob- 
ject result from the immanent activity of the object, as the 
reality adjusts itself to changing conditions. Quality is 
dualistic; it has a subjective and an objective relation. 
It has Its origin in the interrelated activity of subject 
and object. The qualities of an object are its expressed 
nature. The innumerable qualities of objects are for 
us the expression of their significance for life. 



CHAPTER XXX 

QUANTITY 

§ 131. Introductory. — There are many interesting 
and important questions respecting this category which 
the limits of this Introduction to Ontology will not permit 
us to consider. Two facts, however, are of special im- 
port, and it is the purpose of this discussion to set them in 
evidence : (i) That quantitative thought of objects is 
true to reality ; (2) That reality cannot be fully expressed 
in terms of quantity. 

1. The element of experience which we are about to 
consider comes of our thinking of objects as one or more, 
and of an object as being so much. We are constantly 
asking, " How many ^. " and " How much .? " and these 
are questions respecting quantity. In the first of these 
questions, the notion of Number is present ; in the second, 
the notion of Measure. Number and measure exhibit 
important differences ; but they are so closely related that 
we think it well to treat them under the one category 
Quantity, of which they are sub-forms. 

2. Language furnishes evidence that number is a 
fundamental form of thought. The most ancient lan- 
guages have separate singular and plural forms ; and many 
of them also distinguish the dual. The most primitive 
peoples count. Some of them, to be sure, can go no 
further than one, two, many (more than two) ; and, if 
they wish to be more definite as to the many, they com- 
pound thus : two one, two two, two two one, etc. The 
cultured races have a more extended primary series, 

283 



284 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

going at least as far as ten before they begin to form com- 
pounds. But the important fact for us is that thought 
distinguishes one, two, and more than two; that the no- 
tion of number is present in men's thought of objects. 
It is sufficient for us that experience takes this form. 

3. All peoples have standards of measure. The stand- 
ards of primitive peoples — e.g. so many days' journey, 
so many moons — are indefinite as compared with those 
of cultured peoples ; but they are measure standards. The 
fact that all peoples have such standards is evidence 
that measure is a fundamental form of thought. 

§ 132. Characteristics of Number. — A boy finds a 
small bag containing marbles, and he desires to know 
how many there are. He takes out one marble and then 
another and yet another ; and, as he does this, he counts, 
i.e. he thinks the terms of the number series ; and he does 
this until all have been counted. The number which he 
thinks, does not indicate the kind of things that are num- 
bered ; it merely describes quantitatively the group that 
has been taken out of the bag. No two of the marbles 
need be of the same kind, size, color, or value. The num- 
ber modifies the meaning of the collection ; but it gives 
to that meaning a purely quantitative modification. It 
says nothing as to the quality of the individual marbles 
or the collection. Quality is the expression of the nature 
of an individual object ; number indicates nothing re- 
specting the nature of the objects to which it is applied. 
What we wish to emphasize here is that numbers do not 
express quality. A number merely names the term in 
the number series at which we stop counting. 

2. Suppose that, in addition to the marbles, the boy 
should find other objects in the bag; and that there are 
altogether twenty marbles, three pencils, and two knives. 
From this account of what is in the bag, it will be seen that 



QUANTITY 285 

the different classes of objects — marbles, pencils, and 
knives — are counted separately. The objects of any 
single Instance of counting may differ greatly from one 
another ; but they must be alike In this, that they are in 
the same class. In the illustration just used, twenty of 
the objects are marbles, three of them are pencils, and 
two of them are knives. But, if we should ask how many 
things were In the bag, counting would show that there 
were twenty-five, for all these objects fall into the class 
of things. In any instance of counting, or numbering, all 
the objects must be of one class, i.e. they must be homo- 
geneous. The purpose of the person counting determines 
what objects shall be Included in the count. We may state 
this characteristic of number thus : Objects numbered 
must be homogeneous. 

§ 133. Characteristics of Measure. — i. The width of 
this room Is equal to a straight line perpendicular to the 
side walls. If we desired to find the width of the room, 
such a line would be the object to be measured. This 
object is a continuous whole; and in this It differs from 
the whole which we number. The whole concerning 
which we ask, " How many are there .? " is constituted of 
discrete objects which are perceptibly distinct from one 
another; whereas the whole which we measure is con- 
tinuous within its limits. Distance, surface, heat, time, 
and angles are measured ; and they are continuous wholes. 
In weighing an object or a group of objects, we are meas- 
uring the force of gravity upon a defined whole ; and this 
force is continuous, not discrete. The first character- 
istic of measure which we note Is that the whole which is 
measured is continuous between the defined limits. 

2. In measuring the width or length of this room, we 
use a rule on which are marked multiples of certain ar- 
bitrary units of length — yards, feet, and inches. These 



286 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

units are in common use, having been accepted by con- 
vention. The rule is a device for easy and exact count- 
ing of the number of these units which are contained in a 
Hne. If we seek the measure of the surface of the floor, 
we measure the width and the length of the room, and by 
a mathematical calculation — which is a convenient way 
of counting — we determine how many square yards or 
square feet there are in the room. In such case, our ar- 
bitrary unit is a square yard or a square foot. A similar 
procedure holds in the measurement of time, heat, weight, 
angles, etc. ; similar in this, that an arbitrary unit and 
counting devices are employed. Three facts are to be 
noted in this connection, (i) In measuring, we break up 
the continuous defined whole and treat it as if it were 
constituted of discrete parts. (2) In numbering, each 
of the individual objects counted is a unit; in measuring, 
the unit is arbitrary and generally conventional. (3) The 
measure obtained is not absolute; it is relative to the 
arbitrary unit. 

§ 134. Real Number and Ideational Number. — i. 
Number has its origin in endeavor to determine how many 
individual objects of a certain kind there are in a given 
collection. The answer to the inquiry will say that there 
are so many units of that kind; that is, it will be a numeri- 
cal definition of objects, not a mere number. A real 
number, then, is not of itself an individuum ; it is an ac- 
cident of an individual collection or group. An acci- 
dent — as " blue " or " smooth " or " four " — has no 
objective reality in and of itself; to be objectively real 
it must be related to an object. " Four " in the expres- 
sion " four horses " is a real number ; " four " by itself 
is abstract number. A number thought by itself is ab- 
stract, not concrete ; unrelated to objects, it is purely 
subjective or ideational, not real. In language, a real 



QUANTITY 287 

number is a numeral adjective modifying a noun; in 
thought, it is a term in our number series, conceived in 
relation to a group of objects. 

2. The hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle whose 
sides are equal, is a definite whole. In measuring the 
hypothenuse, we are seeking to discover how many units 
of a certain kind — say feet or inches — there are 
in the line. Given such a triangle as an objective 
reality, there is no real number which will express its 
measure. If its equal sides are each five feet in length, 
the number of feet in the hypothenuse would be equal to 
five times the square root of two ; but there is no such 
term in our number series. The symbol 5 v2 does not in- 
dicate a definite or determinable number of units ; it 
symbolizes an infinite series. But a real number is a def- 
inite, or determined, number of units; and, as 5 v2 is 
indeterminate, it is ideational number, not real number. 
We cannot express the measure of this hypothenuse in 
the same unit with that of the equal sides, because there 
is no unit of length which is an exact divisor, or aliquot 
part, of all three sides. In fact, the objects whose measure 
can be stated in real number, are few compared with the 
many for the quantifying of which real number is inade- 
quate. It is inadequate because measure is quantifi- 
cation of what is continuous, and number is discrete. In 
measuring we undertake to divide a continuous whole 
into equal discrete portions ; having done this, we count 
the equal parts. It is evidently impossible to find a unit 
of length which will be an aliquot part of every line ; but 
the unit which will give determinate measure of a line, 
must be such an equal part of the line. What is true 
in this respect of length, is true of weight and of all other 
forms of measure. There are many objective realities 
which real number cannot quantify. 



288 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

§ 135. Quantity and Reality. — Reality presents itself 
as Many and Much; hence the notion of quantity is 
true to reality. Quantitative thought of reality has led 
to important conclusions ; it has furnished an impressive 
and valuable interpretation of the universe. The service 
which higher mathematics, the science of quantity, has 
rendered can scarcely be overestimated. Its testimony 
to the unity and orderliness of the universe is incontro- 
vertible. Through its quantitative study of phenomena, 
it has been able to make predictions which future occur- 
rences have verified ; e.g., eclipses, the return of comets, 
the existence of hitherto unknown planets and elements, 
time and height of tides, the approach of storms. The 
wonderful accomplishments of this science have led many 
to insist that all that is may be expressed in quantitative 
terms. But we take exception to this conclusion. 

Most of the objects with which it deals are ideal con- 
ceptions, not objective realities, not the objects with which 
we have experience in our intercourse with the external 
world. The lever of mathematics is an ideal lever, not 
the real lever of the workman ; it is assumed to be without 
weight and to have a stability which no real lever has. 
The same is true of the beams concerning which it makes 
calculations which are valuable to the bridge-builder and 
the architect. Its conclusions are of great worth ; but 
they are not an exact quantitative representation of the 
world of reality. But the impossibility of reducing all 
reality to quantitative terms becomes still more evident 
when we undertake to express the specifically qualitative 
characteristics of objects and experiences in terms of 
quantity. Quality is an expression of the nature of ob- 
jects, and quantity is indifferent to the nature of the ob- 
jects numbered. The hues of the sunset sky and the taste 
of an orange are not reducible to mere quantitative terms. 



QUANTITY 289 

Those colors and that taste are subjective as well as ob- 
jective; and, whatever may be thought respecting the 
objective element, the subject's consciousness of the color 
and the taste cannot be expressed quantitatively. It is 
not a mere consciousness of many or much. But we have 
already seen that the reality of the object, as expressed 
in quality, is not realized apart from the consciousness of 
a subject (§ 128, 2) ; hence the reduction of quality to 
terms of quantity would require the reduction also of 
consciousness to such terms. Feeling and volitional 
phases of consciousness are assuredly not interpretable 
in quantitative terms. Hopes, fears, joys, sorrows, and 
purposes have in them that which cannot be adequately 
stated as merely so many or so much; and what cannot 
be so thought, is just that which is distinctive of these 
experiences. Quantity cannot give a complete statement 
of subject reality. 

§ 136. Conclusions. — Objects to which a number is 
related must be homogeneous ; and a real number states 
definitely how many such objects there are in a collection. 
A real number is a term in our number series, set in relation 
to a certain kind of objects. The whole which we number 
is a whole of discrete units ; the whole which we measure 
is a continuous whole. In measuring, we divide the whole 
into discrete homogeneous units, and then we number the 
units thus obtained. Mathematical calculations in meas- 
urement, and rules, scales, etc., are devices for effecting 
this division and numbering. If the objects of a collec- 
tion are not homogeneous, the number of units in the 
whole cannot be expressed by a single term of the number 
series. A number which is unrelated to objects, is ide- 
ational, not real. The unit of measure is an arbitrary unit, 
accepted by convention. It frequently occurs that the unit 
of measure is not an aliquot part of that which is to be 
u 



290 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

measured ; in such case, the number by which we express 
the measure, is ideational. 

Our experience of things and events takes this form. 
Quantity is a true representation of reahty, for reality 
presents itself as Many and as Much ; but there are reali- 
ties which cannot be adequately expressed in quantitative 
forms. The inadequacy of discrete number for the ex- 
pression of many quantitative facts sets the continuity 
and structural unity of individua in evidence. There are 
aspects of reality which cannot be expressed in quantita- 
tive terms ; this is notably true of phases of consciousness. 
We have discovered that a real is Many in One ; the mani- 
fold is discrete, the unity is continuous. Subjectively 
regarded, quantity is grounded in the activity of subject 
reality, in our seeking to know the external world in res- 
pect of number and measure. Objectively regarded, it 
is grounded in the activity of object reality presenting 
itself in individual reals, each of which is Many in One. 



CHAPTER XXXI 

SPACE 

We distinguish Perceptual space-experience and that 
which is purely Ideational. Their essential differences 
will appear in the course of this discussion. We treat per- 
ceptual space first. 

§ 137. Characteristics of Perceptual Space Experience. 
— I. The book, inkstand, and pen which are on my desk 
are seen to be distinct objects; each of them is apart 
from, or " out of," the others. As I lay my hand on the 
door-knob in the dark, the knob is felt to be " out from " 
the surface of the door. Similarly each of the corners of 
one of the covers of the book is perceived to be apart from 
the other corners. In like manner we apprehend that 
parts of other material objects are in a relation of " out- 
ness " to one another. The desk, the book, and other 
perceived objects on the desk are experienced as " out 
from " me. We do not perceive sensible objects other- 
wise than in a relation of " outness " to one another and 
to ourselves. So also portions of the cover of a book 
or of a patch of light are seen to be " out from " one an- 
other. In a word, all sensible individua are perceived to 
be in a relation of " outness " to one another and to the 
perceiver. In perceiving sensible objects, we always re- 
late them in respect of position ; and the objective reality 
which yields experience of mutual " outness," is the posi- 
tion-relation of the objects perceived. To say that the 

291 



292 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

inkstand and the pen are " out from " each other, is to 
say that they are in distinct positions, and that we have 
related them in respect of those positions. 

2. When we look at a patch of light, the cover of a 
book, or the top of a desk, we not only have a conscious- 
ness of the apartness of portions of the whole, but we also 
have an experience of " spread-outness," or extensity. 
Taking all the 'many positions on the surface together, 
the whole appears extended. This is true likewise of the 
perceptions of objects which are not in contact with one 
another. You see two colored spots at a sensible remove 
from each other. The whole which you thus perceive is 
two spots related in position, and it has an aspect of 
" extendedness." The element of extensity in your ex- 
perience arises in your perception of the position-relation 
of the spots. This is evident from the fact that the ex- 
tensity of the whole is dependent upon the relative posi- 
tions of the spots. Suppose these spots are colored coun- 
ters. If you give them positions nearer to each other, 
the extensity is lessened ; if you move them farther apart, 
the extensity is increased. When a sheet of paper is 
folded, the more widely separated portions are brought 
nearer to one another, and what we then perceive appears 
to be less extended than the unfolded sheet. In a word, 
the aspect of extensity varies with the variation of the 
position-relation of the objects. The position-relation of 
perceived objects is the objective reality which yields 
experience of extensity. 

§ 138. What Perceptual Space Is. — We have found 
that perceptual space-experience comes of the perception 
of sensible objects, and that it has two characteristics : 
the mutual " outness " of the objects, and the extensity 
aspect of the whole. We have also learned that it is the 
perceived position-relation of objects which gives us ex- 



SPACE 293 

perience of the mutual " outness " of objects and of ex- 
tensity. From this it would follow that perceptual space 
is essentially the perceived position-relation of objects. 
This, however, differs fundamentally from the common 
conception of space, which is that space is extensity. This 
common conception of space is so fixed in thought that we 
restate considerations already presented. Every whole 
is many particulars in one. The surface of this sheet is 
for perception many distinguishable portions of a whole ; 
and it is because we relate distinguishable portions to one 
another in respect of their positions, that the sheet appears 
to be extended. When I have experience of the book, 
the inkstand, and the pen in one perception, it is the posi- 
tion-relation of these objects that gives the aspect of ex- 
tensity to the whole which I perceive. Spatial experience 
is, therefore, not primarily experience of extensity ; it is 
experience of the position-relation of objects. The ob- 
jects whose perception yields this consciousness are nec- 
essarily presented together in experience. You cannot 
relate the positions of three colored spots unless all three 
are present in your thought at the same time. Including 
this fact in our description of spatial experience, we would 
say that it is primarily experience of the position-relation 
of co-existent objects. Space, as a category, is the posi- 
tion-relation of objects, abstracted from the objects. 
There is, of course, no perceptual experience of space thus 
abstracted ; for space does not exist by itself, it is a rela- 
tion. Neither is there experience of extensity by itself ; 
for extensity is an aspect of a perceived whole in which 
there are sensible particulars, — as the book and the pen, 
or distinguishable portions of a surface, — and it does 
not exist apart from sensible particulars. We conclude, 
then, that perceptual space is the perceived position- 
relation of co-existent sensible objects, the perception of 



294 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

this relation giving an aspect of extensity to the whole of 
what is perceived. 

§ 139. Direction. — You reach out and touch a wall, 
you see a tree toward your right, you hear a bell sounding 
behind you. The position of each of these objects is 
related by you to your own position ; and you express 
this relation in the terms, " before," " to the right," 
" behind." Other terms definitive of like spatial ex- 
perience are in frequent use — as " here," " there," 
" above," " below," etc. They define the position of 
objects and are terms of direction. Such definition of 
position-relation is present in all developed spatial ex- 
perience. If we deal efficiently with objects, we must 
apprehend where they are with respect to ourselves. 
This definition of space-perception also makes experience 
available for intersubjective intercourse. If I should 
say, " The book is on the upper shelf of the case which is at 
the left of the door as you enter the study," you would 
understand me and would easily locate the book. The 
examples given show that, in perceptual space-experience, 
direction is determined with reference to the position of 
the subject. The wall is before you, the tree is at your 
right, the bell is behind you, the book-case is at your left 
as you enter the room. In general, in perceptual space, 
the direction is determined by relating the position of the 
object to the position of the subject. 

§ 140. Conceptual Space. — This is virtually the Plain 
Man's conception of space ; it is also the space of mathe- 
matics and, therefore, of Science. 

I. Our discussion has led us to conclude that perceptual 
space, the space of sense-experience, is the perceived posi- 
tion-relation of sensible objects and the resultant extensity 
aspect of the perceived whole. As the extension element 
of the perception is an aspect of what is perceived, it cannot 



SPACE 295 

exist by itself. We cannot image extension apart from 
sensible objects. Conceptual space is extension abstracted 
from objects ; it is mere extensity. According to this 
conception, space is whether objects are or not. As thus 
conceived, space has a sort of thinghood ; it is treated as 
an entity and is virtually regarded as a receptacle for 
material objects. We easily think of space as an infinite 
emptiness within which is all that is material. This 
mode of thought has even found a place in Philosophy ; 
we often say that all sensible objects are in space. But 
we must not so regard the objective reality corresponding 
to our perceptual experience ; for our perceptions and 
our images have a spatial character because of the per- 
ceived and imaged objects. Conceptual space is not the 
same with perceptual space. Perceptual space is a re- 
lation and a resultant aspect ; conceptual space is this 
aspect, conceived as existing by itself. It is a product 
of reflection ; and, although it is related to perceptual 
space, it differs significantly from the latter. 

2. But, if conceptual space, the space of mathematics, 
differs so greatly from the space of sense-experience, are 
the conclusions of mathematics valid for the world which 
we know through sense-experience .? Are they valid for 
the real external world ? Although mathematics conceives 
space as extensity abstracted from perceived objects, 
nevertheless it sets ideal objects in this extensity when it 
reasons respecting space. The ideal objects are the 
mathematical point, line, surface, and solid. Having 
set these in space, it discusses position-relations. The 
point, being without extension, is pure position. It takes 
the place of the subject in perceptual space; and direc- 
tion and distance are determined from the point. Its line, 
surface, and solid are constituted ideally of positions which 
are external to one another. The science of geometry is 



296 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

the science of related positions. From this we conclude 
(i) that, although mathematics conceives space as ex- 
tensity abstracted from objects, it is wont in its reasoning 
to give this extensity concreteness by setting ideal objects 
within space ; and (2) that mathematical reasonings re- 
specting space are discussions concerning position-relations. 
In both these particulars, it puts itself at one with percep- 
tual space. The conclusions logically deduced by such 
reasoning are true for related positions and are, therefore, 
true for the position-relations of objects. By so much as 
they are valid for spatial relations in general, they are 
valid for the spatial relations of the universe. 

§ 141. Is Space infinitely Divisible and infinitely Ex- 
tended? — I. It is frequently said that space is infinitely 
divisible and infinitely extended. This is not true of 
perceptual space. The extension of any perceived whole 
is limited by the related positions of the perceived objects. 
To be sure, I can change the relative positions of my book 
and inkstand and pen so that the resultant whole would 
be less or greater in extent than my present perception. 
But, although I would in that case perceive the same ob- 
jects, the perceived whole would not be the same ; it 
would differ from what I now perceive in the matter of 
position-relation and extensity. Perceptual space is 
necessarily the space of a particular perception, and its 
extensity is fixed by the position-relations of the objects 
perceived. 

2. Conceptual space is infinitely divisible and extended. 
This would follow from the fact that extensity abstracted 
from objects — and that is what conceptual space is — 
is necessarily unlimited. The critical question for us at 
this point is as to v/hat the infinite divisibility and exten- 
sion of space signify. A line is a whole whose capacity 
for division cannot be exhausted ; and this is true also of 



SPACE 297 

a surface or a solid. These are primary concepts of con- 
ceptual space ; and their infinite divisibility simply means 
that their capacity for division can never be exhausted. 
When we say that space is limitless in extent, we mean 
that however far we may think a line or a surface extended, 
we have not exhausted the possibility of extending it. 
In our attempt to think a limit, we think a " beyond." 
From this we see that the infinite divisibility and exten- 
sion of space signify that thought cannot set a limit to the 
possible position-relations, size, or number of objects. 
It does not mean that space is emptiness which is infinitely 
extended, or limited emptiness which may be infinitely 
divided. 

§ 142. Space and Reality. — i. Perception of Material 
Objects always gives Space-Experience. — All material 
objects are known through sensory experience, and they 
are cognized as extended. Matter may, therefore, be 
described as reality expressed in extension and known in 
sense-experience. Being an expression of reality, it is 
real. Speaking exactly, it is a form in which objective 
reality expresses itself to a subject; it is the form in which 
it expresses itself to the subject as sentient. Acting 
after this mode, objective reality expresses itself in objects 
which have parts " out from " other parts — as the parts 
of a pen or a spot of color; and also in indlvidua which 
are perceptibly discrete. Science assures us that bodies 
which present an appearance of continuity are really con- 
stituted of discrete particles, particles which are apart 
from one another. From all that precedes, it would ap- 
pear that reality has an externalizing mode of activity, 
that it has a mode of being in which parts exist " out of " 
each other. To deny that this is true of reality would be 
to say that the cognizing mind contributes to objects 
what is alien to the object; and we have already assigned 



298 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

reasons for rejecting such a doctrine. Objectively re- 
garded, space is grounded in the externalizing activity of 
objective Reality. 

2. Whatever is known, is known as Many in One. — 
My knife, my pen, and my paper-cutter lie before me. I 
perceive all of them in one act of perception. In knowing 
this whole, I individualize portions of the whole — the 
knife, the pen, and the paper-cutter. I see the surface of 
the sheet upon which I am writing ; and, in seeing it, I dis- 
tinguish parts of the surface from other parts, i.e. I indi- 
vidualize portions of the surface. This individualizing 
activity of the mind is the synthetic-analytic activity of 
thought to which we have previously referred. The in- 
dividualizing activity of subject reality and the inter- 
related externalizing activity of object reality yield an ex- 
perience of related " outness " and a consequent aspect of 
extensity. The subjective ground of space is the synthetic- 
analytic activity of mind; subjectively regarded, space 
has its origin in the individualizing activity of the subject. 

§ 143. Non-spatial, or Trans-spatial, Reality. — i. You 
think about bulky things ; your thoughts do not have 
bulk. You feel pleasure, or displeasure, as you think of 
a happening or a person ; but the affective tone of your 
experience is not spatial. You may purpose undertakings 
which will affect many or few interests ; but the purpose 
does not fill so many cubic inches. Our thoughts, feelings, 
and purposes do not, as elements of consciousness, have 
spatial characteristics ; they are not related to each other 
in position. Attention, memory, emotions, and ideas 
are not in position-relations and cannot have extension. 
They are expressions of subject reality. We have object 
reality expressing Itself in extension ; and, over against 
this, we have subject reality whose expressions of itself 
are non-extended. 



SPACE 299 

2. We have been wont to speak of matter as extended 
or spatial reality, and of mind as unextended or non- 
spatial. But there is grave objection to taking these 
negative terms — unextended and non-spatial — as final. 
They do not proffer any content to thought ; whereas 
our experience of self, our self-consciousness, has content ; 
and the mind gains this positive content by being related 
to extended reality. But, to speak of objective reality 
as spatial and of subject reality as non-spatial is to make 
them antithetical to each other. ^ If it were possible that 
there should be two realities, each of them in nature and 
idea exclusive of the other, could they be interrelated ,? 
But, granting the possibility of their existence and their 
being interrelated, neither of them could possibly have 
content for the other. We know, however, that material 
and mental reality are, and that they are actually related, 
and that mental reality obtains content from material real- 
ity. We have also learned that they are complementary 
to each other, not antithetical ; and that material reality 
exists for mental reality and finds its significance in it. 
These considerations lead us to use the term " trans- 
spatial " in preference to the term " non-spatial." The 
self is trans-spatial reality, i.e. reality which is free from 
spatial limitations, that reality in which spatial reality 
becomes significant and for which it exists. 

§ 144. Conclusions. — Perceptual space is the space 
of particular perceptions. It is essentially the perceived 
position-relations of objects, -with the resultant aspect 
of extensity. As a category, it is the extensity of a per- 
ception, abstracted from the objects perceived ; this is 
the same with abstracting the position-relations from 
the perceived whole. Conceptual space is mere extensity, 
extensity abstracted from objects. Perceptual space is 
fundamentally a relation ; conceptual space is treated as 



300 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

an entity. Perceptual space is an aspect of a percep- 
tion, and is a concrete accident ; conceptual space is this 
aspect conceptualized and then regarded as a substance, 
not an accident. In perceptual space, direction is deter- 
mined from the position of the subject; in conceptual 
space, it is determined with respect to a conceived point. 
Although the space of mathematics is conceptual space, 
the discussions of that science are related to perceptual 
space. This is done by setting ideal objects — the point, 
the line, the surface, and the solid — within its conceived 
extensity and in actual position-relation to each other; 
and its discussions are arguments concerning the position- 
relations of these objects. Since its conclusions are valid 
for spatial relations in general, they are valid for the 
external world viewed spatially. The extensity of per- 
ceptual space is limited by the position-relations of the 
perceived objects ; conceptual space is limitless, i.e. there 
is no limit to the possible position-relations, the size, or 
the number of objects. Matter is real ; it is reality ex- 
pressed in extension; it is the form in which objective 
reality expresses itself to the subject as sentient. Mind 
is unextended and trans-spatial reality ; it and matter 
are complementary, not antithetical. Subject reality — 
i.e. the self — is trans-spatial reality ; it is free from spatial 
limitations, and spatial reality exists for it and only comes 
to completion and significance as it is appropriated by a 
self. Space is grounded In the interrelated externalizing 
activity of object reality and the individualizing activity 
of subject reality. 



CHAPTER XXXII 

TIME 

In considering this category, it is necessary to distin- 
guish between the time-element of sense-perception and 
conceptual time. They are closely related, but they 
differ in their conception of time ; and the ignoring of 
this difference had led to confusion. 

§ 145. Characteristics of Perceptual Time. — i. Ex- 
perience is a continuous process (§ 59, 3) ; being a con- 
tinuous process, it is in constant change. Our interest, 
however, leads us to individualize portions of our experi- 
ence. In the experience of this morning, I distinguish a 
stage in which I was reading and this present stage in 
which I am writing. The important fact for our present 
study is, not that I apprehend these stages as differing 
from each other in general content, but that I apprehend 
one of them as coming after the other. These stages are 
cognized by me as related in respect of sequence. This is 
true of all our experience of the external world ; the in- 
dividual stages are cognized as terms in a succession. We 
experience this relation of sequence in and with our ap- 
prehension of the stages. Thus, in taking up the fact of 
my reading and of my writing into one thought, I there- 
with have experience of the sequence of the writing upon 
the reading. This cognition of the sequence is not through 
reflection ; in knowing these stages, I know them as in 
sequence-relation. The time-element of my present ex- 
perience is my perception of one of these stages as sequent 
to the other. The objective time-element is the rela- 

301 



302 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

tion of succession. Perceptual space-experience arises 
in the perception of position-relation ; perceptual time- 
experience arises in the apprehension of sequence-relations. 
2. Because of the spatial element of experience, lan- 
guage — which is a product of experience — has such 
words as " here " and " there " ; because of the temporal 
element, we have the words " now " and " then." 
" Then " may signify that the stage of experience to which 
it is applied is one through which we have passed, or a 
stage thought of, but not yet realized. There are ex- 
periences which may be expressed thus : " I spoke of it 
then " ; or " I will be there to-morrow and will speak of 
it then." " Then " is either before or after " now " ; 
and, in perceptual time, " now " — or the present — is 
the term of the succession to which all stages of experience 
are related. " Now " in time corresponds to " here " 
in space. This present, this " now," is often regarded as 
an instant which ceases in its becoming, which dies as it 
is born ; it is thought by most persons to be a mere time- 
point. James has trenchantly said, " The present is not 
a knife-edge, it is a saddle-back " ; and it would be diffi- 
cult, if not impossible, to find a psychologist who questions 
this statement. The perceptual present is an enduring 
present. It is not a mere time-point, separating past 
sequence from future sequence ; it is a time-line. In the 
briefest time-consciousness, there is awareness of two or 
more sequent phases of experience, distinguished from 
each other. We do not have these phases of experience 
first and then come to know them as sequent by reflection ; 
they are together in experience as successive. Time-experi- 
ence arises in our perception of sequence, of " that " as 
coming before " this," or of " this " and " this " again and 
" this " again, and so on. The perceptual present is 
frequently spoken of as " the specious present " ; but 



TIME 303 

this term is unfortunate, for it implies that the enduring 
present of perception is not a real present. It is the real 
present of experience. We conclude, then, that the per- 
ceptual present has duration. Perceptual time is a per- 
ceived sequence-relation and the resultant aspect of 
duration. The perceptual time-unit is Many in One ; in 
respect of duration, it is one; in respect of succession, 
it is many. 

3. From the above, it appears that awareness of se- 
quence is fundamental to time-experience, and that the 
awareness of sequence gives an aspect of duration to the 
whole which is cognized. " A year ago to-day, I was in the 
rush and din of New York ; now I am tenting beside a quiet 
lake which is hidden in the Maine woods." Here is a cog- 
nized whole of experience ; and, in this whole, two stages 
of experience are distinguished. In the one stage, the sub- 
ject is having experience of New York city ; in the other, he 
has experience of the quiet Maine woods. In thinking 
about these stages, the subject relates them in respect of se- 
quence ; and he fixes the order of sequence by relating the 
New York stage to his present. In thus relating them he 
apprehends them as widely separated ; and, in his cognizing 
them as apart from each other, the whole has an aspect of 
duration. He assigns a measure to this duration ; he 
speaks of it as a year. Perceptual time is the sequence- 
relation of distinguished stages of experience and the 
aspect of duration which arises in the perception of this 
relation. The sequence is determined with reference to 
the present of the subject. If we abstract sequence and 
the duration from the cognized stages, we have perceptual 
time as a category. It is the form in which we cognize 
stages of experience, the form, therefore, in which we 
cognize change. 

§ 146. Conceptual Time. — Conceptual time bears a 



304 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

relation to perceptual time analogous to the relation of 
conceptual space to perceptual space. 

1. In conceptual time, the aspect of duration is ab- 
stracted from actual experience and is conceived as exist- 
ing by itself; briefly, conceptual time is abstract duration. 
An aspect is a characteristic of an objective whole, as 
that whole is perceived by the subject. The extensity of 
a surface or the length of an address is an aspect of the 
surface or the address, as experienced by one who sees 
the surface or hears the address. An aspect exists only 
in a particular cognition ; but conceptual time regards 
abstract duration as an individual real. It is conceived 
as an extended whole in which events and our experience 
of events and persons and things come to be. This ab- 
stract is the time of the Plain Man and the Scientist. 
It is not, however, treated as an abstract, or a concept; 
on the contrary, a sort of thinghood is accorded it. 
Teachers of Philosophy not infrequently speak of events 
and experiences as being in time. This is allowable if 
we are speaking of abstract, or conceptual, time ; but 
from the point of view of real time, the time of perceptual 
experience, experience is not in time, for time has its 
origin and being in experience. If we would keep in 
touch with concrete reality, and would speak with exact- 
ness, we may not say that objects are cognized in time; 
for time is in cognition. Hence when we speak of ex- 
perience as being in time, our statement is only true of 
conceptual time, time conceived as a condition of change. 

2. That the present of perception is an enduring pres- 
ent, is undisputed. The present of conceptual time is a 
mere time-point ; it has no duration ; quantitatively it is 
zero. It is the point of transition between duration which 
precedes and that which follows. 

3. The conceptual notion of time has value for Science 



TIME 305 

and for practical life. It enables us to relate events to 
any moment of the past or future. Perceptual time 
can only relate them to the present of the subject, to our 
personal " now." For example, in our calendar, events 
are related to the birth of Christ — so long before or after 
that moment of human experience. That is, conceptual 
time expresses time-relations in universal terms, terms 
which have like temporal significance to all subjects. 
Although time is generally thought of as mere duration, 
we give it concreteness in scientific thought and every-day 
intercourse ; and we must if it shall have value. We give 
it this concreteness by relating actual events in re- 
spect of sequence. " Columbus discovered America a.d. 
1492 " ; " The Jamestown colonists came to the Western 
world thirteen years before the Plymouth Pilgrims." 
These examples go to show that the time of actual experi- 
ence is an apprehended sequence-relation and an attend- 
ant aspect of duration ; it is not mere duration. 

§ 147. Is Time infinitely Divisible and Extended? — 
It is frequently said that time is infinitely divisible and 
infinite in duration. This statement is open to criticism. 

I. Perceptual time — and that is real time — is ob- 
viously not infinitely extended ; for we cannot have per- 
ceptual experience of infinite duration. Neither is it 
infinitely divisible. Perceptual time arises in awareness 
of succession ; this awareness is an element of perceptual 
experience. This is seen in the fact that the " now " of 
perceptual experience has duration. In the experience 
of any moment, there is awareness of two or more sequent 
phases of experience. If the moment be that of hearing 
a quick tap, in that instant we are aware of the relative 
silence before the tap and after the tap. The " present " 
experience is an experience of Many in One (§ 145, 2). 
Experimental psychology furnishes facts which are im- 



3o6 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

portant in this connection. If there are more than twenty 
changes to the second, vision cannot distinguish the in- 
dividual changes. More than forty changes to the second 
are not distinguishable by touch ; and more than loo taps 
to the second are heard as one tap. Although persons 
differ in their ability to distinguish rapidly repeated sen- 
sations, there is for every one a limit ; repeated changes 
of briefer duration than this minimum are continuous 
for perception. In such case, we cannot perceive a se- 
quence-relation. 

2. Conceptual time is infinitely divisible and infinite 
in duration. Since it is mere duration, it is conceived 
apart from perceived sequence-relation and, therefore, is 
not subject to the limitations of sense-experience. These 
characteristics of conceptual time signify that thought 
cannot set a limit to the beginning or the end of change, 
or to the number or duration of changes in the cosmos. 

§ 148. Time and Reality. — The time-element of ex- 
perience has its origin in our perception of changes in 
objective reality. Our personal interest leads us to in- 
dividualize stages of change in objects ; and we thus dis- 
tinguish parts of the change from one another. Objective 
reality is, in consequence, expressed in sequent revelations 
of itself. These distinguishable sequences in objective 
changes are the objective ground of time-experience. 
The same interest which leads us to individualize stages 
of objective change leads us also to individualize corre- 
sponding phases of experience. By reason of the in- 
dividualizing activity of the mind, objective change is 
perceived in sequent stages, and our experience has for us 
corresponding sequent stages. It is of the nature of mind 
to relate its objects ; it does this in order that it may dis- 
cover their import (§§ 104, 105). In relating the stages 
of change, both subjective and objective, there arises the 



TIME 307 

aspect of duration. From this It follows that the subjec- 
tive ground of time is the activity of the mind in relating 
changes in respect of their sequence. Time is an ex- 
pression of subject reality as revealed in its experience of 
objective reality. 

§ 149. The Non-temporal or Trans-temporal. — i. 
The Objective Ground of Time is Change. — Physical laws 
are unchangeable. Given certain events, we have a 
telephone system; given a certain relating of yourself, 
another person, and the system, you hold a conversation 
with the other person even though he be some miles dis- 
tant. The physical laws involved in these changes do 
not change. One may change the distance between two 
material objects ; but that will not affect the law of at- 
traction as related to those objects. The fundamental 
order of change in the physical universe is unchangeable. 
The relations between persons are subject to change; 
but the ethical principle which determines the duty of 
each of us with respect to others abides the same always. 
The same may be said of the law of identity in logic and 
principle of harmony in aesthetics ; they and physical and 
ethical laws are unchanging orders. These unchangeable 
laws and principles give order to the universe ; but for 
them it would be a chaos instead of a cosmos. The nature 
of reality is necessarily unchangeable; and its nature just 
as necessarily determines its laws of change; as a con- 
sequence, orderly change has its ground in the unchanging 
nature of reality. In other words, what is not temporal 
is the ground of time-experience. 

These unchanging principles have been commonly 
spoken of as non-temporal or timeless ; but these terms 
are not satisfactory. They are negative. They put the 
so-called non-temporal and the temporal out of relation 
to each other, whereas we have found that they are in- 



3o8 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

timately related. They set these unchanging principles 
in fundamental antithesis to the world of change ; but 
these principles and the changes which they order are 
expressions of the nature of reality, and reality is surely not 
divided against itself. We prefer the term trans-temporal; 
the trans-temporal determines the order of the temporal. 

2. Is a Trans-temporal Subject Conceivable? — Our 
" present " is limited. Much of our experience is " past " 
and has to be recalled if we would realize it now ; there are 
sequences in this instant which we cannot distinguish; 
and there is an undefined future of experience before each 
of us, and this future cannot come into our present con- 
sciousness. Our " present " experience is incomplete ; 
it is rendered incomplete by our limitations. We cannot 
call up all of the past at any instant ; we cannot distin- 
guish very rapid sequences, and we cannot realize the 
future. This incompleteness of experience makes it im- 
possible for us to understand the full significance of 
" present " experience. Every stage of the rational 
life of each of us is an organic part of the whole of ex- 
perience ; no stage can be fully understood except it be 
read in the light of the whole life. The student experi- 
ence has explanation for the years after college ; and 
future experience was for the student an ideal which largely 
determined the experience of the student years. There 
is that in the future experience of the child which reveals 
the significance of the present experience of the parents. 
The experience of the citizen finds explanation in the his- 
tory of the state, in incidents of this history which are 
unknown to the citizen. 

Now, it would be of the nature of an Absolute subject, 
a subject who is himself the source of all being and activity, 
to have a complete experience ; for all that exists would 
have its being from him. The incompleteness of our ex- 



TIME 309 

perience is not due to the fact that it is constituted of 
sequent moments. It comes of our limitations. The 
Absolute subject would conceivably cognize all the suc- 
cessive changes of the world as we cognize our " present " ; 
that is, he would have all sequences in a " present " con- 
sciousness. This would not preclude their appearing in 
succession; for succession is in our "now," so all suc- 
cession would be in the enduring " now " of the Absolute 
subject. The full significance of the experience of all of 
us would be revealed in the experience of this subject; 
for his experience, being complete, would include all that 
is. We believe that the ground reality of the universe 
is the Absolute subject. Being Absolute subject, he is 
trans-temporal ; and all that is temporal finds its ulti- 
mate explanation in him. 

§ 150. Conclusions. — Perceptual time is the time of 
particular perceptions. It is the perceived sequence- 
relation of individualized stages of change and the at- 
tendant aspect of duration. Perceptual time, as a form 
of cognition, — i.e. as a category, — is the sequence- 
relation and the duration, abstracted from the distin- 
guished stages of change. Conceptual time is mere 
duration. Perceptual time is fundamentally a relation 
and does not exist apart from distinguished moments of 
perception; conceptual time is regarded as having exist- 
ence by itself. Perceptual time is also an aspect of a 
perceived whole, an aspect having its being in a perceived 
sequence-relation. Conceptual time is this aspect con- 
ceptualized and then thought of as a substance, not an 
accident. In perceptual time, sequent stages of change 
are related to the " present " of the subject. This " pres- 
ent " is not a time-point, it is a time-line ; it has duration. 
In conceptual time, events may be related in respect of 
sequence to any moment of individual or universal history. 



3IO INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

The " present " of conceptual time is a time-point. Al- 
though time is commonly regarded as mere duration, in 
applying this conception to actual experience it ceases to 
be abstract and becomes a concrete aspect of related se- 
quent stages of experience. Perceptual time is not in- 
finite ; we cannot perceive infinite duration. It is not in- 
finitely divisible ; sequences may follow each other so 
rapidly that we cannot distinguish them. The infinite 
divisibility and duration of conceptual time signify that 
thought cannot set a point for the beginning or cessation 
of change, neither can it limit the number of possible 
changes or the duration of the universe. Objectively, time 
is grounded in the fact that reality, both subjective and 
objective, expresses itself in change; and particulars of 
change are necessarily successive. Subjectively, it is 
grounded in the individualizing and relating activity of 
the mind. Changes are orderly; and they are orderly 
because the principles which determine, and therefore 
condition, changes are themselves not subject to change. 
They are trans-temporal. These trans-temporal prin- 
ciples are an expression of the essential nature of reality; 
and this signifies that the activity of reality is by necessity 
orderly. Reality is in its essential nature trans-temporal 
and, therefore, unchangeable; but it is also active and 
expresses itself in change, in what gives time-experience. 
We have experience of what is trans-temporal; but our 
experience is temporal and incomplete. Its incomplete- 
ness and temporality do not come of the fact that ob- 
jective reality is expressed in succession ; it is due to our 
limited " present " ; and our " present " is limited because 
we are not self-subsistent, but are in a dependent relation 
to all that is. An Absolute subject, being self-subsistent, 
would be trans-temporal ; all succession would be compre- 
hended in his "present" ; his experience would be complete. 



CHAPTER XXXIII 

ACTIVITY, REST, AND MOTION 

§ 151. Activity. — i. We know ourselves as thinking, 
purposing, speaking, and doing. Your least knowledge of 
yourself is not that you are, hut that you are and are active. 
The being and being active are inseparable elements of this 
least knowledge. We may separate them in thought, by 
giving emphasis now to the being and again to the being 
active ; but both are always present in our knowledge of 
self. In other words, one never merely knows that he is ; 
he knows himself as active. Thinking and purposing 
activity is obviously internal to the self; it is immanent 
activity. Our speaking and working activity results in 
change which is external to the self; but the activity is 
within and of the self. This notion of activity is not a 
product of reflection; it is present in a subject's cognition 
of himself. That is, subject reality is known after the 
form, or under the category, of activity. 

2. " I wave my hand " and " I lift the book " express 
typical experiences in which I know myself as active. The 
notable fact for us is that, in these experiences, I refer the 
activity primarily to myself. The activity which results 
in the movement of the hand and the lifting of the book is 
thought of as within the subject. The spatial changes — 
the waving of the hand and the moving of the book — 
are thought of as the token and result of the subject's 
immanent activity. The changes which are apparent are 
the tokens of changes which are internal. This is true 
of the movements of animals and the changes which take 

311 



312 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

place in the growth of animals and plants. The shying of 
the horse, the flying of the bird, the barking of the dog, 
the leafing of the trees in spring are outer tokens and re- 
sults of immanent activity and change. The astounding 
transformations which are effected in the chemist's 
laboratory are tokens and results of internal changes in 
the substances with which he deals. This holds also for 
the integrating and disintegrating changes in nature. All 
change comes of activity, and all activity is fundamentally 
immanent. 

§ 152. Transeunt Activity. — So far we have repre- 
sented activity as essentially immanent, as immediately 
related to internal changes in reality. There are experi- 
ences, however, which seem to indicate that activity passes 
beyond the particular real. For example, a boy throws 
a ball. The " common-sense " interpretation of such an 
event is that something passes from the boy to the ball 
and imparts motion to the latter. Because the activity 
of the boy apparently goes beyond him to the ball, his 
activity in this instance is said to be transitive, or transeunt 
— occasionally transient. The usual explanation is that 
energy — or active power — is transmitted to the ball. 
But activity does not exist by itself; and it cannot, for 
activity is an attribute, not a thing. The same is true of 
energy. It is simply impossible that an attribute pass 
over, or be transmitted, from one object to another. 
Hence this interpretation must be rejected. Nevertheless 
it is obvious that the activity of the boy is intimately 
related to the change which takes place in the ball. There 
was energy in the boy and the ball before the boy threw 
the ball. The difference is that when the boy and the 
ball are related as they are in the act of throwing, the energy 
of the ball is expressed in the motion of the ball. A new 
relation is set up by the change in the activity of^the boy 



ACTIVITY, REST, AND MOTION 313 

in throwing, and there follows such an adjustment of the 
ball to the new relation as is necessary to preserve the har- 
mony of the system of which the boy and the ball are parts. 
The adjusting immanent activity of the ball is expressed, 
at least in part, in the movement of the ball. When a 
change is effected in the relation of objects, there is an ad- 
justing change in the activity of the objects ; and this 
change frequently becomes apparent. Transeunt activity 
is not activity in which energy passes over from one object 
to another. When we say that an object is transeuntly 
active, we mean that its activity is perceptibly related 
to changes in another object. 

§ 153. Rest. — We think of an object as at rest when, 
so far as we know, it is not changing Its spatial relations. 
Such an object is commonly thought to be Inactive ; but 
this conception confounds activity and movement. Move- 
ment is not activity ; It Is one result, but not the only result, 
of activity. All reality is active ; hence the mere fact 
that an object Is not changing its position-relations does 
not warrant us in speaking of it, or thinking of it, as in- 
active. Perceptible change In an object Is an indication 
of Internal change. Sometimes immanent activity ex- 
presses itself in changes which are unaccompanied by 
perceptible spatial change — as In the ripening of fruit, 
or In the case of cool water becoming warm by standing 
in a heated room. We judge an object to be at rest when 
its activity Is not expressed in known spatial change. 

The Important question for us is. What determines that 
an object shall be at rest ^ What determines that the 
mellowing apple on my desk shall be at rest, and that the 
hand with which I am writing shall be moving .? We have 
seen that movement is a token of internal change, and 
that sometimes it accompanies change and at other times 
it does not. It follows, then, that the internal changes 



314 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

of an object determine whether it shall appear to be at 
rest or not at rest. Every object is a part of the world 
system and is, at the same time, subject to change. It is 
evident that the preservation of the system requires a con- 
stant process of readjustment in the changing parts of 
the system (§§ no, 114). This readjustment is effected 
by the immanent activity of objects. In some instances 
this systematizing activity is apparent in movement, and 
sometimes it takes place without apparent change of 
spatial relations. Whether an object shall be at rest is 
determined by the systematizing activity of the reality 
of which the object is an expression. 

§ 154. Motion. — We have experience of objects in the 
process of changing their position-relations. So much of 
experience takes this form that most, if not all, of us 
accept the reality of motion without question. But the 
Eleatics doubted its reality ; and there have been teachers 
since who have held that motion is irrational. We will 
consider the principal objections which have been urged 
against holding that motion is real. 

I. Zeno argued that a body, in moving from one point 
to another, must pass through an infinite number of spaces ; 
but it would require infinite time to pass through an in- 
finite number of positions, hence motion is impossible. 
Others have conceived the line passed over to be divided 
in half; then the half farthest from the starting point 
is divided in half ; then the farther quarter is thus divided ; 
and so on. This converts the line into a series which has 
no last term ; and it is argued that, as there is no defin- 
able last point in the line, the end of the line can never 
be reached. Again, a like division of the first half is con- 
ceived, and of the first quarter, and the first eighth, and 
so on. From this it is argued that there is no definable 
first point after the point of beginning; hence motion 



ACTIVITY, REST, AND MOTION 315 

cannot begin. The inference from such objections is 
that motion is irrational. 

But these objections misconceive both space and time. 
It is assumed that the extensity between two points is an 
aggregate of an infinite number of infinitesimal spaces ; 
that is, this perceived space is thought of as a totality. 
These objectors would constitute space of an infinite num- 
ber of discrete particulars. This is a serious misconcep- 
tion ; the line passed over and the time taken to pass over 
it are both of them continuous. It may be convenient 
to think them broken up into discrete parts ; but, as a 
matter of fact, they are not the total of discrete particu- 
lars. Extensity is a flux, not a series of discrete terms ; 
so also is duration. They increase from within ; and thus 
differ radically from the total of a series, for the series in- 
creases from without. The extensity between any two 
positions is a unit ; so also is the duration of an experience 
and a sequent experience. A unit " is an original one, 
not a totality." These objections will not stand ; they 
misconceive space and time. 

2. Zeno presented another argument which ran thus : 
A body which is at rest is in one place. " An arrow in its 
flight is, at each successive moment, in one place ; there- 
fore it is at rest." In this we have the same misconcep- 
tion of space and time as that in the objections already 
discussed ; and we might dismiss it with this criticism, 
but we wish to call attention to another defect in this 
reasoning. Motion is continuous change of place; it Is, 
therefore, not true that the flying arrow " is at each suc- 
cessive moment in one place." As a matter of fact, the 
arrow is at each successive moment passing through some 
place. To be in is apparently consonant with rest ; but 
to be -passing through is only consonant with motion. This 
objection falls, because it is based upon misrepresentation 
of an essential fact. 



3i6 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

3. One other objection remains to be noticed. It is 
this : The fleet-footed Achilles cannot overtake the slow 
tortoise ; because, when Achilles arrives at the place 
occupied by the tortoise when he set out, the tortoise will 
have moved forward ; and this will necessarily continue 
to infinity. Here we have the same misconception of 
space and time that was the basis of the objections first 
considered. They are transformed from unities into to- 
talities and are treated as though they were aggregations 
of discrete particulars. All these objections have their 
origin in failure to recognize the radical difference be- 
tween a continuous whole and a sum of discrete terms. A 
continuous whole and a total of distinct terms may be 
equal in measure ; but, when we argue as though the con- 
tinuous were the same as a total, we are in danger of draw- 
ing unwarranted conclusions. 

§ 155. Conclusions. — It is of the nature of reality to 
be active. Perceptible change in an object is an expres- 
sion of internal change. Some perceptible changes are 
changes in spatial relations ; changes in position-relations 
are the expression to sense of internal changes and are, 
in consequence, manifestations of internal changes. 
Whether an object shall appear to be at rest or in motion 
is determined by the immanent activity of the object; 
and the form of its Immanent activity is determined by 
the relation of the object to the system of which it is a part. 
Transeunt activity is not activity in which an attribute 
or a state of one object is transmitted to another object. 
All activity is immanent; and, inasmuch as the activity 
of an object is sometimes perceptibly related to changes In 
another object, this experience has led to the conception 
of transmitted activity ; the term transeunt activity arose 
from this conception. The changes in the object to which 
the activity appears to pass over are due to the adjusting 



ACTIVITY, REST, AND MOTION 317 

immanent activity of this same object. Its relations have 
been changed, and this change forces a new adjustment of 
the object to all that is. This adjusting activity frequently 
expresses itself in perceptible spatial changes ; and known 
objects are perceived to be in motion. Motion is real ; 
it is grounded in the systematizing activity of reality. 
The reasons assigned for holding that motion is unreal and 
that our perceptions of motion are illusions are based upon 
a misconception of space and time. The objections prof- 
fered conceive a particular extensity or duration to be a 
total of discrete particulars, whereas it is a continuous 
whole. 



CHAPTER XXXIV 

CAUSALITY 

§ 156. Origin of the Idea of Cause. — i. We have 
experience of ourselves as acting and of our activity as 
leading to changes In the external world. The child soon 
learns that crying will secure attention. How little or how 
much thought the child gives to this we may not safely 
undertake to say ; but we are assuredly justified In saying 
that the earliest self-consciousness has In It experience of 
the self affecting the objective world. Doubtless this 
element of experience Is not consciously distinguished at 
first ; but it Is a part of experience, and early In our con- 
scious life we conclude that our doing brings events to 
pass outside the mere self. We have no doubt but that 
we open and close the door, that we determine the arrange- 
ment of articles In the room. The matter of interest for 
us here Is that we believe we effect changes in the province 
of the not-self. From this point of view, our life Is an ex- 
tension of the self into the objective world ; and In so 
projecting ourselves into the external world, we conclude 
that we effect changes there. " I tore down the wall," 
"I built the house," — in these and similar statements, 
we assert that we Influence the course of events. We 
are certain that we do not merely act, but that our activity 
is a factor In bringing changes to pass In objective reality. 

2. We also have experience of being limited in our 
doing by what Is not self. We find that the nature of 
objects, their way of behaving, limits our determination 
of changes. A potter learns that clays differ and that 

318 



CAUSALITY 319 

his treatment of clay must be adapted to the peculiarities 
of that which he is handling. If you would bend a glass 
rod and not break it, you must heat it. We often find 
ourselves restrained when we endeavor to shape the course 
of events ; and sometimes we are coerced — as when the 
struggling boatman is swept over the falls. Our doing is 
conditioned by physical laws and by other selves. The 
inventor of the telephone determined the ideal coordina- 
tion of objects for this form of distance-speaking ; 
the maker of the instrument and the person who installs 
the system determine the actual coordination ; and those 
who use the instrument determine the messages. But 
the inventor, the maker of the instrument, and the man 
who installs the system are conditioned by physical laws ; 
their activities must be adapted to these laws. The 
activity of one who would use the instrument is conditioned 
by those who serve in the central exchange, not to speak 
of others. Our doing is conditioned by those with whom 
we are related in our endeavor to carry out our purposes. 
3. The uncritical interpretation of these experiences — 
experiences in which we determine changes and are con- 
ditioned in our activity — involves the notion of causality. 
This naive interpretation may be erroneous ; but whether 
correct or incorrect it is an element of experience and is, 
therefore, subject-matter for our study. We apparently 
interfere in the movements of the objective world ; and we 
seem to make changes to suit our purposes. We move 
things from where they were to where we would have 
them be; and, in lifting them about, we overcome their 
persistent pull toward the earth. Our practical life 
is made up of such apparent interferences in nature and 
resistance of its tendencies. In all this, we think of our- 
selves as acting upon the objects with which we deal and 
causing changes in them ; and we also think of the objects 



320 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

as acting upon us and causing changes In our feelings. 
When you lift the window, you think of yourself as causing 
the change in its position ; when it falls upon your hand, 
you think of the window as causing your discomfort. Men 
naturally and inevitably apply this interpretation to 
changes In the external world of which they are percipients, 
but to which they are not more directly related. We see 
a stone fall upon a toy, and the toy Is broken. We pro- 
ject our experience, as we Interpret it, Into the objective 
world and apply it in explanation of what has taken place ; 
and we think of the stone as acting upon the toy and caus- 
ing the change in It. 

4. A certain characteristic of Intelligence insures the 
development of the notion of causality : this characteristic 
is the mind's insistent demand for a sufficient reason why 
an occurrence takes place. It Is a principle of rationality 
that nothing occurs but that " there Is a sufficient reason 
why It should occur rather than not." The mind begins 
in the early stages of Its development to ask for a sufficient 
reason for occurrences. The child asks, " Why does It 
thunder .? " or " What makes thorns grow on rose-bushes ? " 
and Innumerable other questions quite as puzzling. These 
are Inquiries for cause. The myths of primitive peoples 
are the outcome of endeavor to set forth a reason for the 
common and the unusual occurrences In nature ; this 
endeavor has resulted in these fanciful answers to ques- 
tions of cause respecting the origin of the world and man, 
and the varied natural phenomena. We are constantly 
framing causal judgments ; and these judgments are for 
us satisfactory answers to the rational demand for a 
sufficient reason why events should take place. The ac- 
tivity of scientists in their search for natural laws and their 
formulation of these laws Is an endeavor to respond to this 
insistent request of Intelligence. The law of causation is, 



CAUSALITY 321 

as Bosanquet has said, a " subform " of the law of Suffi- 
cient Reason. 

§ 157. Conceptions of Cause. — i. Causality presents 
one of the most complex of philosophical problems. Much 
of the diificulty which attends its consideration arises from 
the ambiguity which attaches to the term " cause." All 
of us connect events causally in our thought. We insist 
that the stroke of the broom-handle knocked the vase off 
the mantel ; and, when we do not know the cause of a 
phenomenon, — as the Northern Lights, — we still believe 
that it is caused. But what do we mean b}^ " cause " ? 
In the course of thought upon this subject differing con- 
ceptions of cause have developed. 

(i) The boy says he is crying because his foot hurts, and 
that his foot hurts because a stone fell on it. He is con- 
necting changes causally ; he says that the falling of the 
stone has injured his foot, and that the change in the foot 
is causing him pain. The cause is, for him, the antecedent 
occurrence ; the falling of the stone is the antecedent 
event of which the injured foot and the pain are conse- 
quents. The electric button was pressed, and the dyna- 
mite which the miners had placed in the rocks exploded. 
The pressing of the button was the antedecent occurrence, 
or cause ; the torn rocks are the consequent event, or effect. 
The scientist would describe what took place in greater 
detail ; but his description would agree in principle with 
this. For him the cause is an antecedent event, and the 
effect Is an event consequent upon the antecedent. This 
conception of cause is variously named. It is known as 
the scientific, mechanical, physical, empirical, or phenom- 
enal conception of cause ; or more briefly as scientific, 
empirical, or phenomenal cause. 

(2) But it is evident that the empirical cause of an event 
is not a final explanation of why it occurs. Why did the 

Y 



322 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

stone fall ? How did the stone come to be ? These 
questions obviously lead us back toward the source of all 
that is not self-existent. In seeking a sufficient reason 
why anything is or why an event occurs, we are seeking 
the ground of all being and change. To distinguish this 
conception of cause from that described above, it has been 
called the metaphysical cause, the ultimate cause, the 
ultimate ground, or simply the Ground. In keeping with 
this last term, Theists are wont to speak of God as the 
Ground of Being and Activity. They hold that the com- 
plete explanation of being and occurrences is to be found 
in God. 

(3) There is another view of cause, which we shall call 
the naive metaphysical doctrine of cause. It will be more 
particularly described later in this chapter. 

2. We have not given a full definition of these concep- 
tions in what is said above ; we have merely indicated 
their distinguishing marks. Although these conceptions 
differ, there is that which they have in common — viz., 
that an event occurs because of somewhat else than the 
event itself. This notion is the category of cause ; it 
is present in our thought of things as coming to be and in 
our thought of events. 

§ 158. Phenomenal Cause. — i. You see a portion of 
a limb fall from a tree upon a telephone wire, and the wire 
is broken. As you perceive this occurrence, you have 
experience of a falling limb and of the wire being broken. 
In your perception of this event, you regard the falling 
limb as the cause, and the broken wire as the effect. You 
might speak of the limb as the cause ; but a more critical 
consideration shows that what you take to be the cause is 
not the limb, but the limb's falling. That is, the im- 
mediate cause is an event, not a thing or a person. My 
pen is not itself the cause of this writing; it is the event 



CAUSALITY 323 

of my using the pen. The immediate effect is a change 
in the appearance of this sheet ; that is also an event. 
In both these instances, we perceive two intimately re- 
lated occurrences. In our thought of these occurrences, 
that which is first in time is regarded as a cause, and the 
second as effect. In other words, we relate them causally. 
The fact that the effect is perceived as consequent upon 
the cause has led to our calling the first of two causally 
related occurrences, the antecedent ; and the second, the 
consequent. In phenomenal cause, antecedent and con- 
sequent are equivalent respectively to cause and effect. 
Those who hold this conception of cause often apply the 
term cause to a person or thing ; e.g. the limb and the 
pen would be spoken of as cause, and I would be taken to 
be the cause of my pen's movements. This is permissible, 
perhaps ; but it is certainly inexact, for the antecedent 
and consequent are events or changes, not persons or 
things. 

2. From the above, it might seem that we are wont to 
think that all perceived sequence is causal ; that, if one 
event is perceived to be immediately consequent upon 
another, they are thought to be causally related. Not 
so, however. Day follows upon night ; yet no one thinks 
that the occurring of night is the cause of day. The shin- 
ing of the sun upon any portion of the earth's surface is 
the antecedent of day; and the intervening of the body 
of the earth between any portion of its surface and the 
sun is the antecedent, or cause, of night. Night and day 
are distinct consequents, or effects ; each has its own cause. 
Given the sun shining upon any part of the earth, it must 
be day at that part ; given the earth intervening between 
any place and the sun, it must be night at that place. 
From this we conclude that the cause of any event is that 
antecedent event which is necessary to the occurrence of 



^24 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

the consequent. To put it otherwise : of two causally 
related events, that much of the antecedent event is 
cause or part of the cause, whose non-recurrence would 
mean the non-recurrence of the consequent event. Mill 
speaks of the cause as " the unconditional invariable 
antecedent " ; and Bain explains this as meaning that 
the cause is " the sole sufficing circumstance whose pres- 
ence makes the effect, and whose absence arrests it." 

3. What we have said thus far would seem to indicate 
that, for the Phenomenal conception of cause, a cause is 
a simple event. In actual experience this is seldom, if 
ever, the case. Take, for example, the instance of a boy 
throwing a ball through a window and breaking a pane of 
glass. To duplicate this occurrence, so much at least as 
the following would be required : the boy must be in ex- 
actly the same position-relation to the glass, he must 
give the stone exactly the same initial momentum, and 
the stone must hit the glass with the same portion of its 
irregular surface. All these particulars are elements of the 
antecedent and enter into the determination of the con- 
sequent. It is evident that the cause is not the simple 
fact of a stone's hitting a pane of glass ; it is a complex of 
antecedents or, as one has put it, " a concurrence of an- 
tecedents." 

4. Phenomenal, or empirical, cause does not know of 
any objective causal bond uniting events which are 
thought to be causally related. It deals only with what is 
perceived, and we do not perceive any causal bond. You 
see apples falling from a tree which a man is shaking. 
What you perceive is a man shaking the tree and the apples 
falling. But In perceiving these two occurrences, you 
judge that the apples fall because of what the man is 
doing. You perceive the events ; and. In the act of per- 
ceiving, you think the causal relation. This is true in 



CAUSALITY 325 

all cognition of relations (§ 104, 3). In space-experience, 
we perceive material objects ; and, in perceiving them, we 
think their position-relation — before, behind, above, 
below, etc. Similarly in causal experience, when I see 
the stone strike the glass and the glass break, I perceive 
the throwing, the stone flying, and the glass breaking; 
and I think the thrown stone to be the cause of the glass 
breaking. We do not perceive a causal bond ; we per- 
ceive events and we relate them causally, because we think 
that one of them, the consequent, comes to be because of 
the other, the antecedent. According to this conception 
of causality, antecedent and consequent are subjectively, 
not objectively, united. 

5. It is essential to phenomenal cause that the ante- 
cedent and the consequent shall be regarded as distinct 
occurrences, as events which are not objectively connected. 
They are conceived to be connected in our thought, but 
not in the external world. This conception of causality 
is based upon the doctrine that we are not to affirm any- 
thing respecting an experience which is not present to 
sense-perception. The causal event and the caused 
event are perceived as distinct phenomena; and, ac- 
cording to this doctrine, we are to regard them as separate 
events, not merely distinguishable occurrences. For 
sense-experience, the pushing of the button and the 
shining of the electric lamp are independent events. 
Those who hold this conception of causality insist that 
these occurrences are really separate occurrences. We 
think of them as connected ; but those who hold the view 
we are considering declare that the notion that events are 
objectively linked by a causal bond is simply a developed 
mental habit. It would be foreign to our present purpose 
to set forth in detail the arguments by which it is sought 
to sustain this contention. The important fact for us is, 



326 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

that cause and effect are regarded as wholly external to 
each other, as distinct and Independent. 

§ 159. Is Phenomenal Cause Adequate? — Is the con- 
ception of cause which we have considered In the preceding 
section adequate ? Is It an adequate statement of ex- 
perience as It Is expressed In causal judgments ? We do 
not ask whether It can answer all questions which may be 
raised In this connection. What we wish to know Is 
whether it Is true to thought and to objective reality. 

I. This conception of causality meets the requirements 
of practical life. Men put capital and labor into the 
construction of telephone Instruments and the connecting 
of them in a system. They do this because they believe 
that by relating the parts of the Instrument In a certain 
way and by connecting the instruments according to 
certain principles, desired results will be obtained : per- 
sons will be able to converse at a distance. Whether 
there Is any causal bond linking the speaking into one 
instrument with the hearing at another instrument. Is 
not a matter of practical consequence to those who con- 
struct the system, or to the man of business who uses It. 
They probably believe that there is such a bond ; but, 
apart from this. It is sufficient for them that the antici- 
pated consequent follows upon the antecedent. So in all 
the every-day activities of men. When they discover 
that a certain effect follows upon a certain known ante- 
cedent, they conclude that, given the same complex of 
antecedents, they will have the same result. The matter 
of absorbing Interest to them Is the sequence of the effect 
upon the antecedent; what makes it follow Is of passing 
interest to a few — a matter of curiosity, rather than a 
fact of practical value. 

The Scientist is satisfied with this conception of caus- 
ality. He deals with the orderly succession of changes ; 



CAUSALITY 327 

and he seeks an accurate and detailed description of 
changes in consciousness and the external world. When 
he concludes that an occurrence is the invariable and nec- 
essary antecedent of another occurrence, he regards the 
antecedent event as the cause of the consequent event. 
He does not undertake to discover the nature of the causal 
bond, whether it is objective or subjective; he is content 
to know that the antecedent is the invariable and neces- 
sary prius of the consequent. Cause is for him the orderly 
connection of phenomena. It is his aim to trace this con- 
nection, to discover the essential elements of the connec- 
tion, and to state the order in a formula which will hold 
for all events of a defined class. These general statements 
are our scientific laws — e.g. the law of gravitation in 
physics and the law of association In psychology. Further 
than this the scientist does not need to go ; hence phe- 
nomenal cause is for him an adequate conception of 
causality. 

2. But is it an adequate conception for Philosophy } 
That Is the Important question for us ; and we think It 
must be answered in the negative. Take the following 
example : I push a button and the electric lamp glows. 
According to phenomenal cause, we have two occurrences, 
and the causal relation consists simply in this, that the 
pushing of the button Is the Invariable and necessary an- 
tecedent of the lighting of the lamp. For It, the pushing 
of the button is a complete fact, and the shining of the 
lamp Is another complete fact. But If we regard the 
pushing of the button a complete fact, we have no right 
to speak of it as the cause of anything. In conceiving It 
to be the cause of another event, that other event is taken 
to be significant for the pushing of the button; it Is es- 
sential to a complete statement of what the pushing of 
the button signifies in the external world. When we say 



328 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

that It is the cause of the lamp's being lighted, we so con- 
nect it with the lighted lamp that It Is In our thought 
incomplete apart from the change In the lamp. 

When we think of the antecedent event in the above 
illustration as the cause of the consequent event, we think 
of them as causally related ; the two events are then known 
to us as the Interdependent terms of a relation. The unit 
of thought includes both occurrences : the pushing of the 
button and the lighting of the lamp. If we separate 
these occurrences and regard them as discrete and sever- 
ally complete, we have destroyed the relation (§ 104, 1,2). 
For thought, cause and effect are necessarily in a whole 
which Includes both. This whole Is a thought-unit ; 
and, being such, it is more than the succession of its parts. 
Mere succession, even though It be invariable and nec- 
essary succession, cannot constitute the " oneness " 
which is an essential characteristic of a relation. Phe- 
nomenal cause is philosophically Inadequate, for It Is 
untrue to the nature of a whole ; It conceives a whole to 
be a totality Instead of a " one." 

3. The preceding discussion makes It evident that phe- 
nomenal cause is an Inadequate conception of the subjective 
factor in causal experience. It also fails to give a satis- 
factory account of the objective factor. Change Is con- 
tinuous ; it is not constituted of discrete terms. The 
pushing of the button and the shining of the lamp " are 
earlier and later stages In a process which is continuous." 
Leading physicists and philosophers are agreed as to this. 
It Is a characteristic of continuity that. If any two portions 
of It lie wholly outside each other, what lies between these 
mutually exclusive parts is Itself part of the continuity. 
All that comes between the putting forth of my hand and 
the lighting of the lamp Is an unbroken process which goes 
continuously forward from the reaching forth of my hand 



CAUSALITY 329 

to the lighting of the room. We may not truly say of any 
stage of it, " Here the antecedent is complete," or " Here 
the consequent begins " ; cause and effect are in every 
moment of it. We individuate stages of the process ; 
and we do this the more readily because some moments 
of it are recognized by sense-perception. Our individuat- 
ing activity gives an aspect of discontinuity to what is 
really continuous. For much of thought and practical 
life, no difficulty will arise from our regarding it as dis- 
continuous, from our thinking of the whole as constituted 
of separate events ; but such a conception of the objective 
reality is inexact and will not satisfy the requirements of 
Philosophy. 

4. Those who hold that phenomenal cause is an ade- 
quate conception of causality admit that cause and effect 
are sometimes simultaneous. The formation of water 
by the union of hydrogen and oxygen in the proportion of 
two to one, is an example. Since it is essential to this 
conception of causality that the antecedent and consequent 
shall be regarded as independent events, the formation of 
water and the combining of oxygen and hydrogen in the 
proportion stated are to be taken as separate occurrences. 
But this is obviously untrue to the fact. We have one 
event : from one point of view, it is the combining of hy- 
drogen and oxygen ; from another, it is the formation of 
water. The cause and the effect are not distinct events. 
If we accept that the union of the hydrogen and the 
oxygen is the cause, the cause and the effect are simply 
distinguishable elements of one event. This agrees with 
what we found above in our discussion of causally related 
occurrences in which the phenomenal cause and. effect are 
perceived in succession. In that case, cause and effect 
are distinguishable elements of one occurrence. By so 
much, then, as the phenomenal conception of causality 



330 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

regards cause and effect as distinct events, it is philosophi- 
cally inadequate. 

§ i6o. The Naive Metaphysical Conception of Caus- 
ality. — We will approach the study of this view of caus- 
ality by comparing it with phenomenal cause. 

1. The tendency of this conception of causality is to 
regard the cause as a person or thing; whereas phenom- 
enal cause finds it in an event. The uncritical view is 
evidenced in such statements as the following : " He 
caused the disturbance " ; " The wreck was caused by 
a defective rail." If one should ask, What causes the 
engine to move ^ many, if not most, persons would say, 
" Steam." Thus conceived, a cause is a person or a 
thing. Sitting down at your desk to write, you find it 
necessary to clear a space, and you push a dictionary 
aside. For the phenomenal view of causality, the cause 
is the moving of your hand ; for the naive view the cause 
is either your hand or you. Those who hold these differing 
views do not always preserve this distinction. Mill, 
one of the clearest exponents of scientific cause, sometimes 
speaks of an object as a cause; and those who prefer the 
view discussed In this section would not object to the 
statement, " The bursting of the gun caused his death." 
Despite their apparent agreement, these views of causality 
differ at this point ; and the difference is fundamental. 
For the phenomenal conception of causality, the cause is 
essentially an event ; for the naive conception, the cause 
is a person or thing in process of change. 

2. These views differ also as to the objective reality 
of the causal bond. According to phenomenal cause, the 
cause in any instance Is merely a relation between ideas, 
not an objective linking of objects and events ; objectively, 
it Is simply the invariable temporal conjunction of a cer- 
tain necessary antecedent and its consequent. But 



CAUSALITY 331 

the uncritical believe that, In seeking the cause of an 
occurrence, they are seeking something more than a fixed 
order of events. When they find what they believe to 
be the cause, they are certain that they have discovered 
what has actual objective connection with the affected 
object; they are certain that they have found what pro- 
duces the effect. This conception of cause is so fixed in 
the thought of men that thinkers who Insist that phe- 
nomenal cause Is an adequate conception write In terms of 
the uncritical view. Hume says In one place, " The ob- 
servation of this resemblance produces a new Impression 
upon the mind." The term " produces " implies more 
than that " the Impression " is Invariably consequent upon 
" the observation." Bain, also a phenomenalist, speaks 
of the causal antecedent as that circumstance " whose 
presence makes the effect." The important fact for us 
is that the naive metaphysical view accords with that 
conception of cause which seems to be established In the 
thought of men, viz. the notion that the cause makes the 
effect. We do not say that this notion is philosophically 
acceptable ; we are merely reporting a fact. 

3. Another characteristic of this view remains to be 
stated. A billiard ball Is struck by a cue and set In motion ; 
it impinges upon another ball, and the second ball moves. 
According to the naive view, the motion or the momentum 
or an undefined somewhat which was In the first ball Is 
communicated to the second ball. To state it In general 
terms : something which Is in the causal object passes 
over to the affected object and produces the change in the 
latter. The transition of the force or motion or of some 
quality of the thrown stone Is thought to constitute the 
stone a cause and to produce the change In the glass which 
was broken. The important fact for us is that this view 
tries to find an actual objective ground for the objective 



332 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

change. It finds this ground In the transition of some 
quality of the causal object to the object which is affected. 
§ i6i. Is the Naive Metaphysical View of Causality 
Adequate.'' — Does it meet the requirements of critical 
thought ? We think not. 

1 . It is Incomplete for Single Events. — This view con- 
ceives one object — the cause — as active and another 
object as acted upon. These objects are thought to be 
causally related in only one direction, from the cause to 
the object in which the perceived effect takes place. This 
is an incomplete representation of what occurs. When a 
billiard ball in motion strikes another ball, change occurs 
in the striking ball as well as in that which is struck ; as a 
result of the contact, the momentum of the striking ball 
is lessened and its direction Is frequently altered. If it 
be true that the rain has some effect upon the earth, it is 
quite as true that the earth has some effect upon the water 
which falls. The sunlight warms the stone ; and the physi- 
cist insists that this process effects a change in the energy 
of the sunlight. If the billiard ball and the rain and the 
sunlight are active, so also are the second ball, the earth 
and the stone. This agrees with what we found in our 
study of the phenomenal conception of causality : cause 
and effect are both of them elements of every moment of 
an occurrence ; they are inseparable. The causal relation 
is reciprocal ; of two objects thus related, both are causes, 
and effects take place in both. 

2. The Nciive View errs in its Conception of the Causal 
Bond. — It conceives the bond between cause and effect 
to be the transition of some attribute, quality, or state of 
the causal object to the object in which the effect takes 
place. What was said in our discussion of motion (§ 152) 
is pertinent to the matter in hand. It is impossible that 
an attribute, quality, or state of one object shall be trans- 



CAUSALITY 333 

mined to another. The accidents of an object are an 
expression of its reality; they are that object's own, and 
they exist in it and only in it ; they are not transmissible. 
The objective causal bond of the naive view has no exist- 
ence. The objects in connection with which any event 
takes place are parts of the one world-system. If any part 
of a system be essentially changed, such change will ne- 
cessitate a related adjusting change in other parts. If the 
size of a wheel of a watch or the number of teeth in it were 
altered, it would be necessary to effect adjusting altera- 
tions in other parts of the train ; otherwise our collection 
of wheels and springs would cease to be a time-keeping 
system. Causally related changes in the universe are 
adjusting changes in the world-system. In any instance 
selected by us, what we regard as the effect is an element 
of the change to which we give emphasized attention. The 
effect is not due to transmitted motion, force, or quality, 
but to the adjusting immanent activity of the object in 
which the effect is exhibited. 

§ 162. The Complete Ground. — We have concluded 
that the phenomenal and naive conceptions of causality 
are inadequate. We now take up the third conception, 
i.e. the conception of cause as the complete Ground of 
all that is. 

I. There is a particular, not yet considered by us, in 
which both the phenomenal and naive conceptions are 
philosophically inadequate ; and our study will be fur- 
thered if we shall now attend to this particular. If an 
event takes place because of a previous event, it Is obvious 
that this previous event owes its having occurred to some 
event which Is its antecedent. From this it follows that 
our search for a sufficient reason for any occurrence takes 
us endlessly backward ; for, go so far back as we may, we 
must ask respecting the last causal event, " What Is the 



334 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

reason for its occurrence ? " To put it briefly, our search 
leads us back through endless regression. This is true 
also of persons or things regarded as causes. The be- 
ginning of an object is an event; and, in seeking a suffi- 
cient reason for this event, the naive conception can do 
no better than name another object whose beginning was 
also an event. This commits us to an endless regression. 
The root of the difficulty is in the conception of cause 
common to both these views. They seek the explanation 
of everything in something else than the thing itself. 
This sets us upon a regression which this method cannot 
arrest. The regression could only be arrested if we could 
arrive at that which is itself the explanation of all that is ; 
but we cannot do that, for the cause is in each instance a 
particular of the universe and cannot possibly be inclusive 
of the whole. 

Instead of seeking the ground of particular events or 
objects, — a ground which is incomplete, for it is not self- 
explanatory, — we do better to begin with the Ground of 
the universe. The Ground-Reality of the universe is 
necessarily self-subsistent ; and, being self-subsistent, it 
is self-explanatory. Our experience has taught us that 
this. Reality's expression of itself is coherent and orderly 
— i.e. self-consistent and systematic. Such a Ground 
would have in it the full explanation of the universe. 
The Ground-Reality of the cosmos, the Ground of all 
Being and Change, is the only adequate answer to the 
demand of intelligence for a sufficient reason for all that 
is. This Ground is not a particular temporal reality; it 
is necessarily the Absolute Trans-temporal Reality. 

2. What are the attributes of the Ground t (i) It 
must be Being which, in being, is active. It cannot be an 
event ; for there cannot be an event apart from Being. 
Hence it must be concrete Being. Activity is of the nature 



CAUSALITY 335 

of reality, or concrete Being; given concrete reality, it 
acts (§ 8 1, 2). In other words, it is self-subsistently dy- 
namic. The sufficient reason for the being and activity of 
the Ground-Reality is the Ground itself. Since the source 
of the activity of the Ground is in the Ground, it must be 
self-determined ; and change has its origin in the self- 
determination of the Ground. The law of causation 
objectively regarded is the orderly and efficient adjust- 
ment of the particulars of the universe to changes. This 
adjustment — i.e. the law of causation — is an expression 
of the activity, hence also of the nature, of the Ultimate 
Reality. 

(2) It must be Individual. In our discussion of In- 
dividuality, we concluded (§118, i) that whatever has 
distinct being, is individual ; that is most markedly in- 
dividual which is least determined by " the other." The 
stone appears to be determined wholly from outside itself ; 
in the plant, there is something of inner directivity; in 
the animal, still more. The animal has a greater degree 
of individuality than the plant; and the plant is more 
individual than the stone. Man is self-determined, even 
though his activity is conditioned by the nature of that 
with which he deals ; and we accord to man more indi- 
viduality than to animal, plant, or stone. The more 
evident any man's self-directivity, the greater his relative 
independence of his age, or of his family and racial in- 
heritance, the more pronounced is his individuality. The 
individual which is not dependent upon anything apart 
from itself for its activity or its being, is the perfect in- 
dividual. The Complete Reality, the Ground of all 
Being and Activity, being self-subsistent and self-deter- 
mined, is the Absolute Individual. 

§ 163. Conclusions. — i. The idea of cause is grounded 
subjectively in our belief (i) that we effect changes in 



336 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

the external world, (2) that our activity and our feelings 
are conditioned by the external world ; and (3) in the de- 
mand of intelligence for a sufficient reason why any event 
occurs rather than not. It is grounded objectively in the 
adjusting activity of objects. If an essential change 
takes place in any object, adjustment of other objects 
becomes necessary ; only thus can the system in which 
these objects have their reality be preserved. 

2. The phenomenal conception of cause relates events 
to events. It defines cause as the invariable necessary 
antecedent of the effect, or consequent. This view does 
not recognize any objective causal bond connecting an- 
tecedent and consequent. Causality is purely subjective; 
its only ground is the developed habit of accounting that 
such an antecedent produces the effect. The antecedent 
and consequent are regarded as distinct occurrences. This 
conception answers the requirements of Science and of 
our workday relations with the objective world; but we 
deem it philosophically inadequate, because 

(i) It is untrue to the subject-aspect of the causal 
relation. Viewed thus, cause and effect are in a whole ; 
that is, they are two in one. But phenomenal cause regards 
the whole as the aggregation of the two ; and, in thinking 
thus, it makes the unit of thought a " totality " instead 
of a unit. 

(2) It is untrue to the objective reality. It thinks of 
cause and effect as external to each other, as distinct 
events ; whereas they are inseparable elements of one 
occurrence. The occurrence is a process, and cause and 
effect are in every moment of the process. 

3. The naive view of causality relates a causal object to 
another object, one in which the causal object effects a 
change. It holds that the change is produced by the 
transition of some accident of the causal object to the 



CAUSALITY 337 

affected object. This conception recognizes an objective 
linking of the cause to the affected object. This view 
is not satisfactory, because 

(i) It fails to recognize that the causal relation is re- 
ciprocal; that when two objects are causally related, both 
are causes, and effects take place in both. 

(2) Its assumed causal bond does not exist; an acci- 
dent cannot pass from one object to another. The change 
which occurs in the affected object is the effect of the im- 
manent activity of this same object, adjusting itself to the 
phange which has taken place in the causal object. Such 
related adjustment follows necessarily, for the two objects 
are parts of one system. 

4. We decline to accept either of the above views for 
another reason : they can never lead us to a final reason 
why an event occurs rather than not. The reason which 
they may assign for an effect calls for explanation by some- 
thing other than itself ; and so on endlessly. The com- 
pletely sufficient reason will be self-explanatory and will 
comprehend within itself the sufficient reason for all that 
Is. This ultimate reason must be the Ground of the whole. 
This Ground-Reality is self-subsistent, self-determined, 
active Being. It is the Absolute Individual, the Ground 
of all Being and Activity. 



r" 



CHAPTER XXXV 

FINALITY 

§ 164. Finality in Individual Experience. — You sit at 

your desk intent upon study. Having reached a resting 
point, you notice confused sounds which appear to be 
caused by a crowd on the street. You go to the window 
and perceive a street-piano playing and a bevy of children 
laughing and dancing. In going to the window, you 
directed your activity to an end — the discovery of the 
cause of the noise. You were also directing your mental 
activity in the study that preceded your rising from the 
desk; you were endeavoring to secure a certain desired 
result. All our thought-activity is purposive. We may 
be giving such concentrated attention to an object that 
we are for the time not fully aware of the purpose of our 
attention ; but in such case we are obviously trying to 
satisfy ourselves respecting the object. The pleasure 
or displeasure tone of our experience has its origin in the 
fact that our activity is directed toward an end. The boy 
who scores a point in a game is pleased because the gaining 
of the point makes for the attainment of his purpose. 
This is the source of the pleasure of the mathematician 
who advances a step in the solution of a difficult problem, 
and of the pleasure of the inventor whose device gives 
evidence of working as he desires. An experience of dis- 
comfort comes with losing a point in a game or finding 
ourselves halted by some unforeseen difficulty. Whatever 
aids in the attainment of a present purpose yields an 
experience of pleasure ; whatever hinders, yields an experi- 

338 



FINALITY 339 

ence of displeasure. In other words, we have pleasure- 
pain experiences because we are constantly valuing the 
persons and things with which we have to do and the in- 
cidents to which we are consciously related ; and we de- 
termine their value in view of their helping or hindering 
the attainment of our purposes. We may not always be 
aware of the end toward which our activity is 
directed ; we may, indeed, only become aware of it 
when our endeavor to reach it is thwarted ; neverthe- 
less we always think and act and feel with respect 
to an end. We conclude, then, that subjective reality 
relates its activity to ends. The category of Finality 
is the principle of experience illustrated above. This 
principle may be stated thus : activity is always deter- 
mined by an end and finds its significance in the end. 

§ 165. Finality in Historical Sources. — The interpre- 
tation of historical sources requires the recognition of this 
category. We construct the history of primitive races 
and of civilizations which have passed away without 
leaving literary records, from remains which give us a clue 
to their activities. The sharpened flints and the rude 
carving on bone of the earliest inhabitants of Britain, the 
barrows and smooth-stone implements of the Iberians, 
the mounds built by the race that once occupied portions 
of this continent, have historical worth ; but that historical 
value comes of the fact that they are products of activity 
which was directed toward ends. In the study of such 
remains, we always ask. What purpose did this thing fulfill ^ 
Why was it made ^ We must answer this question if we 
would know the meaning of the object to the person who 
wrought it ; and we must know the meaning of these re- 
mains to those who made them or used them if we would 
utilize them in the construction of history. 

What is true of instances like the above is emphatically 



340 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

true of historical phenomena of later periods. The ends 
sought by leaders, as De Montfort in calling the parliament 
of 1625 ; by whole peoples, as the barbarian hordes when 
they invaded the Roman Empire ; by portions of a people, 
as the American colonies in their protests antecedent to 
their declaring themselves independent — these must be 
known if we would understand history. But this is con- 
ceiving history teleologically, that is, by the application 
of the principle of finality. 

§ 166. Finality in the Development of Science. — In 
his earliest dealing with nature, man sought to subject 
objects to manipulation. He wanted to make objects 
serve him in his struggle to support life, or in the effecting 
of what we call practical ends. To accomplish this, he 
was obliged to observe them with some care ; and his 
thought, such as it was, was directed to ends which he 
might attain by means of the objects. Later, men began 
to seek intellectual mastery of the modes of nature's op- 
erations. From these earlier and later endeavors, the 
sciences have developed — agriculture, horticulture, bot- 
any, geology, chemistry, mechanics, etc. They are prod- 
ucts of the mental and manual activity of men, directed 
to the attainment of ends. 

§ 167. Finality in Ethical and ^sthetical Relations. — 
In critical situations we are wont to ask, " What ought I to 
do } " In asking this question one recognizes that he 
may not act merely with a view to securing a certain 
result, — as the obtaining of a situation or the getting 
of money, — but that his activity should conform to an 
ideal standard, the standard of right. When the word 
" ought " is used in its fuller meaning, it signifies that one 
is under obligation so to act as to maintain harmony with 
the moral order. That is, one end of activity should be 
the realization of the idea of right, the actualization of 



FINALITY 341 

the moral ideal in our thinking and doing, and in our at- 
titude toward other persons and the course of events. 
Ethical terms find their significance in the relating of 
thought and feeling and doing to ends and to the realiza- 
tion of the moral ideal. Motive, desire, choice, and pur- 
pose derive their import from the principle of finality 
which is implied in them. Works of art — musical com- 
positions, paintings, statues, dramas, finished style in 
literature — derive their aesthetic character from a desire 
to give expression to the beautiful. Those who create our 
works of art seek more or less consciously to give that char- 
acter to their work. They purpose to embody their con- 
ceptions of beauty. Esthetics, the science of the beauti- 
ful, and Ethics, the science of the true, have their ground 
in this category. 

§ 168. Directivity. — We have found that the succes- 
sive stages of subject activity are teleologically related. 
Beginning in this section with subject activity, we shall 
pass to the consideration of changes in objective reality ; 
and we shall study these changes with a view to deter- 
mining whether objective changes are teleologically related. 

I. Self-conscious Individua. — In rising from my desk 
and going to the window and closing it for the purpose of 
preventing the rain from beating in, I direct my activity 
to a selected end. Not a little of the life of each of us is 
made up of such consciously directed activity. Much of 
our life, however, is constituted of activities which are 
not consciously self-directed. We have acquired habitual 
physical movements — as in walking and writing. These 
habitual movements have become quasi-automatic, and 
we are not under the necessity of consciously directing 
them. There are also instinctive movements — as the 
shrinking of the bashful boy when forced to enter a room 
where there are many strangers ; likewise reflex and auto- 



342 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

matic movements — as the sucking movements of an 
infant's lips when touched, and the life-sustaining activi- 
ties of respiration and digestion. We call attention to two 
facts respecting those activities which are not consciously 
directed by the subject: — 

(i) They are related to ends, even though the subject 
does not consciously direct them to the end to which they 
are related. The reflex and automatic movements get 
their significance from the fact that they serve in the sus- 
taining of life. No description of them is complete unless 
it passes beyond them to the end which they help to se- 
cure. The shrinking of the boy expresses what he would 
do if he were free to act as he would prefer ; he would go 
almost anywhere else than into that room. The shrinking 
is related to an end which he is prevented from attaining. 
In our first efforts to walk and write, we consciously direct 
our movements to the walking and writing ; the acquired 
physical habit frees us from the necessity of exercising 
conscious direction of our specific movements ; neverthe- 
less the walking and the writing are now directed to the 
accomplishment of a purpose. 

(2) Our automatic, reflex, instinctive, and habitual 
movements are directed from within us and by us, al- 
though they are not consciously directed. Respiration and 
digestion are directed by the organism; the organism 
utilizes them for the conservation of life and upbuilding 
of the body. 

2. Other Living Individua; Selective Activity. — We 
find directivity in other living individua; but, in these 
cases, we have no ground for regarding any of it as directed 
with conscious choice of the end and of the mode by which 
the end is attained. Animals select foods. Of two birds 
in the same garden one may take only fruit and the other 
only insects. The life activities of one animal will so 



FINALITY 343 

direct the selected material as to build up the organism of 
a quadruped ; in another, that of a biped ; in yet another, 
that of a fish. Different plants will utilize different con- 
stituents of the soil, and will appropriate the same ma- 
terial in different proportions. Some plants will secrete 
essential organic compounds — as indigo, mint, opium, 
etc. In all cases of selective activity, the activity is 
directed toward an immediate or remote end. Life ac- 
tivities as a whole are directed from within the organism 
toward upbuilding (or anabolic) ends, and against breaking 
down (or katabolic) tendencies. Thus, all the activities 
in a living plant or animal tend to building up and con- 
serving the organism. This is true even of the throwing 
off of effete material; for the presence of effete material 
would make against the conservation of the life of the 
animal or plant. The facts just presented establish the 
teleological character of organic activities. 

§ 169. Non-living Individua. — There are processes in 
non-living individua which tend toward the breaking up 
of the individuum. Are such processes teleologically 
related to world changes } 

I. Living individua conserve life and build up the or- 
ganism (i) by adapting themselves to their environment, 
and (2) by adapting their environment to themselves. 
The adaptation to environment and the adaptation of 
environment are not separate processes ; they are two 
aspects of one life-process. The first process — the adap- 
tation of the organism to its environment — is recognized 
by all biologists. A fish cast upon the land cannot long 
adapt itself to its environment and, because of its want of 
adaptability, it dies ; whereas a frog can adapt itself to 
both an atmospheric and a water environment. The 
second aspect — the organism's adaptation of the environ- 
ment to itself — has been too often overlooked. Organ- 



344 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

isms utilize what is in their environment — air, water, 
elements of the soil, fruits, etc. ; and, in doing this, they 
build up the organism and sustain life. Since organisms 
and their non-living environment are thus adaptable, it 
is evident that they are complementary parts of a system, 
this far at least, that the non-living is the necessary com- 
plement of the living. The living have too often been 
thought to constitute a realm apart from and independent 
of the non-living. The conditions of life show that this 
is a misconception. If the living and non-living were 
wholly external to each other, if there were nothing com- 
mon to both, the non-living could not have any value for 
the living; in such case, there would not be anything in 
it which could be utilized by the living. As a matter of 
fact, however, organisms not only utilize the non-living, 
but they are absolutely dependent upon what they can 
thus utilize. The living and the non-living are comple- 
mentary parts of a system. 

2. The breaking-down processes in the non-living should 
be studied in their relation to the living. The lower 
forms of the living furnish needful sustenance to the higher 
forms ; animals find much of the material for their up- 
building and conserving activity in plants ; they go to 
plants for food rather than to inorganic compounds. 
Plants find their food in the inorganic. From this it 
appears that the breaking-down process in the living is 
not an end in itself ; the product of this process is prepared 
for the plant ; and in the plant it is prepared for the ani- 
mal. We conclude that the breaking-down and up-build- 
ing processes in nature are teleologically related. 

3. The world is a systematic whole; every part of the 
system functions for the whole. In a whole of this char- 
acter, that which is a more limited expression of reality 
subserves the higher; its significance comes to expression 



FINALITY 345 

in the higher. The significance of oxygen and of hydrogen 
has a very limited expression in these elements when each 
is taken by itself. It comes to fuller expression when 
they unite to form water ; and to yet fuller, in the various 
compounds into which they enter. No one of these com- 
pounds — starch, for example — is self-explanatory. The 
significance of water is much more fully expressed when it 
is utilized by plants and animals than it is when regarded 
apart and by itself. So of the enlarging expressions of 
reality from the non-living up to the living, and from the 
lower organisms up to man and rationality. Each of the 
more limited expressions of reality is teleologically related 
to the higher. 

§ 170. Self-determination the Highest Form of Ac- 
tivity. — I. We have mechanical, chemical, instinctive, 
and rational activity. In mechanical and chemical ac- 
tivity, change is toward an end, but the end is not an idea 
of the individuum. This is obviously true of inorganic 
bodies ; e.g. the rolling of a stone down hill, the gathering 
of rust on iron, or the burning of wood. It is true also of 
the mechanical and chemical changes in plants, and of the 
beating of the heart and the chemical changes which take 
place in digestion. So likewise as to instinctive activity, 
e.g. the sucking of the newly born child. In none of these 
is the end an idea of the individuum in which the pro- 
cess occurs. But in the instance of the carpenter making 
a box, the end is an idea of the workman ; he makes con- 
scious choice of it and of each step in the process. In 
rational activity we have intelligence determining the end 
and the course which the subject will take to secure the 
purposed result. This is the highest form of activity of 
which we have experience ; other forms are truly teleo- 
logical, but they are relatively limited and incom- 
plete. 



346 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

2. Teleological activity is not exclusive of, or opposed 
to, mechanical and chemical. The mechanical and 
chemical are present in man ; we have capillarity in the 
circulation of the blood and chemical changes in digestion, 
seeing, and smelling. Instinctive mental and physical 
activities are manifested in fear, anger, and imitativeness, 
and their attendant reactions. These changes are es- 
sential ; they are, that we may be and that we may fulfil 
our functions. The high function of the individual man 
is to bring to pass what is peculiarly his, because he himself 
has made it the end of his activity. The significance 
of the mechanical, chemical, and instinctive activities 
of our organism has only a limited revelation in these ac- 
tivities themselves ; it is most fully manifested in what 
we are as rational beings, as intelligent conative beings; 
it is to be seen in the part we have in the thought of the 
world and the course of events. The lower activities are 
teleologically related to our rational functioning. 

§ 171. Finality and Reality. — i. In respect of subject 
reality, we find that all stages of rational activity are teleo- 
logically related. Each earlier stage finds its significance 
and completion in a later stage. Each step in the solution 
of a problem looks to a complete solution and is taken 
with respect to that end. It has its being, not merely for 
itself, but for the solution which is the ideal set by the 
student. No account of any stage of the process is com- 
plete which does not include the conclusion of the process. 
In man, the conclusion of the process is consciously ac- 
cepted as the ideal whose actualization the subject will 
endeavor to secure. Thought moves forward by trying 
to realize an ideal which it has set for itself ; the thought 
process is determined with respect to an ideal. It is of 
the nature of intelligence to determine its activity thus. 
When one is trying to recall an incident or a quotation, 



FINALITY 347 

he is endeavoring to actualize an ideal. Subjective ac- 
tivity is teleological. 

2. Our discussion has also shown that the particulars 
of the objective world are teleologically related. So far 
as any object or event gives embodiment to an ideal, that 
object or event is teleologically related to the objects and 
changes involved in it and leading up to it. Elements 
do not exist merely for themselves, but for the compounds 
of which they are elements ; and these compounds are 
embodiments of the meaning of the elements. We have 
given an illustration of this in the instance of oxygen and 
hydrogen. The significance of sodium and chlorine is 
expressed in common salt and the utilities which it serves. 
The leaf-bud, the flower, and fruit of a plant express the 
meaning of the biological processes of which they are the 
product. The higher reality is a fuller and a more ex- 
pressive embodiment of the lower. Conscious determina- 
tion of an end and direction of activity toward the 
attainment of the chosen end are characteristic of the tele- 
ological relation in full rational activity ; but they are not 
the essence of the teleological relation. The essence of 
the teleological relation is that every stage or particular 
of an object has value for .the whole object, for the com- 
pletely developed object and for the whole of its history. 

3. Finality is grounded in the nature of reality as de- 
velopmentally active. Each successive stage of an ob- 
ject which is perceptibly changing is significant for the 
process as well as for the object. It sets forth the import 
of the preceding changes ; that is, each successive change 
is end for the antecedent stages. In other words, an object 
regarded in respect of its changes is a system; and the 
parts of a system are teleologically related. The universe 
is a system; and the whole is a continuity. This con- 
tinuity is not continuity upon the same level of signifi- 



348 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

cance and value ; It Is graduated In value for thought, and 
in fullness of expression of reality from the inorganic up 
to man. The teleological relatedness of the particulars 
of the universe is manifest in this graduated continuity; 
and it is grounded in the systematizing nature of ac- 
tivity. 

§ 172. Conclusions. — Activity is always related to an 
end. This " end " is not a terminus, a point at which 
activity shall cease ; it is a result which is itself a point 
of beginning from which another end shall be attained. 
The carpenter in making a box prepares the necessary 
pieces ; each of these is, for the time, the present " end " 
of his thinking and doing. For his further thought and 
work, these pieces are means for effecting a more remote 
result, viz. the box. The box itself is merely a stage in 
his effort to attain a still more remote result, — it may be 
the getting of a living or making a present for a friend. 
In any case, the box is not a terminus. It is made that it 
may be utilized ; and the use to be made of it determines 
the design of the box. The " end " expresses, not the 
terminus of activity, but its import, its value for the sys- 
tem. We have found that changes in the objective world 
are teleologically related, that the katabolic processes of 
nature are teleologically related to the anabolic processes. 
In rational activity, the highest form of which we have ex- 
perience, there is conscious choice of end and of means for 
attaining the end ; but in the lower realms of being, in the 
more limited realities — as plants and animals — directivity 
is present, although the directing of activity is not con- 
sciously determined by the individuum. The changes in 
the most limited expressions of reality reveal the import of 
those realities and of the antecedent stages of the objects. 
The stages of individual thought and of manual activity are 
teleologically related. General history, the development 



FINALITY 349 

of science, and ethical and sesthetlcal consciousness 
can only be understood if we shall recognize the teleo- 
logical relatedness of the particulars of the life of mian. 
Activity is systematic ; and, being systematic, it is 
teleological. 



CHAPTER XXXVI 

INDIVIDUALITY AND PERSONALITY 

§ 173. Individuality and Personality. — In the opening 
of the chapter on Individuality, we said that the study of 
that category would not be completed until later. We 
now resume its consideration. 

- I. In our previous study, we learned that an indivlduum 
subjectively regarded is constituted by the selective ac- 
tivity of the subject. A block, a single building, a suite 
of offices, one of the rooms of a suite, or a single piece of 
furniture in one of the rooms may be an individuum. 
The subject determines what shall constitute his unit 
object, and he determines it in keeping with the interest 
of the moment. We also concluded that individuality 
is a mode of object reality, that what the subject regards 
as an individuum is also an objective individual, and that 
there is significant import in the " common-sense " con- 
ception of individuality, as to distinctness, wholeness, and 
independence of being. We likewise concluded that the 
individual is Many in One, that the Many are constituted 
in the One and function as one. We found further that 
there are degrees of individuality, and that marked dis- 
tinctness of structure and function denote a high degree 
of individuality. Lastly, we discovered that increasing 
comprehensiveness and closer approximation to self- 
subsistence denote approach toward perfect individuality. 
In the present discussion, we will argue that the perfect 
individual is the Absolute Person. 

2. Two marbles may be perceptibly distinct only be- 

350 



INDIVIDUALITY AND PERSONALITY 351 

cause they occupy different positions ; they may appear 
in all other respects to be the same. Two musical notes 
may only differ in the fact that one follows another, as 
when a note is repeated. In such cases, the individuality 
of the objects is indicated in their being in different space 
and time relations. The individuality of most objects 
is expressed in the marks by which they differ from one 
another. The individuality of each of a student's books 
is indicated in the marks by which it differs from all other 
books. But the individuality of an object is not in the 
marks and relations in which it is perceived to differ 
from other objects. Difference of quality and relation are 
tokens of individuality; they are not the individuality 
itself, nor the source of the individuality. Perceptible 
differences are not the ultimate " principle of individua- 
tion '' ; the principle of individuation is immanent in the 
object, not external to it. Individuality is uniqueness. 
The individual is unique in that it alone is, or can be, 
itself ; no other is it or can be it. It is irreplaceable. In- 
dividuality is immanent uniqueness. 

3. We are conscious of great diversity in our experi- 
ences ; no two incidents of our life are in all particulars 
quite the same. Nevertheless these innumerable diverse 
experiences are constituted in a continuous life experience. 
This continuous experience is essentially one, and it is 
comprehensive of all our life. These diverse experiences 
have their being in one self-same self. Our experience as 
a whole is a diversified unity. Each particular of it func- 
tions for all the others ; it has its being in and with all the 
others and modifies them. This is true, whether we speak 
of the distinct experiences which we have through relation 
with the many objects with which we have to do, or 
whether we have in mind the elemental phases of experi- 
ence, as thinking, feeling, and doing. Consciousness is 



352 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

emphatically Many In One. We also have consciousness 
of the self as a unit distinct from the world of not-self, a 
consciousness of the " otherness " of things, other persons, 
and events. In a word, self is known in consciousness as 
having the comprehensive wholeness, the distinctness, 
the diversified unity which characterizes individuality. 
No other reality of which we have experience possesses 
these characteristics in so high a degree as the human 
individual. 

4. In respect of consciousness, each of us is set apart 
from other personal individua, is peculiarly himself, by a 
content which is his " private property." You are the 
only possible subject of your experience. If we should 
go so far as to assume that another person could have 
experience qualitatively identical with yours, that would 
not make him the subject of your experience. You and he 
may rejoice over the same occurrence ; but his joy is his, 
and yours is yours. The consciousness of every human 
individual is unique. Consciousness of self-sameness 
gives to human individuality a higher rank than can be 
found in any other finite individuum. The brute lives 
only in the present moment, with no rational recall of the 
past nor forecast of the future; man possesses his past 
and purposes his future. The activity of the human in- 
dividual is consciously self-directed. In this, we have 
self-assertive activity, asserting its apartness from, and 
relative Independence of, other persons, asserting also that 
it itself originates its thought and determines its activities. 
The human individual likewise holds that his attitude 
toward all without is determined within and by himself, 
that he is in possession of a province within which he rules 
and into which no other may press. This claim to origi- 
nation and rulership is an assertion of uniqueness. We 
recognize the element of uniqueness In our estimate of the 



INDIVIDUALITY AND PERSONALITY 353 

more noted individuals who have made themselves a part 
of organized history. They cannot be merged into the 
mass of humanity. Their uniqueness is expressed in our 
judgment that they had, each of them, a distinguishing 
individuality. The highest finite individuality is in the 
consciously purposive and self-determined individuum. 
Of all that is finite only man is truly individual. 

5. The universal is expressed in the differences as well 
as the likenesses of particulars (§ 47, 3). The universal 
" oak " is the ground of the differences and the likenesses 
of particular " oaks." We have found (§ 80) that ex- 
perience is never experience of a mere particular ; and we 
have concluded (§§ 94, 95) that a known object is not a 
mere particular, but is always a particularized universal. 
Every " horse " or " man " is the universal " horse " or 
" man " particularized ; and it is only in such an individual 
that the universal has actuality. The individual is the 
unity of the universal and the particular. A particular 
" horse " is distinguished from other " horses " through 
the characteristics in which he differs from them. These 
differences set him apart from other " horses " ; and be- 
cause differences distinguish particulars, they are often 
regarded as the sole and sufficient token of uniqueness. 
But to conclude thus is to misconceive the nature of 
uniqueness and individuality. The modern man of cul- 
ture has more individuality than a savage has. His differ- 
encing characteristics are more numerous and more dis- 
tinct than those of the savage ; and he is a more compre- 
hensive expression of the universal " man." That which 
gives the more comprehensive expression of the universal 
manifests the higher degree of individuality. Compre- 
hensiveness and distinctness of characteristics are tokens 
of individuality ; they are elements of uniqueness. The 
many-sided man is distinctly individual. 

2A 



354 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

6. Since reality is individual, the Ground-Reality of the 
universe must be individual. This Universal is all-com- 
prehensive ; for the universe is the manifestation of the 
activity, and the expression of the meaning, of the Ul- 
timate Reality. This individual is wholly self-subsistent 
and is, therefore, rightly denominated the Absolute. Self- 
consciousness and self-determination, characteristics of 
Personality, are also characteristics of the highest indi- 
viduality of which we have experience. The perfect 
unitary reality, that reality which is the most compre- 
hensively diverse and the most distinct, is to be found in 
Personality. The wholly self-subsistent individual, the 
reality which is unitary with an all-comprehensive di- 
versity of activities, the Ground-Reality of the universe, is 
the Absolute Person. 



CHAPTER XXXVII 

sociality; summary of conclusions 

§ 174. The Solitary Self and the Social Self. — Hitherto 
we have regarded consciousness as the consciousness of a 
solitary, purely individual self; this is, however, an in- 
complete view of consciousness. We are in intimate re- 
lation with other selves ; and the consciousness of each 
of us has content and significance because of our relation 
to others. So much as this was said earlier in our study ; 
but more remains to be said. Our consciousness of 
self-rulership, with its attendant assertion of personal 
rights, seems to set us apart in a province which is all our 
own; and we tend to think of our relation to others as 
wholly external. This appears also to follow from the 
uniqueness of the individual. Each of us is just himself; 
and he is all there is of himself. From this point of view, 
society is an aggregate of individuals ; and each of these 
individuals is complete in himself. The self thus con- 
ceived is purely individual ; and this solitary, self-centered 
self is assumed to be the real self. 

As a matter of fact, the self who knows and plans and 
hopes and strives is not this solitary self. Consciousness 
is not purely Individual, it is also social ; with conscious- 
ness of self it includes consciousness of another or others. 
The recognition of this fact has given rise to the term " so- 
cial consciousness," a term for which no satisfactory, con- 
cise definition is at hand. The derivation of the word 
" social " furnishes a point of beginning for the study of 
the social phase of consciousness. The word " socius," 

3SS 



356 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

from which social and its cognates are derived, signifies 
fellow, partner, companion. " Social consciousness " is 
virtually the same with " associating consciousness." In 
saying that consciousness is social, we assert (i) that 
self-consciousness is consciousness of an " other " or of 
" others," as well as consciousness of self ; (2) that other 
persons are regarded as of our kind, and as fellows — or 
associates — in experience. Consciousness is social in 
that it relates itself to others as their socius, or fellow, and 
the " other " to self as the socius of the self. The self 
whom each of us knows as " my self," the self to whom we 
assign our feelings, thought, and purposes, is a social self. 
Sociality, as a category, is that characteristic of conscious- 
ness which arises from our recognizing that others are of 
our kind and are fellow-participants with us in experience. 

§ 175. The Social Self is the Real Self. — If it be true 
that the real self is the self in whose experience there is 
consciousness of the other as his " fellow," evidence of it 
should be abundant. In such case, the social conscious- 
ness should be in all our experience; it should be mani- 
fest in the attitudes and activities of life. 

I. We are not first self-conscious and then conscious 
of the world. Self-consciousness arises in our distinguish- 
ing self from the objects of the external world. But defi- 
nite self-consciousness does not simply set one apart 
from the other realities of the world. In my self-con- 
sciousness, I know myself as knowing and feeling and do- 
ing ; I am for myself a knowing, feeling, and doing reality. 
That is the judgment of every one respecting himself. It 
may not be stated definitely, but it is involved in all our 
thought of ourselves. At first the child assigns feeling 
and thinking to things ; he takes them to be of his kind ; 
he would beat the stick or the chair that hurts him. In 
other words, his consciousness is from the first a social 



SOCIALITY; SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 357 

consciousness ; he and all objects are fellows. Later, he 
distinguishes things from persons, and he ceases to regard 
things as of a kind with himself; but, by so much as his 
consciousness is normal, he continues to account himself 
a " soclus " of persons. From this it appears that con- 
sciousness Is social from the beginning, and that sociality 
gets definition and limitation in enlarging experience. 

2. Language testifies to the reality of the social self. 
Language is a product of the inter-related activity of 
men and has its origin In the endeavor to exchange ex- 
perience. When the master gives an order to his servant, 
he is seeking to arouse in the servant an experience which 
shall be identical in certain particulars with his own. 
Commerce in experience has brought language to its pres- 
ent stage of development. To effect exchange of experi- 
ence is the function of language. When you enter upon 
conversation with another, you assume that the other is 
of your kind, is rational as you are rational. You also 
assume that the other has had an experience in some re- 
spects the same with yours. The listener hears sounds ; 
he assigns import to these sounds, and this Import is for 
him the thought of the speaker. If he shall understand 
what is said, it Is not only necessary that he shall be able 
to hear and to think — i.e. that he shall be sentient and 
rational ; but it Is likewise necessary that he shall have had 
experience which is in some particulars the same with 
that of the speaker. If the listener's experience were 
not the same in any particular, he could not discover the 
speaker's thought, but would be liable to assign a different 
meaning to words and phrases from that which was in 
the mind of the speaker. We recognize that things are 
not sentient and cannot hear, and that animals are 
not rational and have had no experience which will fit 
them to interpret reasoned discourse. As a consequence, 



358 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

we never make a serious attempt to converse with things ; 
and, if we make pretence of conversation with the more 
gifted domestic animals, we for the time play that they 
are of our kind. The teacher can only accomplish his 
undertaking because he and the student have an associ- 
ated experience. The consciousness of the individual 
self is not a solitary, purely individual consciousness. 
A purely individual and isolating consciousness would 
not initiate inter-subjective intercourse; it could not 
have part in rational intercourse. The real self is at once 
individual and social ; the individuality and sociality of 
consciousness are inseparable. 

3. A consideration of our outlook upon life and of the 
interests upon which we set high value, makes it evident 
that the social self is at the centre of all our experience. 
We do not say that the social element of consciousness 
is distinctly recognized by each of us in every moment of 
our experience ; but we do say that the social self is 
the self of the interests which we deem vital. The child's 
earliest definite awareness centres about the person who 
cares for him. The mother or nurse, what she can do 
for him and what he expects her to do — these are for him 
the matters of chief importance. This is, of course, not 
a completely defined social self, but it is the germ of the 
socius ; it is a social consciousness in its beginning. 
Later, there comes a period of interest in toys and games ; 
and then the normally developing child desires companion- 
ship in his pleasures and triumphs, and sympathy when 
he fails. He regularly prefers games in which others 
partake with him ; and, when child companions are want- 
ing, he will ask that father and mother take part with 
him. The vital interests of the parent, of the citizen, of 
every one whatever his line of activity may be, are not 
the interests of a self who stands apart from others ; they 



SOCIALITY; SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 359 

are the interests of a self in whose experience other selves 
have a large place. He is not normal of whom this may 
not be said. 

§ 176. Social Reciprocity and the Development of the 
Individual. — i. The social consciousness has its source 
in our recognition of the fact that we are socially related to 
others. Our attitude toward others, our thought of them 
and our activity as it may affect them are necessarily de- 
termined with respect to the value we assign to this re- 
lation. But the social relation is reciprocal in nature ; 
every person who is normal regards himself as the socius 
of all others. This being true, it follows that social 
attitudes and activities should be reciprocal. We look 
for social reciprocity : we treat others as though they were 
of our kind, and we expect that they shall treat us simi- 
larly. To be ignored, to be treated as though we were 
of no account, would be an afflictive experience. We 
long to be recognized by others as one with them ; and 
we are disturbed when such recognition is not extended 
us. As we know that others enter into, and help make up, 
our experience, so would we have others give us a vital 
place in their interests, a place in their social self. This 
it is which gives such keenness and intensity to the effort 
which some make to gain entrance to what is in common 
parlance called " society." It is seen also in the large 
number of associations of various kinds and the eagerness 
with which men seek membership in them. The normal 
developing self demands social reciprocity; and this de- 
mand is a call for what is essential to the development of 
the individual. 

2. Our incomplete and disconnected experience finds 
its completeness in social reciprocity. The social conscious- 
ness binds all together. It is our " other " who answers 
our questions, resolves our doubts, writes our books. 



36o INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

provides for our amusement, and furnishes us the many 
necessities and comforts which we of ourselves could never 
obtain alone. These " others " awaken in us thoughts 
which had otherwise never been ours ; they live lives 
which inspire us ; and they unite with us in carrying out 
undertakings which we could not effect alone. In all this 
they have part in developing our real self. 

3. We speak of rights, privileges, and obligations. We 
believe that the ideas which these words express should be 
clearly defined in our thought, that they should represent 
to us what is of highest value, and that they should find 
embodiment in conduct. These ideas have their origin 
in the social consciousness. We insist that a man has 
rights equal to those accorded others ; and we consent 
that he has rights equal with ours. The ground of this 
insistence and consent is that he is of a kind with others 
and with us, at least in the sphere within which these rights 
are claimed. When we refuse another equal rights with 
us, it is because we believe that in that sphere he is not of 
our kind. The criminal is restricted in his liberty, because 
he has shown that he is not of the kind of the true citizen. 
This is further exemplified in the exclusiveness of social 
circles, fraternal organizations, and clubs. The unad- 
mitted are held to be, in these relations, not of a kind 
with those who make up these circles and associations. 
We believe also that those who are of our kind have the 
same privileges and obligations that we have. These 
ideas have their development and definition within social 
relations and through social reciprocity; and their de- 
velopment in the individual is essential to his completeness. 
The moral sense is developed within social relations, and 
only there. 

§ 177. Conclusions. — The normal consciousness is 
both individual and social ; it testifies to the individual's 



SOCIALITY; SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 361 

distinctness from others and his incompleteness apart from 
others. As a social self, the individual recognizes that the 
other is of his kind and is a co-participant in experience. 
Such recognition is essential to his own development. 
Sociality is the proximate ground of society and of the 
orderly development of the individual. Hence the in- 
dividual is not an ultimate ; he is not an independent 
centre of experience and therefore cannot be an inde- 
pendent centre of being. Society is not an aggregate of 
independent individuals. We do not say that it is a mere 
organism ; but we are forced to conclude that its individual 
components are so inter-related that no term that impli- 
cates less intimacy of relation than the term " organic " 
can adequately express the relation of individuals to one 
another. Each functions for all the others. The ulti- 
mate ground of society is the Absolute Individual who is 
the ground of the being and the experience of finite indi- 
viduals. Society, in the principles of its coherence, is an 
expression of the nature of the Absolute Individual. 

§ 178. Conclusions from our Study of the Categories. 
— The categories are fundamental forms in which reality, 
both subjective and objective, expresses itself. Our 
study of these forms justifies our assumption that reality 
is active being. All realities are of interest to us ; but of 
finite realities, man is of .prime interest. A man is a true 
individual, but he is not the complete individual ; he is 
not the perfect individual, for his being and his activity 
do not have their source within himself. He can only be 
conscious when he is related as subject to some object. He 
is in the world system and dependent upon it. Reality 
expresses itself in him, but he is a limited expression of 
reality. He is in some particulars trans-spatial ; but 
for much of his activity he is subject to spatial limitations. 
He can conceive the trans-temporal and can in idea scan 



362 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

the ages ; but his possession of the actual Is circumscribed 
by temporal limitations. He can rule over and utilize 
much of the objective world ; but he Is forced to recognize 
that his authority here is a conditioned authority. To 
deal effectively with the not-self he must subject himself 
to the conditions imposed by its constitution ; but, if 
he shall observe these conditions, he becomes ruler in an 
extended realm. A man Is an Individual with rulership 
and rights which are his own as against all other finite 
individuals ; but he Is not an Independent centre of ex- 
perience or reality. He Is organically related to all others 
of his kind, and he Is dependent upon this relation for the 
experience in which he develops true selfhood. 

The Absolute Reality Is the Absolute Individual. As 
the highest individuality of which we have experience Is 
constituted in personality, we are forced to conclude that 
the Absolute Individual Is a person. Is at least self- 
conscious and self-determined. The Absolute is self- 
subsistent, and is the ground of being and activity; the 
world system is of him and dependent upon him. This 
Absolute determines the conditioning of the universe; 
and It would be a reversal of the fundamental order to 
speak of the universe as conditioning its ground. The 
Absolute Reality Is trans-temporal and trans-spatial. 
The Absolute Individual Is the ultimate ground of society ; 
the social consciousness, being grounded in the Absolute, 
is an expression, however limited, of the Absolute con- 
sciousness. Because the world-process Is teleological, 
we conclude that It Is determined toward an end. This 
end Is a purpose, not a conclusion ; and it must be a pur- 
pose that is consonant with the nature of the Perfect 
Person. 



PART IV 

HUMAN FREEDOM AND EXISTENCE OF 

GOD 

CHAPTER XXXVIII 

HUMAN FREEDOM 

§ 179. The Problem. — The problem of Human Freedom 
has given rise to much controversy; and the attempt to 
solve it has resulted in conflicting theories. The subject 
is confessedly difficult, and the difiiculty has been aug- 
mented by lack of agreement concerning the significance 
of the terms usually employed in the discussion. In 
view of this, we shall endeavor to assign such meanings 
to the terms used as will secure that our discussion and our 
conclusions shall be true to experience. 

I. Origin of the Idea of Human Freedom. — We think 
and speak of ourselves as free. We claim some acts as 
our own, and hold that these acts are ours because we 
purposed them and took part in them of our own choice 
and not by compulsion. In other words, we insist that 
we have related ourselves freely to these acts, and we base 
our assertion of freedom upon our consciousness that we 
are self-ruled and self-directed in the decision to act. 
The idea of freedom, then, has its origin in our conscious- 
ness of a certain subjective relation to events in which 
we have part. My consciousness of freedom in any partic- 
ular instance is grounded in my consciousness that I 
purposed my part in what took place ; that the decision 

363 



364 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

to act with reference to a certain end and the initiating 
and directing of my course of action are my own decision, 
initiation, and direction. 

2. The Problem Stated. — The preceding paragraph dis- 
covers the point in controversy : Are we free in the act of 
deciding ? This question is usually confined to ethical 
decisions. It might be stated thus : Is one free when he 
chooses, or refuses, to do what he believes to be right .? 
But the question of human freedom extends to decisions 
which are not purely ethical. Are we intellectually and 
aesthetically free } Are you free in conducting a course 
of reasoning ? Do you determine the reasoning ^ Am I 
free in judging as to the beauty of a landscape ? In short, 
is one in the critical moment of rational activity determined, 
or does he determine I Are our intellective, aesthetic, 
and ethical judgments determined by us or through us ? 

§ 180. Kinds of Freedom. — The term " freedom " 
has three references, and these differ so widely in their 
connotations that it is well to distinguish them. 

1 . Psychical Freedom. — Choosing is a psychical process ; 
hence the question as to whether a man is freely active 
in this process, has a distinctly psychical reference. If we 
believe that one is free in deciding between alternatives, 
— e.g. as to whether he will attend to correspondence or 
go for a walk, — we hold a doctrine of psychical freedom. 
This form of freedom appears to present the best approach 
to the main question under consideration ; and we shall 
have this form of freedom in mind, except it be distinctly 
stated that we are speaking of one of the other forms. 

2. Metaphysical Freedom. — The Epicureans give the 
term " freedom " a metaphysical reference. Epicurus 
held that the atoms have a power of self-determination, 
and that this determination is free in that it is causeless 
and wholly of chance. In this he assumes that reality 



HUMAN FREEDOM 365 

is In Its nature free ; he gives freedom a metaphysical 
reference. The Stoics declared that all changes in the 
universe take place under a law of natural necessity to 
which there are no exceptions. According to them, there 
is no metaphysical freedom. Those systems which con- 
ceive of the ultimate reality as a person regard freedom as 
an attribute of the highest reality. In so doing they 
give freedom a metaphysical reference. The question of 
freedom is thus involved in the nature of the ultimate 
reality. The mediaeval theologians and the Substantial- 
ists give freedom a similar reference in their discussion of 
the Divine will, and this reference occurs naturally in all 
systems that conceive of the ultimate as a person. It is 
present also when we raise the question as to whether 
man is by nature free. 

3. Ethical Freedom. — The question of ethical freedom 
takes two forms. Plato inferred freedom from man's 
sense of responsibility. We hold ourselves responsible 
for certain acts. Plato would argue that a person cannot 
rationally be made responsible for an act that is repre- 
hensible, unless it were possible for him not to have done 
what he did ; neither can one be rightly praised for doing 
what he could not avoid doing. Aristotle agreed with 
him in this ; so likewise almost all who have contended 
for freedom of choice. This gives one form to the question 
of ethical freedom. The other form arises from a question 
which Plato discussed and which has had prominence 
given it in ethical studies. The following query presents 
it with sufficient exactness for our purpose : Is the man 
who chooses what is unreasonable and evil, free ? 

4. Inter-relation of these Forms. — These forms, or kinds, 
of freedom are at root one ; the difference in connation 
comes of considering freedom in different relations. 

Is human freedom possible in this universe.^ Our 



366 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

metaphysical ultimate determines our answer to this 
question. The cosmos is an expression of the ultimate 
reality. Hence, if there is no free activity in the ultimate 
reality, there cannot be freedom in the universe; and, if 
the ultimate is freely active, there is freedom in the uni- 
verse. Whether or not man is free, is a fact to be other- 
wise determined. 

Is freedom present in psychical activity ^ The answer 
to this inquiry determines the question of the actuality 
of psychical freedom. What testimony, if any, does our 
ethical consciousness give respecting human freedom .? 
It is argued by many that our sense of responsibility goes 
to prove that we are psychically free. Others reverse the 
argument; they say that our sense of responsibility has 
its origin in our certainty that we are volitionally free. 
In either case, it is evident that psychical and ethical 
freedom are inter-related. 

The question. Is the man who chooses the unreasonable 
and evil, free ? comes of regarding freedom as the ideal 
relation of the subject to the ethical order. This ideal 
is the subject's inner harmony with the ethical order, his 
perfect ethical rationality, his habitual preference for the 
rationally right, his prompt and invariable decision in 
favor of the right. If one should attain this ideal, he would 
think and act without any sense of restriction ; he would 
be wholly free. This, the second form of ethical freedom, 
connects with the metaphysical ultimate, the Ground- 
Reality of the universe. Has the system of which the 
subject is an individual part, an ethical order J If the 
metaphysical ultimate has no ethical characteristic, the 
system which is an expression of this ultimate will be non- 
ethical ; if this ultimate is ethical in nature, we will expect 
the system to present an ethical order. Hence the ques- 
tion asked at the beginning of this paragraph takes us to 



HUMAN FREEDOM 367 

the Ground-Reality of the universe, and our answer will 
depend upon our conception of this Ground, as to whether 
it is, or is not, ethical. 

§ 181. Theories Stated. — It is generally assumed that 
there are two theories of volitional activity — Deter- 
minism and Indeterminism. The former used to be called 
Necessitarianism ; but many Determinists seriously ob- 
ject to that designation. Indeterminists are sometimes 
spoken of as Libertarians ; but some Libertarians are un- 
willing to be classified as Indeterminists. There are De- 
terminists who hold what is virtually a fatalistic doctrine ; 
while^ others who propound what they call Determinism 
just as distinctly insist that man is free in volition. Where 
there is such disagreement, it will be well to distinguish 
a third theory and to indicate the meaning which this 
study will assign to these terms. 

1. Pure Determinism. — This will be known as De- 
terminism. It is the doctrine that every choice is deter- 
mined by the physical and psychical conditions of the 
subject; the self, the conditions, and the choice are con- 
ceived, as mechanically related, as discrete. The decision 
in favor of one alternative and against others is a term in 
a mechanical series and is external to the preceding states 
of the self. All successive states of the subject are causally 
united ; they are links in a chain of antecedents and con- 
sequents, quite as much so as the ebb and flow of the tides. 
Our decisions are mechanical products. 

2. Pure Indeterminism. — This will be known as Inde- 
terminism. It is the doctrine that decision is not deter- 
mined in any way, not even by an estimate of the relative 
value of what we choose and what we reject. In the in- 
stant of choice, the will acts wholly independent of external 
and internal influences ; it is independent of our native 
and acquired character ; it is unmotived by our estimates 



368 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

of the worth of objects and actions. In this theory, the will 
is conceived as a faculty fulfilling an independent function ; 
and it is regarded as externally related to the self con- 
sidered in respect of character. 

3. Self-determinism, — This is the doctrine that choice 
is determined by the subject's conception of value. This 
conception of value is an expression of the self as rationally 
active in estimating the worth of an object. The subject 
decides in favor of the object or course of conduct which 
he judges to be most desirable, to have highest value for 
him. The judgment of value and the choice are the 
subject's own. According to this doctrine, it is always 
possible for one to choose what he judges to be right ; 
on the other hand, he may put a higher value on the satis- 
fying of evil passion than on doing the right, so that he may 
decide to follow his vicious desires instead of taking the 
course which he deems right. 

4. Determinism and Indeterminism contrasted with Self- 
determinism. — Determinism is fatalistic ; every choice 
is a moment in a cosmic process in which there is no 
place for freedom. Our sense of freedom in deciding and 
the decision follow upon their antecedents with the 
fixedness of changes in a gravitation series. Conscious- 
ness of freedom is an illusion; a feather whirled about 
by the wind determines its movements just as much as we 
determine our choices. Determinism insists that our 
choices are determined /or us. Self-determinism contends 
that our choices are determined hy us. Indeterminism 
avers that they are not determined at all. 

Determinism and Indeterminism set the subject's mo- 
tives, character, and will in an external relation to the self. 
They are thought of as though they were apart from the self 
and acted upon the self. Self-determinism holds that they 
are organically related, and have no existence except in 



HUMAN FREEDOM 369 

and with one another. It insists that the will and char- 
acter are not other than the self, and that motives are an 
expression of the self. The relation of the subject to his 
desires, motives, and decisions is immanent and develop- 
mental, not external and mechanical. 

§ 182. Historical. — i. Determinism. — The Atomists 
held that the atoms — their metaphysical ultimates — 
were subject to natural necessity ; there was no place for 
freedom in the universe as conceived by them. The Stoics 
also held a metaphysical doctrine of determination. This 
would shut out the possibility of freedom ; nevertheless, 
they had so profound a sense of ethical responsibility 
that they Insisted that man is free to obey or disobey 
reason. They tried to reconcile this doctrine of freedom 
with the doctrine that every event is determined by natural 
necessity. Pantheism and Cosmic Mechanism (the theory 
that the universe and all its changes are explicable by the 
laws of matter in motion) are deterministic. Their de- 
terminism is illustrated in Bruno, Spinoza, and most of the 
Mystics, in Hobbes, in the writings of Laplace, and In the 
philosophical excursions of many able scientists. 

2. Indeterminism. — This is exemplified in the teach- 
ings of Epicurus, Carneades, and others of the Epicurean 
and Eclectic schools. Augustine was theoretically an 
indeterminlst ; but he also held that the will is practically 
determined by reason of man's sinfulness : being sinful, 
men cannot choose the good. Duns Scotus and William 
of Ockham were pronounced indetermlnists. Voluntarists 
generally tend to Indeterminism. This comes of their 
subordinating Intellective activity to volitional. William 
James illustrates this theory. 

3. Selj -determinism. — Aristotle seems to belong here; 
he teaches that choice is consequent upon consideration 
of ends. Despite their metaphysical determinism, the 

2B 



370 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

Stoics sought to sustain a doctrine of self-determlnlsm. 
Thomas of Aquino says that the will Is determined by- 
knowledge, and he concedes that the will at times In- 
fluences judgment. This teaching would place him with 
self-determinlsts. Jonathan Edwards leaves us uncer- 
tain as to whether he should be accounted a self-determlnlst 
or a determlnlst ; and the same may be said of not a few 
who accept a deterministic theory. Many Intellectuallsts 
are self-determlnists. Among these we name Locke, 
Kant, and Hegel. 

§ 183. Phases of Consciousness immediately related 
to Volition. — It has been indicated (§§ 179; 180, i) 
that the reality of human freedom turns upon the fact 
of the subject's freedom in choosing between alternatives 
and in deciding to seek a selected end. The solution of 
our problem, then, calls for a study of phases of conscious- 
ness which are Immediately related to such choice and 
decision. 

I. Impulse. — We are said to act from impulse when 
we act without deliberation. Much of our activity is 
from impulse, and thus without consciously organized 
deliberation ; nevertheless, impulsive acts are not always 
non-voluntary. The same may be said of instinctive acts, 
such as calling out in sudden fear or shrinking from an 
object which we fear or loathe, for they are impulsive 
acts. Habitual reactions — e.g. walking — are consciously 
organized ; but having been organized they are performed 
without distinct awareness of conscious determination of 
them. Impulsive and habitual acts may acquire a volun- 
tary character. I write a letter; In doing this, many of 
the mental and motor acts required are not distinctly 
purposed, but they are necessary that I may carry out the 
purpose to write. When a single voluntary act Includes 
impulsive and habitual acts, the impulsive and habitual 



HUMAN FREEDOM 371 

reactions are purposed in the inclusive purpose. But 
the question of freedom does not arise in connection with 
purely impulsive acts, — if we ever perform such ; for no 
alternative is present to mere impulse. 

2. Desire. — Desire is, at root, a longing for satis- 
faction. It arises when one contrasts his actual state 
with an ideal state which he accounts preferable to the 
actual. The hungry boy desires food ; and, in desiring 
it, he necessarily contrasts his present state of dissatis- 
faction with the satisfaction which would be his if he had 
food. This is desire regarded subjectively. We tend, 
however, to identify this subjective desire with some con- 
crete object ; in doing this, we objectify our desire. Thus, 
the boy of whom we have spoken identifies his desire with 
food, or possibly some specific kind of food, as bread or 
an apple. The object may be general, as pleasure or 
honor ; or it may be particular, as a book or a trip. From 
the endeavor to identify our desire with some object, there 
arises what is often called a conflict of desires. Two or 
more objects are compared ; and the subject deliberates 
as to which of these will most assuredly give the longed- 
for satisfaction. With which shall the self identify his 
subjective desire ? Before distinctively rational objective 
action takes place, there must be deliberation and choice, 
and purpose to attain the object chosen. The subject 
must give the various objects a relative valuation ; and he 
must purpose to secure that to which he assigns the highest 
value. It is the self who determines the value- and pur- 
pose-judgments. 

3. Motive. — The term "motive" has a deservedly 
prominent place in discussions respecting human freedom ; 
and we cannot hope to reach valid conclusions if we do 
not get a correct and definite conception of this element of 
experience. Whatever incites to action is a motive. This 



372 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

conception of motive Is accepted without question, and It Is 
apparently as definite as one would desire. But despite 
the simplicity and apparent definlteness of this definition, 
those who have discussed human freedom, have not agreed 
In the application of motive to experience ; and confusion 
has resulted. Some of this confusion has arisen from not 
recognizing the fact that the term " motive " has two 
possible references, a subjective and an objective reference ; 
and that these references should be carefully distinguished. 

(i) Motive has a subjective reference. The boy's 
hunger and the student's dissatisfaction with his present 
knowledge of a subject stir them to thought as to what 
would satisfy them. Thus aroused they deliberate, trying 
to determine what would satisfy them and how that which 
would satisfy may be obtained. Each of them concludes 
his deliberation by deciding what he will do, and he acts 
in keeping with his latest decision. In all this mental 
activity, the desire of the boy and of the student to secure 
satisfaction is the motive which incites them to delibera- 
tion, to assignment of relative values to different objects 
and courses of action, and to a conclusive purpose. The 
desire for satisfaction moves each of them to Identify 
his desire with some concrete object which may possibly 
be obtained — say fruit or bread for the boy, and a certain 
book or course of instruction for the student. The motive 
to rational activity is in each instance one with the desire 
for satisfaction. They are two aspects of the one sub- 
jective state. 

(2) By " motive " we also mean that which one seeks 
to accomplish, that end toward which one directs his ac- 
tivity. In keeping with this, we say that the motive of 
one man is the accumulation of wealth ; of another, the 
winning of political power. When the boy concludes that 
some fruit will quiet his hunger, he proceeds to determine 



HUMAN FREEDOM 373 

how he may obtain It. The getting of the fruit Is his ob- 
jective motive. Similarly, the completed course of study 
is the dominant motive of the student's activity ; it in- 
cites him to devise means and to determine Intermediate 
courses of action. The purposed end is the objective 
motive; and the subject determines what it shall be. 
Motive has its origin in subjective activity; and our ob- 
jective motives are determined hy us, not for us. It is 
in deliberating, choosing, and purposing that we determine 
our objective motives. 

§ 184. The Conditions of Psychical Freedom. — From 
the foregoing it follows that the question of psychical 
freedom may be stated thus : Are we free in deliberating, 
in assigning relative values to objects and to courses of 
activity, and in purposing t Freedom In these activities 
requires : — 

I. That the deliberating, valuing, choosing, and pur- 
posing acts shall be determined by the subject, not by 
what is other than the subject. 

In our study of causality (§ 156) we recognized that our 
activities are limited by persons and things. If we would 
utilize an object, we must note its way of behaving and 
we must so determine our treatment of It that it will 
react In furtherance of our purpose. Thus, gypsum Is 
under certain conditions a powder; under other condi- 
tions It is plastic; under yet other conditions It Is rigid. 
He who would utilize gypsum must accept its ways of 
behaving as conditioning his treatment of it. The nature 
of an object (which is expressed by its way of behaving) 
conditions our use of it. So, too, the attitude of a person 
with whom we have to deal, his interest or want of interest 
in the matter In hand, conditions our intercourse with him. 
To sum it up, the nature of the things we handle and the 
character of persons with whom we have dealings condi- 



374 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

tion our external activities; and, so far as they are 
known to us, they condition our deliberating, valuing, 
and purposing activity in relation to them. This will 
scarcely be questioned, except possibly by indeterminists. 
The conditioning is from without ; it is imposed upon the 
subject. Looked at thus, we would appear not to be free. 

But what has just been said is not a complete statement 
of the case. How about the determination of our thought 
activity and our objective activity .? It is held by many 
that, although we are externally conditioned, we are 
nevertheless free in that each of us initiates, guides, and 
concludes his own deliberative activity; that we deter- 
mine from within ourselves what value things, events, and 
persons have for us and for the fulfilment of our desires ; 
that we form our purposes and decide upon our course of 
action ; and that we do all this in view of these conditions. 
The subject is free if he utilizes these conditions in deter- 
mining his activity. We are free as we relate conditions, 
things, events, and persons to the fulfilment of our desires. 

What has just been said raises another question. We 
have recognized the fact that the character of persons, 
their attitude toward life and life's problems, determines 
their activity. As a consequence, human freedom re- 
quires : — 

2. That the subject's character shall not be determined 
by what is other than the subject, but shall be essentially 
the resultant of the subject's self-determination. 

That we may be psychically free, it is not sufficient that 
our volitions shall be self-determined, but our character 
must likewise be essentially self-determined. My judg- 
ments of fact and value and purpose, in respect of their 
being determined by me, are what they are because of 
what I am in the moment of my judging. Hence, if my 
character is not essentially self-determined, if my char- 



HUMAN FREEDOM 375 

acter is determined by what is other than myself, my judg- 
ments are in reality determined by what is other than 
myself, not by me. 

§ 185. Character. — Does each of us determine his 
own character ? We recognize that race, family, time, 
specific incidents, and the manifold circumstances of life 
have to do with the formation of character; but for us 
the crucial question is as to whether any or all of these fix 
our character for us, or whether each of us determines 
his own character. 

1. Character Defined. — Character has been defined as 
habitude of will ; but this obviously falls short of including 
all that we have in mind when we use this term. When we 
speak of a person's character, we mean his personal quali- 
ties taken as a whole — his disposition or temperament, 
his general and relatively persistent attitude toward per- 
sons and things and the course of events. As thus de- 
scribed, character is emotional, as well as volitional, habi- 
tude. But we may not rest here, for this is a defective 
conception of character ; it is untrue to the organic unity 
of the self. As a matter of fact, we acquire intellectual 
qualities in and with our acquisition of emotional and 
volitional qualities ; and these should be included in our 
conception of character. Stout says, " Character is just 
the constitution of the Self as a whole." We can accept 
this statement if we add, " considered with respect to the 
qualities which distinguish a particular self." Hence 
character is rational habitude ; it is an individual's mode 
of relating himself to the objects of which he has experi- 
ence; it is expressed in the manifold qualities of the in- 
dividual. 

2. Personality and Character Distinguished. — Person- 
ality and character are used to denote the same reality — 
the self; and they are sometimes regarded as freely in- 



2,^6 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

terchangeable. It is well, however, to distinguish them, 
even though the particular in which they differ is gener- 
ally negligible. In the term " personality " we emphasize 
the essential qualities, or the attributes, of a person — as 
self-consciousness and self-determination; in the term 
" character " we emphasize those qualities which are in a 
peculiar sense the individual's own, as evidenced in his 
usual attitude toward other persons and their interests, 
and in the standard by which he values the objects and 
incidents of life. In respect of essential qualities, all men 
are alike ; in respect of qualities emphasized in the term 
" character," probably no two are wholly alike ; for it is 
scarcely possible that any two persons shall have the same 
emotional, volitional, and intellectual habitude. 

3 . Personality is Subject to Development. — To be a 
person is to be self-conscious and self-determined ; for 
self-consciousness and self-determination are essential 
qualities of personality. But an individual is not self- 
conscious at birth and is, therefore, not consciously self- 
determined ; he is not an actual person. It Is certain, 
however, that the normal child, if he shall live, will in time 
become conscious of self and will begin consciously to 
direct some of his own activities. The attributes of per- 
sonality are obviously implicit In the child; they become 
explicit as the result of his experience. Man, therefore, 
is at birth only a potential person ; it is through the ex- 
perience of the individual that this potential personality 
becomes actualized. It is not, however, fully realized in 
any of us. Complete self-control, perfect mastery of our 
abilities, facile and effective application of our mental 
furnishing to the life problems which we are called upon 
to solve, does not come to us by Inheritance. Self-mastery 
is attained only through extended experience ; and we have 
reason to believe that it is still incomplete, even in those 



HUMAN FREEDOM 377 

who are most highly developed. Personality is a matter 
of degrees. It is subject to the law of development; it 
is not static, but is changing every moment. 

4, Character is a System. — The concept " character " 
originates through our regarding the qualities of an in- 
dividual as aspects of what is itself unitary. When we 
think of the characteristic qualities of one whom we know, 
— e.g. his kindliness and forcefulness, — these qualities 
are thought of as distinguished phases of what is in itself 
an indivisible whole. That character is conceived to be 
a unit, is also indicated in the fact that we do not speak 
seriously of a man's characters, as if he had more than one, 
even though he reveals qualities of self-hood which appear 
to us to be irreconcilable. If a person is violent in address, 
but patient under severe provocation, we take these in- 
harmonious qualities to be expressions of the one charac- 
ter. The many qualities of any one character are thought 
of as cohering, although particular qualities may appear 
to be incoherent ; and the concept " character " itself 
involves the idea that the qualities of the perfect character 
are perfectly coherent. All the instincts, appetencies, 
impulses, attitudes, and judgments of truth and value 
and purpose of such a character would be perfectly con- 
cordant. That could only be if they were all perfectly 
subjected to a single principle, or law. In speaking of a 
man's character, we assume that his affections and all his 
subjective activities may be truly conceived as coor- 
dinated, or organically related, parts of a whole. The 
objective activities of an individiial are expressions of his 
subjective organization. 

5. The Organization of Character. — Has man a char- 
acter at birth t We recognize that the essential qualities 
of personality are implicit in the babe, and that these at- 
tributes are certain to become explicit through experience. 



378 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

Is the future character of the babe similarly determined 
at birth ? Has the babe at birth a determined implicit 
habitude, so that the whole of individual qualities which is 
his later, i.e. the rational habitude which he develops, is 
at birth potentially determined for him ? We may accept 
it as assured that every individual is born with a racial 
and family inheritance of " dispositions." It Is certain 
that a child begins early to exhibit a " temperament." 
He would be a bold man who would undertake to describe 
these " dispositions " or this " temperament " more par- 
ticularly; but the fact of such an inheritance Is hardly 
open to question. It Is, however, a serious mistake to 
regard this inherited " temperament " as constituting 
character. Character Is not temperament or disposition ; 
it is all the elements of our rationality organized into a habi- 
tude. Our Impulses, Instincts, affections, and attitudes 
are " raw material " from which character Is constituted. 
They enter into character only as they are ordered Into a 
system. Personality is self-organizing. It differs from 
the plant In this : the plant's type and environment de- 
termine the organism ; the environment and material 
condition the organizing activity of the self, but do not 
determine It. The self chooses the principle to which all 
its impulses, instincts, dispositions, and activities are sub- 
jected. It coordinates these phases of consciousness, 
subordinating some to others and subordinating all to 
the ruling principle. Our choices and purposes are ob- 
viously determining factors in the organizing of character. 
The constituting of character Is a continuous process ; It 
may seem to be fixed In some, but it Is in reality always In 
the making. All experience is educative ; every judgment 
of value and purpose works for the development of char- 
acter. Man Is not born with a determined germinal char- 
acter ; character Is always determining, never determined. 



CHAPTER XXXIX 

HUMAN FREEDOM (continued) 

§ i86. Indeterminism Criticised. — Indeterminism holds 
that when we will we are uninfluenced by judgments of 
fact ; it insists that our purposes are not determined by our 
estimate of value of an object or a course of action. It 
declares that volition is so far from being determined in 
view of fact-judgments and value-judgments that the will 
itself determines such judgments. According to the In- 
determinist, character does not determine choice. In 
holding the theory stated above, Indeterminism is untrue 
to the nature of rationality. Man is always a willing-feel- 
ing-thinking being; there is no instant of consciousness 
In which any one of these elements is unmodified or un- 
influenced by the others. In asserting that choice is not 
determined by the character of the subject, the Indeter- 
minist assumes a self, which is mere will, apart from the 
self of organized character. We know of no self other than 
the self of experience; and that self is not without char- 
acter. In fact, character is that self's constitution; and 
the self cannot possibly act independent of its constitution. 

This theory also avers that volition and the psychical 
processes which precede it — as impulse, desire, delibera- 
tion — are unrelated, except in time. It would follow 
from this that volition springs from nothing, that there is 
at least no relation between the impulse to choose and the 
choice itself, except that one comes after the other. This 
doctrine does not stop with declaring that the causal 
explanation of choice is inadequate; we could agree to 

379 



38o INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

that. But it denies that there is any relation between 
choice and what was antecedent in the experience of the 
subject; and to that we must object. That would make 
volitional activity and the directing of our objective ac- 
tivities irrational. According to this teaching, one is 
lawless in his willing, not free. Since this doctrine gives 
the primacy to will and regards will as not subject to law, 
it follows also that we are not under law. As a conse- 
quence, there cannot be any ethical order for man ; for 
ethics implicates an order to which we should conform ; 
that is, it would subject the will to law. The logical issue 
of this doctrine is not liberty, but the anarchy which must 
ensue when caprice or chance rules. 

§ 187. In Favor of Determinism. — Determinism is 
supported by a strong cumulative argument. The fol- 
lowing statement of the case for this theory is unavoidably 
brief. 

I. From Reflex, Impulsive, and Habitual Reactions. — 
Digestion is an unconsciously directed activity ; so also 
is the closing of the infant's hand when the palm is touched. 
The hysterical laugh, the trembling and cowering of one 
who fears, the hesitant shying of the bashful child, and 
the impulsive grasp for something when we are suddenly 
tripped are reactions of which the subjects are in some 
measure conscious, but which are not under the control 
of the subjects. We are conscious sometimes of winking 
and of breathing, and we may partially control these re- 
actions. Now, it is impossible to draw the line between 
our unconsciously directed activities, such as digestion, 
and our conscious uncontrolled reactions, such as the hys- 
terical laugh ; neither can we point out the boundary 
between our uncontrolled conscious reactions and reactions 
which are subject to partial control, such as respiration 
and winking. Further, who can state with precision when 



HUMAN FREEDOM 381 

we pass the line which separates these partially controlled 
activities and our habitual reactions, such as acquired 
automatic balancing in walking and quasi-automatic 
guidance of the pen when writing ? These habitual re- 
actions were consciously originated, but they do not re- 
quire conscious direction now that they are established. 
Who will undertake to say just when we pass the boundary 
between the realm of unconsciously directed activities 
and activities which we assume to be determined by the 
subject, if any are so determined ? Many believe that re- 
flex and impulsive acts are due to external determination, 
that they are purely mechanical reactions to external 
stimulus. That Is the scientific explanation of them. 
Then, why not preserve unity in the explanatory principle, 
and say that volitional activity Is externally determined ? 
2. Thinking which is not Self-determined. — It is gen- 
erally thought that we control our thinking, that a course 
of reasoning is freely determined from within the subject 
and by the subject. We are no more certain that we form 
our own purposes than we are that we direct our thought, 
e.g. in the solving of a problem. We believe that we 
determine the successive steps. But is this conviction 
well founded ? All of us have had thoughts thrust upon 
us. Sometimes in the consideration of a difficult subject, 
an idea has come to us which was not, so far as we could see, 
logically connected with anything which we had previously 
thought. At other times, thoughts which were quite 
foreign to the subject in hand would occupy our attention 
and we could not free ourselves from them ; they annoyed 
us by their persistent interference. How can such expe- 
riences be shown to consist with psychical freedom .^ If 
we are self-determined, if our rational activity is ours in 
the sense that It Is determined from within us and by us, 
what shall we say of these experiences ? The Determinlst 



382 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

insists that they can only be explained if we shall accept 
his theory, that rational activity is externally determined. 

3. The Asserted Universality of Causal^ or External, 
Determination. — It is an accepted principle of science that 
the universe is subject to the law of external determination. 
Science proceeds upon this assumption ; and its conclusions 
are verified by the course of events. There is no reason 
for believing that this assumption will ever lead to erro- 
neous scientific conclusions. In our commerce with things, 
we assume that objects are changed by action upon them 
from without, so that what they shall do or become is 
determined by external influences, and this assumption 
does not lead to confusing consequences. This law cer- 
tainly holds true for descriptions and forecasts of all 
processes, except those in which will is present. Why 
make the volitional process an exception t Why exempt it 
from the law of external determination .? 

4. Character. — Character is to be reckoned with in our 
study of choice. We have a special liking for certain ob- 
jects and situations ; we think of them as having peculiar 
value. There can be no doubt but that we are influenced 
by these objects and situations. One has a love for study ; 
another dislikes study, but is happy in conducting business 
undertakings. One loves pure and uplifting associations ; 
another finds such associations unbearable. Some men 
give so great value to selfish projects and vicious relations 
that it is extremely difficult for them to choose against 
their selfish tendencies and the gratification of low pas- 
sions. Many assert, with show of truth, that they can- 
not, in these things, choose other than as they do. Others 
give greater value to virtuous relations and to a life of 
helpfulness ; and they could scarcely bring themselves 
to make choice of degrading associations or to withhold 
help from the needy. Is it not evident that, our charac- 



HUMAN FREEDOM 383 

ter being what it is, we are determined in our choices by 
accordant objects and situations ? This much is certain, 
character determines choice. 

This agrees with the fact that we explain the conduct 
of others by referring it causally to their character and 
circumstances. If any particular act of one whom we 
know well cannot be adequately explained thus, if it is 
not of a kind with the past of that individual's life, we 
explain it by saying : " He was not himself," or " There was 
something in the circumstances which is not known to us," 
or " He has changed." Each of these explanations is 
based upon the assumption that character and circum- 
stances determine conduct. 

5. Conclusions. — From facts like those presented 
above, important deterministic conclusions are drawn. 

(i) Some conclude that all our activities are deter- 
mined mechanically. This was the view of the older 
associational Psychology. Associationism has been gen- 
erally discarded, but traces of it appear in relatively re- 
cent writings. That school held that our consciousness of 
freedom in willing and with it all other complex ideas are 
the result of a purely mechanical self-combining of ele- 
mental ideas ; and that these elemental ideas are the 
product of physical stimuli acting upon our sense-organs. 
These elemental ideas are given to us, we do not in any 
way determine them ; and, when they become ours, they 
combine by fixed laws into thinking, feeling, and purposing 
elements of consciousness. All our rational processes 
are wrought for us, not by us. Our judgments of fact, of 
value, and of purpose are terms in a fixed mechanical 
series ; and there is no place for freedom in that series. 
According to this doctrine, we no more determine our 
thoughts and purposes than the thistle-down floating in 
the air determines its course. 



384 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

(2) Others conclude that volition is determined by the 
strongest motive, and that this motive is itself determined 
by the subject's birth-character and the circumstances 
within which his life has been lived up to the moment of 
any choice. It is urged that we have no choice as to our 
birth-character, and none as to the circumstances of life 
preceding self-consciousness, and little choice for some time 
after. But these initial factors — the birth-character 
and the earliest circumstances of life — determine our 
volitions ever after, for they determine the nature of the 
motives which shall have most power over us. These 
factors exclude freedom during the earliest stages of the 
development of character, and there is no door left for 
freedom to enter afterward. 

§188. Determinism Criticised. — i. General. — The 
argument for Determinism is cumulative, and it would 
be unfair to reject this theory because it could be shown 
that each separate averment is insufficient to establish 
the doctrine. This could be done. For example, the 
fact that thought appears at times to be determined for 
the self, not by the self, is readily explained as mental 
activity which is not wholly normal. We deem such ex- 
periences exceptional. In these exceptional experiences, 
we are usually conscious of an inner struggle, accompanied 
by a feeling that we owe it to ourselves to retain mastery 
of our thought ; and sometimes we succeed in reestab- 
lishing such control. These facts accord with the view 
that such experiences are not to be accounted truly nor- 
mal. Upon what ground should we permit experience 
which is not normal to determine our interpretation of 
normal experience t But we will not deal with the sepa- 
rate counts in the argument for Determinism ; for this 
theory must stand or fall by reason of the validity or in- 
validity of its fundamental conception. For it, the dis- 



HUMAN FREEDOM 385 

tinguished elements of experience — as desire and motive 
— are distinct from each other ; motive is treated as 
though it were distinct from the self; and all processes 
are thought of as purely mechanical and are regarded as 
due to phenomenal cause. The pertinence of this crit- 
icism will appear in what follows ; but we call attention 
at this point to the fact that phenomenal cause is not an 
adequate philosophical conception, and to the further 
fact that the phases of mental activity are not externally 
related. The phases of rationality are organically related ; 
to treat them as terms in mechanical relation is to open 
the way to grave error. 

2. Is our Sense of Freedom an Illusion? — Determin- 
ists acknowledge that we think we are free in volition ; 
but they deem this an illusion. According to this theory, 
the order of the universe imposes this illusion upon all 
men ; and, in doing this, it contradicts itself, for it imposes 
upon me belief that I am free and, at the same time, forces 
me to infer from other particulars that I am not free. If 
this were true, it would follow that the fundamental order 
of the universe is untrustworthy ; and universal scepticism 
is the only consistent conclusion. But the inference that 
the consciousness of freedom is an illusion is more open 
to doubt than the consciousness itself. In knowing 
myself as purposing, I know myself as free. Doubt of the 
validity of this cognition of self is an inference, and it is 
based upon the assumption that all processes are solely 
mechanical. This hypothesis, that all changes are solely 
mechanical, does not have general acceptance among 
philosophers. Determinism asks us to give greater weight 
to an inference based upon a disputed hypothesis than we 
give to a primary cognition. We decline to do so. 

3. Determination misconceives the Process in the Con- 
stitution of Character. — It declares (i) that we have a 

20 



386 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

birth-character; (2) that subsequent to birth, character 
is determined by environment. Our congenital tempera- 
ment is not character ; it is material which the self utilizes 
in organizing character. As to our being determined by 
circumstances, we must never forget that the subject is 
not a mere passive recipient of influences from environ- 
ment. We are not simply acted upon by the outer world 
and its occurrences ; we utilize the external world, its 
objects and incidents. The self coordinates its impulses, 
dispositions, desires, and cognitions ; and it relates cir- 
cumstances, opportunities, hindrances, and all other 
environing particulars to itself. We determine the value 
for ourselves of objects and circumstances. In this co- 
ordinating, relating, and valuing activity, we organize 
our character; and the organizing activity is the activity 
of a person, i.e. of a self-determining individuum. The 
theory under consideration misconceives character. 

4. Determinism misconceives the Relation of Character 
and the Self to Desires and Motives. — It speaks of the 
self as " having desires " and as " impelled by motives " ; 
and Determinists are wont to say that " the will is deter- 
mined by the strongest motive," as though desires and 
motives existed apart from and independent of the self 
and could have mastery over the self. Desire is the 
self s longing for satisfaction — e.g. the student's longing 
for mental satisfaction ; motive is the self's longing, 
thought of as stirring one to discover means for attaining 
satisfaction. Subjectively regarded, desire and motive 
have their being in the self. An objective desire or motive 
is constituted such by the subject. He identifies the de- 
sired object with his longing for satisfaction ; for example, 
the hungry boy concludes that a bag of peanuts will give 
him satisfaction. The possession of the desired object is 
thus constituted a motive. The young man makes the 



HUMAN FREEDOM 387 

attainment of an education his motive. An objective 
motive can only become such, because the subject con- 
stitutes it the end of his endeavor. Desires and motives 
are what they are because the character of the subject is 
what it is. They become desires and motives because 
of the activity of the self, and they are expressions of the 
activity of the subject. Determinism represents them as 
controlling the subject; the truth is that the self deter- 
mines them, both as to being and characteristics. 

5. Determinism leaves Activity without Ethical Quality. 
— If a man's volitions are determined by what is external 
to him, -his choices and conduct are not his in the sense 
which Ethics demands. They are imposed upon him, and 
he is powerless to resist or to make them other than they 
are. In that case, the words " ought " and " moral " 
have their origin in illusion. We are not even permitted 
to say that these words should be eliminated from speech, 
and the corresponding ideas from thought ; because 
" ought " is implied in " should." 

§ 189. Self-determinism. — From the preceding dis- 
cussion, we conclude that our psychical life is a developing 
system. The systematizing principle is our own self- 
directivity seeking the realization of ends. The activity 
and the direction of it have their origin in the self; its 
systematic and coherent character show it to be deter- 
mined. 

I. Self-determinism agrees with the Volitional Conscious- 
ness. — In deliberation, our self-awareness is of the self 
as conducting the deliberation and closing it off. We know 
ourselves as framing the purpose-judgment with which 
deliberation is cut off. I am determining how I shall 
spend my vacation. A friend suggests a European trip ; 
I had thought of a quiet time in the mountains. The 
deliberative process in which I balance the values for me 



388 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

of the trip and the restful quiet Is mine ; and the judg- 
ment with which I close the deliberation is mine, whether 
that judgment is to put off the decision, or to go to Europe, 
or to rest in the mountains. The concluding judgment 
is ours. This holds even though the judgment be to ac- 
cede to the request, advice, or demand of another ; for 
in that case we know ourselves as making the decision to 
accede. In all the process, the subject knows himself 
as a self-determining Ego. 

2. Self -determinism agrees with our Sense of Respon- 
sibility for our Deliberative Acts. — It is often argued that 
we are not responsible, that we are not to be praised or 
blamed, if our acts are externally determined. That is 
not what is here urged ; it seems better to follow the order 
of the development of the sense of responsibility. This 
much is certain : we deem ourselves responsible for cer- 
tain acts, and we hold others responsible for acts to which 
they are similarly related, and we adjudge the fact and 
the degree of responsibility by the fact and the degree of 
self-determination. Responsibility always goes with de- 
liberative acts, and is based upon the consciousness that 
such acts have their origin in us. If we judge that a man 
has become a slave of passion or habit, this may mitigate 
the severity of our adverse judgment in the instance of 
some present act of his ; but we hold him responsible for 
his present character so far, at least, as we believe it would 
have been possible for him to have developed a different 
character. Our sense of responsibility has its origin in 
our sense of self-determination. 

3. Self -determinism agrees with the General Affirmation 
of Volitional Freedom. — This much is certain : men have 
generally believed that they were free, that their decisions 
were freely determined by themselves. They have praised 
or blamed others, and have justified themselves for doing 



HUMAN FREEDOM 389 

so upon the ground that those whom they praised or 
blamed might have chosen to act otherwise than as they 
did. Self-determinism agrees with this. It holds that 
each of us determines his thinking and judging; and that 
we do so by determining the relation to ourselves of what 
is external to us. What the outer world shall be for my 
conduct of life is fixed by me. The objects of the world 
condition my treatment of them; if I use them, I must 
have regard to their qualities. But, by taking advantage 
of their ways of behaving, I adapt them to my purposes. 
Their fixed modes of behavior make my free activity ef- 
fective. We have also concluded that the character of 
an individual is organized by the individual himself. 
These conclusions — that each of us determines the re- 
lations of the objects of the outer world to his thinking 
and his purposing and to much of his objective activity, 
and that we organize our own characters — agree with the 
consciousness of volitional freedom. 

4. Self -determinism does not ignore the Law of Mechani- 
cal Causality. — The action of the will is purposive ; it 
has respect to ends ; and it would be ineffectual if there 
were no fixed, or determined, order. We secure our ends 
by relating the fixed order of the external world to our 
purposes. (See §§ 156, 2; 184, i.) It is also true that 
our activity becomes extended and effectual in the degree 
to which we establish an order of physical and psychical 
reactions in our organism. Such established order gives 
expertness to the type-writer ; and it is the source of the 
genius of the musician, artist, public speaker, and author. 
This order is always in the making ; its ideal is the com- 
plete systematization of our activities. The more nearly 
one approaches this ideal, the more uniform is his con- 
duct. Viewed from without, the conduct of others ap- 
pears to be determined ; we are surprised if one whom we 



390 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

know takes a course which seems to differ from what has 
been habitual with him. Two things contribute to give 
conduct this fixed mechanical aspect : (i) We see the life 
of another from outside it, and it appears in stages which 
seem to be external to each other; and (2) Character 
develops through the systematizing of our activities, 
and this makes for a regularity in conduct which comports 
with mechanical determination. 

5. An Objection. — " According to Self-determinism, 
the self that chooses has developed a character, he has 
developed a certain mode of relating himself to objects. 
One's choice in any instance is, therefore, determined by 
the character which he has acquired. In other words, a 
man is the bondman of his past." 

(i) This objection errs in its conception of character; 
it thinks of character as static in the instant of valuing 
and purposing. You have to arrive at a decision, pos- 
sibly one of great import to you. The person who ad- 
vances this objection thinks of you as coming to the time 
of decision with a character already developed ; and he 
conceives your decision to be determined by a character 
acquired previous to the time of deliberation and decision. 
This is a serious misconception. Character is not static 
even for an instant; it is " in the making " in the instant 
and act of valuing and purposing. New situations are 
constantly in presentation, and the subject organizes char- 
acter in his relating these new situations to himself. Every 
moment of life has in it new situations and outlooks and a 
developing character. Character determines choices 
while it is developing; and it develops in the choosing. 
The character which determines the choice of an instant 
is the forming character of the instant. In that develop- 
ing character, we have a past character and the self- 
determining self in a new situation with new outlooks. 



HUMAN FREEDOM 391 

Doubtless we tend to maintain the general characteristics 
of our present rational habitude. Stability of character 
is generally thought to be a token of maturity; and we 
are surprised if the generous person becomes penurious, 
or the haughty humble. But character is always forming, 
never formed ; and this, together with the fact that it is 
self-determined, makes it so that the subject is not in any 
instant the mere bondman of his past. 

(2) It occurs not seldom that the conduct of persons In 
particular cases does not accord with their past; and in 
many instances a transformation of character takes place. 
Miserly, pitiless men have been known, in exceptional 
cases, to be generous ; and persons who were regarded as 
kind have said and done what was inexcusably cruel. 
There are instances of lapses from virtuous life, even in 
vigorous maturity ; and cases of conversion and reform 
are indubitable. These facts make against the objection; 
but self-determinism finds a place and a possible explana- 
tion for such facts. 

It is possible that there was in the character of one 
who has thus changed, some element which had not been 
previously so organized into his character as to aifect 
conscious activity sufficiently to become manifest in con- 
duct; and, in relating some new situation to himself, he 
brings this quality to the fore. He may, or may not, give 
this element permanent importance. It is also possible 
that, in his new view of objects and courses of conduct, 
he may temporarily or permanently assign a diiferent 
relative value to objects and ideals from that which he 
had previously given them. These explanations are 
possible because character is never made, but is always 
" in the making." 

§190. Perfect Freedom. — i. Psychical Freedom. — 
The process in the formation of character is a process of 



392 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

coordinating impulses and desires. The perfectly free 
person would be the person who had completed this co- 
ordination, and who had organized all his activities into a 
perfectly cohering system in accordance with the ground 
principle of personality. That person would experience 
no subjective limitations. Since his activities would be 
perfectly systematized, they would be harmonious ; as 
the system is determined by the ground principle of per- 
sonality, he would be free ; for freedom is an attribute of 
personality. Psychical Freedom is implicit in us at birth ; 
normally it develops toward complete systematization of 
our activities. 

2. Ethical Freedom. — Is the man who chooses what is 
unreasonable and evil, free ? Psychical Freedom requires 
that the psychical activities shall be in perfect harmony 
with the ground principle of Personality. Ethical Free- 
dom demands that the individual's system of rational 
activities shall agree with the system of the universe, 
that its principle shall be the same with the fundamental 
order of the cosmos. For us, this order is the expression 
of the perfect Personality ; it is rational and good. Man, 
therefore, attains freedom to the degree in which his 
estimates of value accord with the cosmic gradation of 
values, with the actual relative values of objects and ideals. 
If he shall determine his conduct by these values, he does 
not come into permanent confusion. He becomes free to 
the extent to which he is at one with the fundamental 
order of the universe ; for to that extent this order ceases 
to limit him. This fundamental order is the expression 
of the perfect Reality ; hence, man becomes free as he 
comes to be at one with the perfect Reality. As that 
Reality is reasonable and good, the man who chooses the 
unreasonable and evil is not free. 



CHAPTER XL 

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 

§ 191. Introductory. — Early in our study we said that 
three great topics had occupied the attention of phi- 
losophers : The Object — i.e. the world of persons, things, 
and events; The Subject, who is conscious of the objects 
and of self; and The Religious Consciousness. We have 
confined our study to the first two of these topics. A sys- 
tematic consideration of the religious consciousness would 
yield a Philosophy of Religion. In the limits assigned us, 
we cannot do more than give an introduction to one of 
the many questions which are discussed in constructing a 
Philosophy of the religious consciousness, viz., the ques- 
tion of the existence of God. Even in the study of this 
one question we are forced to recognize limitations, and 
thus to forego the advantage of a historical sketch setting 
forth the various arguments by which thinkers have under- 
taken to justify their affirmation of the reality of God. 
A consideration of these arguments and of the criticisms 
to which they have been subjected would be both inter- 
esting and valuable. But for this we must refer the stu- 
dent to works which treat the subject more at large. A 
few of these are named in our list of references. 

It is not the purpose of the present chapter to originate 
faith in God. In fact, it is not the duty of Philosophy to 
originate faith; it is its province to examine beliefs in 
order to discover whether they stand justified in the court 
of reason. Belief in God is here ; it develops in the devel- 
opment of the religious consciousness, and it persists. 

393 



394 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

The nature of this beHef is such that, if true, it is of the 
highest importance. Attempts have been made to oust 
it ; but reason has always demanded a substitute, and no 
substitute has been able to satisfy all the facts of experi- 
ence. This is a case in which doubt should be required 
not merely to set forth reasons for its scepticism, but also 
to do full justice to the religious consciousness and to 
experience in general. 

The question to which we give an Introductory answer 
in this chapter is this : What are some of the experiential 
facts which justify us in retaining belief in the existence 
of God ? It will be noted that we only set forth some of 
these facts. We cannot note all ; for, if God is, it follows 
of necessity that the whole process of the world and his- 
tory, and all the particulars of experience rightly read, 
reveal Him. By God v/e mean the perfect spiritual 
Being, the self-subsistent One, the Ground of being and 
activity. Since He is conceived as the self-subsistent One, 
we speak of Him as the Absolute ; and we wish the term 
Absolute when used in this work to have this meaning 
assigned to it. 

§ 192. The Religious Consciousness. — i. The Fact of 
the Religious Consciousness is Indisputable. — This ele- 
ment of experience has been potent in the history and 
development of man. The having a religious conscious- 
ness is not simply a characteristic of individuals ; it is 
a racial characteristic. If exceptions appear, the excep- 
tional individuals or peoples are to be accounted as lack- 
ing a characteristic essential to fully developed human self- 
hood. A person who does not respond to music or the 
figures and rhythm of poetry is without a phase of ex- 
perience which is essential to the full life of man. By 
the general consent of mankind, the lack of a religious 
consciousness would be a still greater defect. 



THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 395 

2. A Marked Characteristic of this Experience is a Sense 
of Dependence. — We feel that we do not have the full 
control of our own affairs. Men believe that all events 
do not occur by mere chance, that they are made to occur 
often by some other than ourselves ; and this is true of 
matters in which we are immediately interested. As thus 
described, this consciousness of dependence is not distinctly 
religious. But it is not found by itself ; it is accompanied 
by a belief in the presence and activity of an invisible 
power or powers. Men have felt that they were living 
in a world where " higher powers " have to do with the 
management of human affairs. This feeling of dependence 
on a " higher power " has developed a desire to stand right 
with this power; and this desire expresses itself in wor- 
ship. The object or objects of worship are always thought 
of as superior in some respect to the things of sense, and 
of a higher nature than man. This feeling, with its im- 
pulsion to worship, is not regarded by man as a by- 
product of life, a negligible accompaniment of experience. 
On the contrary, it is thought to be of chief importance ; 
and, being thus regarded, it has had great impelling force. 
The religious consciousness, of which this sense of de- 
pendence upon the super-human is the heart, has deter- 
mined the ethical principles and social organization of 
peoples ; it has given the highest ideals to literature and 
has influenced law and governmental forms and national 
activities. 

3. The Religious Consciousness Demands an Object of 
Faith. — By this we mean that the religiously revered 
object must be thought of as a known reality. Mystery 
always attends man's thought of the object of religious 
veneration. There is a tacit or open acknowledgment 
that the higher nature of what is worshipped makes it 
impossible for us to attain complete knowledge of it ; but 



396 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

the object of worship cannot be wholly undefined. Only 
that can be real for us of which we have, or believe we have, 
some knowledge. Religious consciousness is not a matter 
merely of the feelings, nor of the will, nor of both feeling 
and will ; it is of the whole self. To eliminate intellec- 
tion from it, is to make it the consciousness of a partial 
self ; and a partial self is in fact no self at all. We repeat 
here what we have previously insisted upon :. man is a 
thinking-feeling-willing being. Man must have some 
idea of the object of his worship. One cannot worship 
" a mental vacuum " ; one cannot relate the conduct of 
life to that of which he has no knowledge. An object of 
faith, of which something is believed to be known, is es- 
sential to the religious consciousness. The Greek gods 
did not become objects of really definite belief; and, as a 
result, the religious consciousness of the Greeks was rela- 
tively weak, and it had little influence over life. When this 
phase of consciousness is well developed, it assigns to the 
revered object a much higher degree of reality than to 
any object of sense; and it thinks of that object in de- 
scriptive terms, for man can only think thus. 

4. The Religious Consciousness seeks a Unifying Real- 
ity. — Our experiences in dealing with the world of nature 
are many and greatly varied ; and the world realities are 
many. The scientist groups the many changes and ob- 
jects which he studies. He collects objects into classes, and 
so unifies them ; and he unifies changes and expresses their 
unity in statements of natural law. He carries this uni- 
fication as far as he can. The first groups — as species — 
are unified into a more inclusive group — as genus ; and 
this larger group into a yet more comprehensive group — 
as family; and so on. There is a tendency, rather a 
distinct effort, to effect a similar unification of changes. 
Thus, evolution is taken as including a number of orders 



THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 397 

of change — selection, heredity, etc. It is also accepted 
that the different sciences have a unity which demands 
recognition ; and scientists recognize the structural unity 
of all sciences. In this more comprehensive view, exact 
scientific thought conceives the myriad objects and changes 
which it studies to be realities and changes of a unity. 
Even the Plain Man has a notion, vague to be sure, that 
all these things with which he has to do, belong together. 

The religious consciousness evinces the same tendency. 
In the lowest forms of religion, there are many objects 
of reverence; and each of these objects stands for the 
relating of many experiences. The experiences connected 
with war are related, in respect of their religious aspect, 
to the god 6i war ; experiences in connection with sowing 
and reaping, to the god of the harvest. In each of these 
objects of religious reverence, the religious consciousness 
has unified many experiences. Thus, the religious con- 
ceptions represented in the many gods of Egypt became 
unified in Ra, the god of light. This movement toward 
unity in and through the religious consciousness finds its 
completest expression in monotheism. The religious 
consciousness, judged by its highest stage of development, 
would relate all Its experiences to one Supreme Being. It 
believes that its hopes are forwarded, its successes secured, 
its assurances sustained, its fears quieted, its failures re- 
paired, and its doubts resolved, only when the subject of 
these experiences is in right relation with the Supreme, 
in real accord with the activity of God. 

5. This Consciousness demands a Personal Object of 
Faith. — The object of worship must be one with whom the 
worshipper may have communication. Worship finds its 
incentive and meaning in the desire for communion with 
the super-human ; and It seeks such communion with a 
view to securing rest of heart and support in life. This is 



398 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

obviously true of the more distinctly spiritual worship ; 
that is, worship in which there is the least of fixed ritual. 
But it holds also for worship which is ritualistic, for that 
centres about the idea of sacrifice and the kindred idea of 
sacrament. The element of sacrifice is significant of the 
thought of the worshipper, alike in the worship of primitive 
peoples and of those who are most highly cultured. Sac- 
rifice is offered in order that communion with God may be 
made possible; and in the sacrificial meal, the worshipper 
partakes with the divine, or of the divine. In the sacra- 
mental idea, there is at least the conception of the binding 
of the worshipper to God through covenant. The per- 
fect religion, that which would fulfil the highest aspira- 
tions of the religious consciousness, would involve im- 
mediate fellowship with the " higher power"; it would 
find its life and its satisfaction in conscious communion 
with the object of religious reverence. 

It is this which gives religion so great power in the life 
of the genuine worshipper; he believes that he has en- 
tered into fellowhip with God. " Spiritual growth is 
brought about by the impact of nobler souls on ours." 
It is not only true that he who lives in communion with 
those whose life is higher than his own rises with them ; 
but it is also true that he would who rise, seeks such com- 
panionship. The religious instinct follows this order and 
will not be turned aside. Definite religious experience is 
always attributed, by those who have it, to their having 
come into intimate relation with a higher reality. This 
requires that the object of religious reverence shall be 
personal ; for we cannot have real fellowship with what 
lacks the attributes of personality. Primitive peoples 
worship natural objects and powers; and the Positivists 
worship Humanity ; but the primitive peoples assign 
quasi-personality to those natural objects and powers. 



THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 399 

and the Positivists do quite the same with Humanity. 
The religious consciousness seeks communion with the 
object of worship ; in this it conceives the Supreme as 
personal. 

§193. The Religious Consciousness Evaluated. — i. 
What does it signify that the religious consciousness 
demands a knowable concrete reality as an object of faith, 
one reality in which all experiences are unified, a personal 
object so that the worshipper may commune with the 
object worshipped, a Supreme Being in order that the 
dependent worshipper may be assured of efficient aid ? 
Is this consciousness the expression of a mere individual 
desire, or is it a mode of reality and therefore at one with 
the Ground , Reality of the universe .? We believe that it 
is a mode of subject-reality, and that it also expresses 
what is significant of the world of nature and of racial 
and individual history. So far as it expresses the signifi- 
cance of our relation to nature and history, objectively 
regarded, it is a mode of object-reality. If this concep- 
tion be true, the religious consciousness has equal author- 
ity with cognitive consciousness. 

2. The religious consciousness is implicit in man. This 
phase of consciousness cannot be alien to the nature of man. 
It is not found in merely individual experiences ; it is 
characteristic of the race. Individual exceptions may be 
discovered. There are some persons in whom it seems 
never to have been developed ; and there are others who 
have confessedly repressed it or neglected to foster it until 
its presence in consciousness can be scarcely, if at all, 
recognized. But such persons fail, in this particular, to 
represent the normal consciousness ; just as the blind 
and the deaf do not represent normal sentient conscious- 
ness. The religious consciousness is a characteristic of 
humanity. It is not a mere datum of our social environ- 



400 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

ment. We never take " raw " material of experience into 
our consciousness ; we always make over the material 
which we appropriate, and we assimilate it to our mental 
constitution. Some one is speaking. Air waves stimu- 
late our auditory sense-organs ; but, for our consciousness, 
those air waves are ideas. The " raw " material proffered 
to sense becomes, in our appropriation and assimilation 
of it, something quite other than that which stimulated 
our sense-organs. It has been assimilated to our rational 
nature. It is thus with all that becomes constituent of 
consciousness. The religious consciousness cannot be 
an exception ; it is developed in our appropriating and 
assimilating what comes to us in our experience of the 
external world. In man's experience of the world of per- 
sons, things, and events, he has developed this phase of 
consciousness ; in assimilating the material of experience, 
he has given it this quality. We must conclude, then, 
that it is of the nature of man to be religious, since his 
experiences have a religious aspect. To put it otherwise, 
the being religious is implicit in man ; and, in his appro- 
priation of the material of experience, what was implicit 
in him becomes explicit. It follows that the religious con- 
sciousness is a mode in which subjective reality expresses 
itself; it is a mode of its being. The requirements of 
the religious consciousness are, therefore, the require- 
ments of rationality. 

3. Consciousness of God is implicit. This conscious- 
ness has not been communicated to man from without. 
Man does not first hear of God and then become religious. 
Consciousness of the super-human is a primal and persistent 
element of the religious consciousness. If the conscious- 
ness of God, or of what is regarded as God, becomes dulled, 
the force of religious aspiration and impulse is lessened, and 
religion loses its supreme place in life and its influence over 



THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 401 

life. For reasons similar to those advanced in the last 
paragraph, we hold that consciousness of God is implicit 
in man. Whatever aids the development of this con- 
sciousness is in harmony with the nature of man ; it aids 
in bringing subjective reality to effective development. 
The requirements of this consciousness are the require- 
ments of rationality. 

4. The religious characteristic of consciousness accords 
with the significance of objective reality. We have in- 
sisted that man gives a religious quality to the " raw " 
material of experience. A question naturally follows : 
Is this religious significance foreign to the objective world ? 
We do not ask as to whether the world of nature and his- 
tory, racial and individual, is distinctly religious. What 
we wish to know may be stated thus : Is the religious 
consciousness in its nature alien to the significance of 
the world ? 

We have given reasons for holding that the mind does 
not contribute to the known object what is alien to that 
object (§ 98, 2 (2)). It is true that we may err in par- 
ticular instances ; and a whole age may err respecting 
an object of thought. But even in these instances there 
is some knowledge of reality. The point which we made 
in § 98 was that the cognitive act as such does not contrib- 
ute to knowledge what is alien to the object. One as- 
sumption underlies all our consideration of experience and 
must precede all reflective thought; viz., that the world 
and life are intelligible. We do not assume that any one 
person or age will have complete knowledge of the world 
and life; but that the world and life are intelligible and 
may be known. Thought cannot begin without this as- 
sumption. That the world of nature and history may be 
intelligible, it is necessary that objective reality shall 
express itself in modes which are not alien to the modes 

2D 



402 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

in which the mind acts. The world in relation with which 
man has experience and develops consciousness comes to 
expression in consciousness. The consciousness which 
is thus developed has a religious quality ; for it, life in 
this world has a religious significance. It must be, then, 
that at least some of the situations and relations in which 
objective reality expresses itself have a religious signifi- 
cance. The religious phase of consciousness is not alien 
to the significance of the world of history and na- 
ture. 

5. When we compare the requirements of the religious 
consciousness with the conclusions to which we were led 
by our study of the categories, it becomes manifest that 
the objective world is at ground in harmony with the 
religious consciousness. The categories are the forms of 
reality, the forms of its being and its activity; they are 
at once the forms in which we experience the world and 
the forms in which reality expresses itself. The religious 
consciousness requires for its satisfaction the unification 
of experiences ; and the highest development of this 
consciousness finds the ground of harmonious, restful ex- 
perience in a Personal God, of whom and in whom the 
universe is. Our study of the categories led us to conclude 
that there is one ultimate reality ; that the ultimate 
reality is the Absolute Individual, the Perfect Person ; 
that the myriad objects and changes of the world, and the 
varied experiences of individuals find their unity in Him ; 
that society is grounded in Him — in a word, that He is 
the unification and explanation of all experience. The 
religious consciousness demands a God in whom all ex- 
periences are unified. Our study of reality concludes 
that all modes of being and activity, all modes of ex- 
perience, are thus unified. According to this, the religious 
consciousness is not a purely subjective longing; it is one 



THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 403 

of the modes of reality, and its requirements have the 
value for reason that reality has. 

6. Men have given a specific religious significance to 
certain experiences. We aspire to rise to a nobler estate 
of self-hood ; we strive and are often forced to confess 
failure. At the best, we acknowledge that the task — 
felt to be a worthy one — has not yet been completed. 
We are convinced that the true, the highest interpretation 
of life is that there is something better for us than the 
struggle for objects of sense, or mere intellectual attain- 
ment, or position of power. Above all these, there is 
something of infinitely greater moment for us. Our 
conception of this better object of thought and endeavor 
may be vague, and our definition of it unsatisfactory even 
to us ; but in our best moments we have no doubt of its 
reality. The vanity of things of sense, the incapacity of 
mere knowledge to fit one to enjoy others and to be 
gladdened by their gain — such experiences as these and 
those just named above lead our thoughts above the world 
in which and for which much of our life is lived. When 
we are at our best, we are convinced that, if we and all 
others should get a vision of the true end of life and 
should be obedient to that vision, the very struggle to 
actualize that ideal would be better than to be content 
with seeking what most of us too easily make the end of 
life. These are not mere illusions, pure vaporings ; 
they are man's interpretation of the meaning of his being 
in the universe, his interpretation of the significance of 
his experience of the world of persons, things, and events ; 
and they are not alien to that world. 

These experiences go to sustain our contention that the 
religious consciousness is at one with the order of the uni- 
verse. Consciousness of the need of an aim that is worthy 
the self has in it a religious element ; and men have turned 



404 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

to religion to learn how they may surely attain the true 
end of life. They have sought fellowship with God, as 
One who knew them and the world. And the most deeply 
religious declare that in this fellowship they have been 
lifted above their lower selves and have been inspired to 
attain a higher self-hood. They attest that they have been 
joined to an ideal which, although never perfectly realized 
by them, has been of inestimable value. They testify 
that in this fellowship they have been aroused to seek the 
best and have been aided in the search ; and they have 
found peace. Since these experiences tend to incite man 
to seek what he believes to be highest and best, they are 
obviously at one with the law of development. The in- 
dividual may err in judging what is highest. But to be 
responsive to what one deems to be the highest is the true 
test of self-hood ; and the religious consciousness makes 
for that. If the end of experience is the development in 
man of the highest expression of finite personality, and we 
believe that it is, then the religious consciousness must be 
regarded as being in the order of the universe. We con- 
clude, therefore, that it has the same value for reflective 
thought that the order of the universe has. 

§ 194. Conclusion. — We have found that the require- 
ments of the religious consciousness in general and of the 
consciousness of God in particular are requirements of 
rationality. We have also found that the religious con- 
sciousness is one of the modes of reality, both subjectively 
and objectively expressed, and that its requirements have 
the value for reason that any other expression of reality has. 
We have likewise learned that the religious consciousness is 
at one with the order of the universe, and that definite, 
constructive, religious experience is in the order of the 
universe. We conclude, therefore, that religious experi- 
ence has the value for reflective thought that the order 



THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 405 

of the universe has. The acceptance of the reality of the 
one God, personal and supreme, a God with whom man 
may have communion, is a demand of the religious con- 
sciousness. Hence, we retain, as an article of philosophic 
faith, our belief that God, the Perfect Personality, the 
Absolute Individual, is, and is the Ground of being and 
activity. " In Him we live and move and have our 
being." 



REFERENCES 

Those who desire fuller bibliographies will do well to consult Baldwin's 
"Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology," Vol. Ill, and the bibli- 
ographies given with articles on philosophical subjects in "The Ency- 
clopaedia Britannica," nth edition. An excellent bibliography for 
Modern Philosophy is to be found in Calkins 's "Persistent Problems of 
Philosophy," 2d ed., pp. 457-564. Baldwin's Dictionary referred to 
above is especially helpful in the matter of definition and in its condensed 
statements of philosophical problems and controversies. 

ABBREVIATIONS 

The following abbreviations will be used in the instance of works 
more frequently referred to: — 

BosANQUET, Logic = Bosauquct's Logic, 2d ed. 

BosANQUET, Individuality = Bosanquet's Principle of Individuality and 
Value, Giiford Lectures for 191 1. 

BowNE, Metaphysics = Bowne's Metaphysics, rev. ed. 

Bradley, Appearance = Bradley's Appearance and Reality, 2d ed. 

Caird, Kant = Caird's Critical Philosophy of Kant, 2d ed. 

Calkins, Persistent Problems = Calkins's Persistent Problems of Phi- 
losophy, 2d ed. 

Creighton, Logic = Creighton's Introductory Logic, 3d ed. 

Enc, Brit. = Encyclopaedia Britannica, nth ed. 

Ladd, Reality = Ladd's Theory of Reality. 

New Int. Enc. = The New International Encyclopaedia. 

Ormond, Foundations = Ormond's Foundations of Knowledge. 

Phil. Rev. = The Philosophical Review. 

Taylor, Metaphysics = Taylor's Elements of Metaphysics, 2d ed. 

Watson, Outline = Watson's Outline of Philosophy, 3d ed. 

CHAPTER I 

Calkins, Persistent Problems, pp. 3-6. 
RoYCE, Spirit of Modern Philosophy, 3d ed., pp. I-3. 
Ward, Enc. Brit., Vol. XXII, p. 550. 
Watson, Outline, pp. 1-3. 

WiNDELBAND, History of Philosophy, 2d ed., § I. 

406 



\ 



REFERENCES 407 

CHAPTERS II-XII 

We suggest the following for persons beginning the study of Philosophy : 

CuSHMAN, A Beginner'' s History of Philosophy, 2 vols. 

Rogers, Student's History of Philosophy. 

Turner, History of Philosophy, — especially valuable for Mediaeval 

Philosophy. 
Weber, History of Philosophy. 
WiNDELBAND, History of Philosophy, 2d ed. 

Modern Philosophy. 

HoFFDiNG, Brief History of Modern Philosophy. 
Calkins, Persistent Problems. 

CHAPTER Xni 

MuiRHEAD, Enc. Brit., Vol. XIV, pp. 285 f. 
Rogers, Student^ s History of Philosophy, pp. 505 ff. 
Seth, English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy, pp. 358 ff. 
Eucken, Main Currents of Modern Thought, 4th ed., pp. 70-82 ; 103-I15; 
230-239. 

CHAPTER XIV 

Ladd, Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 6-27. 
Pringle-Pattison, Enc. Brit., Vol. XXI, pp. 440 ff. 
Watson, Outline, pp. 13-20. 
Watson, Philosophy of Kant Explained, pp. 1-3. 

CHAPTER XV 

Caird, Kant, Vol. II, pp. 90-92. 
Ormond, Foundations, pp. 30-51; iii f. 
Royce, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 165-171. 
Ward, Enc. Brit., Vol. XXII, pp. 550, 552, 564. 

CHAPTER XVI 

Hibben, Philosophy of the Enlightenment, pp. 85-108. 
Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean, pp. 312-352; 371-399. 
New Int. Enc, Vol. X, pp. 757 ff. 
Pringle-Pattison, Enc. Brit., Vol, XXIV, pp. 306 f. 



408 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 

CHAPTER XVII 

Calkins, Persistent Problems , pp. 404 ff. 

Pearson, The Grammar of Science, 2d ed., pp. 60-63. 

New Int. Enc, Vol. X, pp. 764 f. 

WiNDELBAND, History of Philosophy, 2d ed., pp. 471, 675. 

CHAPTERS XVIII and XIX 

Calkins, Persistent Problems, pp. 149 ff. 

Ladd, Reality, pp. 49-56. 

Watson, Outline, pp. 32-42. 

New Int. Enc, Vol. X, pp. 758 ff. 

Bradley, Appearance, Bk. I. 

Pringle-Pattison, Man's Place in the Cosmos, etc., pp. 137-192. 

BosANQUET, Logic, Vol. I, pp. 25-28; Vol. II, p. 210. 

Creighton, Logic, pp. 343-352. 

CHAPTER XX 

Baillie, Idealistic Construction of Experience, pp. 146-175. 

Bowne, Metaphysics, pp. 17-26. 

Bradley, Appearance, pp. 359-382. 

Ladd, Reality, pp. 81 f. ; 130-132. 

Leighton, Phil. Rev., Vol. XIX, pp. 1-17. 

Watson, Outline, pp. 38-41. 

CHAPTER XXI 

Spencer, First Principles, 6th ed., pp. 61-97. 
Muirhead, Enc. Brit., Vol. XIV, p. 281. 

ScHURMAN, Phil. Rev., Vol. II, pp. 133 ff. ; Vol. VII, pp. 235 ff. 
Jones, Phil. Rev., Vol. XX, pp. 405-421. 
Watson, Outline, pp. 431-439. 

Fraser, Locke,.\n Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, pp. 122-147. 
Wallace, Kant, in Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, pp. 156-178. 
Pringle-Pattison, Scottish Philosophy, in Blackwood's Philosophical 
Classics, pp. 1-32; 77-91. 



REFERENCES 409 

CHAPTER XXII 

Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, 5th ed., pp. 130-173. 
Cunningham, Thought and Reality in Hegel's System, pp. 17-20. 
Creighton, Logic, pp. 322-342. 
Creighton, Phil. Rev., Vol. XV, pp. 482-489. 

CHAPTER XXIII 

Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. I, pp. 29-51 ; 90-95. 

Creighton, Logic, pp. 322-342. 

Creighton, Phil. Rev., Vol. XXI, pp. 303-321. 

EucKEN, Main Currents of Modern Thought, 4th ed., pp. 64-98. 

Ward, Enc. Brit., Vol. XXII, p. 564. 

CHAPTER XXIV 

Adamson ; X, Enc. Brit., Vol. V, pp. 511 f. 

Ladd, Reality, pp. 84-110. 

Ormond, Foundations, pp. I11-117. 

New Int. Enc, Vol. IV, pp. 211 f. 

Wallace, Logic of Hegel, 2d ed., pp. 387-391. 

Watson, The Philosophy of Kant Explained, pp. 157-168. 

CHAPTER XXV 

Bradley, Appearance, pp. 572-584. 
Ladd, Reality, pp. 160-177, 
Taylor, Metaphysics, pp. 140-153. 

CHAPTER XXVI 

Bowne, Metaphysics, pp. 44-67. 
Taylor, Metaphysics, pp. 158-164. 

CHAPTER XXVII 

Ormond, Foundations, pp. 272-279. 
Taylor, Metaphysics, pp. 123-128. 



4IO INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 



CHAPTER XXVIII 

Ormond, Foundations^ pp. 176-193. 
Taylor, MetaphysicSj/pp. 128-140. 

CHAPTER XXIX 

BosANQUET, Logic, Vol. I, pp. 104-140; 154-160; 204-207. 
BowNE, Metaphysics, pp. 31-38. 
Bradley, Appearance, pp. 572-584. 
Ormond, Foundations, pp. 151-160. 
Taylor, Metaphysics, pp. 128-140. 

CHAPTER XXX 

Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. I, pp. 144-161 ; 166-169; I93~I9S' 
Ormond, Foundations, pp. 147-15 1. 

CHAPTER XXXI 

Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. I, pp. 112-115; 174-189. 
New Int. Enc, Vol. XVI, pp. 19 f. 
Ormond, Foundations, pp. 1 18-146. 
Sturt, Enc. Brit., Vol. XXV, pp. 525 f. 
Taylor, Metaphysics, pp. 243-264. 

CHAPTER XXXII 

Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. I, pp. 112-115; 169-174; 186-189; 258 f. 
Ormond, Sturt, and Taylor, same as for Chapter XXXI. 



CHAPTER XXXIII 

I 



Bowne, Metaphysics, pp. 74-79; 205-227. 

McIntyre, Cyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. I, p. 80 



Ward, Enc. Brit., Vol. XXII, p. 597. 

CHAPTER XXXIV 

Mill, Logic, 8th ed., pp. 234-266. 

Bain, Logic, rev. ed., pp. 245-253 ; 267 f. 

Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. I, pp. 250-267; Vol. II, p. 215. 



REFERENCES 411 

Ormond, Foundations, pp. 161-175; 205-216. 

Taylor, Metaphysics, pp. 164-190. 

Watson, Otti/in^, pp. 15-19; 27-29; 89-100; 385-387. 

CHAPTER XXXV 

BosANQUET, Individuality, pp. 123-154. 

Cairo, Kant, Vol. II, pp. 442-521, especially pp. 481, 489-497. 

Ormond, Foundations, pp. 464-468; 521. 

Pfleiderer, The Philosophy of Religion, Vol. Ill, pp. 259-264. 

Watson, The Philosophy of Kant Explained, pp. 399-402. 

CHAPTER XXXVI 

BosANQUET, Individuality, pp. 68-77. 

Cunningham, Thought and Reality in HegeVs System, pp. 79-113. 

Illingworth, Personality Human and Divine, pp. 6-80; 240 f, 

Ormond, Foundations, pp. 254-268. 

RoYCE, The World and the Individual. See Index under Individual. 

CHAPTER XXXVII 

Ormond, Foundations, pp. 268-271 ; 283-300. 

RoYCE, The World and the Individual, Vol. II, pp. 168-174. 

Angell, Psychology, 4th ed., pp. 445 f. 

Calkins, A First Book in Psychology, pp. 245-259. 

Stout, Manual of Psychology, pp. 509-516; 520-527. 

CHAPTERS XXXVIII and XXXIX 

BosANQUET, Individuality, pp. 318-357. 

Caird, Kant, Vol. II, pp. 223-255. 

James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, pp. 569-579. 

LoTZE, Outlines of Practical Philosophy, pp. 35-50. 

Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, pp. 90-100. 

MuiRHEAD, Elements of Ethics, pp. 45-54. 

SiDGWiCK, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed., pp. 57-76; 511-516. 

RoYCE, The World and the Individual. See Index under Freedom. 

Taylor, Metaphysics, pp. 358-380. 

Watson, Outline, pp. 235-248; 460-483. 

Eucken, Main Currents of Modern Thought, 4th ed., pp. 409-444. 



412 



INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 



CHAPTER XL 



Caird, The Evolution of Religion, 4th ed. See Index under God, also pp. 
82-84. Caird cogently insists that God is "the ultimate presup- 
position of our consciousness." 

BowNE, Metaphysics, pp. 94-120. 

Calkins, Persistent Problems. See Index under God. 

Cunningham, Thought and Reality in Hegel's System, pp. 138-157. 

Illingworth, Personality Human and Divine, pp. 81-112; 138-191. 

Pfleiderer, Philosophy cf Religion, Vol. Ill, pp. 237-290. 

RoYCE, The World and the Individual, Vol. II, pp. 418-425. 



INDEX 



Abelard : 54 f . 

Absolute, the : 394 f., 405; Fichte's 
Universal Ego, 97 f., 102 ; Schel- 
ling's idea of, 99 f ., 102 ; Hegel's 
idea of, loi ff . ; as Person, 102, 
354, 361 f ., 402, 405 ; as true uni- 
versal, 102 f. ; subject, 308 f., 
310; individual, 335, 337, 354, 
361, 402, 405; reality, 362. 

Accidents: 55, 70, 267 £E., 271. 

Activity: 187, 311 ff. ; and cognition, 
66 f., 207-214, 232' f.; combining 
or synthetic, 85, 88, 93 ; rational, 
loi f. ; cognitive, tri-phasal char- 
acter of, 207-214; organic, 225- 
228; selective, 342 f . ; transeunt, 
312 f., 316 ; immanent {see 
organic), 187, 311 f., 313 ; self- 
determination, highest form of, 
345 ; teleological and mechanical, 
346, 338-349. 

Acts: instinctive, habitual, 341 f., 
370, 380 f. 

Esthetics: 127, 340 f. 

Affection: and experience, 134, 207- 
209, 211-213. 

Affectivism: defined, 46, 59, 207-209. 

Agnosticism: see Scepticism. 

Agnostics : 39, 40 f . 

Albert, the Great: doctrines, 57, 58; 
scientist, 59; intellectualist, 208. 

Anaxagoras: doctrines, 18 f., 255; 
teleology, 33. 

Anaximander: 16. 

Anazimenes: 16. 

Anselm: 54. 

Antecedent: 322-330. 

Antiochus: 41. 

Appearance: illusory, 161 ff . ; real- 
ity expressed, 171 f . ; and reality, 
157-178; and reality mutually 
exclusive, 159-161, 174; and real- 
ity correlatives in cognition, 171 f. ; 



and perception, 174 f . ; and expe- 
rience, 175-178 ; a construct of the 
subject, 173-178, 194 f . ; Kant's 
doctrine, 203-205 ; see Phenom- 
enalism, Re^ty. 

Apperception: 136 f. 

Aquinas, Thomas: 58 f., 208, 370. 

Arabians: influence, 56 f . ; relation 
to science, 122. 

Archimedes: 39. 

Aristarchus: 39. 

Aristotle: 21, 22, 29; a monist in 
purpose, 30, 36; scientist, 35; cf. 
with Plato, 31 f. ; attitude toward 
dualism, 34, 37; doctrine of uni- 
versal, 32, 52, 102 f . ; of develop- 
ment, 32 ff . ; of man, 36 ; of form 
and matter, s^, 38, 58, 267; on 
mechanism, 34 ; on teleology, 33 f., 
37 f.; logical doctrine, 34 f . ; con- 
ception of God, 38 ; an ideaUst, 83 ; 
on judgment, 35 f., 212 ; categories, 
235 f . ; on substance, 267 f. ; on 
freedom, 365; a self-determinist, 

369 f- 

Associationism : 11 3-1 15, 383. 

Atomists: doctrines, 16, 18, 20 f., 
255, 266; determinists, 369. 

Atoms: 17; properties of, 30 f. 

Augustine : method and doctrine, 50, 
369; a voluntarist, 208; on cate- 
gories, 236; an indeterminist, 

369. 
Averroes: 57, 59, 208, 
Avicebron: 208. 

Bacon, Francis : 76,122. 

Bacon, Roger: 57, 58, 59, 122. 

Bain: 115; on causation, 324, 331. 

Being: in Pre-Socratic thought, 17; 
and reahty, 82, 100 f . ; pure, 102, 
272; active, def., 187, 311 f. 

Berkeley: 77. 79> 83, 270. 



413 



414 



INDEX 



de Biran : 208. 
Boehme, Jacob: 62. 
Bradley: 162-166. 
Brahe, Tycho : 61. 
Bruno: 61. 

Campanella: 61. 

Carneades: 369. 

Categories: 234-362; general view, 
234-242 ; def., 23s f ., 242 ; Kant- 
ian and Hegelian view, 103 f., 
236-238; historical, 235 ff. ; and 
subjective reality, 238 f . ; and 
objective reality, 239 f. ; and con- 
tent for thought, 240 f . ; unity of, 
241 f. ; general conclusions, 242, 
361 f. 

Causality: 318-337; and change, 
319 f., 326-329; and conditioning, 
318 f. ; naive conception, 319 f., 
330-333; conceptions of, 321 f . ; 
metaphysical doctrine, 330-333 ; 
phenomenal, 322-333 ; is phenom- 
enal cause adequate? 326 £f. ; 
complete ground, 333-335, 337- 

Cause: in Pre-Socratic Philosophy, 
18; origin of idea, 318-321; con- 
ceptions of, 321 f. 

Change: and permanence, 16, 254- 
258 ; Leibniz on, 75 ; Spinoza, 74 f . ; 
historical, 254 f . ; and reality, 
256-258; see Permanence . 

Character: def., 375; and person- 
ality distinguished, 375 f . ; sub- 
ject to development, 376; a sys- 
tem, 377; organization of, 377 f. 

Choice: and freedom, 373 ff. ; and 
character, 382 f. 

Christian Dogma and Philosophy: 
48, 51-61, 62 f. 

Cognition: 31, 40, 58, 60, 65 f., 78, 
84 f., 140-178, 190-233; super- 
ordinary, 44 ; involves feeling and 
will, 211-213; a thought-process, 
213 f. ; conclusions, 228-233; see 
Knowledge. 

Common-sense Philosophy : no ff. 

Concept: 23 fif., 26 f., 28, 40, 53, 
218-222; def., 218; relation to 
thought, 219-222; ground of, 
221 f. ; see Ideas, Plato, Universal. 



Conceptualism : 52 £., 54, 57. 

Condillac: 115. 

Confucius: 12. 

Consciousness : of self-sameness, 
134-136, 170, 94, 254, 25s; of 
self, 169 f., 189, 363 f. ; state of, 
not primary object in cognition, 
197-203; and feeling and will, 

133 f., 207-209, 387-389; unitary, 

134 f., 209-211; many in one, 
351 f. ; social, 355-361; see Ex- 
perience, Religious Conscious- 
ness. 

Copernicus: 61. 
Cosmology: 16. 

Criteria of truth: Stoic and Epi- 
curean, 40 f . ; Descartes, 73 f. 

Democritus: 20 f., 30 f., 66, 73, 

273. 
Descartes: an extreme rationalist, 

70; doctrines, 71-74, 122, 269, 

273. 
Determinism: def., 367; historical, 

369; argument for, 380-384; 

criticism of, 384-387, 
Directivity: 341 ff. 
Diversity : see Identity. 
Dogma : see Christian Dogma, Reli- 
gious Consciousness in Mediaeval 

Philosophy. 
Doubt: 140-149; see Agnostics, 

Hume, Scepticism. 
Dualism: def., 17, 46; epistemolog- 

ical, 29 ; ontological, 29 ; Plato's, 

28, 30, 31 ; Aristotle's, 34; Kant's, 

92 f. 
Duration : see Time. 

Eckhart: 60. 

Eclectics: 39, 41; and indetermin- 
ism, 369. 

Edwards, Jonathan: 370. 

Ego: Kantian and Fichtean con- 
ceptions, 87-89, 96-98; and the 
external world, Pearson's concep- 
tion, 152 f., 154 f. 

Eleatics: 16, 17, 19, 25, 162 f., 255, 
266, 314. 

Empedocles: 16, 18, 255. 

Empiricism: 66-69, 76 f,, ii3-iis» 



INDEX 



41S 



115 f., 192 £f. ; def., 66 ; early mod- 
ern, 76 f. ; later modern, 113 f . ; 
and knowledge, 78, 114, 116 f., 
193 f. ; and reality, 79 f., 117. 
Environment : and organisms, 
343 fi. ; and self, 318 f., 373 f-, 

385 f. 
Epicxireans: 39, 40, 41, 42, 46, 58, 

364, 369- 

Epistemology : 128-233; def., 21; 
of Sophists, 19 f. ; Kant, 84-87, 
89 f., 92-94; Fichte, 96 f. ; Schel- 
ling, 100; Hegel, 104-106; Reid, 
Hamilton, et al., 109-113; Mill, 
Spencer, etal., 11 3-117 ; 5ee Knowl- 
edge. 

Erigena: 51. 

Error in perception : sources of, 175- 
178. 

Ethics: a normative, science, 127; 
of Stoics and Epicureans, 41 f . ; 
of Socrates, 22-24; Kant's moral 
imperative, 90 f . ; in Fichte's 
system, 95, 97, 98, 100. 

Euclid: 39. 

Existence of God: 393-405; see 
God. 

Experience: 128-139; def., 4, 131; 
source, i ; and knowledge, 2 ; as 
viewed by Philosophy, 3 f., 130- 
132; dual aspect, 4, 132-134; 
conative, 4 f., 133 ; is philosophic 
material, 8-10 ; a development, 
136 f . ; a continuous whole, 139; 
characteristics, 82, 139, 216 f . ; 
is unitary, 170; judgment and, 
142,175-178; universal in, 181- 
186, 216-218; cognitive expe- 
rience, 190-206; three phases, 4 f., 
207-214; organic, 225-228. 

Faith : in Patristic Philosophy, 48 f . ; 
and reason, 49, 56-60 ; and knowl- 
edge in Kant's system, 90 f., 92 f., 
203-205; and Philosophy, 393. 

Fathers, the : 48. 

Feeling: def., 134, 210; with Stoics, 
Eclectics, Epicureans, 42 f . ; in 
psychological theory, 208 f. 

Fichte: motive, 95 f.; epistemology, 

j^ 96 f . ; doctrine of ego, 97 f . ; tele- 



ology, 98; idealism, 98; a volun- 
tarist, 208. 
Finality: 338-349; in individual 
experience, 338 f. ; in historical 
sources, 339 f . ; in development of 
science, 340; in ethical and 
sesthetical relations, 340 f . ; and 
reality, 346 ff. ; and activity, 

347 ff. 

Freedom: psychical, 364-367, 
391 f. ; ethical, 365-367, 392; 
metaphysical, 364-367; see Hu- 
man Freedom. 

Fries : 209. 

Galileo: 61. 
Gerbert: 51. 

God: Aristotle's idea, 38; Neo- 
Platonic, 43, 44 f . ; Patristic, 49 f . ; 
with Plotinus, 44 f . ; Origen, 49 f . ; 
Augustine, 50; Erigena, 51; 
Nicholas of Cusa, 60; Bruno, 61; 
Boehme, 62; Descartes, 71 f., 72; 
Spinoza, 72; Leibniz, 73, 270; 
Kant, 88 f . ; Schelling, 99 f . ; as 
ground of being and activity, 322 ; 
reality of universe, 333 ff., 399; 
attributes, 334; the perfect Per- 
sonality, 362, 402,405; 5ee Exist- 
ence of God. 

Gorgias: 20, 140. 

Ground, complete: 242, 252, 253, 
322, 354, 361, 362; see Causality. 

Hamilton: 110-113. 
Hedonism: 42. 

Hegel: 100-108, 122; nature of 
reality, 100 f . ; ultimate reality, 
loi f. ; cf. Fichte and Schelling, 
102 ; the Absolute, 101-103 ; the 
universal, 102 f. ; the categories, 
103, 238; knowledge and reality, 
104 ; Kmitation of knowledge, 105 ; 
identity of subject and object, 
105 f. ; the self, 106 f . ; general, 
107 f. 

Heracleitus: 16, 17, 254, 264. 

Hesiod: 13. 

Hobbes: 76, 270. 

Homer: 13. 

Human Freedom: 363-392; his- 



4i6 



INDEX 



torical, 369 f . ; theories of : de- 
terminism, 367, 368, 380-387; 
indeterminism, 367 f., 368 f., 
379 f. ; self-determinism, 368 f., 
387-391 ; conditions of, 373 f. ; 
and character, 390 f . ; perfect 
freedom, 391 f. 
Hume: on knowledge, 77, 78, 114, 
148; on substance, 80, 270; on 
perceptions, 137; on reason, 144, 
148; his scepticism, 141. 

Idea: Platonic, 26-30; universal, of 
Plato and Aristotle, 32 f . ; innate 
ideas, 40, 77 f. ; objects embodi- 
ments of, 81 ; Kantian regulative, 
87-89 ; relation of, to subject and 
object, 197-202; def., 201. 

Idealism: def., 46, 81 f., 109; his- 
torical, 82 f . ; absolute, 108; and 
realism compared, 109 f., 120; per- 
sonal, 120. 

Identity: of subject and object, 
105 f . ; in difference, 162, 163 fE., 
222-225. 

Illumination: 44, 62. 

Illusions: 177. 

Impressions: Hume's doctrine, 78, 
80. 

Impulse: 370. 

Indeterminism: 367 ff. ; criticised, 

379 f. 

Individual: and particular, 353; 
perfect, 262 ; is a system, 276, 351 ; 
solitary and social, 355-360; finite, 
not an ultimate, 361 ; see Indi- 
viduality, Individuum, Person. 

Individuality: 259-262, 350-354; 
an individual object, 259 f . ; as 
determined by the subject, 260 f. ; 
by the object, 261 f. ; and per- 
sonality, see Personality. 

Individuum: 259. 

lonians: early, 15, see Milesian; 
later, 15, 16, 17, 266. 

Jacobi : 209. 

Jamblichus : 45. 

James: 209, 369. 

Jewish Philosophy : 44, 57, 208. 

Judgment: 174 f., 219; Aristotle's 



doctrine, 34 fi. ; Kant's, 85 f. ; 
Hegel's, 107 f. ; Raid's, 112. 
Justinian: 45. 

Kant : philosophical motive, 83 f , ; 
compared with Fichte, Schelling, 
Hegel, 95-98, 100, 103-108; his 
philosophy, 83-94; on faith, 91; 
cognition, 84-87, 104, 194-197; 
objectivity of what is known, 
86 f . ; regulative ideas, 87 f . ; 
phenomena and noumena, 89-91 ; 
knowledge and reality, 89, 104 f., 
245 f. ; knowledge and faith, 91, 
204 f . ; the self, 87-91, 270 f . ; 
mechanism and teleology, 91 f . ; 
dualism, 92 f. ; judgment, 85 f., 
212; limitation of knowledge, 105, 
203-205; substance, 270 f . ; cate- 
gories, 103, 112, 236-239, 240, 242; 
summary of doctrines, 93 f . ; 
an intellectualist, 208, 370; a self- 
determinist, 370. 

Kepler: 61. 

Knowledge: not complete, 2, 116, 
143, 147 f., 230-232; validity of, 
see Validity; immediate object, 
67 f., 197-203, 216 fi., 218-222, 
see Object; Sophists' doctrine, 
19 f . ; Democritus, 20, 30; Soc- 
rates, 22 ff . ; Plato, 28, 30 f . ; 
Aristotle, 31, 34-36; Stoics and 
Epicureans, 40 ; Neo-Platonic, 
43 f . ; Augustine, 50 ; Albertus 
Magnus and Aquinas, 57 f. ; Duns 
Scotus and William of Ockham, 
60; Campanella, 61; Descartes, 
Spinoza, and Leibniz, 73 f . ; Locke 
and Hume, 77 f . ; Fichte, 96 f . ; 
Schelling, 100, 104 f. ; Reid, inf.; 
Hamilton, 112 f . ; Mill and 
Spencer, 116 f . ; see Empiricism, 
Hegel, Hume, Kant, Leibniz, 
Validity. 

Leibniz: method, 71; on substance, 
72, 270; monads, 72-74, 75, 270; 
mind and matter, 73 ; knowledge, 
73 f., 19 . ; mechanism and tele- 
ology, 74; pre-established har- 
mony, 75. 



INDEX 



417 



Locke: innate ideas, 77 f. ; cogni- 
tion, 78, 193; reality, 79; pri- 
mary and secondary qualities, 79, 
273; substance, 270; a self- 
determinist, 370. 

Logic: 34 fif., 127. 

Lotze : 208. 

Maimonides: 57. 

Many and One: and reality, 17 f., 
25, 60, 290; and relation, 248, 
252; and individuality, 262, 274f., 
276, 290, 305, 350, 351 f. ; and 
perception, 298, 303, 305. 

Materialism: 40, 46. 

Matter: 16 f., 44, 45, 49, 72, 269 f., 
299; scientific conception, 158. 

Measure: see Quantity. 

Mechanism: 18, 225-228, 369; and 
teleology, 18 f., 45.; with Aris- 
totle, 34; Epicurus, 40; Kant, 
91 f., 204f. ; Substantialists, 74; 
cosnaic, def., 369 ; see Teleology. 

Mediaeval Philosophy: see Re- 
ligious Consciousness; Philos- 
ophy: Patristic, Scholastic, Tran- 
sition. 

Metaphysics: def., 21. 

Milesian: school, 15, 16, 17. 

Mill, J. S. : on mind, 115 f. ; knowl- 
edge, 116; objective reality, 117; 
consciousness, 137; cause, 324, 
330. 

Mind: and matter, 19, 40, 49; Des- 
cartes, 71 f., 73; Spinoza, 73; 
Locke, 79 ; Hume, 80 ; Fichte, 99 ; 
Schelling, 99, 102 ; Hegel, loi f. ; 
and object, 229-233; and experi- 
ence, 188 f., 231 fif. 

Modern Philosophy: see Empiri- 
cism, Idealistic Rationalism, Phi- 
losophy, Realistic Rationalism, 
Substantialists. 

Monad: Bruno's, 61 ; Leibniz', 72 f., 
75, 270. 

Monism: def., 17, 45, 46, 119. 

Monotheism: 38, 397. 

Motion: 314-317. 

Motive: 371 fif. 

Mysticism: def., 44, 60, 62, 209. 

Mystics: 60, 209. 

2E 



Necessity: and Freedom, 93, 95; 

see Human Freedom. 
Neo-Platonists : general view, 43 ; 

anti-Christian, 44; Jewish, 44; 

doctrines, 44-46, 208 f., 268. 
New Realism: no. 
Nicholas of Cusa : 60, 209. 
Nominalism: 52 fif. 
Noumena: 89-91, 92 f.; ^ee Kant. 
Nous: 19, 36, 44- 
Number : see Quantity. 

Object: primary, 19 f., 58, 60, 61, 

67 f., 74, 78, no, in f., 116, 150- 
156, 197-203; see Knowledge, im- 
mediate object; in Kantian sys- 
tem, 84-87, 89, 90 f., 92, 203 f. ; 
Hegel's, 104, 105 f . ; subject and, 
105 f., 188 f., 229-233 ; and individ- 
uality, 259 f., 261 f. ; see Subject. 

Objectivity: 5 f., 86 f., 97. 

Ockham, William of: 60, no, 208, 

369- 
One, the, and the Many : see Many 

and One. 
Ontology: def., 21, 234-362. 
Organic relation : 225-228. 
Origen: 49. 

Pantheism: 51, 54. 

Parallelism : 74 f . 

Parmenides: 17, 19. 

Particular: Plato's doctrine, 27 f. ; 
Aristotle's, 32-34; in Mediaeval 
Philosophy, 51-55, 57, 63 ; Hegel's 
doctrine, 102 f . ; and individual, 
353; ^ee Universal. 

Patristic Philosophy : see Philosophy, 
schools. 

Pearson, Professor Karl: 152-155. 

Perception: Sophists on, 19-21; 
Plato, 27-29; Democritus, 30 i.'. 
Stoics and Epicureans, 40 f. ; 
Locke, 78; Berkeley, 83; Kant, 
84-86, 93; Hegel, 108; and ap- 
pearance, 173-178; and qualities, 
188, 274; and relation, 244; see 
Cognition, Concept, Knowledge. 

Permanence: and change, 16; his- 
torical, 254 f. ; actual, 255 f. ; 
and reality, 256-258; see Change. 



4i8 



INDEX 



Person: Absolute is Person, loi f . ; 
Perfect Individual, 350, 354; Per- 
fect, 361 f ., 402, 405 ; see Absolute, 
Individual, Personality. 

Personality: 106 f., 232, 350 ff. ; a 
development, 232, 376; and char- 
acter, 375 f.; is self-organizing, 
377 f. ; essential qualities, 376, 
377; 5ee Individuality. 

Phenomena : see Appearance, 
Noumena. 

Phenomenalism: def., 141, 150- 
170, 215 f., 246, 270 f. 

Pherecydes: 13. 

Philo: 44. 

Philosophy: def., 4; material, 8-10; 
problem, 6-8, 21, 44, 51 f., 118 £f., 
191 f . ; province, 122-127; and 
theology, see Jewish, Patristic, 
Scholastic, Transition; and psy- 
chology, 3, no f., 113-115, 128- 
131; and science, 124-126; of the 
unconditioned, 113; present-day, 
1 1 8-1 2 1 ; principal divisions, 12 f., 
14, 47 f., 69; poetic period, 13; 
Schools, 14 f. ; Oriental, 12 f . ; 
Greek, 13, 14-46; Jewish, 44, 
57; Patristic, 47-51; Scholastic, 
47, 51-60; Arabian, 56 f. ; Tran- 
sition, 61 f . ; Modern, 68-127. 

Plato: relation to other phil- 
osophers, 25, 54 f . ; estimate of, 
26, 29; doctrine of ideas, 14 f., 
82 f., 266; of reality, 27 f . ; dual- 
ism, 28 f., 30 f.; a pluralist? 29; 
teleology, 29, 33, 38 ; universal 
and particular, 27 f., 32 f., 52; 
an idealist, 83 ; on freedom, 365. 

Plotinus: 44 f., 236. 

Pluralism: def., 17, 40, 46. 

Polytheists: 45. 

Positivists: 398 f. 

Pragmatism: 120, 208, 209. 

Pre-established Harmony : 75. 

Protagoras: 21, 23, 140. 

Psychology: and Philosophy, 3 f., 
77, III, 113 f., 128-130, 190-192; 
Associational, 114, 383; faculty, 
204, 209 ; and Affectionism, 208 f . 

Purpose : and the cognitive process, 
211 f. 



Pyrrho: 140, 143 f. 
Pythagoreans : 17. 

Quality: 278-282; primary and 
secondary, 61, 79, 157 f., 273 f. ; 
reality of, 179 ; and object, 278 f. ; 
and subject, 188, 279 f. ; and rela- 
tions, 281 ; and reality, 186, 279, 
281 f. ; see Substance. 

Quantity: 283-290; number, 283 t. ; 
characteristics of number, 284 f.; 
of measure, 285 f . ; real and idea- 
tional number, 286 f. ; and reality, 
288-290. 

Rationalism: def., 31, 67, 68 f., 70; 
idealistic, see Idealism, Kant, 
Fichte, Schelling; realistic, see 
Realism, Reid, Hamilton. 

Rationality: tri-phasal, loi f., 207- 
214; and experience, 189, 232 f. 

Realism: def., 109; in Scholastic 
Philosophy, 52-54; in the Tran- 
sition Period, 63 f . ; moderate 
Realism, 57, 63 f . ; in Modern 
Philosophy, 65, 109-113, n8, 120; 
and idealism, 120. 

Reality: 17 f., 21, 25, 179-189; 
def., 81 f., 186-188; Plato's doc- 
trine, 27 f . ; Aristotle's, 32, 33 f., 
37,38; in Grasco-Roman Schools, 
39 f . ; in Patristic Philosophy, 49, 
50; Kant on, 89-91; Fichte on, 
96 f . ; Schelling, 98-100 ; Hegel, 
100-102, 104; appearance and, 
217 f., 157-178; this concept 
essential, 166-169; cognition and, 
215-233, see Cognition, Knowl- 
edge; kinds, 179; degrees, 180 f,; 
the universal in experience, 181- 
186, 216 ff. ; nature of, 186-188; 
as object, 188, 232 f . ; as subject, 
189; immaterial, 19, 26, 49; and 
concepts, 218, 222; categories 
and, 238-241 ; relation and, 245 f. ; 
change, permanence and, 256 f. ; 
substantiality and, 275-277 ; qual- 
ity and, 281 f. ; quantity and, 
288 flF. ; space and, 297-300; 
trans-spatial, 298 f . ; time and, 
306, 310; trans-temporal, 308 f., 



INDEX 



419 



310, 334; finality and, 346 ff . ; 
see Appearance. 

Reason: 18 f.; ^ee Anaxagoras ; and 
knowledge, 29 ; authority of, 
doubted, 43 ; and faith, 48 f., 50, 
55, 56, 57 f-, 59, 60, 62; Kant's 
doctrine, 87-91. 

Reid: 110-112. 

Relation: relations in general, 243- 
253; subject-object, 171 f., 188 f., 
200-202, 232 f . ; mechanical and 
organic, 225-228; characteristics, 
243 f. ; mediates thought, 244 f . ; 
and reality, 245 f . ; internality of, 
247-249 ; modifies objects, 249 f., 
ground, 252; conclusions, 252 f. 

Relativity of Knowledge: Hamil- 
ton's doctrine, 112 f . ; Spencer's, 
116 f. 

Religion: see Oriental Philosophy, 
Greek, Neo-Platonic, Patristic, 
Scholastic. 

Religious Consciousness: 12 f., 14; 
in Mediaeval Philosophy, 47-49, 
51, 56-58, 59, 63 ; characteristics, 
394-399; evaluated, 399-405. 

Representationism : Reid's criti- 
cism, 112, 118. 

Rest: 313 f- 

Revelation: 43 f., 48, 49, 56. 

Roscellin: 54. 

Scepticism: 140-149; 20, 40 f. ; 
Hume, 78, 80, 144, 148; grounds 
of doubt, 141-144; examined, 
144-149. 

Schelling: problem, 98 f. ; matter 
and mind, 99 ; Absolute, 99 f ., 102 ; 
knowledge and reality, 100; ideal- 
ism, 100. 

Scholastic Philosophy: 51 ff. ; see 
Philosophy. 

Schools : see Philosophy. 

Science: historical, 47, 51, 57, 59, 
61, 122; province, 123-126; 
classification, 126 f. ; conception 
of reality, 187. 

Scottish Philosophy : 110-115. 

Self : and the world, 1-6 ; solitary 
and social, see Sociality; super- 
conscious, see Kant's doctrine ; 



empirical, see Kant's doctrine; 

not phenomenal, 169 f . ; unitary, 
170, 204, 207-214; Kant's doc- 
trine, 86 f ., 90 f., 92, 97, 203 f. ; 
Fichte's, 95-98 ; Hegel's, 106 f . ; 
and reality, 169 f., 180; and 
experience, 227 f. 
Self-consciousness: 90, 93, 96 f., 

106 f. ; and experience, 227 f. 
Self-determinism: 352 f., 368 f., 
369 f., 387-391 ; highest form of 
activity, 345 f. 
Sensation : 65 ff., 190 f . ; and knowl- 
edge: Sophists' view, 19 f . ; 
Stoic and Epicurean, 40; Em- 
pirical, 78, 114, 115 f. ; Kantian, 
84 f., 203. 
Sensationalism: def., 19, 31, 46, 118. 
Sensibility: 85, 87. 
Separation, Period of: 59; see 

Scholastic Philosophy. 
Sociality: 355-362; the social self, 
355 f. ; is real, 356-358; and 
development of the individual, 
359 f. ; ultimate ground of society, 
361. 
Socrates: purpose, 22; contrasted 
with Sophists, 22 f . ; method, 
23 f. ; and the concept, 24 f., 
26 f.; teleology, 37 f. 
Socratic Philosophy: and knowing, 
46, 42 ; philosophers, 46 ; on 
cognition, 65-67 ; see Aristotle, 
Plato, Socrates. 
Solipsism: 150-156; doctrine, 

150 f . ; Pearson's view, 152 f . ; 
arguments examined, 153 ff . ; 
conclusions, 155 f., 215. 
Sophists: 15, 16, 19 f., 22 f., 140, 

181. 
Soul: 36, 44, 91, 93- 
Space: 291-300; Kant's view, 85, 
236 f.; perceptual, 291-293; con- 
ceptual, 294-296 ; conceptual and 
perceptual compared, 299 f . ; 
is space infinite? 296 f . ; and 
reality, 297 f. ; non-spatial, or 
trans-spatial, reality, 298 f. 
Spencer: 115; on mind, 115 f. ; 
knowledge, 116 f. ; objective 
reality, 117. 



420 



INDEX 



Spinoza: 71, 74 f . ; method, 71; 
mind and matter, 72, 73, 74 f., 
269; knowledge, 74; necessity 
and freedom, 95 ; parellelism, 
74 f.; substance, 77; an idealist, 

83. 

Stoics: 39, 40-42, 46, 58, 236, 36s, 
369, 370. 

Subject: 4, 12, 15, 19, 42, 65; sub- 
jective, 5 f ., 15, 42 ; and object, 84, 
86 f., 105 f., 171 f., 188 f., 198-202, 
203 f., 229 f . ; and experience, 
134-136, 137 f., 184-186; see 
Object, Self. 

Subjectivism: 118, 150-156, 197 f., 
198, 203 f., 215; criticised, 154- 
156, 94. 

Substance: 16-18, 70, 71-73, 79; 
historical review, 265-271; and 
substrate, 79, 271-273; and qual- 
ity, 273-275. 

Substantialists : 70-75, 208, 365. 

Substantiality: 263-277; origin, 
263-265; and reality, 275-277; 
see Substance. 

Syllogism : Aristotle's doctrine, 34 £f . 

Teleology: def., 37; in Pre-Socratic 
Philosophy, 18 f . ; of Plato, 29 f. ; 
Anaxagoras, 33 ; Aristotle, 33 ; 
Socratic Period, 37 f . ; Stoics, 
41; Leibniz, 74; Kant, 91 f . ; 
Fichte, 98; Hegel, 108; see 
Finality. 

Thales: 16. 

Theology: see Religious Conscious- 
ness in Mediaeval Philosophy. 

Thought: loi f., 165 f., 209-214; 
and concepts, 218-222; and cate- 
gories, 238, 240 f., 242 ; and rela- 
tion, 244 f. ; see Judgment. 

Time: 301-310; Kant's view, 85, 
86, 236-238; perceptual, 301-303; 
"specious present," 302 f . ; con- 
ceptual, 303-305 ; is time in- 
finitely divisible? 305 f . ; and 
reality, 306 ; non-temporal or 
trans-temporal reality, 307-308; 
conclusions, 309 f. 

Transition Period: 61 f.; see Phi- 
losophy. 



Trans-spatial : see Space. 

Trans-temporal : see Time. 

Truth: orders of, Aquinas, 58; 
Duns Scotus and William of 
Ockham, 60; self-evident, 35 f . ; 
probable, 40 f., 78; and incom- 
plete knowledge, 147 f . ; see 
Criteria, Validity. 

Ultimate Reality : Pre-Socratic, 
16 f . ; Plato, 25; Stoics and Epi- 
cureans, 40; Substantialists, 70- 
72 ; the world-ground, 334 f., 337, 
354, 362, 405. 

Unit: of thought, 35, 37, 107 f., 
112, 247 f . ; def., 315, 316; see 
Many and One. 

Unity : see Many and One. 

Universal: and particular, 32 f., 
51 f., 54 f., 57, 63 f. ; Ego, 97 f. ; 
the true universal, 102-104, 353 f- \ 
experience and, 181-186, 216-218; 
see Concept, Hegel, Particular. 

Universe: intelligible, 146, 230, 
245 f. 

Validity of Knowledge: historical, 
19 f., 25, 34-36, 40 f-j 71, 73 f-, 78, 

87, 104, 113; an inevitable 
assumption, 147 f., 149, 155 f., 
169 f., 178, 206, 229, 233. 

Value: judgments of, 134, 212 f., 

368, 371, 379, 391, 392. 
Victorines : 209. 
Volition: 59, 119, 133 f., 208, 209- 

214; see Human Freedom. 
Voluntarism: def., 46, 208, 369. 

Will : see Human Freedom, Volition. 

World: and ourselves, 1-4, 6-10; 
-substance, 16-18; two worlds, 
201 f . ; of Plato, 28 ff . ; of Kant, 

88, 92 f. ; Schelling's conception, 
99; intelligible, 145 f., 229 ff., 
245 f . ; a systematic whole, 344 ; 
see Universe. 

Xenophanes: 17. 

Zeno: 314-316. 



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